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Series of ^obern pbilosopbers. 

Edited by E. Hershey Sjieatli, Ph.D. 



DESCARTES by Prof. H. A. P. TORREY of the 

University of Vermont.* 
SPINOZA by Prof. GEO. S. FULLERTON of the 

University of Pennsylvania.* 
LOCKE by Prof. JOHN E. RUSSELL of Williams 

College.* 

V HUME by Prof. H. AUSTIN AIKINS of Trinity 

College, N. C* 
REID by E. HERSHEY SNEATH of Yale Uni- 
versity.* 

Y KANT by Prof. JOHN WATSON of Queen's 

University, Canada.* 
HEGEL by Prof. JOSIAH ROYCE of Harvard 
University. 

* Those marked with an asterisk are ready. 



HENRY HOLT & CO., Publishers, 

NEW YORK. 



Bevies ot f^o^cvn pbilosopbers 

"^ - — Edited by E. Hejshey Sneath, Ph. D. 

THE /' 

Philosophy of Spinoza 

AS CONTAINED IN THE 

FIRST, SECOND, AND FIFTH PARTS OF THE 

"ETHICS," AND IN EXTRACTS FROM 

THE THIRD AND FOURTH 



TRANSLA TED FROM THE LA TIN, AND EDITED 
WITH NOTES 



BY 

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON 

Professor of Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania 



SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED 

■' 0? CO 



• 19 189A 




Jf^^/J-^'^ 



/ 






NEW YORK 

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY 

1894 




Copyright, i8 



HENRY HOLT & CO. 



THK MERSHON COMPANY PRESS, 
KAHVVAY, N. J, 



PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. 

As it is the purpose of this little volume to set forth 
the philosophical system of Spinoza in the philoso- 
pher's own words, and not merely to prepare a book 
of disconnected extracts from his writings, I have fol- 
lowed a plan which may seem somewhat unusual in 
works of this kind. 

The philosophy of Spinoza is contained in its final 
form in the " Ethics." By translating in full the first, 
second, and fifth parts of the "Ethics," giving the 
author's prefaces to, and summaries of, the third and 
fourth parts, and supplying in foot-notes passages in 
the omitted portions to which reference is made, I 
have found it possible to give a just idea of the doc- 
trine contained in the " Ethics," while reducing the 
work by about one-half, and bringing it within the 
limits demanded by this Series. That it is not easy 
to cut into a work constructed as is this one, anyone 
may readily satisfy himself by examination. I think, 
liowever, I have omitted nothing essential to a com- 
prehension of Spinoza's metaphysical system, and have 
preserved intact his chain of argument. 

Lack of space has made any extended criticism of 
his reasoning out of the question. A very brief exam- 
ination of some of the cardinal points in his system I 
have thought it desirable to insert in the form of notes. 
These are referred to by number in the text, and will 
be found in the back of the book. 



IV PREFACE. 

In making the translation I have used the excellent 
Latin text of Van Vloten and Land, which appears to 
be remarkably free from errors of any sort, and have 
endeavored first of all to be exact and to avoid para- 
phrases. This has sometimes resulted in a sacrifice of 
grace, but it is, of course, worth the sacrifice. 

I take this opportunity of thanking my colleague 
and former pupil, Dr. Wm. Romaine Nevvbold, for a 
number of suggestions which have materially improved 
my translation. 

GEORGE STUART FULLERTON. 

University of Pennsylvania, 

October, 1 89 1. 



PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

This second edition is so different from the first 
that it may ahnost be regarded as a new book. The 
general plan is retained, but the translation has been 
freely altered throughout, and in Part III. proposi- 
tions I to II have been added. Some of the intro- 
ductory matter is new, and the critical and explana- 
tory notes have been greatly multiplied. I have 
discussed at length in a prefatory note the nature of 
Spinoza's reasoning and the foundations upon which 
it rests ; and I beg the reader to examine this care- 
fully before proceeding to a study of the text. It has 
been my experience that, even to intelligent students, 
the argument of the " Ethics " presents serious diffi- 
culties. In my notes I have taken great pains to 
make the author's meaning plain, and have not 
hesitated, with this end in view, to repeat the same 
thought in different places, when, in the interests of 
clearness, it has seemed wise to do so. I have, of 
course, been somewhat hampered by the necessity of 
keeping the size of the volume within reasonable 
limits. 

Explanations and excuses are always rather stupid, 
but it may not be wholly amiss for me to state here 
that, when the first edition was printed, an uncor- 
rected copy of the translation of Part I. was sent, 
through a misunderstanding, to the printer. As the 



VI PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. 

proofs were corrected for me by a friend, while I was 
suffering from a serious illness, the fact was not dis- 
covered until after the publication of the book. It, 
hence, contains some errors from which the present 
edition is free. 

George Stuart Fullerton, 
June, 1894. 



CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

Bibliography i 

Biographical Sketch 5 

Sources of Spinoza's Philosophy ' ii 

Brief Exposition of Spinoza's System. — Spinoza's 

Influence upon Subsequent Thinking 13 

The Ethics : 

Part I. Of God 25 

Part II. Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind 74 

Part III. Of the Origin and Nature of the Emotions 132 
Part IV. Of Human Bondage, or of the Strength of 

the Emotions 153 

Part V. Of the Power of the Understanding, or of 

Human Freedom 171 

Critical and Explanatory Notes 209 

Introductory Note : I. Spinoza's Epistemology : 

1. Ideas and Things 210 

2. Parallelism of Ideas and Things 211 

3. The Test of Truth 213 

4. The Concatenation of Ideas 214 

5. Mind and Body 215 

6. Summary 216 

Introductory Note : II. Spinoza's Realism the Key to 
the Reasonings Contained in the " Ethics ": 

7. The System of Ideas 217 

8. Spinoza's Realism. . . . 219 



Vin CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

9. The Concept 225 

10. Concepts made Causes 233 

11. Concepts, though Causes, yet Universals 235 

12. The Word " Involved " 239 

13. Essence 244 

14. Deduction of Ideas from the Idea of God 252 

15. The Dual Causality of the " Ethics" 254 

16. The Eternity of Essences 255 

17. Summary 258 

Notes to Part I 262 

Notes to Part II 283 

Note on the Mind and its Knowledge 317 

Notes to Part III 325 

Notes to Part IV 330 

Notes to Part V 335 

Index 355 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

It would not be profitable to attempt, in a work of 
this sort, anything like a complete bibliography of 
Spinozistic literature. Such a bibliography would be 
very extensive, and of little value to most of those 
who will use this book. I shall, consequently, merely 
indicate, for the sake of the few who may wish such 
information, where it may be looked for, and shall 
then confine myself to mentioning a limited number 
of books readily obtainable, which the student will 
find of service in gaining a good knowledge of the 
life and philosophy of Spinoza. A list of Spinoza's 
works will be found in the Biographical Sketch fol- 
lowing this Bibliography. 

In 187 1 Dr. A. van der Linde published at The 
Hague a full and excellent catalogue of the Spino- 
zistic literature, under the title " Benedictus Spinoza : 
Bibliografie." This brings the bibliography down to 
1871. The introductory chapter to Sir Frederick 
Pollock's volume on Spinoza (to be mentioned later) 
supplements this, and brings us to 1880. What has 
appeared since, those interested in the subject will 
not find it difificult to trace. 

The last edition of the complete works of Spinoza, 
and one which should be on the shelf of every care- 
ful student of his philosophy, is that of Van Vloten 
and Land (2 vols., The Hague, 1882-83). It is 
attractive in typography, and very free from errors of 



2 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

any sort. This edition has been used in the transla- 
tion of these selections. 

The German reader will doubtless find it helpful to 
sometimes compare with the Latin Auerbach's transla- 
tion (" Spinoza's Sammtliche Werke," 2 vols., Stutt- 
gart, 187 1). Auerbach follows the Latin very closely 
— more closely, indeed, than an English writer would 
dare to. Where a passage admits of more than one 
meaning he seems to use excellent judgment in making 
a selection. Readers of French may use in the same 
way Saisset's translation of Spinoza's principal works 
(3 vols., Paris, 1872). It is not, however, as close as 
Auerbach's. 

There is no complete English translation of the 
works of Spinoza. A translation of his most impor- 
tant works, by R. H. M. Elwes, appeared in 1883-84 
(2 vols., London, Bohn's Philos. Lib.). This contains 
the "Theologico-Political Treatise," the "Political 
Treatise," the unfinished work on the " Improvement 
of the Understanding," the " Ethics," and an abridg- 
ment of Spinoza's Correspondence. The translation 
of the " Ethics " I have compared pretty carefully with 
the original, and have found it careful, generally quite 
close, and graceful. The translator has used Bruder's 
text (1843), which is now superseded by the text of 
Van Vloten and Land, With Elwes's rendering of 
some passages I do not agree, as is, of course, to be 
expected ; but I can recommend his translation, and 
the student would do well to secure these volumes. 
There are several other translations of the"Ethics,"the 
best of which is that by William Hale White (London, 
1890, second edition, by Mr. White and Amelia 
Hutchinson Stirling, 1894). This seems to be accu- 
rate, but is not as readable as the translation just men- 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 3 

tioned. Another translation, which is, however, quite 
inferior to those by Elwes and White, was made by 
Professor Henry Smith of Lane Theological Seminary 
(Cincinnati, 1886). It is preceded by a lengthy criti- 
cism of Spinozism, and especially of its significance 
for theology. An anonymous translation, which ap- 
peared before any of these (New York, 1876), is not 
reliable. 

The expository and critical volumes on Spinoza by 
Sir Frederick Pollock (" Spinoza : His Life and Phi- 
losophy," London, 1880), Dr. James Martineau ("A 
Study of Spinoza," London, 1883), and Dr. John 
Caird (" Spinoza," Edinburgh, 1888), will be found 
helpful to a comprehension of his system. They are 
written from different points of view, and will serve to 
supplement each other. Pollock lays especial stress 
on the scientific side of Spinoza's thought, and em- 
phasizes the harmony of some of his doctrines with 
the conceptions of modern science. His book is full 
of valuable information communicated in a very clear 
and straightforward way. His admiration for the 
philosopher, however, makes him, in my judgment, a 
little blind to his errors in reasoning, and inclined to 
pass lightly over that aspect of his philosophy which 
finds its explanation in his Jewish birth and training. 
Dr. Martineau gives more attention to Spinoza's meta- 
physics, and his criticisms will be found acute and 
suggestive. Dr. Caird writes from what one may call 
the Neo-Hegelian point of view, and is most in sym- 
pathy with what Pollock is inclined to explain away. 
If one is unable to procure all three of these books, 
and has to choose a single one, he would better take 
the volume by Dr. Martineau. 

For most of our information concerning the life of 



4 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Spinoza we are indebted to Colerus. An old English 
version of Colerus' account is reprinted by Pollock 
{pp. at., Appendix A.). It gives a vivid picture of the 
man and his surroundings. Both Pollock and Mar- 
tineau (especially the latter) devote a good deal of 
space to Spinoza's life. In connection with the above 
it would be well to read four essays on Spinoza by 
Land, Kuno Fischer, Van Vloten, and Renan, which 
have been edited in an English dress by Professor 
Knight of St. Andrews (London and Edinburgli, 
1882). The German reader will enjoy Auerbach's 
historical romance (" Spinoza, Ein Denkerleben," 
Stuttgart, 1880. A translation by Charles T. Brooks, 
New York, 1882), which is excellent. 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 

Baruch de Spinoza was born at Amsterdam, No- 
vember 24, 1632. He was the son of Spanish or Portu- 
guese Jews who had taken refuge in the Netherlands 
from the cruel persecutions directed against their race 
in the Peninsula. His early education, which was 
entirely Jewish, was probably largely confined to the 
study of the Hebrew language and literature, in which, 
at the age of fifteen, he was regarded as a very prom- 
ising scholar. Latin he learned from the free-thinking 
physician Francis van den Ende, from whom also he 
may have gotten his knowledge of German, his initi- 
ation into the sciences, and an introduction to the 
works of Giordano Bruno and Descartes. He was 
acquainted with Spanish and Portuguese, as these lan- 
guages were spoken in the Jevvish colony to which he 
belonged, and one of them was his mother tongue. 
Italian he learned, probably, from his teacher, the 
Rabbi Morteira, who was a Venetian. Dutch he 
never used with fluency, although he spent his life in 
Holland. 

His studies and the reflections to which they gave 
rise produced in him a gradual separation from the 
faith of his fathers. In 1656 it was deemed necessary 
by the rulers of the synagogue at Amsterdam to take 
steps to remove the scandal occasioned by his hereti- 
cal opinions and his lax observance of the ceremonial 
law. He was offered an annuity of 1000 florins on 
condition of an outward conformity. This being 

s 



6 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 

refused, he was excommunicated for thirty days. 
During this period, as he was one evening leaving the 
Portuguese synagogue, he was set upon by an unknown 
man armed with a dagger, who, however, succeeded 
only in piercing his coat. After this event he removed 
from Amsterdam to tlie house of a friend — himself a 
heretic, as he belonged to the sect of the CoUegiants — 
two or three miles from the city, on the Ouwerkerk 
road. On the 27th of July, 1656, he was formally 
excommunicated, and cut off from his people. This 
was the occasion of his substituting for his Hebrew 
name Baruch, its Latin equivalent Benedict. 

Spinoza had learned the art of making lenses for 
optical instruments, and he now supported himself by 
it. He acquired a reputation as an optician, and was 
consulted in this capacity by Leibnitz and Huygens. 
About the beginning of the year 1661 he moved with 
his Collegiant friend to Rijnsburg, near Leyden. 
Three years later he moved again to Voorburg, a 
suburb of The Hague, where he spent six years. In 
1670 he took up his residence in The Hague, and there 
lived until his death, which occurred on February 
21, 1677. 

Spinoza lived much alone — in part, probably, from 
choice, but also in part from necessity. His separa- 
tion from his kindred was complete after his excom- 
munication. On the death of his father, his two sisters 
made an effort to deprive him of his share of the 
inheritance, on the ground that he was a heretic and 
cut off from Israel. An appeal to the civil power 
established his right, but he afterward voluntarily 
resigned to his sister^ all that came to him except one 
bed. As he never joined any Christian sect, his com- 
panionship with Christians was necessarily not of the 



^ 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 7 

closest, and his opinions, which he took no great pains 
to conceal, inspired with horror many who would have 
been drawn to him by the beauty of his life. Yet he 
had a limited number of enthusiastic disciples who 
studied his manuscript works with ardor, and addressed 
him as master. Reacquired the friendship of persons 
high in position, notably of the De Witt brothers, and of 
a number of scholars who addressed to him letters on 
scientific and philosophical subjects. Not the least 
interesting part of his writings is this correspondence, 
which throws light on several important points in his 
philosophy. At the time of the French invasion of 
the Netherlands in 1672, he was sent for by the Prince 
of Conde, who wished to make his acquaintance. On 
his arrival at the camp he found the Prince absent, 
but was informed that he could probably obtain a 
pension from Louis XIV. by dedicating some work to 
that monarch. This offer he refused. 

Occupied with his philosophical studies and cor- 
respondence, and with his manual labor, Spinoza led a 
quiet and laborious life, sometimes remaining in his 
apartments for days together. His simple recreations 
were smoking an occasional pipe of tobacco and con- 
versing on ordinary matters with the people of the 
house, watching the habits and quarrels of spiders, 
working with a microscope, and making sketches of 
his friends with ink or charcoal, in which last exercise 
he appears to have had some skill. A book of such 
sketches was in existence after his death. 

The character of Spinoza was singularly pure and 
beautiful. With a single-minded devotion to truth, 
and a willingness to suffer martyrdom for his con- 
victions, he combined an earnest desire for a tranquil 
and quiet life, and a catholicity of sympathy which 



8 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 

manifested itself in a generous tolerance. Though he 
had suffered for his opinions at the hands of both Jew 
and Christian, toward neither does he show any trace 
of bitterness or spite. The material goods valued by 
the multitude — money, position, reputation — he re- 
garded with the indifference of the Stoic sage. A gift 
of 2000 florins from Simon de Vries, a disciple and 
admirer, was refused ; and when, later, De Vries wished 
to make the philosopher his heir, Spinoza dissuaded 
him from the act, saying that the money ought to pass 
to tlie natural heir, a brother of De Vries. The estate 
was so disposed of, but with the proviso that a pension 
be paid to Spinoza during his lifetime. The heir 
having fixed this pension at 500 florins, Spinoza 
declared the sum excessive, and refused to accept 
more than 300. When the Elector Palatine Charles 
Lewis offered him the chair of Philosophy at Heidel- 
berg, it was declined on the ground that the duties 
attached to it might interfere with philosophical re- 
search, that liberty of thought and expression might 
be restricted, and that he preferred the quiet of private 
life to the honor of the position tendered him. The 
picture of this private life left us by Colerus, the 
Lutheran minister who afterward occupied apartments 
Spinoza had lived in at The Hague, shows it to have 
been simple and frugal in the extreme. A number of 
sensational stories concerning his death-bed were cir- 
culated soon after his death. They are all denied by 
Colerus. For years Spinoza had suffered from con- 
sumption, but his death was sudden and unexpected. 
On the morning of the day in which he died, he came 
down and conversed with the people of the house. In 
the afternoon he passed away while alone with his 
friend and physician Lewis Meyer. There is every 



BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 9 

reason to believe that his death was as quiet and 
peaceful as his Hfe. His estate scarcely more than 
sufficed to pay his debts and the expenses of his 
funeral. 

The only bit of romance his biographers have con- 
nected with his life must be received with hesitation. 
The story goes that Van den Ende, under whom, as 
has been said, Spinoza acquired the Latin, was assisted 
in his teaching by his daughter Clara, a young woman 
of learning and intelligence. Spinoza became her lover, 
but was defeated by a more fortunate rival named Ker- 
kering, who was his fellow-pupil, and whose addresses 
were made irresistible by the gift of a valuable neck- 
lace. It is true that Van den Ende's daughter Clara 
married a man named Kerkkrinck, but the marriage 
took place in 167 1, and the bride was then only twen- 
ty-seven years old. She could not, consequently, have 
been more than twelve when Spinoza left Amsterdam. 
Besides this, the reputed rival was seven years younger 
than Spinoza, and it is not likely that they both stud- 
ied under Van den Ende at an age in which rivalry 
could arise betw^een them. It is, however, possible 
that Spinoza kept up his visits to the house of his 
former teacher after he took up his residence out of 
the city, and we have in this possibility a straw for 
those to cling to who wish to believe in the story of 
his love. Yet there is little in the life or writings of 
the philosopher to indicate that he was susceptible to 
a romantic passion. He lived in a world of the intel- 
lect and not of the emotions. 

Only two of Spinoza's works were published during 
his lifetime. The first was a summary of the first 
and second parts, and a portion of the third part, of 
Descartes' " Principles of Philosophy," arranged in 



lO BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH. 

the form of mathematical demonstration. This ap- 
peared at Amsterdam in 1663. In 1670 he put forth 
anonymously the " Tractatus Theologico-Politicus," 
which is an attempt to prove not only that freedom of 
thought and speech may be granted without danger to 
piety and the peace of the commonwealth, but also 
that such freedom cannot be denied without danger 
to both. To prove his point he enters into an exhaust- 
ive examination of the nature of prophecy, the author- 
ity of the Biblical writers, the principles of interpreta- 
tion, and the relation of theology to philosophy, all of 
which subjects he handles with the utmost freedom 
and boldness. His methods are those of the modern 
school of historical criticism, and it Avas but natural 
that both methods and results should give offense. 
Especially offensive was his Erastian doctrine of the 
supremacy of the state in matters ecclesiastical. The 
book was speedily condemned by the Reformed 
churches and put on the Index of the Church of 
Rome. 

Spinoza had arranged that after his death the desk 
containing his letters and unpublished manuscripts 
should be carried to Jan Rieuvvertz, a publisher at 
Amsterdam. This was done, and in the same year 
(1677) appeared the " Opera Posthuma," which con- 
tained the " Ethics," the " Tractatus Politicus," the 
unfinished "Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione," 
a selection of the letters written to Spinoza by various 
scholars, and his answers to them, and a " Compen- 
dium of Hebrew Grammar." In 1687 was printed at 
The Hague Spinoza's brief " Treatise on the Rainbow," 
which for years was supposed to have perished, but 
was discovered and reprinted in 1862 by Dr. J. van 
Vloten in a supplement to an edition of Spinoza's 



SOURCES OF SPINOZA S PHILOSOPHY. II 

works. In the same supplement appeared for the first 
time the early essay entitled, " A Short Treatise on 
God, and on Man and his Blessedness." A few letters 
not contained in the collection of the " Opera Pos- 
thuma" have since been published. 



SOURCES OF SPINOZA'S PHILOSOPHY. 

The reader of Spinoza is struck by the fact that one 
finds in his philosophy, curiously blended with one 
another, two widely different elements. He is, on the 
one hand, a mediaeval realist, a mystic, dwelling in a 
world which seems to the modern thinker strange and 
unreal. On the other hand he is a scientific thinker 
who has anticipated with remarkable acuteness some 
of the most important conceptions of later scientific 
thought. The mind of a philosopher is not a mere 
aggregation of independent elements easily separated 
and traced to different sources ; but if we venture to 
make the distinction between Spinoza the scientific 
thinker and Spinoza the religious philosopher, we may 
regard the former as the child of Descartes and the 
latter as the descendant of the mediceval Jewish phi- 
losophers, who held to an Aristotelianism colored by 
Neo-Platonic. conceptions. 

Born a Jew, and early impregnated with the Jewish 
literature and philosophy, it is scarcely conceivable that 
Spinoza should have escaped the influence of the semi- 
Oriental character of the leading scholars of his race. 
Although but one direct reference to the Kabbala 
occurs in his writings, and that one is contemptuous 
in tone, it is sufficiently evident that the Neo-Platonic 
conceptions at the root of the Jewish philosophy have 



12 SOURCES OF SPINOZA S PHILOSOPHY. 

contributed much to the form and spirit of his doc- 
trine. That Spinoza was familiar with the works of 
the Jewish philosophers we know. It is, furthermore, 
very probable that he was influenced by the writings 
of Giordano Bruno, the mystic and pantheist. In 
these facts we have enough to account for the pres- 
ence of one element in his philosophy ; and that an 
element so important, as the reader will see, that the 
reasonings of the "Ethics" cannot be made intelligi- 
ble unless its presence be constantly recognized. 

That Spinoza owes much to Descartes, I have just 
said. He was, perhaps, at no time a Cartesian ; but 
it is easy to find in Descartes' "Meditations" and 
" Principles of Philosophy " passages which appear to 
belong more properly to the later system, and which, 
more fully developed, might have resulted in some of 
its leading ideas. Nevertheless, the notion that the 
philosophy of Spinoza is simply the logical outcome 
of the philosophy of Descartes, and only brings to 
light what was implicit in the latter, cannot justly be 
held. It leaves out of view a very important element 
in the Spinozistic philosophy. The fusion of the two 
elements and the resulting system of doctrine was, of 
course, due to the genius of Spinoza himself. 



BRIEF EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA'S SYSTEM. 
SPINOZA'S INFLUENCE UPON SUBSEQUENT 
THINKING. 

■ Influenced by the conceptions at the root of the 
medieval Jewish philosophy, Spinoza transformed 
the Cartesian doctrine of two independent substances, 
mind and matter, into a pantheistic doctrine which 
recognizes but one substance, God, of which thought 
and extension are mere manifestations. 

Substance is defined as that which is in itself, and 
is conceived through itself. Only one substance can 
exist, and this must be infinite, and self-caused. It is 
the real cause of all that exists, and, indeed, is all that 
exists, for all things are but manifestations of the one 
substance, which unfolds itself in manifold forms 
through an inner necessity of its nature. This sub- 
stance is God, a being not outside of the world and 
acting upon it as men exercise their activity upon 
external things, but an immanent cause, the very 
being of whatever is. 

Attribute is defined as that which the understanding 
perceives as constituting the essence of substance. 
Substance consists of an infinite number of infinite 
attributes, only two of which can be known by us. 
These two are thought and extension. Each attribute 
expresses, though in a different way, the essence of 
the one substance. Hence different attributes, while 
they are conceived as distinct, are not really different 
entities, independent substances, but the one thing 



14 EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 

viewed under different aspects. God is, therefore, a 
thinking being in so far as he is contemplated under 
the attribute of thought, and he is extended in so far 
as he is contemphited under the attribute of extension. 
The same may be said in the case of all the other 
attributes to us unknown. Between different attri- 
butes there cannot be any interaction. The spiritual 
cannot act upon the material, nor the material upon 
the spiritual. As aspects of the same thing they are 
absolutely parallel and perfectly correspond, but they 
can exercise upon each other no influence. Only 
body can act upon body, and thought upon thought. 

Modes are individual things. The modes of the 
attribute thought are ideas. Those of the attribute 
extension are material things, or bodies. As it is the 
one substance that is revealed under the two attributes 
thought and extension, a body and the idea of that 
body are one and the same thing expressed in two 
ways. The order and connection of things is, there- 
fore, identical with the order and connection of ideas. 
For every mode in the attribute of extension there is 
a corresponding mode in the attribute of thought, and 
in each of the other attributes. All the modes in 
each attribute are causally connected with each other, 
and form an endless chain of causes and effects. 

The human body is a mode in the attribute exten- 
sion, and the human mind, which is composed of ideas, 
is the corresponding mode in the attribute thought. 
Consequently, the mind cannot act upon the bod}', 
nor the body upon the mind. All the actions of the 
body must be explained by material causes, and all 
changes in ideas by reference to other ideas. Both 
physical and mental changes follow unvarying laws, 
and there is no possibility of freedom, in the common 



EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 15 

acceptation of the word. " Nothing in the universe 
is contingent, but all things are determined by the 
necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a 
definite manner." When men, therefore, believe 
themselves possessed of free will, it is because they 
are conscious that they will and desire, but are igno- 
rant of the causes which have impelled them to do so. 

Every one of man's actions is, hence, to be regarded 
as a link in an infinite chain of causes and effects. 
Each idea may be traced back along the ideal series, 
and each physical fact along the series of physical 
facts. Neither series has a beginning, and, as per- 
fectly parallel, they can by no possibility come together. 
Man is, in modern phrase, a physical automaton with 
parallel mental states. 

Man necessarily seeks what he deems to be useful 
to him, and that alone is useful which preserves and 
exalts his being. The terms "good" and "evil" 
indicate nothing really in things regarded as they are 
in themselves : by " good " we mean what we know 
to be useful to us, and by evil what we know to 
be a hindrance to us in the pursuit of any good. Vir- 
tue is power, the power of furthering one's being, 
and self-preservation is the supreme law. As, how- 
ever, man is but a part of nature, and his power is 
inferior to that of other things, he cannot indefinitely 
preserve his being, but must ultimately go to the wall. 
In so far as he is acted upon by external things, he is 
in a state of passivity, or is subject to the passions, 
which are natural phenomena, belonging to the -fixed 
order of nature, and may be studied as one studies 
the geometrical properties of bodies. 

This doctrine of human bondage to the order of 
natural causes would seem to cut off completely the 



i6 EXPOSITION OF Spinoza's system. 

possibility of any sort of freedom in human action, 
and yet it is the teaching of the " Ethics " that man 
may hberate himself from this dependence upon 
external causes, cease to be "a part of nature," and 
become free. Such freedom is the goal that he is to 
set before him, and in its attainment consists his 
blessedness. To understand Spinoza's deliverances 
on the freedom of man, one must examine his con- 
ception of the relation of substance to its modes, and 
his doctrine of essences. 

It has been said above that substance is the cause 
of all things that exist, and that it is, at the same 
time, their very being. How can these two state- 
ments be reconciled? A cause is something numeri- 
cally distinct from its effect, and how can it be its 
very being ? 

The careful reader of the " Ethics " will discover 
that Spinoza has three distinct conceptions of God or 
substance, and that he passes from one to another in 
a very confusing way. I discuss all this at length in 
my notes, and shall not dwell upon the subject here, 
but it will suffice to state that sometimes he conceives 
the relation of substance to its modes as that of cause 
to effect, sometimes as that of a whole to its parts, 
and sometimes as that of a universal to the individ- 
uals subsumed under it. It is the last conception 
that it is important for us to consider in this con- 
nection. 

The problem of the universal and its relation to the 
individual was the common heritage of Christian, 
Jew, and Arab in the Middle Ages. It absorbed the 
attention of speculative minds to a degree that seems 
to us surprising, unless we bear in mind the conclu- 
sions drawn from the solution given it, and their 



EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 1 7 

significance for the whole philosophical system of the 
thinkers of the time. To the extreme Realist, class 
names were not mere words, or conveniences for clas- 
sification. They stood for things — not individual 
things, but things in a higher sense, things upon 
which individual things depend, and to which they 
owe the fact that they are what they are. But class 
names may indicate broader or narrower classes, and 
we may arrange them in a series as higher or lower ; 
regarding as the highest that which indicates the 
broadest class, and as the lower those which, by the 
addition of differences, come to indicate smaller and 
smaller classes down to the smallest class possible. If 
class names indicate things, we have here a series 
of things, which are yet not individual things, but 
essences, things of a different order, and which stand 
to each other in the relation of higher and lower. 
Now, if the individuals depend upon the species, it is 
but reasonable to suppose that the species depend in 
the same way upon the genus which embraces them. 
If individual men are what they are by virtue of 
their " manhood," it seems but reasonable to say that 
"rational animal " and "irrational animal" stand in 
a like relation to "animal." We have thus a hier- 
archy of universals, a --world of essences, which are 
things, though not individual things, and which are so 
related to each other that the lower depend upon the 
higher, and may be called, in a certain sense, their 
effects. At the top of the series stands the highest 
universal, which is ultimate cause, and at the bottom 
we find individual things, which do not, indeed, 
belong to the world of essences, but which are related 
to essences as each lower essence is related to the one 
above it. 



lO EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 

Thus are universals turned by the Realist into 
things, and these things made real causes. It should 
be noted, however, that they are causes of a peculiar 
kind. They are not separate from their effects and 
beside them, but they are, so to speak, within them. 
The essence "man," for example, is in each individual 
man; and if "man" is to be defined as a rational 
animal, the higher essence "animal " is in the lower 
essence "man." Essences are, then, immanent causes, 
and an individual which is determined to any action 
by its essence is not determined by an external thing, 
but may be said to determine itself. It is, conse- 
quently, free, for freedom means, not absence of 
determination simply, but absence of determination 
by an external cause. 

Such reasonings did not die with the Middle Ages, 
and it is thus that Spinoza reasons. He turns univer- 
sals into things, and makes these things immanent 
causes of their effects. This makes it possible for 
him to regard man as determined by two distinct kinds 
of causes : first, external causes, or real individual 
things, which are outside of and distinct from their 
effects ; and second, immanent causes, which belong 
to tlie world of essences, and are not to be sought out- 
side of their effects. In so far as man is regarded as 
a mere link in the chain of finite modes, he is subject 
to natural necessity and is not free, for each such link 
is absolutely conditioned by what precedes it; in so 
far as he is determined by his essence to any action he 
is determined from within. In being so determined 
he is no longer in a state of bondage, he does only 
what is in harmony with his nature, is freed from the 
passions, and enjoys a state of blessedness. The 
problem of life is to detach one's self from the influence 



EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. I9 

of external things, and to be more and more deter- 
mined from within. 

But the mind that attains this self-determination is, 
in just so far, immortal. Essences are related to each 
other as higher and lower, and the higher may be 
regarded as causes of the lower, but this peculiar 
causal relation does not imply that they are related to 
each other as temporal antecedent and consequent. 
Time-relations only apply to things regarded as stand- 
ing in the other causal series, that of individual finite 
modes. The relation of one essence to another is an 
eternal one. If, then, anything in man be regarded as 
belonging to the series of essences or as the result of 
a descent along this series, this must, like everything 
else belonging to the series, be eternal. Man's essence 
is, hence, eternal and imperishable, and if it constitute 
the greater part of a man's mind he will have small 
cause to fear death, for the part of him which will 
perish will be very small compared with that which 
will remain. 

But how is one to attain this freedom and immor- 
tality ? and what part of the mind is it that is eternal ? 
It is that part which consists of clear and distinct, or 
adequate, ideas. The mind is, as we have said, com- 
posed of ideas. Some of these are clear and distinct, 
and some are confused. We know a thing confusedly 
when we know it only in part, and we know only in 
part when we cannot explain the thing from its 
causes. Each link in fhe series of finite modes must 
be explained by a reference to other modes preceding, 
these by a reference to still others, and so on without 
end. Such things cannot be adequately known, for 
all their causes cannot be known. They are things 
which have to be explained by a reference to some- 



20 EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 

thing beyond themselves. If, however, anything can 
be explained by a reference to the other series of 
causes, the series of essences, it carries its explanation, 
so to speak, within itself, and may be adequately 
known. Now God or substance is the sole cause of 
itself and of things, and if we can obtain an idea by a 
logical deduction along the series of essences from the 
idea of God, we have completely explained it and 
know it adequately. And we have explained it with- 
out going beyond it to any other idea. Moreover, as 
we have obtained this idea by a logical deduction 
from the idea of God, we see that it is contained im- 
plicitly in the nature of God, and, hence, we recognize 
it to be eternal and imperishable. That part of the 
mind, therefore, that consists of adequate ideas belongs 
to the world of essences and shares their immortality. 
Thus the highest good of the mind is the knowledge 
of God, and in inowin^ God inan gains freedom and 
blessedness. It follows that our highest aim in life 
should be to know God, or, in other words, to replace 
our confused and fragmentary knowledge by adequate 
ideas. The ignorant man is in bondage to passion, a 
perishable thing : in so far as a man is wise, he is free 
and undisturbed in spirit, he belongs to the world of 
essences, and possesses immortality and true peace. 
The path that leads to this goal seems difificult, but it 
may be found. " All things excellent are as difficult 
as they are rare." 

So much for the doctrine contained in the " Ethics." 
I shall refer the reader for a fuller exposition and for 
a criticism to the notes that follow the text. Spinoza's 
reasonings are often loose and faulty, but his meaning 
and the general plan of his work should, to the sym- 
pathetic student, be sufificiently apparent. Part I. 



EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 2 1 

treats of God or substance ; Part II. of the nature of 
the human mind ; in Part III. the mind is treated as 
a part of nature, a finite mode in the infinite chain of 
modes, and completely conditioned by its place in that 
chain ; in Part IV. the essence of the mind as a some- 
thing belonging to the world of essences, and to be 
distinguished from that which is individual and perish- 
able, makes its appearance. It is a. part oi the mind, 
and distinguished from the rest. The last half of 
Part V. treats of this part of the mind as altogether 
detached from its place in the world of individual 
real things, and wholly in the world of essences. If 
the student will read carefully my somewhat lengthy 
Introductory Note, he will, I think, be in a position to 
follow Spinoza as he unfolds his thought. 

The properly ethical portions of his work are con- 
tained in Part IV. Here Spinoza is still in the world 
of real things, but is not wholly of it. He has passed 
from the consideration of the individual as an indi- 
vidual to the consideration of him as containing 
something universal — as not this man or that, but 
as mmi. This leads to the treatment of man as a 
social being, having rights and duties ; and though 
the reader may criticise the reasoning by which our 
author passes from an uncompromising egoism to an 
altruistic utilitarianism, he will have to admit that 
many of Spinoza's ethical maxims are excellent, and 
the spirit of his teachings elevated. 

Spinoza never founded a school as did Descartes. 
For this the intense theological antagonism he has 
aroused has been partly responsible. He appears to 
have been very imperfectly understood, and, indeed, 
except for an occasional unfriendly criticism, almost 
overlooked by the learned world during the century 



22 EXPOSITION OF SPINOZA S SYSTEM. 

(Succeeding his death. He was brought before the 
German mind by Lessing and Jacobi in the latter 
part of the last century, and has deeply influenced it 
since. Lessing, Goethe, Herder, Fichte, Schelling, and 
Hegel owe him much. Coleridge, who regarded the 
" Ethics" as one of the three greatest works since the 
introduction of Christianity, brought him from Ger- 
many to England. He has, however, had more in- 
fluence upon English literature and theology than 
upon the course of English philosophy. On French 
soil Spinozism has never flourished. In our own 
time there has been a revival of interest in Spinoza 
among Dutch scholars, resulting in a celebration with 
fitting ceremonies of the two hundredth anniversary of 
liis death, and the erection of the statue of the philos- 
opher at The Hague, where he spent the last years of 
his life. The widespread interest of men of letters in 
his thought and personality is revealed by the fact 
that thirteen nations were represented on the com- 
mittee charged with the erection of the statue. At the 
present time this interest is evidently increasing. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA AS CON- 
TAINED IN THE FIRST, SECOND, AND 
FIFTH PARTS OF THE "ETHICS," 
AND IN EXTRACTS FROM THE 
THIRD AND FOURTH. 



THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 



Ube Btbics. 

PART I. 
OF GOD. 

Definitions. 

1. By cause of itself I mean that whose essence 
involves existence ; or, in other words, that whose 
nature cannot be conceived except as existing. i * 

2. A thing is said to he. finite in its kind when it can 
be limited by another of the same nature. For ex- 
ample, a body is called finite because we always con- 
ceive another still greater. In the same way one 
thought is limited by another. But a body cannot be 
limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body. 

3. By substance I mean that which is in itself, and 
.is conceived by means of itself : that is, that the con- 
ception of which does not need to be formed from 
the conception of any other thing. 2 

4. '^y attribute \ mean that which the understanding 
perceives as constituting the essence of substance. 3 

5. By mode I mean the modifications of substance : 
in other words, that which is in and is conceived by 
means of something else. 4 

6. By God I mean a being absolutely infinite : that 

* These numbers refer to the critical notes, at the end of this 
volume, — Tr. 



26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

is, a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, 
each one of which expresses an eternal and infinite 
essence. 5 

Explanation. — I say absolutely infinite, not infinite 
in its kind ; for we can deny an infinity of attributes 
of anything that is infinite only in its kind. But to 
the essence of that which is absolutely infinite belongs 
everything that expresses essence and involves no 
negation. 

7. A thing will be called free that exists by the sole 
necessity of its nature, and is determined to action 
by itself alone : that, on the other hand, which is 
determined by something else to exist and to act in a 
definite and determinate way will be called necessary, 
or rather coerced.^ 

8. By eternity I mean existence itself in so far as it 
is conceived as following necessarily from the mere 
definition of an eternal thing. 

Explanation. — For such existence, like the essence 
of a thing, is conceived as an eternal truth ; it cannot, 
therefore, be explained by duration or time, even 
though duration be conceived as without beginning 
and without end. 7 

Axioms^ 

1. Everything that is, is either in itself or in some- 
thing else. 

2. That which cannot be conceived by means of 
something else must be conceived by means of itself. 

3. Granted a determinate cause, an effect necessa- 
rily follows ; conversely, if there be no determinate 
cause it is impossible for an effect to follow. 

4. Knowledge of an effect depends upon and in- 
volves knowledge of its cause. 



Prop. 4] OF GOD. 2 7 

5. Things which have nothing in common cannot 
be comprehended by means of each other ; that is, 
the conception of the one does not involve the con- 
ception of the other. 

6. A true idea must agree witli its object. 

7. If a thing can be conceived as non-existent, its 
essence does not involve existence. 

Prop. i. Substance is by nature prior to its modifica- 
tions. 9 

Proof. — This is evident from defs. 3 and 5. 

Prop. 2. Two substances with different attributes 
have nothing in covuno7i. 

Proof. — This, too, is evident from def. 3. Each 
must be in itself and be conceived by means of itself ; 
that is, the conception of the one does not involve 
the conception of the other.io 

Prop. 3. When things have nothing in common, the 
one cannot be the cause of the other. 

Proof. — If they have nothing in common, then 
{axiom 5) they cannot be comprehended by means of 
one another, and, hence {axiom 4), the one cannot be 
the cause of the other." Q. E. D. 

Prop. 4. Two or more distinct things are distin- 
guished from each other either by a difference in the 
attributes of the substances, or by a difference in their 
modifications. 

Proof. — Everything that is, is eitlier in itself or in 
something else {axiom i), that is {defs. 3 and ^, out- 
side of the understandingi2 there is nothing save sub- 
stances and their modifications. There is, therefore, 
outside of the understanding, notliing by means of 
which several things can be distinguished from one 
another, except substances, or, which is the same 



28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. ' [Part I 

thing {^def. 4), their attributes and their modifica- 
tions. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 5. There cannot he in the universe two or tnore 
substances of the same nature, that is, with the same 
attribute. 

Proof. — Were there several distinct substances, they 
would have to be distinguished from one another 
either by a difference in attributes or by a difference 
in modifications (by the preceding proposition). If 
merely by a difference in attributes, it will be admitted 
there cannot be more than one with the same attribute. 
If, on the other hand, one is to be distinguished from 
another by a difference in modifications, then, since a 
substance is by nature prior to its modifications (i),* 
when we lay aside its modifications, and consider it in 
itself, that is {def. 3 and axiom 6), consider it as it is, 
we cannot conceive it as distinguished from another 
substance. In other words {by the preceding proposi- 
tion), there cannot be several substances, but only 
one.13 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 6. One substance cannot be produced by another 
substance. 

Proof. — There cannot be in the universe two sub- 
stances with the same diiX.x\h\ite {by the preceding propo- 
sition), that is (2), substances that have something in 

* The meaning of the references occurring in the text would 
seem to be sufficiently plain ; but to avoid possible misconception 
it may be well to state that where reference is made to a proposi- 
tion, definition, etc., in the same Part, the number of the propo- 
sition or definition only is given : where the passage referred to is 
in another Part, the Part is indicated by Roman numerals. When 
the reference is to something omitted in this volume, the passage 
referred to, or its equivalent, is given in a footnote. Most of the 
references are to propositions, and in such cases the numbers 
stand alone. — Tr. 



Prop. 8] OF GOD„ , 29 

common. Therefore (3), the one cannot be the cause 
of the other, or, in other words, the one cannot be 
produced by the other. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that a substance cannot 
be produced by any other thing. For there is nothing 
in the universe except substances and their modifi- 
cations, as is evident from axiom i and defs. 3 and 5. 
But a substance cannot be produced by a substance 
{l^y the preceding proposition). Hence a substance can- 
not be produced by any other thing whatever. Q. E. D. 

Another Proof. — This is proved even more readily 
by a reductio ad absurdiwi. For if a substance could 
be produced by any other thing, the knowledge of it 
would have to depend on a knowledge of its cause 
{axiom 4) ; hence {def. 3) it would not be a sub- 
stance. 14 

Prop. 7. It belongs to the nature of a stibstance to 
exist. 

Proof. — A substance cannot be produced by any 
other thing {by the corollary to the preceding proposition); 
it must, therefore, be its own cause, that is {def. i), 
its essence necessarily involves existence, or, in other 
words, it belongs to its nature to exist. ^5 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite. 

Proof. — There does not exist more than one sub- 
stance with a given attribute (5), and it belongs to the 
nature of that one to exist (7). It must, therefore, 
belong to its nature to exist either as finite or as infi- 
nite. But not as finite. For {def. 2) it would have to 
be limited by another of the same nature, and this, 
also, would necessarily have to exist (7). There 
would, then, be two substances with the same attribute, 
which is absurd (5). It therefore exists as infinite. 16 
Q. E. D. 



3© THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

Scholium i. — Since finitude is in fact a partial nega- 
tion, and infinitude an absolute affirmation of the exist- 
ence of any nature, it follows from prop. 7 alone that 
every substance must be infinite. ^7 

Scholium 2. — No doubt it is difficult for all those 
who judge of things confusedly and are not accus- 
tomed to come to a knowledge of them by means 
of their first causes, to comprehend the proof of 
prop. 7 ; for they make no distinction between the 
modifications of substances and the substances them- 
selves, nor do they know how things are produced. 
Hence they ascribe to substances the origin they see 
proper to natural objects. For those who are ignorant 
of the true causes of things confuse all things, and 
without repugnance fancy trees talking as well as men, 
and that men are formed from stones as well as from 
seed, and they imagine that any kind of thing can be 
changed into any other. In the same way those who. 
confuse the divine nature with the human easily ascribe 
to God human emotions, especially as long as they are 
further ignorant how the emotions are produced in 
the mind. But if men would consider attentively the 
nature of substance, they would never doubt the truth 
of prop. 7 ; nay, rather they would all accept 
this proposition as an axiom and class it among the 
common notions. For by substance they would mean 
that which is in itself and is conceived by means of 
itself ; in other words, that the knowledge of which 
does not presuppose the knowledge of any other thing. 
By modification, on the other hand, they would mean 
that which is in something else, and whose conception 
is formed from the conception of the thing in which it 
is. For this reason we can have true ideas of non- 
existent modifications, since, although they do not 



Prop. SJ OF GOD. 3 1 

actually exist outside of the mind, yet their essence is 
included in something else in such a way that they 
can be conceived by means of that. But since sub- 
stances are conceived by means of themselves, their 
truth can have no being outside of the mind except 
in themselves. Hence, should anyone say that he 
has a clear and distinct, that is, a true idea of a sub- 
stance, and yet doubts whether such a substance 
exists, it would be absolutely the same as saying that 
he has a true idea and yet is not certain that it is not 
false ! This will be plain to anyone who gives the 
matter enough attention. Or if one maintains that a 
substance is created, he thereby maintains that a false 
idea has been made true, than which really nothing 
more absurd can be conceived. We are, therefore, 
forced to confess that the existence of a substance is 
an eternal truth, just as is its essence. i8 Hence we 
are able to prove in another way that there cannot be 
more than one substance with a given nature, and I 
have thought it worth while to set forth the proof 
here. But to do this in a methodical way, I must 
note — First, that the true definition of a thing neither 
involves nor expresses anything except the nature of 
the thing defined. Whence it follows in the second 
place, that no definition either involves or expresses a 
certain definite number of individuals, seeing that it 
expresses nothing but the nature of the thing defined. 
For example, the definition of the triangle expresses 
nothing but just the nature of the triangle, and not a 
certain definite number of triangles. I must note in 
the third place that every existing thing necessarily 
has some definite cause, by reason of which it exists. 
And finally in the fourth place that this cause, by 
reason of which anything exists, must either be con- 



32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

tained in the very nature and definition of the existing 
thing {for the reason, of course, that it belongs to the 
nature of such a thing to exist), or it must be outside of 
it. Granted these points, it follows that if there exist 
in the world some definite number of individuals, 
there must necessarily be a cause why those individuals, 
and neither more nor less, exist. If, for example, 
there exist in the universe twenty men (I will suppose, 
to make the matter clearer, that they exist at the same 
time, and that no others have ever existed before), it 
will not be a sufificient explanation of the existence of 
the twenty men to show the cause of human nature 
in the abstract ; but it will be further necessary to 
show the cause why twenty exist, and not more nor 
less ; for ij)y point third) there must necessarily be a 
cause for the existence of each one. But this cause 
{by poi7its second and third) cannot be contained in 
human nature itself, since the true definition of man 
does not involve the number twenty. Hence {by 
point fourth) the cause why these twenty men exist, 
and, consequently, why each one exists, must neces- 
sarily be outside of each one. Therefore, the conclu- 
sion is unavoidable that everything of such a nature, 
that several individuals with that nature can exist, 
must necessarily have an external cause to bring about 
their existence. Now since it belongs to the nature of 
a substance to exist {by what I have Just shown in this 
' scholium), its definition must involve necessary exist- 
ence, and hence its existence must be inferred from its 
mere definition. But from its definition {as has just 
been proved from points second and third) the existence 
of several substances cannot be inferred. From it, 
therefore, it follows necessarily that but one of a given 
nature exists, as was maintained. ^9 



Prop, io] OF GOD. 33 

Prop. 9. The jnore reality or being anything has, the 
greater the nii7nber of its attributes. 

Proof. — This is evident from def. 4.20 

Prop. 10. Each attribute of a substance must be con- 
ceived by means of itself. 

Proof. — Attribute is that which tlie understanding 
perceives as constituting the essence of substance 
{def. 4) ; therefore {def. 3) it must be conceived by 
means of itself. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Hence it is evident that although two 
attributes are conceived as really distinct — that is, the 
one is conceived without help from the other — yet we 
cannot thence infer that they constitute two beings, 
or, in other words, two different substances. For it 
is of the nature of a substance that each of its attri- 
butes is conceived by means of itself ; seeing that all 
the attributes it has have always been in it simulta- 
neously, nor has it been possible for one to be pro- 
duced by another, but each one expresses the reality, 
that is, the being of the substance. It is, therefore, 
far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one 
substance ; nay, nothing in the world is clearer than 
that every being must be conceived under some attri- 
bute, and that the more reality or being it has, the 
more attributes has it that express both necessity, that 
is, eternity, and infinity. Hence nothing can be 
clearer than that an absolutely infinite being must 
necessarily be defined {as in def. 6), as a being con- 
sisting of an infinity of attributes, each one of which 
expresses a definite eternal and infinite essence. 
Should one here ask, by what mark, then, can we 
distinguish different substances ? let him read the 
propositions that follow, which show that there exists 
in the universe but a single substance, and that this is 



34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

absolutely infinite. Hence such a mark would be 
sought in vain. 21 

Prop. ir. God, that is, a substance consisting of an 
infinity of attributes, each one of ivhich expresses an 
eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. 

Proof. — If you deny it, conceive if you can that 
God does not exist. Then (axiom 7) his essence does 
not involve existence. But this (7) is absurd. There- 
fore God necessarily exists. 22 Q. E. D. 

Another Proof. — A cause or reason must be 
assigned, whether for the existence or the non-exist- 
ence of everything. For example, if a triangle exists 
there must be a reason or cause for its existence ; if, 
on the other hand, it does not exist, there must be a 
reason or cause which prevents it from existing, one, 
in other words, which annuls its existence. Now, 
this reason or cause must either be contained in tlie 
nature of the thing, or must be external to it. For 
instance, the reason for the non-existence of a square 
circle is given in its very nature — it involves a contra- 
diction. The existence of a substance, on the other 
hand, also follows from its very nature, for this in- 
volves existence (7). But the reason for the exist- 
ence or non-existence of a circle or of a triangle is 
not to be found in their nature, but in the order of 
the material universe, for from this it must follow 
either that a triangle now necessarily exists, or that it 
is impossible for it now to exist. This is self-evident. 
Hence it follows that if there is no reason or cause 
which prevents a thing from existing, that thing neces- 
sarily exists. If, therefore, there can be no reason or 
cause which prevents God from existing, or which an- 
nuls his existence, we must certainly conclude that 
he necessarily exists. But were there such a reason 



Prop, ii] of god. 35 

or cause it avouM have to be either in the divine 
nature itself or external to it, that is, in some other 
substance of another nature. For were it of the same 
nature, God, by that very fact, would be admitted to 
exist. But a substance of a different nature could 
have nothing in common with God (2), and hence 
could neither bring about nor annul his existence. 
Since, therefore, there cannot be, external to the 
divine nature, a reason or cause which annuls the 
divine existence, such a cause, if God does not exist, 
will have to be found in his very nature, and this 
would involve a contradiction. To affirm this of a 
Being absolutely infinite and supremely perfect is 
absurd. Therefore, neither in God nor external to 
God is there any cause or reason which annuls 
his existence, and, hence, God necessarily exists.23 
Q. E. D. 

Another proof. — To be able not to exist is lack of 
power, and, on the other hand, to be able to exist is 
power {as is self-evident). If, therefore, nothing nec- 
essarily exists but finite beings, finite beings are more 
powerful than the absolutely infinite Being, and this 
{as is self-evident) is absurd. Hence, either nothing 
exists, or an absolutely infinite Being necessarily 
exists also. But we exist either in ourselves, or in 
something else that necessarily exists {axiom i a7id 
prop. 7). Therefore, an absolutely infinite Being, 
that is {def. 6) God, necessarily exists. 24 Q. E. D. 

ScJwlium. — In this last proof I have, for the sake of 
clearness, chosen to demonstrate the existence of God 
a posteriori. Not that God's existence does not fol- 
low a priori hom. the same premises. For since to be 
able to exist is power, it follows that, the more 
reality belongs to the nature of a thing, the greater 



$6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [ParI' I 

the power it has of itself to exist. Hence the abso- 
lutely infinite Being, God, has of himself an absolutely 
infinite power to exist. He, therefore, exists abso- 
lutely. Many, perhaps, will find it difficult to see the 
force of this proof, because they are accustomed to 
consider only those things which flow from external 
causes. They see that of such things, those which 
quickly come into being — that is, which easily exist — 
easily cease to exist ; and, on the other hand, those 
things which they conceive as having many properties, 
they consider less easy to bring into being — that is, 
less ready to exist. But, to free them from these 
prejudices, I need not here show in what sense the 
saying " w/ia/ quickly comes into being, quickly perishes^' 
is true ; nor yet discuss whether, from the point of 
view of nature as a whole, everything is equally easy or 
not. It is enough to point out that I am not speaking 
of things which are brought into being by external 
causes, but of substances alone, which (6) cannot be 
produced by any external cause. For things which 
are brought into being by external causes, whether 
they consist of many parts or of few, owe all their 
perfection or reality to the virtue of an external cause, 
and, hence, their existence has its source solely in the 
perfection of an external cause, and not in their own. 
A substance, on the other hand, owes what perfection 
it has to no external cause. Hence, even its existence 
must follow from its very nature, and, accordingly, is 
nothing but its essence. Perfection, therefore, does 
not annul the existence of a thing, but insures it. 
Imperfection, on the contrary, annuls it. Hence, there 
is nothing of whose existence we can be more certain 
than we are of that of the absolutely infinite or perfect 
Being, that is, God. For the mere fact that his es- 



Prop. 13] OF GOD. 37 

sence excludes all imperfection, and involves absolute 
perfection, removes every cause for doubting his 
existence, and establishes it as most certain. This, I 
think, will be clear to anyone who gives the matter a 
little attention. 25 

Prop. 12. No attribute of substance can be truly con- 
ceived from which it would follow that substance can be 
divided. 

Proof. — The parts into which substance so con- 
ceived would be divided, will either retain the nature 
of substance, or they will not. If the former, then (8) 
each part will have to be infinite, and (6) its own 
cause, and (5) will have to consist of a different attri- 
bute. Hence it will be possible to make several 
substances out of one substance, which (6) is absurd. 
Furthermore, the parts (2) would have nothing in 
common with the whole, and the whole {def. 4 and 
prop. 10) could both be and be conceived with- 
out its parts, which no one can doubt to be absurd. 
If, on the other hand, we take the latter alternative, 
namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of 
substance ; then, were the whole substance divided 
into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance, 
and would cease to be, which (7) is absurd. 26 

Prop. 13. Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. 

Proof. — Were it divisible, the parts into which it 
would be divided will either retain the nature of 
absolutely infinite substance, or will not. If the 
former, there will be several substances of the same 
nature, which (5) is absurd. If the latter, then 
{as above) it will be possible for absolutely infinite 
substance to cease to be, which (11) is also 
absurd. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that no substance, and 



38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

consequently no corporeal substance, in so far as it is 
substance, is divisible. 

Scholium. — That substance is indivisible may be 
more readily apprehended from the mere fact that the 
nature of substance cannot be conceived except as 
infinite, and that by a part of substance one can only 
mean a finite substance, which (8) plainly involves a 
contradiction. 27 

Prop. 14. Besides God, no substance can be or be 
conceived. 

Proof. — God is an absolutely infinite being, of 
whom no attribute that expresses the essence of sub- 
stance can be denied {def. 6), and he necessarily 
exists (11). If, then, there were any substance besides 
God, it would have to be expressed by means of some 
attribute of God, and thus there would exist two sub- 
stances with the same attribute, which (5) is absurd. 
There cannot, therefore, be any substance besides 
God, nor can such even be conceived. For if it could 
be conceived, it would necessarily have to be con- 
ceived as existing. But this {by the first part of this 
proof) is absurd. Therefore, besides God, no sub- 
stance can either be or be conceived. Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows very clearly : First, 
that there is but one God, or, in other words {def. 6), 
there is in the universe only one substance, and that 
this is absolutely infinite, as I have intimated above 
in the scholium to prop. 10. 

Corollary 2. — It follows, second, that that which is 
extended and that which thinks are either attributes 
of God, or {axiojn i) modifications of God's attri- 
butes.28 

Prop. 15. Whatever is, is in God, and without God 
nothing can either be or be conceived. 



Prop. 15] OF GOD. 39 

Proof. — Besides God, there is no substance, and 
none can be conceived (14) ; that is {def. 3), there is 
nothing that is in itself and is conceived by means of 
itself. But {^def. 5) modes can neither be nor be con- 
ceived without a substance. Hence they can only be 
in, and be conceived by means of, the divine nature. 
But, besides substances and modes, there is nothing 
{axiom i). Therefore, without God nothing can 
either be or be conceived. 29 Q. E. D. 

Scholiuvi. — There are those who fancy that God, 
like man, consists of body and mind, and is subject to 
passions, but how far they are from possessing a true 
knowledge of God is sufficiently evident from what 
has been already proved. These I pass by, for all 
who have to any degree reflected upon the divine 
nature, deny that God is corporeal. Of this they give 
an excellent proof in the fact that by body we mean 
a certain quantity, having length, breadth, and thick- 
ness, and bounded by some definite figure, than which 
nothing more absurd can be asserted of God, a being 
absolutely infinite. Nevertheless in other arguments, 
by which they try to establish this truth, they all the 
while show clearly that they wholly separate corporeal 
or extended substance from the divine nature, and 
maintain it to be created by God. By what divine 
power it could have been created, they are quite igno- 
rant ; which shows clearly that they do not understand 
what they say themselves. I, for my part, have proved, 
as I think, clearly enough (6, cor., and 8, schol. 2), that 
no substance can be produced or created by any other 
thing. Furthermore, I have shown (14) that besides 
God no substance can either be or be conceived, and 
hence have inferred extended substance to be one of 
the infinite attributes of God, Still, for the sake of 



40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

a fuller exposition, I will answer the arguments of my 
opponents, which all amount to this : Fir-st, they 
maintain that corporeal substance, as substance, con- 
sists of parts, and, therefore, deny that it can be 
infinite, and, consequently, that it can be predicated 
of God. This argument they develop in many ways, 
one or two of which I will quote. If, they say, cor- 
poreal substance is infinite, let it be conceived as 
divided into two parts ; each part will be either finite 
or infinite. If the former, then that which is infinite 
is composed of two finite parts, which is absurd. If 
the latter, then one infinite is twice as great as another, 
which is also absurd. Again, if an infinite quantity 
be estimated in parts a foot long, it will have to con- 
sist of an infinite number of such parts ; as will also be 
the case if it be estimated in parts an inch in length. 
Hence one infinite number will be twelve times as 
great as another. Finally, if from one point of a 




certain infinite quantity we conceive as extending to 
infinity the two lines, A B, A C, which at first are 
a definite and determined distance apart ; it is certain 
that the distance between B and C will continually 
increase, and at length from a determinate distance 
will become indeterminable. Since, as they believe, 
these absurdities follow from the supposition that 
quantity is infinite, they infer that corporeal substance 
must be finite, and, hence, that it does not belong to 
the essence of God. The second argument is also 



Prop. 15J OF GOD. 41 

drawn from God's supreme perfection. God, they 
say, since he is a supremely perfect being, cannot be 
passively affected ; but corporeal substance, since it is 
divisible, can be passively affected. It follows that it 
cannot belong to God's essence. These are the argu- 
nTents I find writers bringing forward to prove that 
corporeal substance is unworthy of, and cannot belong 
to, the divine nature. But anyone who pays proper 
attention will find that I have already answered these 
arguments, for they are based wholly on the supposi- 
tion that corporeal substance is composed of parts, 
which supposition I have above (12 and it,., co?-.) shown 
to be absurd. In the second place, anyone who will 
rightly consider the matter will see that all those 
absurdities (if, indeed, they are all absurdities — a point 
I am not now discussing), from which they would 
infer extended substance to be finite, do not in the 
least result from the supposition that quantity is infi- 
nite, but from the supposition that infinite quantity is 
measurable, and is composed of finite parts. Hence, 
from the absurdities which result from that supposi- 
tion, they can draw no other conclusion than that 
infinite quantity is not measurable, and cannot con- 
sist of finite parts. This is exactly what we proved 
just above (12, ^/r.). Thus they really turn against 
themselves the weapon aimed at us. If, therefore, 
they still choose to infer from this absurdity they 
plead, that extended substance must be finite, they do 
just what one does who infers that the circle has no 
center from which all lines drawn to the circumference 
are equal, and infers it from the false supposition that 
the circle has the properties of the square. For they 
conceive corporeal substance, which can only be con- 
ceived as infinite, single, and indivisible (8, S,and 12), 



42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part I 

in such a way as to infer that it is finite, composed of 
finite parts, manifold and divisible. In the same way, 
others, after pretending that a line is composed of 
points, are able to find many arguments to prove that a 
line cannot be divided to infinity. And certainly it is 
no less absurd to maintain that corporeal substance is 
composed of bodies or parts, than that a solid is com- 
posed of surfaces, surfaces of lines, and lines of 
points. This must be admitted by all who know that 
clear reasoning is infallible, and especially by those 
who deny the existence of a vacuum. For if corporeal 
substance could be so divided that its parts would be 
really distinct, why could not one part be annihilated 
and the rest remain connected with each other as 
before ? And why must all be so fitted together that 
there exists no vacuum ? Surely, of things really dis- 
tinct from one another, one can exist and abide in its 
own state without another. Since, therefore, there is 
no vacuum in nature (of this I shall speak elsewhere), 
but all the parts must so run together that there be no 
vacuum ; it again follows that they cannot be really 
distinguished; in other words, that corporeal substance, 
as substance, cannot be divided. If, nevertheless, one 
here asks, why we are so prone by nature to divide 
quantity ; I answer, it is because we conceive quantity 
in two ways ; to wit : abstractly, that is, superficially, 
as when we imagine it, and, second, as substance, in 
which case we conceive it by means of the under- 
standing alone. If, therefore, we consider quantity as 
it is in the imagination, a thing we do often and quite 
easily, we shall find it finite, divisible, and composed 
of parts. If, on the other hand, we consider it as it is 
in the understanding, and conceive it as substance — 
a very difficult task — then, as I have already sufifi- 



Prop. i6] OF GOD. 43 

ciently proved, we shall find it infinite, single, and 
indivisible. This will be plain enough to everyone 
who knows how to distinguish between the imagina- 
tion and the understanding, especially if he will also 
consider that matter is everywhere the same, and that 
there is in it no distinction of parts except as we con- 
ceive it affected in diverse ways, whence its parts are 
distinguished only modally, not really. For example, 
we conceive water, in so far as it is water, to be 
divided, and its parts to be separated from one 
another ; but not in so far as it is corporeal substance, 
for, in so far as it is that, it is neither separated nor 
divided. Again, water, in so far as it is water, is gen- 
erated and destroyed; but in so far as it is substance, 
it is neither generated nor destroyed. With this I 
think I have answered the second argument also ; see- 
ing that it, too, rests upon the assumption that matter, 
in so far as it is substance, is divisible and composed 
of parts. But even if what I have said were untrue, 
I do not know why matter should be unworthy of the 
divine nature, since (14) besides God there can be no 
substance, in relation to which it could be passive. 
Everything, I say, is in God, and everything that hap- 
pens, happens solely through the laws of the infinite 
nature of God and results (as I shall show presently) 
from the necessity of his essence. Therefore, even if 
extended substance be supposed to be divisible, yet, 
provided only it be admitted to be eternal and infinite, 
there can be no reason for saying that God is passive 
in relation to something else, or that extended sub- 
stance is unworthy of the divine nature. But of this 
enough for the present. 3° 

Prop. 16. From the necessity of the divine nature 
there must folloiv in infinite ways an infinity of things : 



44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [pART I 

that is, everything that can fall ivithin the scope of an 
infinite intellect. 

Proof. — The truth of this proposition ought to be 
evident to everyone who bears in mind that, granted 
the definition of a thing, the understanding infers 
from this a number of properties, which necessarily 
follow from it (in other words, from the very essence 
of the thing). And it infers the more properties, the 
more reality the definition of the thing expresses ; that 
is, the more reality the essence of the thing defined 
involves. But since the divine nature has an absolute 
infinity of attributes {def. 6), each one of which, 
further, expresses an essence infinite in its kind, there 
must necessarily follow from its necessity in infinite 
ways an infinity of things, that is, everything that can 
fall within the scope of an infinite intellect. Q. E, D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows that God is the 
efficient cause of everything that can fall within the 
scope of an infinite intellect. 

Corollary 2. — It follows, in the second place, that 
God is a cause /^r se, and wol per accidens.''' 

Corollary 3. — It follows, in the third place, that 
God is absolutely the first cause. 3^ 

Prop. 17. God acts solely from the laws of his oivn 
nature and under no constraint. 

Proof. — We have just shown (16) that from the 
mere necessity of the divine nature, or, in other words, 
from the mere laws of that nature, there follows an 
absolute infinity of things ; and we have proved (15) 
that nothing can either be or be conceived without 
God, but all things are in God. Wherefore there can 
be nothing external to him that can determine or con- 
strain him to act, and hence, God acts solely from 

* /. e.. Causality belongs to his very nature. — Tr. 



Prop. 17] OF GOD. 45 

the laws of his own nature, and under no constraint. 
Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows, first, that there is no 
cause, except the perfection of his nature, which, 
either from without or from within, moves God to act. 

Corollary 2. — It follows, in the second place, that 
God alone is a free cause. For God alone exists 
from the mere necessity of his nature (11, and 14, 
cor. i), and acts from the mere necessity of his nature 
(by the preceding proposition). Therefore {def. 7), he 
alone is a free cause. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Others think that God is a free cause 
because they suppose him able to prevent those things 
of which we have spoken as following from his nature 
— in other words, as in his power — from coming to 
pass, that is, from being produced by himself. But 
this is the same as saying that God can prevent it fol- 
lowing from the nature of a triangle that its three 
angles are equal to two right angles ; that is, can pre- 
vent an effect from following its cause, which is ab- 
surd. Furthermore, I shall show below, without mak- 
ing use of this proposition, that neither intellect nor 
will belongs to God's nature. I know, of course, that 
many think they can prove that the highest intellect 
and free will belong to his nature, saying they find 
nothing they can ascribe to God more perfect than 
what is in us the highest perfection. Again, although 
they conceive God as actually in the highest degree 
a knower, yet they do not believe that he can bring 
into existence all the things he actually knows, for 
they think this destroys God's power. If, they say, 
he had created all the things that are in his intellect, 
he would not, after that, have been able to create any 
more, and this, they believe, contradicts God's omnipo- 



46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

tence. Hence they have preferred to maintain that 
God is indifferent to all things, and creates only what, 
by a certain arbitrary fiat, he has decided to create. 
But I think I have shown clearly enough (i6) that 
from God's supreme power, that is, from his infinite 
nature, in an infinity of ways an infinity of things — in 
other words, all things — have streamed forth of neces- 
sity, or, rather, always follow by the same necessity ; 
just as, from the nature of the triangle, it follows from 
eternity to eternity, that its three angles are equal to 
two right angles. Hence God's omnipotence has from 
eternity been actual, and to eternity will abide in this 
actuality. This it seems to me, ascribes to God a 
much truer omnipotence. Nay, to speak plainly, my 
opponents appear to deny that God is omnipotent. 
For they are forced to admit that God knows an 
infinity of things that can be created, and yet will 
never be able to create them. Otherwise — that is to 
say, supposing him to create everything he knows — he 
would, as they hold, exhaust his omnipotence and 
render himself imperfect. Hence, in order to hold 
that God is perfect, they are reduced to the necessity 
of maintaining at the same time that he cannot do 
everything that falls within his povver. I do not see 
that anything more absurd than this, or more incon- 
sistent with the omnipotence of God, can be imagined. 
Again, to say a word here of the intellect and will 
commonly ascribed to God ; if intellect and will do 
belong to God's eternal essence, each of these attri- 
butes must be taken in a sense very different from 
the common one. For there would have to be a 
world-wide difference between our intellect and will 
and the intellect and will constituting God's essence, 
nor could they agree in anything, except in name ; 



Prop. 17] OF god. 47 

just as the Dog, a constellation, agrees with dog, an 
animal that barks. This I will prove as follows : If 
intellect belongs to the divine nature, it cannot, like 
our intellect, be by nature posterior to (as many 
think), or simultaneous with, the things it knows, for 
God is by his causality- prior to all things (16, cor. i). 
On the contrary, the truth and the formal * essence of 
things is what it is, because it exists as such objec- 
tively in the intellect of God. Therefore God's intel- 
lect, in so far as it is conceived as constituting God's 
essence, is in reality the cause of things, whether of 
their essence or of their existence — a truth which 
appears also to have been remarked by those who 
have maintained that God's intellect, will, and power 
are one and the same thing. Since, therefore, God's 
intellect is the sole cause of things, in other words, is 
the cause, as we have shown, both of their essence and 
of their existence, it must necessarily differ from them 
both with respect to its essence and to its existence. 
For an effect differs from its cause in just that which 
it has from its cause. For example, one man is the 
cause of the existence of another man, but not of his 
essence, for the latter is an eternal truth. Hence, as 
regards essence, they can exactly agree ; but they 
must differ in existence. If, therefore, the existence 
of the one come to an end, it does not follow that 
that of the other will do so too ; but if the essence of 
the one could be destroyed or made false, the essence 
of the other would be destroyed also. Wherefore, 
a thing that is cause both of the essence and of the 
existence of a given effect, must differ from such an 

* Formal, i. e., having what we would now call objective exist- 
ence ; objective, i. e., existing in the mind by way of representa- 
tion. — Tr. 



48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

effect as regards both its essence and its existence. 
But God's intellect is the cause both of the essence and 
of the existence of our intellect ; hence God's intellect, 
in so far as it is conceived as constituting the divine 
essence, differs from our intellect as regards both its 
essence and its existence, nor can it agree with it in 
anything save in name, as I said before. The same 
reasoning applies to the will, as one can easily see. 32 

Prop. 18. God is the immanent, not the transient, 
cause of all things. 

Proof. — Everything that is, is in God, and must be 
conceived by means of God (15) ; hence (16, cor. i), 
God is the cause of the things that are in himself ; 
which was the first point to be proved. Again, 
there cannot be external to God any substance (14), 
that is {def. 3), anything which is in itself external 
to God ; which was the second point. Therefore, 
God is the immanent, not the transient, cause of all 
things.33 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 19. God is eternal^ that is, all God's attributes 
are eternal. 

Proof. — God {^def. 6) is a substance, and this (11) 
necessarily exists, that is (7), it belongs to its nature 
to exist ; in other words, his existence follows from 
his definition. Hence {def. 8) he is eternal. In the 
second place, by God's attributes is meant that {def. 
4) which expresses the essence of the divine sub- 
stance, that is, that which belongs to substance. 
This, I say, must be involved in the attributes them- 
selves. But eternity {as I have already proved from 
prop. 7) belongs to the nature of substance. There- 
fore, each of the attributes must involve eternity 
and, hence, all are eternal. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — The truth of this proposition is also 



Prop. 21] OF GOD. 49 

most clearly evident from the proof I have given (11) 
of God's existence. This proof, I say, establishes 
that God's existence, like his essence, is an eternal 
truth. Moreover {see '''The Principles of the Cat te- 
sian Philosophy,'' prop. 19), I have given also another 
])roof of God's eternity, which it is unnecessary to 
repeat here. 34 

Prop. 20. God's existence and his essence are one and 
the sat?ie thing. 

Proof. — God {by the preceding proposition) and all 
his attributes are eternal. That is, each of his 
attributes expresses existence. Therefore, the sam^? 
attributes of God that {def. 4) express God's eternal 
essence also express his eternal existence ; in other 
words, just that which constitutes God's essence con- 
stitutes at the same time his existence ; hence the 
latter and his essence are one and the same thing. 
Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows, first, that God's 
existence, like his essence, is an eternal truth. 

Corollary 2. — It follows, in the second place, that 
God is unchangeable, or, in other words, that all 
God's attributes are unchangeable. For were these 
changed as regards their existence they would also 
have to be changed {by the preceding proposition) as 
regards their essence ; that is {as is self-evident)., 
they would be changed from true to false, which is 
absurd. 35 

Prop. 21. Everything that follows from the abso- 
lute nature of any attribute of God must aha ays exist 
and be inftiitej that is, by virtue of that attribute it 
is eternal and infinite. 

Proof. — If you deny it, conceive, if you can, as in 
some attribute of God and following from its absolute 



50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

nature, something that is finite and has a determinate 
existence or duration — for example, the idea of God 
in thought. Now, thought, since it is, by hypothesis, 
an attribute of God, is necessarily (ii) in its nature 
infinite. But in so far as it has the idea of God, it is, 
by hypothesis, finite. Now {def. 2), it cannot be 
conceived to be finite unless it be limited by thought 
itself. Not, however, by thought itself in so far as it 
constitutes the idea of God, for in so far it is, by 
hypothesis, finite ; hence, by thought in so far as it 
does not constitute the idea of God, which, neverthe- 
less (ri), must necessarily exist. There is, therefore, 
thought which does not constitute the idea of God, 
and, hence, from its nature, in so far as it is absolute 
thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow. 
(For it is conceived as constituting, and not -consti- 
tuting, the idea of God.) This is contrary to our 
hypothesis. Therefore, if the idea of God in thought, 
or anything else (it matters not what is taken, for the 
proof is a general one) in any attribute of God, fol- 
lows from the necessity of the absolute nature of that 
attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. This was 
the first point. 

In the second place, that which follows in this way 
from the necessity of the nature of any attribute can- 
not have a determinate duration. If you deny it, let 
us suppose that there is in some attribute of God a 
thing that follows from the necessity of the nature of 
that attribute, for example, the idea of God in thought ; 
and let us suppose that this thing at one time has not 
existed or sometime will not exist. Now, since thought 
is by hypothesis an attribute of God, it must neces- 
sarily exist and be unchangeable (11 ajid 20, cor. 2). 
Therefore, beyond the limits of the duration of the 



Prop. 23] OF GOD. 51 

idea of God (for we are supposing that it has at one 
time not existed, or sometime will not exist), thought 
must exist without the idea of God. But this is con- 
trary to our hypothesis, which assumes that when 
thought is granted the idea of God necessarily follows. 
Therefore, the idea of God in thought, or anything 
that necessarily follows from the absolute nature of 
some attribute of God, cannot have a determinate 
duration, but is, by virtue of that attribute, eternal. 
This was the second point. Mark, this is true of 
everything that necessarily follows in any one of God's 
attributes from the absolute nature of God.36 

Prop. 22. Whatever foUo7vs from any attribute of 
God, in so far as it is 7nodified by a modification that, by 
virtue of this attt-ibute, necessarily exists and is infinite, 
must also both necessarily exist and be infijiite. 

Proof. — The proof of this proposition is similar to 
that of the preceding one. 

Prop. 23. Every mode, which necessarily exists and is 
infinite, must necessarily have followed either from the 
absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some 
attribute modified by a modification ivhich necessarily 
exists and is infinite. 

Proof. — A mode is in something else, by means of 
which it must be conceived {def. 5); that is (15), it is 
in God alone, and can be conceived by means of God 
alone. If, therefore, a mode is conceived as necessa- 
rily existent, and as being infinite, in both cases this 
is necessarily inferred or perceived by means of some 
attribute of God, in so far as this is conceived as 
expressing infinity and necessity of existence, or, in 
other words {^def. 8), eternity ; that is {def. 6 and 
prop. 19), in so far as it is considered absolutely. A 
mode, therefore, wliich necessarily exists and is infi- 



52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. TPart I 

nite, must have followed from the absolute nature of 
some attribute of God ; and that either immediately 
(21), or mediately through some modification which 
follows from his absolute nature, that is {by the 
preceding propositioii), which necessarily exists and is 
infinite. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 24. The essence of the things produced by God 
does Jtot involve existence. 

Proof. — This is evident from def. i. For that 
whose nature (considered in itself) involves ex- 
istence, is its own cause, and exists solely from the 
necessity of its nature. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that God is not merely 
the cause that brings things into existence, but is also 
the cause of their continuing in existence ; or, to use 
a scholastic term, God is the cause of the being of 
things. For wliether things exist or do not exist, 
whenever we consider their essence we find it does 
not involve either existence or duration ; hence their 
essence cannot be the cause either of their existence 
or of their duration. Only God, to whose nature 
alone existence belongs, can be the cause of these 
(14, cor. i).37 

Prop. 25. God is not the efficient cause of the exist- 
ence of things only, bid also of their essence. 

Proof. — If you deny it, it follows that God is not 
the cause of the essence of things. Hence {axiom 4) 
the essence of things can be conceived without God. 
But this (15) is absurd. Therefore God is the cause 
of the essence of things also. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This proposition follows more clearly 
from prop. 16. For from that proposition it follows 
that, given the divine nature, one must necessarily 
infer from it the essence as well as the existence 



Prop. 28] OF GOD. 53 

of things ; and, in a word, that God must be said 
to be the cause of all things in just the sense in 
which he is said to be the cause of himself. This will 
be still more clearly evident from the following 
corollary. 

CoroUa>j. — Particular things are nothing but modi- 
fications of the attributes of God ; in other words, 
modes, by which tlie attributes of God are expressed 
in a definite and determinate manner. The proof of 
this is evident from prop. 15 and def. 5.38 

Prop. 26. A thing that is detei'viined to any action 
has necessarily been so determined by God : and a thing 
that is not determined by God cannot determine itself to 
action. 

Proof. — That through which things are said to be 
determined to any action is necessarily something 
positive (as is self-evident). Therefore, God is, from 
the necessity of his nature, the efficient cause both of 
its essence and of its existence {2^and 16). This was 
the first thing to be proved. From this the second part 
of the proposition very clearly follows. For if a thing 
which is not determined by God could determine 
itself, the first part of the proposition would be false, 
which is absurd, as we have shown. 

Prop. 27. A thing that is determined by God to any 
actiofi cannot render itself undetermined. 

Proof. — The truth of this proposition is evident 
from axiom 3. 

Prop. 28. No individual thing, that is. nothing that 
is fiiiite and has determinate existen e, can exist or 
be determined to action, unless it be determined to exist- 
ence and action by some cause other than itself, which also 
is finite and has a determinate existence; again, this 
cause cannot exist nor be determined to action unless it be 



54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

determined to existence and action by still another, which, 
too, is finite and has a determinate existence ; and so to 
infinity. 

Proof. — Whatever is determined to existence and 
action is so determined by God (26 a7id 24, cor.). 
But that which is finite and has a determinate exist- 
ence cannot have been produced by the absolute 
nature of any attribute of God ; for everything that 
follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of 
God is infinite and eternal (21). It must, therefore, 
have followed from God or from some one of his at- 
tributes, in so far as tliis is considered as modified by 
some mode, for besides substance and modes nothing 
exists {axiom i and defs. 3 and 5), and modes (25, cor). 
are only modifications of the attributes of God. But 
it cannot have followed from God or from one of his 
attributes in so far as this is modified by a modifica- 
tion that is eternal and infinite (22). It must there- 
fore have followed from, or have been determined to 
existence and action by, God or one of his attributes 
in so far as this is modified by a modification that is 
finite and has a determinate existence. This was the 
first point. In the second place, this cause, that is, 
this mode [by the same reasoning by whicJi the first part 
of the proposition has just been proved) must also have 
been determined by another, which, too, is finite and 
has a determinate existence, and tliis last, in turn, by 
another {by the same reasoning), and so on {by the same 
reasoning) to infinity. 39 Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Since certain things must have been 
produced by God immediately, namely, those things 
that necessarily follow from his absolute nature, and 
through these certain other things, that yet cannot 
either be or be conceived without God ; it follows ; 



Prop. 29] of god. 55 

First, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of 
the things immediately produced by himself; but he 
is not a cause, as the saying is, after their kind. For 
God's effects cannot either be or be conceived without 
their cause (15 and 24, cor^. It follows, in the second 
place, that God cannot be properly called the remote 
cause of particular things, unless, perhaps, because 
we distinguish the latter from tlie things that he has 
produced immediately, or, rather, that follow from his 
absolute nature. For by a remote cause we mean one 
that is in no way joined with its effect. But every- 
thing that is, is in God, and so depends upon God, 
that without him it can neither be nor be con- 
ceived. 4° 

Prop. 29. There is in the universe nothing con- 
tingent ; but all things are, from the necessity of the 
divine nature, determined to existence and action of a 
definite sort. 

Proof. — Whatever is, is in God (15) ; but God can- 
not be called a contingent thing, for (11) he exists 
necessarily and not contingently. In the second 
place, the modes of the divine nature have followed 
therefrom necessarily, and not contingently (16), and 
that whether the divine nature be considered abso- 
lutely (21) or as determined to action of a definite 
sort (27). Moreover, God is not merely the cause of 
these modes in so far as they simply exist (24, cor^, 
but also (26) in so far as they are considered as deter- 
mined to some action. But if they are not determined 
by God {by the same propositioit), it is impossible, not 
contingent, that they should determine themselves ; 
on the other hand (27), if they are determined by 
God, it is impossible, not contingent, that they should 
render themselves undetermined. Therefore, all 



56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

things are, from the necessity of the divine nature, 
determined not only to existence, but also to existence 
and action of a definite sort, and there is nothing that 
is contingent.41 Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Before going further, I will here explain 
to the reader, or rather remind him of, what we must 
understand by naitcra naturans and natura fiaturata* 
From what precedes, I think it is now evident that 
we must mean by natura naturans that which is in 
itself, and is conceived by means of itself ; in 
other words, those attributes of substance which 
express an eternal and infinite essence, that is 
(14, cor. I, and 17, cor. 2), God, in so far as he is 
regarded as a free cause. By natura naturata, on the 
other hand, I mean all that follows from the necessity 
of God's nature, or in other words, from the necessity 
of each of his attributes ; that is, all the modes of 
God's attributes, in so far as these modes are regarded 
as things that are in God, and that cannot be or be 
conceived without God.42 

Prop. 30. An intellect, actually finite or actually 
infinite, must comprehend the attributes of God and the 
modifications of God, and nothing else. 

Proof. — A true idea must agree with its object 
{axiom 6), that is {as is self-evident^, what is contained 
objectively in the intellect must necessarily exist in 
nature. But in nature (14, cor. i) there is but one 
substance, which is God ; nor are there any modifica- 
tions (15) but those which are in God, and which {by 

* For these expressions we have no exact equivalent. They 
might be rendered: "nature regarded as active," and "nature 
regarded as passive " ; but I have preferred to keep the Latin 
names, which have become common property. A literal tranglft' 
tion into English would not be endurable. — Tr, 



Prop. 32] of god. 57 

the same proposition) without God can neither be nor 
be conceived. Therefore, an intellect, actually finite 
or actually infinite, must comprehend the attributes 
of God and the modifications of God, and nothing 
else.43 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 31. Actual intellect, whether it be finite or 
infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., 7nust be referred to 
natura naturata and not to natura naturans. 

Proof. — By intellect {as is self-evident) we do not 
mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of 
thinking, which mode differs from others, such as 
desire, love, etc., and must, hence, be conceived by 
means of absolute thought ; in other words (15 and 
def. 6), it must be so conceived through some attri- 
bute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite 
essence of thought, that without it it can neither be 
nor be conceived. Therefore (29, schol.) it must be 
referred to natura naturata and not to natura 
naturans, as must also the other modes of thinking. 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — My reason for here speaking of actual 
intellect is not that I admit that there is such a thing 
as intellect in potence ; but, as I wish to avoid all 
confusion, I have chosen to speak only of a thing we 
perceive as clearly as possible, namely, of the mere 
act of knowing, than which we perceive nothing more 
clearly. For we cannot know anything that does not 
conduce to a more perfect knowledge of the act of 
knowing. 

Prop. 32. Will cannot be called a free, but only a 
necessary, cause. 

Proof. — Will, like intellect, is only a certain mode 
of thinking, hence (28) no volition can exist or be 
determined to action unless it be determined by some 



5,8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [rAKT I 

cause other than itself, and this, in turn, by another, 
and SO on to infinity. But if we suppose will to be 
infinite it must be determined to existence and action 
by God, not in so far as he is absolutely infinite 
substance, but in so far as he has an attribute that 
expresses the infinite and eternal essence of thought 
(23). Therefore, in whatever way we conceive it, 
whether as finite or as infinite, it calls for a cause to 
determine it to existence and action ; hence {def. 7) 
it cannot be called a free, but only a necessary or 
constrained cause. Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows, first, that God does 
not act from the freedom of his will. 

Corollary 2. — It follows, in the second place, that 
will and intellect are related to God's nature in the 
same way as motion and rest, and absolutely all 
natural things, which (29) must be determined by 
God to existence and action of a definite sort. For 
will, like everything else, needs a cause to determine 
it to existence and action of a definite sort. And 
although an infinity of things follow when will or 
intellect are granted, yet God cannot on this account 
be said to act from the freedom of his will, any more 
than he can be said to act from the freedom of mo- 
tion and rest, on account of the things that follow 
from motion and rest, for an infinity of things follow 
from these also. Therefore, will no more belongs to 
God's nature than do the rest of the things in nature, 
but is related to it in the same way as are motion and 
rest, and all the other things, which, as we have shown, 
follow from the necessity of the divine nature, and are 
by it determined to existence and action of a definite 
sort. 44 

Prop. 2>Z- Things could not have been produced by 



Prop. 33] OP GOD. 59 

God in any other ivay or in any other order than that in 
which they have been produced. 

Proof. — All things have followed necessarily from 
the nature of God as given (16), and from the neces- 
sity of God's nature have been determined to exist- 
ence and action of a definite sort (29). If, therefore, 
things could have been of a different nature, or could 
have been determined to action of another sort, so 
that the order of nature would be different, God's 
nature, too, could be different from what it is ; hence 
(11) that nature, too, would have to exist, and, conse- 
quently, there could be two or more Gods, which (14, 
cor. i) is absurd. Therefore, things could not have 
been produced by God in any other way or in any 
other order than that in which they have been pro- 
duced. Q. E. D. 

Scholium i. — As in what precedes I have made it 
clearer than noonday that there is in things absolutely 
nothing to justify one in calling them contingent, I 
will here explain briefly what is meant by contingent ; 
but, first, what is meant by necessary and impossible. 
A thing is said to be necessary either by reason of its 
essence, or by reason of its cause. For the existence 
of a thing necessarily follows either from the essence 
and definition of the thing, or from the fact that there 
is an efficient cause. Again, for similar reasons, a 
thing is said to be impossible; namely, either because 
its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or 
because there is no external cause determined to the 
production of the thing. But a thing is called con- 
tingent only in relation to the imperfection of our 
knowledge. For when we do not know that the 
essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or do 
know certainly that it does not involve a contradic- 



6o THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

tion, and yet can make no definite assertion concern- 
ing the existence of the thing because we are igno- 
rant of the order of causes, then the thing cannot 
seem to us either necessary or impossible ; and, 
hence, we call it either contingent or possible. 

Scholium 2. — From what precedes it clearly follows 
that things have been brought into being by God in 
the highest perfection, seeing that they have followed 
necessarily from a most perfect nature. Nor does 
this charge God with any imperfection, for it is his 
perfection that has compelled us to make this asser- 
tion. Nay, from the contrary statement, it would 
clearly follow (as I have just shown) that God is not 
supremely perfect ; for, if things had been brought 
into being in some other way, we should have to 
ascribe to God some other nature different from that 
which, from a consideration of the most perfect Being, 
we are compelled to ascribe to him. I have no doubt 
many will reject this opinion as absurd, and will refuse 
to apply their mind to a careful consideration of it ; 
and that simply because they are accustomed to ascribe 
to God a freedom very different from that {def. 7) we 
ascribe to him — in other words, an absolute will. 
But I have also no doubt that, if they will consider 
the matter and duly weigh my chain of proofs, they 
will wholly reject the sort of freedom they now 
ascribe to God as not only worthless, but a great 
obstacle to knowledge. There is no need of my re- 
peating here what I have said in the scholium to 
prop. 17. Still, for the sake of my opponents, I will 
further show that, even if will be admitted to belong 
to God's essence, it nevertheless follows from his per- 
fection that things could not have been created by 
God in any other way or order. This will be easy to 



Prop. 33] OF GOD. 61 

prove if we consider first the fact, admitted by my 
opponents, that it depends solely on God's decree and 
will that everything is what it is — otherwise God 
would not be the cause of all things. And in the 
second place, that all God's decrees have been ordained 
by God himself from all eternity — otherwise he would 
be charged with imperfection and fickleness. Now, 
since there is in eternity no when, before, or after, it 
follows, from the mere perfection of God, that God 
never can decree anything else, and never could have 
done so ; in other words, that God has not existed 
before his decrees and cannot exist without them. 
But it is said, even on the supposition that God had 
made some other universe, or had from eternity 
ordained other decrees regarding nature and its 
order, that would not argue any imperfection in God. 
But those who say this admit thereby that God can 
change his decrees. For if God had ordained other 
decrees regarding nature and its order than those he 
has ordained, that is, had had some other will and 
thought regarding nature, he would necessarily have 
had an intellect different from that he actually has 
and a will different from that he actually has. And 
if one may ascribe to God a different intellect and a 
different will without any change in his essence and 
in his perfection, what is to prevent his changing his 
decrees regarding created things and nevertheless 
remaining as perfect as before? For his intellect and 
his will regarding created things and their order are, 
in their relation to his essence and perfection, just the 
same, however we conceive them. Again, all the phi- 
losophers I know admit that there is in God no 
potential, but only actual, intellect ; now since, as 
they also admit, neither his intellect nor his will is to 



62 THE PHILOSOPHY OP SPINOZA. [Part I 

be distinguished from his essence, it further follows 
that, if God had actually had a different intellect and 
a different will, his essence, too, would necessarily be 
different. Hence (as I inferred at the outset), if 
things had been brought into being by God other than 
tliey actually are, God's intellect and his will, that is 
(as is admitted) his essence, would have to be different ; 
which is absurd. 

Since, therefore, things could not have been brought 
into being by God in any other way or order, and 
since the truth of this assertion follows from God's 
supreme perfection, there is no sound reason that can 
persuade us to believe that God has chosen not to 
create, in the same perfection with which he knows 
them, all the things that are in his intellect. It will 
be objected that there is in things neither perfection 
nor imperfection ; that that in them which makes 
them perfect or imperfect, and on account of which 
they are called good or bad, depends solely on the 
will of God, and hence, had God chosen, he could 
have made what is now perfection the greatest imper- 
fection, and vice versa. But what else would this be 
than the open assertion that God, who necessarily 
knows what he wills, can by his will make himself 
know things in some other way than as he knows 
them, which (as I have just shown) is highly absurd. 
Hence I can turn this argument against those who 
bring it forward, thus : All things depend upon God's 
power. Therefore, for things to be different God's will 
also would necessarily have to be different ; but God's 
will cannot be other than it is (as I have just shown 
very plainly from God's perfection). Hence things, too, 
cannot be other than they are. I confess this doctrine 
which subjects all things to a certain arbitrary fiat of 



Prop. 36] OF GOD. 6^ 

God and makes them depend upon his good pleasure, 
is less wide of the truth than that of those who main- 
tain that God does all things with some good end in 
view. The latter appear to affirm that there is some- 
thing external to God and independent of him, upon 
which, as upon a pattern, God looks when he acts, or 
at which he aims, as at a definite goal. This is simply 
subjecting God to fate, and nothing more absurd than 
this can be maintained concerning God, who is, as we 
have shown, the first and only free cause as well of 
the essence of all things as of their existence. It is, 
therefore, unnecessary to waste time in refuting this 
nonsense. 45 

Prop. 34. God' s power is his very essence. 

Proof. — It follows from the mere necessity of God's 
essence that God is his own cause (11), and (t6 and 
cor.) the cause of all things. Therefore, God's power, 
through which he himself and all things are and act, 
is his very essence. Q. E, D. 

Prop. 35. Whatever we conceive to be in God's power., 
necessarily exists. 

Proof. — Whatever is in God's power must {by the 
preceding proposition) be so comprehended in his es- 
sence that it necessarily follows from it ; hence it 
necessarily exists. Q. E. D. 

Prop. t,6. There exists notliing from tvhose natui c 
some effect does not follow. 

Proof. — Every tiling that exists expresses in a defi- 
nite and determinate way God's nature or essence 
(25, r^r.), that is (34), everything that exists expresses 
in a definite and determinate way God's power, 
which is the cause of all things. Therefore (16), 
from everything that exists, some effect must follow. 
Q. E. D. 






64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

APPENDIX. 

In the foregoing I have unfolded the nature of God 
and his properties ; as that he exists necessarily ; that 
he alone is ; that he exists and acts solely from the 
necessity of his nature ; that he is, and in what way 
he is, the free cause of all things ; that all things are 
in God, and so depend upon him that without him 
they can neither be nor be conceived ; and, finally, 
that all things have been fore-ordained by God, not 
from the freedom of his will or his absolute good- 
pleasure, but from his absolute nature, or, in other 
words, his infinite power. Moreover, wherever an 
opportunity presented itself, I have taken care to 
remove prejudices which could have prevented the 
reader from seeing the force of my proofs. As, how- 
ever, there still remain not a few prejudices which 
very well could and can prevent men from grasping 
the connection of things as I have set it forth, I have 
thought it worth while to here summon these before 
the bar of reason. Now all the prejudices I here 
undertake to point out depend on just this one ; that 
men commonly suppose that all things in nature act, 
as they themselves do, with a view to some end, nay, 
even assume that God himself directs all things to 
some definite end, saying that God has made all things 
for man, and man that he might worship God. I shall, 
therefore, consider this prejudice first. I shall inquire, 
in the first place, why most persons assent to it, and 
all are naturally so prone to embrace it. In the second 
place, I shall prove that it is false ; and, lastly, I shall 
show how there have sprung from it prejudices con- 
cerning good and evil, 7nerit and sin, praise and blame, 
order and confusion, beauty and ugliness, and other 
things of the sort. This is not the place, however, to 



Appendix] OF GOD. 65 

deduce these things from the nature of the human 
mind. It will here suffice to assume certain facts all 
must admit, namely, that all men are born ignorant of 
the causes of things, and that all men have, and are 
conscious of having, an impulse to seek their own 
advantage. From this it follows, first, that men think 
themselves free for the reason that they are conscious 
of their volitions and desires, and, being ignorant of 
the causes by which they are led to will and desire, 
they do not so much as dream of these. It follows, 
second, that men do everything with some purpose in 
view ; that is, with a view to the advantage they seek. 
Hence it happens that they always desire to know 
only the final causes of actions, and, when they have 
learned these, are satisfied. It is because they have 
no longer any reason to doubt. But if they cannot 
learn these from someone else, nothing remains for 
them to do but to turn to themselves and have re- 
course to the ends by which they are wont to be 
determined to similar actions ; and thus they neces- 
sarily judge another's character by their own. Again, 
since they find in themselves and external to them- 
selves many things, which, as means, are of no small 
assistance in obtaining what is to their advantage, as, 
for example, the eyes for seeing, the teeth for chewing, 
plants and animals for food, the sun for giving light, 
the sea for maintaining fish, and so on — this has led 
them to regard all the things in nature as means to 
their advantage. And knowing that these means have 
been discovered, not provided, by themselves, they 
have made this a reason for believing that there is 
someone else who has provided these means for their 
use. For after they had come to regard things as 
means they could not believe that things had made 



66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part I 

themselves; but from the means which they were 
wont to provide for themselves they had to infer the 
existence of some ruler or rulers of nature, endowed 
with human freedom, who had provided everything 
for them, and had made all things for their use. 
Moreover, as they had never had any information con- 
cerning the character of such beings, they had to 
judge of it from their own. Hence they maintained 
that the gods direct all things with a view to man's 
advantage, to lay men under obligations to themselves, 
and to be held by them in the highest honor ; whence 
it has come to pass that each one has thought out for 
himself, according to his disposition, a different way 
of worshiping God, that God might love him above 
others, and direct all nature to the service of his blind 
desire and insatiable avarice. Thus this prejudice has 
become a superstition and has taken deep root in 
men's minds ; and this has been the reason why 
everyone has applied himself with the greatest effort 
to comprehend and explain the final causes of all 
things. But while they sought to prove that nature 
does nothing uselessly (in other words, nothing that is 
not to man's advantage), tliey seem to have proved 
only that nature and gods and men are all equally 
mad. Just see how far the thing has been carried. 
Among all the useful things in nature they could not 
help finding a few harmful things, as tempests, earth- 
quakes, diseases, and so forth. They maintained that 
these occur because tlie gods were angry on account 
of injuries done them by men, or on account of faults 
committed in their worship. And although experience 
daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of 
instances that good and evil fall to the lot of the pious 
and of the impious indifferently, that did not make 



Appendix] OF god. 67 

them abandon their inveterate prejudice ; they found 
it easier to class these facts with other unknown things 
of whose use they were ignorant, and thus to retain 
their present and innate condition of ignorance, than 
to destroy the whole fabric of their reasoning and 
think out a new one. Hence they assumed that the 
judgments of the gods very far surpass man's power of 
comprehension. This in itself would have been suffi- 
cient to hide the truth forever from mankind, had not 
mathematics, which is concerned, not with final causes, 
but with the essences and properties of figures, shown 
men a different standard of truth. Besides the mathe- 
matics, other causes can be mentioned (I need not 
here enumerate them) which might have led men to 
examine these common prejudices, and have brought 
them to a true knowledge of things. 

In what precedes I have sufficiently developed my 
first point. To show that nature has no predetermined 
end and that all final causes are only human fancies 
needs but little argument. For I think this is suffi- 
ciently evident, both from the bases and causes, 
whence, as I have shown, this prejudice has had its 
origin, and from prop. 16 and the corollaries to prop. 
32, as also from all those propositions in which I have 
proved that everything in nature proceeds by a certain 
eternal necessity, and in the highest perfection. Still, 
I will add that this doctrine of final causes simply 
turns nature upside-down. It regards as effect what 
is really cause, and vice versa. In the second place, 
it makes last what is by nature first. Finally, it ren- 
ders most imperfect what is supreme and most per- 
fect. For (to omit the first two points as self-evident) 
that effect, as is plain from props. 21, 22, and 23, is the 
most perfect which is immediately produced by God ; 



68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

and the more intermediate causes are needed for the 
production of a thing, the more imperfect it is. But 
if the things immediately produced by God were 
made in order that God might attain his end, then 
necessarily the last things, for the sake of which the 
first were made, would be the most excellent of all. 
Again, this doctrine denies God's perfection ; for if 
God acts with an end in view, he necessarily seeks 
something he lacks. And although theologians and 
metaphysicians distinguish between \X\t finis indigenticR 
and the finis assimilationis^^ they nevertheless admit 
that God has done everything for his own sake, and 
not for that of created things. For, except God him- 
self, they can assign no final cause of God's acting 
before the creation, and hence are forced to admit 
that God lacked these things for which he chose to 
provide means, and desired them, as is self-evident. 
Nor must I here overlook the fact that the adherents 
of this doctrine, who have chosen to display their 
ingenuity in assigning final causes to things, have 
employed in support of their doctrine a new form of 
argument, namely, a reduction, not ad impossible, but 
ad ignorantiam j f which shows that there was no other 
way to set about proving this doctrine. If, for exam- 
ple, a stone has fallen from a roof upon someone's 
head, and has killed him, they will prove as follows 
that the stone fell for the purpose of killing the man : 
If it did not fall, in accordance with God's will, for 
this purpose, how could there have been a chance 
concurrence of so many circumstances (for many cir- 

*Literally, "the end of need" and " the end of assimilation." 
The meaning of the terms is sufficiently clear. — Tr. 

f That is, they appeal, not to the absurdity of the opposing doc- 
trine, but to the ignorance of their opponent. — Tr. 



Appendix] OF GOD. 69 

cumstances often do concur) ? Perhaps you will 
answer, it happened because the wind blew and the 
man had an errand there. But they will insist, why 
did the wind blow at that time ? and why did that 
man have an errand that way at just that time ? If 
you answer again, the wind rose at that time, because, 
on the day before, while the weather was still calm, 
the sea had begun to be rough ; and the man had had 
an invitation from a friend; they will again insist, since 
one may ask no end of questions, but why was the sea 
rough ? and why was the man invited at that time? 
And so they will keep on asking the causes of causes, 
until you take refuge in the will of God, that asylum 
of ignorance. So again, when they consider the 
structure of the human body, they are amazed, and 
because they are ignorant of the causes which have 
produced such a work of art, they infer that it has not 
been fashioned mechanically, but by divine or super- 
natural skill, and put together in such a way that one 
part does not injure another. Hence it happens that 
he, who seeks for the true causes of miracles, and 
endeavors, like a scholar, to comprehend the things in 
nature, and not, like a fool, to wonder at them, is 
everywhere regarded and proclaimed as a heretic and 
an impious man by those whom the multitude rever- 
ence as interpreters of nature and the gods. For these 
men know that, with the disappearance of ignorance, 
wonder — their only means of argument and of main- 
taining their authority — goes too. But this I leave, 
and pass on to the third point I proposed to treat 
here. 

After men had persuaded themselves that everything 
that happens, happens for their sake ; they had to re- 
gard that quality in each thing which was most useful to 



70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

them as the most important, and to rate all those things 
which affected tliem the most agreeably as the most 
excellent. Hence, to explain the natures of things, 
they had to frame the notions ^v^i?^/, evil, order, confu- 
sion, ivarm, cold, beauty, and deformity j and from their 
belief that they are free have arisen the notions of 
praise and blame, sin and merit. The latter I shall 
explain below, after discussing the nature of man ; 
the former I will briefly explain here. They have 
called good, everything that conduces to health and to 
the worship of God, and bad everything that is un- 
favorable to these. And as those who do not under- 
stand nature make no affirmations about things, but 
only imagine things, and take imagination for under- 
standing ; in their ignorance of things and of their 
nature they firmly believe that there is order in things. 
For when things are so arranged that, when they are 
represented to us through the senses, we can easily 
imagine them, and hence can easily think them over, 
we call them orderly ; if the opposite be true, we say 
they are in disorder, or are confused. And since those 
things we can easily imagine are more pleasing to us 
than the others, men place order above confusion — as 
though order had any existence in nature except in 
relation to our imagination — and they say that God 
created all things in order, thus unwittingly ascribing 
imagination to God ; unless possibly they mean that 
God, making provision for the human imagination, 
arranged all things in the way in which they could be 
most easily imagined. Nor will it, perhaps, put any 
check upon them that we find an infinity of things that 
far transcend our imagination, and very many that, by 
reason of its weakness, confound it. But of this 
enough. The other notions, too, are nothing but 



Appendix] . of god. 71 

modes of imagining, which affect the imagination in 
various ways : yet they are regarded by the ignorant 
as the chief attributes of things. This is, as we have 
just said, because men believe that everything was 
made for their sake, and call the nature of a thing 
good or bad, sound or rotten and spoiled, according 
as it affects them. For example, if the motion com- 
municated to the nerves by objects represented 
through the eyes is conducive to health, the objects 
which cause it are called beautiful ; those objects, on 
the other hand, that excite a contrary motion, are 
called ^lgly. Again, those that move the sense through 
the nostrils are called odoriferous or stinking ; those 
that move it through the tongue, sweet or bitter, 
savory or unsavory, and so on ; those that move it 
through the touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, and 
so forth. Finally, those that move the ears are said 
to give forth noise, sound, or harmony ; which last has 
driven men so mad that they believed even God takes 
delight in harmony. Nor are there wanting philos- 
ophers who have persuaded themselves that the 
motions of the heavenly bodies compose a harmony. 
All this sufficiently proves that everyone has judged 
of things according to the condition of his brain, or, 
rather, has taken the affections of his imagination 
for things. Hence (to make a passing allusion to 
this point, too), it is not surprising that so many con- 
troversies have arisen among men as we find to be the 
case, and tliat from these skepticism has resulted. 
For although men's bodies are in many respects alike, 
yet tliey have very many points of difference, and, 
therefore, what seems good to one seems bad to 
another ; what seems orderly to one seems confused 
to another ; what is pleasant to one is unpleasant to 



^2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

another ; and so of the other cases, which I here pass 
over, not only because this is not the place to deal 
with them expressly, but also because it is a matter 
of common experience. The sayings : " Many men, 
many minds ; " " Every man is satisfied with his own 
opinion ; " " Brains differ as much as palates ; " — these 
are in everybody's mouth ; and they sufficiently prove 
that men judge of things according to the condition 
of their brains, and rather imagine things than com- 
prehend them. For had they comprehended things, 
all these proofs would, as mathematics bears witness, 
if not attract, at least convince them. 

We see, therefore, that all the fundamental notions 
upon which the ordinary man is wont to base his 
explanation of nature, are only modes of imagining, 
and do not indicate the nature of anything, but only 
that of the imagination. Since they have names, like 
entities existing outside of the imagination, I call 
them entities, not of reason, but of the imagination. 
Hence all arguments against me drawn from such 
notions can 'easily be refuted. Many are accustomed 
to reason as follows : If everything has followed 
from the necessity of God's most perfect nature, 
whence so many imperfections in nature — the stinking 
rottenness of things, their disgusting ugliness, confu- 
sion, evil, sin, and so forth ? But, as I have just said, 
those who reason thus are easily confuted ; for the 
perfection of things is to be determined solely from 
their nature and power, nor are things more or less 
perfect because they please or displease man's senses, 
and are helpful or harmful to man's nature. To those, 
however, who ask : Why did not God create all men 
such as to be led solely by the guidance of reason ? I 
answer only, because he had no lack of material 



Appendix] OF GOD. - • 73 

wherewith to create all things, from the very highest 
to the very lowest degree of perfection ; or, to speak 
more strictly, because the laws of his nature were 
ample enough to suffice for the production of every- 
thing that can be conceived by an infinite intellect, 
as I have proved in prop. 16. These are the prej- 
udices which I undertook to note here. If any more 
of this sort remain, anyone can, by a little reflection, 
correct them for himself.4^ 



PART II. 

OF THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND. 

I NOW proceed to set forth those things tliat neces- 
sarily had to follow from the essence of God, a Being 
eternal and infinite. I shall not, indeed, treat of all 
of them, for I have shown (I, 16) that there must 
follow from this essence an infinity of things in infinite 
ways, but I shall treat only of those which may lead 
us, as it were, by the hand, to a knowledge of the 
human mind and its highest blessedness. 47 

DefinitionsA^ 

1. By body I mean a mode which expresses, in a 
definite and determinate manner, the essence of God, 
in so far as he is considered as an extended thing. 
{^See I, 25, cor^ 

2. I regard as belonging to the essence of a thing that 
which, being given, the thing is necessarily given, and 
which being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken 
away ; in other words, that without which the thing, 
and, conversely, which without the thing, can neither 
be nor be conceived. 

3. By idea I mean a conception of the mind, which 
the mind forms because it is a thinking thing. 

Explanation. — I say rather conception than percep- 
tion, because the word perception seems to indicate 
that the mind is acted upon by the object ; but con- 
ception seems to express an action of the mind. 

74 



Axioms] the MIND. 75 

4. By adequate idea I mean an idea which, in so far 
as it is considered in itself and without reference to 
an object, possesses all the properties or intrinsic 
marks of a true idea. 

Explanation. — I say intrinsic, to exclude the extrinsic 
mark, namely, the agreement of the idea with its 
object. 

5. Duration is indefinite continuance in existence. 
Explanation. — I say indefinite, because it can in no 

wise be limited by the nature itself of the existing 
thing, nor yet by the efficient cause, which, to be sure, 
necessarily brings about the existence of the thing, but 
does not sublate it. 

6. By reality 3.Ti.^ perfection I mean the same thing. 

7. By individual things I mean things that are finite 
and have a determinate existence. If, however, 
several individuals so unite in one action that all are 
conjointly the cause of the one effect, I consider all 
these, in so far, as one individual thing. 

AxiomsA^ 

1. Man's essence does not involve necessary exist- 
ence ; in other words, in the order of nature, it equally 
well may or may not come to pass that this or that 
man exists. 

2. Man thinks. 

3. Such modes of thinking as love, desire, or what- 
ever else comes under the head of emotion, do not 
arise unless there be present in the same individual 
the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc. But the idea 
may be present without any other mode of thinking 
being present. 

4. We perceive by sense that a certain body is 
affected in many ways. 



76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

5. We do not feel or perceive any individual things 
except bodies and modes of thinking. 

See the Postulates after Prop. 13. 

Prop. i. Thought is an attribute of God, that is, God 
is a thinking thing. 

Proof. — Individual thoughts, or this and that 
thought, are modes which express in a definite and 
determinate manner God's nature (I, 25, cor.). God 
therefore possesses (I, def. 5) the attribute, the con- 
ception of which is involved in all individual thoughts, 
and through which they are conceived. Hence, 
thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, and 
it expresses God's eternal and infinite essence 
(I, def. 6) : that is, God is a thinking thing. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This proposition may also be proved 
from the fact that we can conceive an infinite thinking 
being. For the more thoughts a thinking being is 
capable of having, the more reality or perfection do 
we regard it as containing ; a being, then, that can 
think an infinity of things in an infinity of ways is 
necessarily, by virtue of its thinking, infinite. Since, 
therefore, we conceive an infinite being by fixing 
attention upon thought alone, thought is necessarily 
(I, defs. 4 and 6) one of the infinite attributes of God, 
as I asserted. 50 

Prop. 2. Extension is an attribute of God, that is, 
God is an extended thing. 

Proof. — This is proved like the preceding prop- 
osition. 

Prop. 3. There is necessarily in God an idea, both of 
his own essence, and of all those things which necessarily 
follotu from his essence. 

Proof. — God can (1) think an infinity of things in 



Prop. 3] I'HE MIND, 77 

an infinity of ways, or {which is the same thing, I, 16) 
can form an idea of his own essence, and of all those 
things which necessarily follow from it. But every- 
thing that is within God's power necessarily is (I, 35). 
Therefore such an idea necessarily is, and (T, 15) it is 
in God and nowhere else.S^ Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — By the power of God the multitude 
understand God's free will, and his authority over all 
things that are, which consequently are commonly 
regarded as contingent ; for God has, they say, the 
power to destroy all things and to reduce them to 
nothing. Again, they very often liken the power of 
God to that of kings. This I have refuted in I, 32, 
corollaries i and 2, and have shown in I, 16, that God 
acts by the same necessity as that by which he knows 
himself ; that is, just as it follows from the necessity 
of the divine nature (as all agree in maintaining) that 
God knows himself, so from the same necessity it 
follows that God does an infinity of things in an infin- 
ity of ways. Later, in I, 34, I have shown that the 
power of God is nothing else than the active essence 
of God ; hence it is as impossible for us to conceive 
that God does not act as to conceive that he does not 
exist. Moreover, did I care to follow this up further, 
I could show, too, that the power the multitude 
attribute to God not only is a human power (in that 
it shows that God is conceived by the multitude as a 
man, or as like a man), but even that it involves lack 
of power. But I do not wish to discourse so often 
upon the same theme. I merely beg the reader again 
and again to ponder repeatedly what is said concern- 
ing this point in Part I, from prop. 16 to the end. 
For no one will be able rightly to perceive my mean- 
ing unless he very carefully avoids confounding the 



7 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

power of God with the human power or authority of 
kings. 

Prop. 4. The idea of God, from which aft infinity 
of things folloiv in ati infijiity of ways, can be but 
one. 

Proof. — Infinite intellect comprises nothing save 
God's attributes and his modifications (I, 30). But 
God is one (I, 14, cor. i). Therefore the idea of God, 
from which an infinity of things follow in an infinity 
of ways, can be but one. 52 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 5. The formal* being of ideas admits of God 
as its cause, only in so far as he is regarded as a think- 
ing thing, and not in so far as he is manifested in some 
other attribute. That is, the ideas both of the attributes of 
God and of individual things do not admit of their objects 
— -perceived things — as their efficient cause, but God him- 
self, in so far as he is a thinking thing. 

Proof. — The proof is evident from prop. 3 of this 
Part. We there concluded that God can form an idea 
of his own essence, and of all those things which neces- 
sarily follow from it, from the mere fact that God is a 
thinking thing, and not from the fact that he is the 
object of his own idea. It follows that the formal 
being of ideas admits of God as cause, in so far as he 
is a thinking thing. 

Another proof of this is as follows : The formal 
being of ideas is a mode of thinking {as is self- 
evident^, that is (I, 25, cor^, a mode which ex- 
presses in a definite manner the nature of God, in so 
far as he is a thinking thing, and thus (I, 10) involves 
the concept of no other attribute of God, and conse- 
quently (I, axiom 4) is the effect of no other attribute 
than thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas 
* Formal is here about equivalent to real or actual. — Tr. 



Prop. 7] THE MIND. 79 

admits of God as its cause, only in so far as he is re- 
garded as a thinking thing, etc. S3 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 6. The modes of any attribute have God as 
their cause, only in so far as he is considered under the 
attribute of which they are modes, not in so far as he 
is considered under any other attribute. 

jProof—Fj3.ch attribute is conceived through itself 
independently of anything else (I, 10). The modes, 
tlien, of each attribute involve the concept of their 
own attribute, but of no other ; therefore (I, axiom 4), 
they have as their cause God, only in so far as he is 
considered under the attribute of which they are 
modes, and not in so far as he is considered under 
any other attribute. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the formal being 
of things, which are not modes of thinking, does not 
follow from the divine nature because this first knew 
things ; but the objects of ideas follow and are 
inferred from their attributes in the same manner, and 
by the same necessity, as we have shown ideas to 
follow from the attribute of thought. 54 

Prop. 7. The order arid connection of ideas is the 
same as the order and connection of things. 

Proof. — The proof is evident from axiom 4, of 
Part T, for the idea of anything that is caused 
depends upon a knowledge of the cause whose effect 
it is. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that God's power of 
thinking is equal to his realized power of acting. 
That is, whatever follows formally* from God's infi- 
nite nature follows also objectively in God in the same 
order and with the same connection from the idea of 
God. 

* See note to I, 17, schol. — Tr. 



8o THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part li 

Scholium. — Before going further we should recall to 
mind this truth, which has been proved above, namely, 
that whatever can be perceived by infinite intellect as 
constituting the essence of substance belongs exclu- 
sively to the one substance, and consequently that 
thinking substance and extended substance are one 
and the same substance, apprehended now under this, 
now under that attribute. So, also, a mode of exten- 
sion and the idea of that mode are one and the same 
thing, but expressed in two ways ; a truth which cer- 
tain of the Hebrews* appear to have seen as if 
through a mist, in that they assert that God, the intel- 
lect of God, and the things known by it, are one and 
the same. For example, a circle existing in nature, 
and the idea, which also is in God, of this existing 
circle, are one and the same thing, manifested through 
different attributes ; for this reason, whether we con- 
ceive nature under the attribute of extension, or 
under that of thought, or under any other attribute 
whatever, we shall find there follows one and the same 
order, or one and the same concatenation of causes, 
that is, the same thing. I have said that God is the cause 
of an idea ; for instance, the idea of a circle, merely 
in so far as he is a thinking thing, and of the circle, 
merely in so far as he is an extended thing, just for 
the reason that the formal being of the idea of a circle 
can only be perceived through another mode of think- 
ing, as its proximate cause, that one in its turn through 
another, and so to infinity. Thus, whenever we con- 
sider things as modes of thinking, we must explain 

* This may have reference to a passage in the work entitled 
"The Garden of Pomegranates," by Moses Corduero, a Kab- 
balist of the sixteenth century ; or, perhaps, to a passage in the 
" Guide to tlie Perplexed," by Maimonides. — Tr. 



Prop. 8] THE MIND. 8l 

the whole order of nature, or concatenation of causes, 
through the attribute of thought alone ; and in so far 
as we consider them as modes of extension, we must 
likewise explain the whole order of nature soleJy 
through the attribute of extension. So also in the 
case of the other attributes. Hence God, since he 
consists of an infinity of attributes, is really the cause 
of things as they are in themselves. I cannot explain 
this more clearly at present. 55 

Prop. 8. The ideas of individual things or modes 
which do not exist must be comprehended in the infinite 
idea- of God, in the same way as the formal essences of 
individual things or modes are contained in the attributes 
of God. 

Proof. — This proposition is evident from the one 
preceding, but it may be more clearly understood 
from the preceding scholium. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that so long as indi- 
vidual things do not exist, except in so far as they are 
comprehended in the attributes of God, their objec- 
tive being, that is, their ideas, do not exist, except in 
so far as the infinite idea of God exists ; and when 
particular things are said to exist, not merely in so far 
as they are comprehended in the attributes of God, 
but also in so far as they are said to have a being in 
time, their ideas, too, involve an existence, through 
which they are said to have a being in time. 

Scholium. — If anyone wants an illustration to ex- 
plain this matter more fully, I can, indeed, give none 
that will adequately explain the thing of which I 
speak, for it is unique. I will, however, do what I can 
to make it clear. 

The nature of the circle is such that the rect- 
angles formed by the segments of all the straight 




82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

lines which intersect each other in it are equal. 
It follows that an infinity of rectangles equal to each 
other are contained in the circle. Still, no one of 
them can be said to exist, except in so far as the circle 
exists, nor can the idea of any one of these rectangles 
be said to exist, except in so far as it is comprehended 
in the idea of the circle. 

Of that infinite number let us now conceive two 
only, E and D, as existing. Plainly 
their ideas also now exist, not 
merely in so far as they are com- 
prehended in the idea of the circle ; 
but also in so far as they involve 
the existence of those rectangles. 
And by this they are distinguished 
from the remaining ideas of the rest of the rectangles. 5^ 
Prop. 9. The idea of an individual thing, actually 
existent, has God for its cause, not in so far as he is in- 
finite, but in so far as he is considered as afi^ected by 
another idea of an individual thing actually existent, of 
which idea in its turn God is cause, in so far as he is 
affected by a third idea, and so to infinity. 

Proof. — The idea of an individual thing actually 
existent is an individual mode of thinking, and distinct 
from all others (8, cor. and schol); therefore (6), it has 
God, in so far merely as he is a thinking thing, for its 
cause. Not, however (I, 28), in so far as he is a thing 
thinking absolutely, but in so far as he is considered 
as affected by some other mode of thinking ; and of 
this also God is cause in so far as he is affected by 
another, and so to infinity. But the order and con- 
catenation of ideas (7) is the same as the order and 
concatenation of causes ; therefore, of any particular 
idea, another idea, that is, God, in so far as he is con- 



Prop, io] THE MIND. 83 

sidered as affected by another idea, is the cause ; of 
this one, too, he is the cause in so far as he is affected 
by another, and so to infinity. Q. E. D. 

Corolla)'}'. — Whatever takes place in the individual 
object of any idea, the knowledge of this is in God, in 
so far only as he has an idea of the said object. 

Proof. — The idea of whatever takes place in the 
object of any idea is in God (3) not in so far as he is 
infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected 
by another idea of an individual thing {by the preceding 
proposition); but (7) the order and concatenation of 
ideas is the same as the order and concatenation of 
things. The knowledge, therefore, of what takes 
place in any individual object, is in God, in so far 
only as he has the idea of that object. 57 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 10. Substantive beifig does not belong to the 
essence of man, that is, substance does not cojtstitute the 
essence of man. 

Proof. — Substantive being involves necessary exist- 
ence (I, 7). If, then, substantive being belongs to 
the essence of man, granted substance, man would 
necessarily be granted {def. 2) : hence man would 
necessarily exist, which {axiom i) is absurd. There- 
fore, etc. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This proposition is proved also by I, 5, 
which maintains that there are not two substances of 
the same nature. As, however, a number of men may 
exist, that which constitutes the essence of man is not 
substantive being. This proposition is evident, more- 
over, from the other properties of substance, to wit, 
that substance is in its nature infinite, immutable, 
indivisible, etc.; as anyone may readily see. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the essence of 
man consists of certain modifications of God's attrj- 



84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

bates. Substantive being (fy the preceding propositioii) 
does not belong to the essence of man. It is, there- 
fore (I, 15), something which is in God, and which 
without God can neither be nor be conceived, that is 
(I, 25, cor?), a modification, or mode, which expresses 
God's nature in a definite and determinate manner. 

Scholium. — Surely all must admit that without God 
nothing can be or be conceived. For it is an accepted 
fact with all that God is the sole cause of all things, 
both of their essence and of their existence ; that is, 
God is the cause of things, not merely as regards their 
coming into existence, but also as regards their being. 
At the same time most persons say that that belongs 
to the essence of a thing without which the thing can 
neither be nor be conceived. Consequently, they 
either believe that the nature of God belongs to the 
essence of created things, or that created things can 
be or be conceived without God, or, as is more prob- 
able, they are inconsistent. The cause of this I 
believe to be that they have not observed the proper 
order of philosophizing. They have believed the 
divine nature, which should be contemplated before 
everything else, since it is prior both in knowledge 
and in nature, to be last in the order of knowledge, 
and the things called objects of sense to be first of all. 
Whence it has come to pass that, while they contem- 
plated the things of nature, they thought of nothing 
less than they did of the divine nature ; and when 
afterward they brought their mind to the contempla- 
tion of the divine nature, there was nothing they could 
think of less than of their first imaginings, upon which 
they had based the knowledge of the things of nature, 
inasmuch as these could not at all help one to a 
knowledge of the divine nature. Hence it is no 



Prop, ii] ' the mind. 85 

wonder that tliey sometimes contradicted themselves. 
But this I pass over. My purpose here was only to 
give the reason why I did not say that that belongs to 
the essence of anything without which the thing can 
neither be nor be conceived. It is, that particular 
things cannot be or be conceived without God, and 
yet God does not belong to their essence. For my 
part, I have said that that necessarily constitutes the 
essence of anything, which being granted, the thing is 
granted, and which being taken away, the thing is 
taken away ; or that without which the thing, and, 
conversely, which without the thing, can neither be 
nor be conceived. 58 

Prop. 11. The first thing that constitutes the actual 
being of the human mind is nothing else than the idea 
of some individual thing actually existing. 

Proof. — Man's essence {by the corollary to the preced- 
ing propositioii) consists of certain modes of the 
attributes of God ; namely {axiom 2) of modes of 
thinking, in all of which {axiom 3) an idea is prior by 
nature, and when this is present the other modes 
(those, that is, to which the idea is prior by nature) 
must be preeent in the same individual {by the same 
axiom). Thus an idea is the first thing that constitutes 
the being of the human mind. But it is not the idea 
of a non-existent thing, for in that case (8, cor) the 
idea itself could not be said to exist ; it is, then, the 
idea of a thing actually existing. Not, however, of 
an infinite thing. For an infinite thing (I, 21 and 22) 
must always necessarily exist; but this is {axiom i) 
absurd ; therefore the first thing that constitutes the 
actual being of the human mind is the idea of an 
individual thing actually existing. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the human mind 



86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

is a part of the infinite intellect of God. When, 
therefore, we say that the human mind perceives this 
or that, we say merely that God, not in so far as he is 
infinite, but in so far as he is manifested by the nature 
of the human mind, that is, in so far as he constitutes 
the essence of the human mind, has this or that idea ; 
and when we say that God has this or that idea, 
not merely in so far as he constitutes the nature of the 
human mind, but in so far as besides the human mind 
he has also the idea of another thing, we say the 
human mind perceives the thing partially or inade- 
quately. 

Scholium. — Here, doubtless, my readers will stick, 
and will contrive to find many objections which will 
cause delay. For this reason I beg them to proceed 
with me slowly, and not to pass judgment on these 
matters until they have read over the whole. 59 

Prop. 12. Whatever takes place in the object of the 
idea that constitutes the human mi7id must be perceived by 
the human mind; that is, an idea of that thing is 7ieces- 
sarily in the mind. In other words, if the object of the 
idea that constitutes the human inind be a body, nothing 
can take place in that body without being perceived by the 
mind. 

Proof. — Whatever takes place in the object of any 
idea, the knowledge of it is necessarily in God (9, cor.), 
in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of 
that object ; that is (11), in so far as he constitutes 
the mind of anything. Whatever, then, takes place 
in the object of the idea that constitutes the human 
mind, the knowledge of it is necessarily in God, in so 
far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, 
that is (11, cor^, the knowledge of it is necessarily in 
the mind, or the mind perceives it. Q. E. D, 



Prop. 13] the mind. 87 

Scholium. — This proposition is evident also, and 
more clearly understood, from 7, schol., which see. 60 

Prop. 13. The object of the idea that constitutes the 
humaji mind is the body, that is, a definite mode of exten- 
sion actually existing, and nothing else. 

Proof. — If the body were not the object of the 
human mind, the ideas of the modifications of the 
body would not be in God (9, cor.^, in so far as he 
constituted our mind, but in so far as he constituted 
the mind of something else; that is {\\, cor?), the 
ideas of the modifications of the body would not be in 
our mind. But {axiom 4) we have ideas of the modi- 
fications of the body. Therefore the object of the 
idea that constitutes the human mind is the body, and 
that (11) is a body actually existing. Again, if, be- 
sides the body, there was still another object of the 
mind, then, since nothing (I, 36) exists from which 
some effect does not follow, there vvould (11) neces- 
sarily have to be in our mind the idea of some effect 
of this object. But {axiom 5) there is no such idea. 
Therefore the object of our mind is the existing body 
and nothing else. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that man consists of 
mind and body, and that the human body exists, just 
as we perceive it. 

Scholium. — From this we comprehend, not merely 
that the human mind is united to the body, but also 
what is meant by the union of mind and body. No 
one, however, can comprehend this adequately or dis- 
tinctly, unless he first gain an adequate knowledge of 
the nature of our body. AVhat I have proved so far 
have been very general truths, which do not apply 
more to men than to all other individual things, which 
are all, though in different degrees, animated. For of 






88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

everything there is necessarily an idea in God, of 
which God is the cause, just as there is an idea of the 
human body ; hence, whatever I have said of the idea 
of the human body must necessarily be said of the 
idea of everything. Yet we cannot deny that ideas 
differ among themselves as do their objects, and that 
one is more excellent than another, and contains more 
reality, just as the object of the one is more excellent 
than the object of the other, and contains more reality. 
Therefore, in order to determine in what the human 
mind differs from other ideas, and in what it excels the 
others, we must gain a knowledge, as I have said, of 
the nature of its object, that is, of the human body. 
This, however, I cannot here treat of, nor is it neces- 
sary for what I wish to prove. I will only make the 
general statement that, in proportion as any body is 
more capable than the rest of acting or being acted 
upon in many ways at the same time, its mind is more 
capable than the rest of having many perceptions at 
the same time ; and the more the actions of a body 
depend upon itself alone, and the less other bodies 
contribute to its action, the more capable is its mind 
of distinct comprehension. We may thus discern the 
superiority of one mind over others, and we may see 
the reason why we have only a very confused knowl- 
edge of our body ; and many other things which, in 
what follows, I shall deduce from what has been said. 
Hence I have thought it worth while to explain and 
prove these things rather elaborately. To do this, I 
must make a few preliminary statements concerning 
the nature of bodies. 6i 

Axiom I. — All bodies are either in motion or at rest. 

Axiom 2. — Every body moves sometimes more 
slowly, sometimes more rapidly. 



Prop. 13] the mind. 89 

Lemma i. — Bodies are distinguished from one another 
as regards their motion or rest, their swiftness or slow- 
ness, and not as regards their substance. 

Proof. — The first part of this I assume to be self- 
evident. That bodies are not distinguished as regards 
their substance is evident both from I, 5, and I, 8. 
It is still more evident from what has been said in the 
scholium to I, 15. 

Lemma 2. — All bodies agree in some respects. 

Proof. — All bodies agree, in the first place, in that 
they involve the conception of one and the same attri- 
bute {def. i). In the second place, in that they can 
move now more slowly, now more swiftly, or simply 
now move and now remain at rest. 

Lemma 3. — A body in motion or at rest must have been 
determined to motion or rest by another body, which also 
was determined to motion or rest bv another, this again by 
another, and so to infinity. 

Proof. — Bodies {def. i) are individual things, which 
{lemma r) are distinguished from one another as re- 
gards their motion and rest ; therefore (I, 28) each 
must necessarily have been determined to motion or 
rest by another individual thing, namely (6), by 
another body which also {axiom i) is either in motion 
or at rest. But this, too {by the same reasoning^, could 
not have been in motion or at rest if it had not been 
determined to motion or rest by another, and this in 
turn {by the same reasoning^ by another, and so to 
infinity. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that a body in motion 
remains in motion until it is determined by another 
body to come to rest ; and a body at rest remains, too, 
at rest until it is determined to motion by another. 
This is, besides, self-evident. For if I suppose a 



90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

body — A, for instance — to be at rest, and do not 
direct my attention to other moving bodies, I can say 
nothing of the body A except that it is at rest. But 
should it afterward happen that the body A is set in 
motion, that surely could not have been due to the 
fact that it was before at rest ; for from that nothing 
else could follow than the body A should remain at 
rest. If, conversely, A be supposed to be in motion, 
whenever we think only of A, we can make no affirma- 
tion concerning it except that it is in motion. But 
should it afterward happen that A is brought to rest, 
that truly could never have been due to the motion 
which it had before ; from the motion nothing else 
could follow than that A should be in motion. It is 
due, therefore, to something which was not in A, 
namely, to an external cause, by which it was deter- 
mined to come to rest. 

Axiom I. — All the modes, in which any body is 
affected by another body, are a consequence both of 
the nature of the body affected and of the nature of 
the body affecting it ; so that one and the same body 
is set in motion in divers ways according to the diver- 
sity of nature of the bodies setting it in motion ; and 
conversely, different bodies are set in motion in differ- 
ent ways by one and the same body. 

Axiom 2. — When a body in motion impinges upon 
another which is at rest, and which 
it cannot set in motion, it is re- 
flected in such a way that it contin- 
ues in motion, and the angle made 
by the line of reflection with the 
plane of thebody at rest, upon which 
the former body has impinged, is equal to the angle 
which the line of incidence makes with the same plane„ 




Prop. 13] the MIND. 9! 

This is true of the most simple bodies, which are 
distinguished from one another only by motion or 
rest, swiftness or slowness ; now let us pass on to 
those that are complex. 

Definition. — When several bodies of the same size 
or of different sizes are so pressed upon by other 
bodies as to lie against each other, or if they move 
with the same or with different degrees of rapidity, in 
such a way as to communicate to each other tlieir 
motions according to some fixed law, we say that they 
are united to each other, and that all together com- 
pose one body, that is, one individual, which is distin- 
guished from all others by this union of bodies. 

Axiom 3. — In proportion as the parts of an indi- 
vidual, or composite body, are in contact with each 
other by greater or less surfaces, the less or more 
easily can they be forced to change their place, and, 
consequently, the more or less easily can that individ- 
ual be made to take another shape. Hence I shall call 
hard, bodies the parts of which are in contact by large 
surfaces ; soft, those the parts of which are in contact 
by small surfaces ; and fluid, those, finally, whose 
parts are in motion among themselves. 

Lemma 4. — //, from a body, or individual, co?nposed 
of many bodies, some bodies are taken aze.<ay, and at the 
same time Just as many of the same nature take their 
place, the individual laill keep the nature it had before, 
without any change of its essence. 

Proof. — Bodies {lemma i) are not distinguished as 
regards their substance ; but it is a union of bodies 
{Jyy the preceding definition) that constitutes the essence 
of the individual. This {by hypothesis) it retains, even 
though there be a continual change of bodies. The 
individual will retain, therefore, as respects both 



92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

substance and mode, the nature that it had before. 
Q. E. D. 

Lemma 5. — If the compojient parts of ati mdividual 
become greater or less, hut in such a way that all preserve 
the sa7iie relative proportion of motion and rest with 
respect to each other as they did before, the individual 
will likewise retain the nature it had before, without 
any change of essence. 

Proof. — The proof of this is the same as that of the 
preceding lemma. 

Lemma 6. — If the bodies which compose an individual 
are made to change the direction of the motion which they 
have, but in such a way that they may continue their 
motions, and communicate them to one another in the same 
proportion as before, the individual will likewise retain 
its nature, without any change of essence. 

Proof. — This is self-evident. For it retains, by 
hypothesis, all that I have given in its definition as 
constituting its essence. 

Lemma 7. — Moreover, the individual, thus composite, 
retains its nature, whether as a whole it moves or is at 
rest, or whether it moves in this or in that direction, so 
long as each part retains its motion, and conwiunicates it 
to the rest, as before. 

Proof. — This is evident from its definition, which 
see before lemma 4. 

Scholium. — Thus, we see how a composite indi- 
vidual can be affected in many ways, and yet preserve 
its nature. So far we have conceived an individual, 
which is composed merely of bodies that are distin- 
guished from one another only by motion or rest, 
swiftness or slowness, that is, which is composed of 
the most simple bodies. If now we conceive another 
composed of many individuals of different natures, we 



Prop. 13] THE MiXD. 93 

shall find that it can be affected in many other ways, 
and yet preserve its nature. For, since each of its 
parts is composed of many bodies, each part will be 
able {by the preceding lejtima), without any change of 
its nature, to move now more slowly, now more 
swiftly, and hence to communicate its motions more 
swiftly or more slowly to the other parts ; and if we 
further conceive a third class of individuals composed 
of this second kind, we shall find that it can be 
affected in many other ways, without any change of 
its essence. If we go on thus to infinit}', we shall 
easily conceive the whole of nature as one individual, 
whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in an infinity of 
ways, without any change of the whole individual. 
Had it been my professed purpose to treat of body, I 
ought to have explained and proved these things more 
at length. But I have just said that I have another 
purpose, and bring these things forward only for the 
reason that I can easily deduce from them what I 
have undertaken to prove. 

Postulates. 

r. The human body is composed of very many 
individuals of different natures, each one of which is 
highly composite. 

2. Of the individuals which compose the human 
body, some are fluid, some soft, and some hard. 

3. The individuals which compose the human body, 
and, consequently, the human body itself, are affected 
in very many ways by external bodies. 

4. The human body needs, for its conservation, very 
many other bodies, by which it is continually, as it 
were, born anew. 

5. When a fluid part of the human body is deter- 



94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA [Part II 

mined by an external body to impinge often upon a 
soft part, it changes the plane of the latter, and 
imprints upon it certain traces, as it were, of the 
impelling external body. 

6. The human body can move external bodies in 
very many ways, and arrange them in very many 
ways. 

Prop. 14. The human mind is capable of having very 
many pe^^ceptions^ and the more capable, the greater the 
number of ivays in which its body can be disposed. 

Proof. — The human body {postulates 3 and 6) is 
affected in very many ways by external bodies, and is 
adapted to affect external bodies in very many ways. 
But (12) the human mind must perceive whatever 
takes place in the human body. Therefore, the 
human mind is capable of having very many percep- 
tions, and the more capable, etc. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 15. The idea, which constitutes the essential 
being of the human 7nind, is not simple, but composed of 
very many ideas. 

Proof. — The idea, which constitutes the essential 
being of the human mind, is the idea of the body (13), 
and this {postulate i) is composed of many highly 
composite individuals. But there is necessarily in 
God (8, cor^i an idea of each of the individuals which 
compose tlie body. Therefore (7) the idea of the 
human body is composed of these many ideas of the 
component parts. 62 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 16. The idea of any mode, in which the Jiuman 
body is affected by external bodies, must involve both 
the nature of the human body and the nature of the 
external body. 

Proof. — All the modes, in which any body is affected, 
are a consequence both of the nature of the body 



Prop. 17] THE MIND. 95 

affected, and the nature of the body affecting it {axiom 
I, after the cor. to lemma 3). Hence their idea (I, ax- 
iom 4) necessarily involves the nature of both bodies. 
Consequently, the idea of any mode, in which the 
human body is affected by an external body, involves 
the nature of the human body and of the external 
body. Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows, in the first place, 
that the human mind perceives the nature of very 
many bodies along with the nature of its own body. 

Corollary 2. — And it follows, in the second place, 
that the ideas which we have of external bodies indi- 
cate rather the constitution of our own body than the 
nature of external bodies ; as I have explained with 
many illustrations in the Appendix to Part 1. 63 

Prop. 17. If the hu77ian body is affected in a manner 
which involves the natiire of any external body, the human 
mind will regard this external body as actually existing, 
or as present to it, until the body is affected with some 
modification zvhich excludes the existence or presence of 
this body. 

Proof. — This is evident. For as long as the human 
body is thus affected, the human mmd (12) will con- 
template this modification of the body ; in other words 
{ly the preceding propositioii), will have the idea of a 
mode actually existing, which involves the nature of 
an external body ; that is, an idea that does not ex- 
clude tlie existence or presence of the nature of the 
external body, but affirms it. Therefore the mind 
{cor. 1 to the preceding proposition) will regard an exter- 
nal body as actually existing, or as present, until it is 
affected, etc. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — The mind can contemplate, as if they 
were present, external bodies by which the human 



g6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA, [PART II 

body has once been affected, although they do not 
exist and are not present. 

Proof. — When external bodies cause the fluid parts 
of the human body to impinge often upon the softer 
parts, they change {postulate 5) the planes of these 
latter ; whence it happens {axiotn 2 after the cor. to 
lemma 3) that the fluid parts are reflected by them in 
a way different from that in which they were before ; 
and that, after that, when they meet these new planes 
in their spontaneous motion they are reflected in the 
same way as they were when impelled by external 
bodies toward these planes ; and consequently, when 
they continue their motion thus reflected, they affect 
the human body in the same way. Of this the mind 
(12) will think again ; that is (17), the mind will again 
regard the external body as present. This it will do 
as often as the fluid parts of the human body meet in 
their spontaneous motion the same planes. Hence, 
even if the external bodies by which the human body 
was once affected do not exist, the mind will regard 
them as present, as often as this action of the body is 
repeated. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Thus we see how it can be that we regard 
as present things that do not exist, as often happens. 
It is possible that this is brought about by other causes, 
but it is here sufficient that I have shown one by which 
I can explain the thing as well as if I had explained it 
by its true cause. Nevertheless I do not think I am 
far wrong, since all the postulates I have assumed 
contain scarcely anything not in harmony with expe- 
rience, and experience we may not doubt, after we 
have shown that the human body exists just as we 
perceive it (13, cor^. Besides {from the preceding cor., 
and 16, cor. 2) we clearly comprehend the difference 



Prop. i8] THE MIND. 97 

between the idea, for instance, of Peter, which consti- 
tutes the essence of the mind of Peter, and the idea 
of the same Peter, which is in another man, say in 
Paul. The former directly expresses the essence of 
Peter's body, nor does it involve existence, except so 
long as Peter exists ; the latter, on the other hand, 
indicates rather the condition of Paul's body than the 
nature of Peter ; and, therefore, while that condition 
of Paul's body endures, Paul's mind will regard Peter 
as present, even if he does not exist. Further, to keep 
to the usual phraseology, we will call the modifications 
of the human body, the ideas of which represent 
external bodies as present to us, images of things, 
although they do not reproduce the shapes of things. 
When the mind contemplates bodies in this way, we 
will speak of it as imagining. And here, that I may 
begin to show what error is, I would have you note 
that acts of imagination, in themselves considered, 
contain no error ; that is, that the mind does not err 
from the mere fact that it imagines, but only in so far 
as it is considered as lacking the idea, which excludes 
the existence of the things it imagines as present. For 
if the mind, when imagining things non-existent as 
present, knew that these things did not really exist, 
surely it would ascribe this power of imagination to 
a virtue in its nature, and not to a defect, especially 
if this faculty of imagining depended solely upon its 
nature, that is (I, dcf. 7), if this mental faculty were 
free.64 

Prop. \2>. If the human body has once been affected 
simultaneously by two or more bodies^ when the mind after 
that imagines any one of them it will forthwith call to 
reme?nbrance also the others. 

Proof. — The cause of the mind's imagining any 



98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

body is (<^ the preccdi?ig corollary) , that the human 
body is affected and disposed by the traces of an ex- 
ternal body in the same way as it was affected when 
certain of its parts were impelled by that external 
body ; but {by hypothesis) the body was then so dis- 
posed that the mind imagined two bodies at the same 
time ; it will therefore now, also, imagine two at the 
same time ; and when the mind imagines either, it 
will forthwith recollect the other. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — From this we clearly comprehend what 
memory is. It is nothing but a certain concatenation 
of ideas, involving the nature of things outside of the 
human body, which arises in the mind according to 
the order and concatenation of the modifications of 
the human body. I say, in the first place, that it is a 
concatenation of those ideas only that involve the 
nature of things outside of the human body, not of 
the ideas that express the nature of those things ; for 
these ideas are really (i6) ideas of the modifications 
of the human body, which involve both its nature and 
that of external bodies. I say, in the second place, 
that this concatenation follows the order and con- 
catenation of the modifications of the human body, to 
distinguish it from the concatenation of ideas wliich 
follows the order of the understanding, whereby the 
mind perceives things through their first causes, and 
which is the same in all men. From this, furthermore, 
we clearly understand why the mind from the thought 
of one thing immediately passes to the thought of 
another which bears no resemblance to the former. 
For example, from the thought of the word pomum 
(apple) a Roman passes straightway to the thought of 
the fruit, which bears no resemblance to that articulate 
sound, and has nothing in common with it, except 



Prop. 19] ' the mind. 99 

that the body of the same man has often been affected 
by these two ; that is, the man has often heard the 
vfordi pomwn while he saw this fruit. Thus each one 
passes from one thought to another, according as 
custom has ordered the images of things in his body. 
A soldier, for instance, who sees in the sand the tracks 
of a horse, passes at once from the thought of the 
horse to the thought of its rider, and from that to the 
thought of war, etc.; while a rustic passes from the 
thought of a horse to the thought of a plow, a field, 
etc. Thus each one, according as he has been accus- 
tomed to join and connect the images of things in this 
or that way, passes from a given thought to this thought 
or to that. 

Prop. 19. The human mind does not come to a knowl- 
edge of the human body itself, or know that it exists, 
except through the ideas of the modifications by which 
the body is affected. 

Proof. — The human mind is the idea or knowledge 
of the human body (13), which (9) is in God, in so 
far as he is considered as affected by the idea of 
another individual thing. Or rather, since {postu- 
late 4) the human body needs many bodies, by which 
it is continually born anew, as it were ; and since the 
order and connection of ideas is (7) the same as the 
order and connection of causes ; this idea is in God, 
in so far as he is considered as affected by the ideas 
of many individual things. Therefore God has an 
idea of the human body, or knows the human body, 
in so far as he is affected by many other ideas ; and 
not in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human 
mind; that is {11, cor.), the human mind does not 
know the human body. But the ideas of the modifica- 
tions of the body are in God, in so far as he con- 



lOO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

stitutes the nature of the human mind ; that is, the 
human mind perceives these same modifications (12), 
and consequently (16) perceives the human body 
itself, and that (17) as really existing. Therefore, 
only in so far does the human mind perceive the 
human body. 65 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 20. There is in God also an idea or knowledge 
of the human mind, which follows in God in the same 
tvay, and is referred to God in the same way, as the idea 
or knowledge of the human body. 

Proof. — Thought is an attribute of God (i) ; there- 
fore (3) there must necessarily be in God an idea of 
it and of all its modifications, and consequently (11) 
of the human mind also. In the second place, it 
does not follow that this idea or knowledge of the 
mind is in God in so far as he is infinite, but in so far 
as he is affected by another idea of an individual 
thing (9). But the order and connection of ideas is 
the same as the order and connection of causes (7). 
Therefore this idea or knowledge of the mind follows 
in God, and is referred to God, in the same way as 
the idea or knowledge of the body.66 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 21. This idea of the mind is united to the mind 
in the same way as the mind itself is united to the body. 

Proof. — We have proved that the mind is united to 
the body, from the fact that the body is the object of 
the mind (12 and 13); hence, for the same reason, the 
idea of the mind must be united with its object, that 
is, with the mind itself, in the same way as the mind 
is united with the body. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This proposition is much more clearly 
comprehended from what was said in the scholium to 
prop. 7 of this Part. I there showed that the idea of 
the body and the body, that is (13), the mind and the 



Prop. 23] the mind. ioi 

body, are one and the same individual, conceived now 
under the attribute of thought, now under that of 
extension. Hence the idea of the mind and the mind 
itself are one and the same thing, conceived under 
one and the same attribute, namely, that of thought. 
The idea of the mind, I say, and the mind itself fol- 
low in God, by the same necessity, from the same 
power of thinking. For, in truth, the idea of the 
mind — that is, the idea of an idea — is nothing else 
than the essence of an idea, in so far as this is con- 
sidered as a mode of thinking, and without relation to 
its object. For when anyone knows a thing, from that 
very fact he knows that he knows it, and at the same 
time knows that he knows that he knows it, and so to 
infinity. But of this more hereafter. 67 

Prop. 22. The htiinan mind perceives^ not mej-ely 
the modifications of the body, but also the ideas of these 
modifications. 

Proof. — The ideas of the ideas of modifications 
follow in God in the same way, and are referred to 
God in the same way, as the ideas of the modifica- 
tions. This is proved as is prop. 20. But the ideas 
of the modifications of the body are in the human 
mind (12), that is (11, cor?), they are in God, in so far 
as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. 
Hence, the ideas of these ideas are in God, in so far 
as he has a knowledge, or idea, of the human mind ; 
that is (21), they are in the human mind itself, which, 
consequently, perceives not merely the modifications 
of the body, but also the ideas of these. 68 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 23.. The tnind only knozvs itself in so far as 
it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body. 

Proof. — The idea or knowledge of the mind (20) 
follows in God in the same way, and is referred to 



I02 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

God in the same way, as the idea or knowledge 
of the body. But since (19) the human mind does 
not know the body itself; that is (11, cor.), since 
the knowledge of the human body is not referred to 
God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the 
human mind ; neither is the knowledge of the mind 
referred to God, in so far as he constitutes the essence 
of the human mind; and hence (11, cor.), in so far 
the human mind does not know itself. In the second 
place, the ideas of the modifications which the human 
body receives involve the nature of the human body 
itself (16), that is (13), they agree with the nature of 
the mind ; hence the knowledge of these ideas neces- 
sarily involves the knowledge of the mind. But {by 
the preceding proposition) the knowledge of these ideas 
is in the human mind itself. Therefore only in so far 
does the human mind know itself. 69 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 24. The human mind does not involve a7i 
adequate knoivledge of the parts which compose the 
hioman body. 

Proof. — The parts which compose the human body 
do not belong to the essence of the body, except in so 
far as they communicate to one another their motions 
according to a certain definite law (see the def. after 
lemma 3, cor)), and not in so far as they can be 
regarded as individuals without relation to the human 
body. For the parts of the human body are {postu- 
late i) highly composite individuals, the parts of 
which {lemma 4) can be separated from the human 
body, while the nature and essence of the latter are 
preserved intact, and can communicate their motions 
{axiom i, after lemma 3) to other bodies according to 
another law. Therefore (3) the idea or knowledge 
of any part is in God, and that (9) in so far as he 



Prs^OP. 26] THE MIND. 103 

is regarded as affected by another idea of an indi- 
vidual thing, which individual thing is prior in the 
order of nature to the part in question (7). This 
may be said, too, of any part of the individual which 
forms a part of the human body ; hence, the knowl- 
edge of any component part of the human body is in 
God, in so far as he is affected by many ideas of 
things, and not in so far as he has an idea of the human 
body merely ; that is (13), an idea, which constitutes 
the nature of the human mind. Therefore {11, cor.) 
the human mind does not involve an adequate knowl- 
edge of the parts Avhich compose the human body. 7° 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 25. T/ie idea of any modification of the hiunan 
body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external 
body. 

Proof. — I have shown (16) that the idea of a modi- 
fication of the human body involves the nature of an 
external body in so far as the external body modifies 
the human body itself in a certain determinate manner. 
But in so far as the external body is an individual, 
which is not referred to the human body, the idea or 
knowledge of it is in God (9), in so far as God is re- 
garded as affected by the idea of another thing, which 
(7) is prior by nature to the external body itself. 
Hence the adequate knowledge of an external body is 
not in God in so far as he has an idea of a modifica- 
tion of the human body ; in other words, the idea of 
a modification of the human body does not involve an 
adequate knowledge of an external body.71 Q. E. D. 

Prop, 26. The human mind does not perceive any 
external body as actually existing, except through the 
ideas of the modifications of its own body. 

Proof. — If the human body is in no way affected by 



104 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

an external body, neither is (7) the idea of the human 
body, that is (13), the human mind, affected in any 
way by the idea of the existence of that body, or, in 
other words, it in no way perceives the existence of 
that external body. But in so far as the human 
body is in some way affected by an external body, 
the mind (i6 and cor.) perceives an external body. 
Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — In so far as the human mind imagines 
an external body, it does not have an adequate knowl- 
edge of it. 

Proof. — When the human mind contemplates ex- 
ternal bodies through the ideas of the modifications of 
its own body, we say that it is imagining (17, sc/iol.)', 
nor can the mind by any other method {by the preceding 
proposition) imagine external bodies as really existing. 
Therefore (25), in so far as the mind imagines external 
bodies, it does not have an adequate knowledge of 
them. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 27. The idea of any modification of the huniaji 
body does not involve an adequate knottdedge of the human 
body itself. 

Proof. — Any idea of any modification of the human 
body involves the nature of the human body just in so 
far as the human body is regarded as affected in a 
certain determinate manner (16). But in so far as the 
human body is an individual, which can be affected 
in many other ways, the idea of the said modification, 
etc. {See proof of prop. 2 5.) 72 

Prop. 28. The ideas of the modifications of the human 
body in so far as they are referred to the hwnaji mind 
alone, are not clear and distinct , but confused. 

Proof. — The ideas of the modifications of the human 
body involve the nature both of external bodies and 



Prop. 29] THE MIND. 105 

of the human body itself (16); and they must involve 
the nature, not only of the human body, but also of its 
parts ; for the modifications are modes (^postulate 3) 
which affect the parts of the human body, and conse- 
quently the whole body. But (24 and 25) the adequate 
knowledge of external bodies, as well as of the parts 
which compose the human body, is not in God in so 
far as he is considered as .affected by the human mind, 
but in so far as he is considered as affected by other 
ideas. These ideas of modifications are therefore, in 
so far as they are referred to the human mind merely, 
like conclusions without premises ; that is {as is self- 
evident) they are confused ideas. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — It may be proved in the same way that 
the idea which constitutes the nature of the human 
mind is not, considered in itself alone, clear and dis- 
tinct. This applies also to the idea of the human mind, 
and to the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of 
the human body, in so far as they are referred to the 
mind alone, as anyone may readily see. 73 

Prop. 29. The idea of the idea of any modification of 
the humati body does not involve an adequate knowledge 
of the huma?i mind. 

Proof. — The idea of a modification of the human 
body does not (27) involve an adequate knowledge 
of the body itself, that is, does not adequately express 
its nature, or, in other words (13), does not adequately 
agree Avith the nature of the mind. Therefore (I, 
axiom 6) the idea of this idea does not adequately 
express the nature of the human mind ; that is, does 
not involve an adequate knowledge of it. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the human mind, 
.when in the ordinary course of nature it perceives 
things, has not an adequate but merely a confused and 



Io6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

fragmentary knowledge, whether of itself, of its body, 
or of external bodies. For the mind has no knowl- 
edge of itself, except in so far as it perceives ideas of 
the modifications of the body (23). Its own body, 
however, it does not perceive (19), except through 
those very ideas of the modifications through which 
alone (26) it perceives external bodies. Therefore, 
in so far as it has these, it has not an adequate, but 
merely (28 and schol.) a mutilated and confused knowl- 
edge of itself (29), of its body (27), and of external 
bodies (25). Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — I say expressly that the mind has not 
an adequate but merely a confused knowledge of 
itself, of its body, and of external bodies, when in the 
ordinary course of nature it perceives things ; that is, 
when, by chance contact with things, it is determined 
from without to the contemplation of this thing or 
that ; not when, from the fact that it is contemplating 
several things simultaneously, it is determined from 
within to a perception of their liarmonies, differences, 
and oppositions. For when it is determined from 
within in this way or that, things are contemplated 
clearly and distinctly, as I shall show later. 74 

Prop. 30. We can have but a very inadequate knowl- 
edge of the duration of our body. 

Proof. — The duration of our body does not depend 
upon its essence {axiom i), nor yet upon the absolute 
nature of God (I, 21). It is (I, 28) determined to 
existence and action by causes, which are also deter- 
mined by others to existence and action of a definite 
and determinate sort, and these again by others, and 
so to infinity. Hence the duration of our body 
depends upon the common course of nature and the 
constitution of things. But what the constitution of 



Prop. 32] the mind. io? 

things is, of this an adequate knowledge is in God, in 
so far as he has ideas of all things, and not merely in 
so far as he has the idea of the human body (9, cor?). 
Hence there is in God a very inadequate knowledge 
of the duration of our body, in so far as he is consid- 
ered merely as constituting the nature of the human 
mind. That is (i i, r^r.), this knowledge is in our 
mind very inadequate. 75 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 31. We can have but a very inadequate knowl- 
edge of the duration of individual things which are 
external to us. 

Proof. — Every individual thing, like the human 
body, must be determined to existence and action of 
a definite and determinate sort by some other indi- 
vidual thing ; this in turn by another, and so to 
infinity (I, 28). But since I have proved in the pre- 
ceding proposition, from this common property of 
individual things, that we have but a very inadequate 
knowledge of the duration of our body, the sanic 
inference is to be drawn concerning the duration of 
individual things, to wit, that we can have of it but 
a very inadequate knowledge. Q. E. D, 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that all individual 
things are contingent and perishable. For we can 
have no adequate knowledge of their duration {by the 
preceding proposition), and this is what we mean (I, t,t„ 
schol. i) by the contingency of things and the possi- 
bility of decay. Except in this sense (I, 29) nothing 
is contingent. 

Prop. 32. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to 
God, are true. 

Proof. — All ideas, that are in God, absolutely agree 
with their objects (7, cor?), therefore (I, axiom 6) all 
are true. 76 Q. E. D. 



Io8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

Prop. ^^. There is in ideas no positive element, on 
account of which they are called false. 

Proof. — If you deny this, conceive, if you can, the 
positive mode of thinking which constitutes tlie essence 
of error or falsity. This mode of thinking cannot be 
in God {by the preceding proposition) ; and yet out of 
God it cannot either be or be conceived (I, 15)- 
Therefore, there can be in ideas no positive element, 
on account of which they are called false. 77 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 34. Every idea which is in ns absolute, that is, 
adequate and perfect, is true. 

Proof. — When we say that there is in us an ade- 
quate and perfect idea, we say merely (11, cor.) that 
there is in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence 
of our mind, an adequate and perfect idea. Con- 
sequently (32) we say, merely, that such an idea is 
true. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 35. Falsity consists in the privatio?i of knoitd- 
edge that is ifivolved in inadequate or mutilated and 
confused ideas. 

Proof. — There is in ideas no positive element to 
constitute the essence of falsity {'h'h)- But falsity 
cannot consist in absolute privation (for minds, not 
bodies, are spoken of as going astray and being de- 
ceived) ; nor yet in absolute ignorance, for ignorance 
and error are different things. Hence it consists in 
that privation of knowledge which is involved in an 
inadequate knowledge of things, that is, in inadequate 
and confused ideas. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — In the scholium to prop. 17 I have 
explained in what sense error consists in a privation 
of knowledge, but for the fuller explication of this 
I will give an example. Men are, for instance, de- 
ceived in thinking themselves free, a belief which 



Prop. 37] • the mind. 109 

rests upon this alone, that they are conscious of their 
actions and ignorant of the causes which determine 
them. This, then, is their idea of freedom, that they 
know no cause of their actions. Their statement 
that human actions are due to Avill is a collection of 
words, for which they have no idea. For all are 
ignorant of what will is, and how it moves the body. 
Those who boast that they know, and imagine seats 
and habitations for the soul, usually provoke either 
laughter or disgust. Thus, when we look upon the 
sun, we imagine it about two hundred feet away from 
us ; an error which does not consist merely in the act 
of imagination, but in the fact that, while we thus 
imagine it, we are ignorant of its true distance, and 
of the cause of this act of the imagination. And, 
although we afterward learn that it is above six 
hundred diameters of the earth away from us, never- 
theless we imagine it is as near ; for we do not 
imagine the sun to be so near because we are ignorant 
of its true distance, but because the modification of 
our body involves the essence of the sun, in so far as 
the body itself is affected by that object.78 

Prop. ^6. Inadequate ajid confused ideas folloiv by 
the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas. 

Proof. — All ideas are in God. (I, 15) ; and, in so 
far as they are referred to God, are true (32) and 
(7, cor?) adequate. Hence none are inadequate, or 
confused, except in so far as they are referred to 
some individual mind (24 and 28). Hence all, both 
adequate and inadequate, follow by the same neces- 
sity (6, cor). Q. E. D. 

Prop. 37. That tvhich is common to all things (see 
lemma 2, above), and is equally in the part and in the 
7vhole, constitutes the essence of no individual thing. 



no THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

Proof. — If you deny this, conceive, if you can, that 
it constitutes the essence of some individual thing, 
namely, the essence of B. Then [def. 2) it cannot be 
nor be conceived without B. But tliis is contrary to 
the hypothesis. Hence it does not belong to the 
essence of B, nor constitute the essence of any other 
individual thing. 79 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 38. That 7vhich is common to all things, and is 
equally in the part and in the whole, cannot be conceived 
except adequately. 

Proof. — Let A be something that is common to all 
bodies, and that is equally in the part and in the 
whole of each body. I say that A cannot be con- 
ceived except adequately. For the idea of it (7, cor.^ 
is necessarily adequate in God, both in so far as he 
has the idea of the human body, and in so far as he 
has the ideas of its modifications, which (16, 25, and 
27) involve to some degree both the nature of the 
human body and that of external bodies. That is 
(12 and 13), this idea is necessarily adequate in God, 
in so far as he constitutes the human mind, or in so 
far as he has ideas, which are in the human mind. 
The mind, therefore (ii, cor?), necessarily perceives A 
adequately, and that in so far as it perceives itself, its 
own body, or any external body ; nor can A be con- 
ceived in any other way. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that certain ideas or 
notions are common to all men. All bodies {lemma 2) 
agree in some things, and these [by the preceding propo- 
sitio?i) must be perceived adequately, or clearly and 
distinctly, by all. 80 

Prop. 39. That which is common to and a property 
of the human body and those external bodies by which the 
human body is wont to be affected, and which is equally in 



Prop. 40] THE MIND. Ill 

the part and in the whole of each of them — of this 
also there is an adequate idea in the nmid. 

Proof. — Let A be something, which is common to 
and a property of the human body and certain exter- 
nal bodies, which is equally in the human body and 
in these external bodies, and which, finally, is equally 
in the part and in the whole of each external body. 
Of this A there will be in God an adequate idea 
(7, cor?), both in so far as he has an idea of the human 
body, and in so far as he has ideas of the said exter- 
nal bodies. Now, let the human body be affected by 
an external body, through that which they have in 
common, that is, through A. The idea of this modi- 
fication will involve the property A (16) ; and hence 
(7, cor^ the idea of this modification, in so far as it 
involves the property A, will be adequate in God, in 
so far as he is affected by the idea of the human 
body; that is (13), in so far as he constitutes the 
nature of the human mind. Therefore (11, cor?) this 
idea is adequate in the human mind also. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the more prop- 
erties the body has in common with other bodies, the 
more things is the mind capable of adequately per- 
ceiving.81 

Prop. 40. All ideas in the mind, that follow frovi 
ideas which are in it adequate, are themselves adequate. 

Proof. — This is evident. When we say that an idea 
in the human mind follows from ideas which are in 
the mind adequate, we merely say (11, cor.) that there 
is, in the divine mind itself, an idea of which God is 
the cause, not in so far as he is infinite, nor in so far 
as he is affected by the ideas of many individual 
things, but in so far merely as he constitutes the 
essence of the human mind. 



112 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

Scholium i. — In the above I have set forth the 
cause of the notions that are called common, and 
that are the foundation of all our reasoning. But 
of certain axioms or notions there are other causes, 
which it would be a digression to unfold here by my 
method. From these it would appear, which notions 
are the most useful, and which are of scarcely any 
value ; and again, which are common notions, and 
which are clear and distinct to those only who are 
without prejudices ; and, finally, which are unfounded. 
Moreover, it would appear whence the notions called 
secondary, and hence the axioms based upon them, 
have had their origin ; and there would be set forth 
other reflections which I have made at various times 
touching this subject. But since I have reserved these 
things for another treatise, and for fear that I may 
arouse aversion by my excessive prolixity, I have de- 
cided to pass over this matter here. Nevertheless that 
I may omit nothing that it is necessary to know, I will 
briefly mention the causes in which the terms known 
as transcendental have had their origin, as, for exam- 
ple. Being, Thing, Something. These terms arise 
from the fact that the human body, since it is limited, 
is only capable of forming in itself distinctly a certain 
number of images at one time (/ have explained 
ivhat an image is in the scholium to prop. 17). If this 
number be exceeded, the images begin to run to- 
gether ; and if the number of images that the body 
is able to form in itself distinctly at one time be 
greatly exceeded, they are all entirely confused with 
each other. Since this is so, it is evident from 
the corollary to prop. 17, and from prop. 18, that 
the human mind can imagine distinctly at onetime 
as many bodies as there are images that can be 



Prop. 40] the mind. 113 

formed at one time in the body corresponding to it. 
But when the images in the body are wholly confused 
with each other, the mind, too, will imagine all the 
bodies confusedly, and without distinguishing them at 
all. It will grasp them under one attribute, as it were, 
namely, under the attribute of Being, of Thing, etc. 
This can also be deduced from the fact that images 
are not always equally lively ; and from other causes 
analogous to these, which it is not necessary to unfold 
here, for it is sufficient to the object I have in view to 
consider a single one. They all amount to this, that 
these terms stand for ideas in the highest degree con- 
fused. Again, from like causes have sprung the 
notions called universals, as Man, Horse, Dog, etc. 
There are formed in the human body at the one time 
so many images — for instance, of man — that they over- 
come the faculty of imagination ; not, indeed, wholly, 
but to such a degree that the mind is unable to im- 
agine the little differences in the individuals (as the 
color, the size, etc., of each) and their exact number. 
It distinctly imagines only that in which all, in so far 
as they affect the body, agree. By this element, espe- 
cially, the body was affected in the case of each indi- 
vidual ; it is this that the mind expresses by the word 
man ; and this that it predicates of an infinity of indi- 
viduals. As I have said, it cannot imagine the exact 
number of individuals. But bear in mind that these 
notions are not formed by everyone in the same way, 
but differently by each according to the nature of the 
object by which the body has been the more often af- 
fected, and which the mind most easily imagines or 
remembers. For example, those who have more often 
regarded with admiration the stature of men will un- 
derstand by the word man an animal erect in stature. 



114 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

Those, on the other hand, who have been accustomed 
to notice something else, will form another common 
image, as that man is a laughing animal, a featherless 
biped, a rational animal, and so on. Each one will 
form universal images of things according to the char- 
acter of his body. Hence it is not strange that among 
philosophers, who have endeavored to explain nature 
through the mere images of things, there have arisen 
so many controversies. 82 

ScholiuJH 2. — From all that has been said above it 
is clearly evident that we have many perceptions, and 
that we form universal notions : First, from indi- 
viduals, represented to our understanding through the 
senses fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order 
(29, cor.) ; hence I have been accustomed to call such 
notions knowledge from vague experience. Second, 
from signs ; for example, when we hear or read cer- 
tain words, we think of things, and form certain re- 
sembling ideas of them, through which we imagine 
them (18, schoL). Both these ways of viewing things 
I shall hereafter call Knowledge of the First Kind, 
Opinion, or Itnagination. Third : From the fact 
that we have common notions and adequate ideas of 
the properties of things (38, cor., 39 and cor., and 40). 
I shall call this Reason, or Knowledge of the Second 
Kind. Besides these two kinds of knowledge there is, 
as I shall show in what follows, still a third, which I 
shall call Iiituitive Kfiotuledge. This kind of knowl- 
edge proceeds from the adequate idea of the formal 
essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate 
knowledge of the essence of things. I will make all 
this clear by a single example. Three numbers are 
given to find a fourth, which shall be to the third as 
the second is to the first. Without hesitation mer- 



Prop. 43] the mind. 115 

chants multiply the second and the third, and divide 
their product by the first. They do this, either be- 
cause they have not forgotten the rule they received 
without proof from their teacher, or because they have 
often tested it with very simple numbers ; or by virtue 
of the proof of prop. 19 of the seventli book of Euclid, 
namely, from the common property of proportionals. 
But with very simple numbers none of these is neces- 
sary. For example, given the numbers i, 2, 3 — every- 
one sees that the fourth proportional number is 6, and 
we see this much the more clearly in that we infer it 
to be the fourth from the ratio that we see at a glance 
the first bears to the second. 83 

Prop. 41. Knowledge of the first kind is the sole cause 
of falsity, while that of the second and third kinds is 
necessarily true. 

Proof. — I have said in the preceding scholium that 
to knowledge of the first kind belong all those ideas 
that are inadequate and confused. Hence (35) this 
knowledge is the sole cause of falsity. I have said, in 
the second place, that to knowledge of the second and 
third kinds belong all those that are adequate. There- 
fore (34) it is necessarily true. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 42, Knowledge, not of the first, but of the 
second and third kinds, teaches us to distinguish between 
the true and the false. 

Proof. — This proposition is self-evident. He who 
knows how to distinguish between the true and the 
false must have an adequate idea of the true and the 
false ; that is (40, schol. 2), must apprehend the true 
and the false by knowledge of the second or third kind. 

Prop. 43. He who has a true idea, at the same time 
kuoivs that he has a true idea, nor can he doubt of the 
truth of the thing known. 



Il6 THK PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

Proof. — An idea that is true in us is one which is 
adequate in God, in so far as he is manifested by the 
nature of the human mind {\\, cor.). Let us grant, 
therefore, that there is in God, in so far as he is mani- 
fested by the nature of the human mind, an adequate 
idea A. There must necessarily be also in God an 
idea of this idea, and this is referred to God in the 
same way as the idea A [l^y 20, the proof of which is 
general). But the idea A is, by hypothesis, referred 
to God in so far as he is expressed by the nature of 
the human mind. Therefore the idea of the idea A 
must also be referred to God in the same way. That 
is (11, cor.), this adequate idea of the idea A is in the 
mind that has the adequate idea A. Hence, he who 
has an adequate idea, or (34) truly knows something, 
must at the same time have an adequate idea of his 
knowledge, or, in other words, have true knowledge of 
it ; that is {as is self-evident), he must at the same 
time be certain. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — In the scholium to prop-. 21 I have 
explained what the idea of an idea is, but one should 
note that the preceding proposition is sufficiently evi- 
dent of itself. No one who has a true idea is ignorant 
that a true idea involves the highest certainty ; for to 
have a true idea means nothing else than to know 
something perfectly or in the best possible way. No 
one can doubt this, unless he thinks an idea is some- 
thing passive like a picture on a panel, and not a 
mode of thinking, to wit, the act of understanding 
itself. Who, I ask, can know that he perceives 
anything, without first perceiving the thing ? That 
is, who can know that he is certain of anything, 
without first being certain of that thing? Again, 
what norm of truth can there be more clear and cer- 



Prop. 44] the mind. 117 

tain than a true idea? Just as light reveals both itself 
and darkness, so truth is the norm both of itself and 
of what is false. In the foregoing I think I have given 
an answer to the following disputed points : First, if a 
true idea be distinguished from a false one only in 
that it is said to agree with its object, the true idea 
has no more reality or perfection than the false (since 
they are distinguished merely through an external 
relation), nor, consequently, has the man who has true 
ideas any more than the man who has only false ideas. 
Second, how does it happen that men have false ideas ? 
And, third, how can one know certainly that one has 
ideas which agree with their objects ? I think, I say, 
that I have now answered these disputed points. As 
regards the difference between a true idea and a false, 
it appears from prop. 35 that the one is related to the 
other as being to not being. The causes of falsity I 
have very clearly shown from prop. 19 to prop. 35 
with its scholium. From these it is clear what the 
difference is between the man who has true ideas and 
the man who has only false. As to the last point, 
namely, how a man can know he has an idea that 
agrees with its object ; this I have, just above, suffi- 
ciently and more than sufficiently shown to spring 
from the mere fact that he has an idea that agrees 
with its object — in other words, from the fact that 
truth is its own norm. Add to this that our mind, in 
so far as it perceives things truly, is a part of the 
infinite intellect of God (11, cor.). Therefore it is as 
necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind 
must be true as that the ideas of God must be true.84 

Prop. 44. It is of the nature of reason to regard 
things, not as contingent, but as necessary. 

Proof. — It is of the nature of reason to perceive 



Il8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

things truly (41), namely (I, axiom 6), as they are in 
themselves ; that is (I, 29), not as contingent, but as 
necessary. 85 Q. E. D. 

Corollary i. — Hence it follows that it is due only to 
imagination that we regard things, whether with respect 
to the past or to the future, as contingent. 

Scholiuiii. — How this happens I will briefly explain. 
I have shown above (17 and cor?) that the mind, even 
when things do not exist, always imagines them as 
present, unless there present themselves causes that 
exclude their present existence. Again, I have 
shown (18) that, if the human body has once been 
affected by two external bodies simultaneously, the 
mind, whenever, after that, it imagines either one of 
them, will forthwith recall also the other, that is, will 
regard both as present to it, unless there present them- 
selves causes that exclude their present existence. 
Further, no one doubts that we imagine time because 
we imagine some bodies moving more slowly or more 
swiftly than, or equally fast with, others. Let us sup- 
pose, then, a boy, who has yesterday for the first time 
seen Peter in the morning, Paul at noon, and Simon 
in the evening, and to-day again sees Peter in the 
morning. It is evident from prop. 18 that as soon 
as he sees the morning light he will imagine the 
sun passing over the same part of the sky he saw it 
pass over on the day before, that is, he will imagine 
the entire day ; and with the morning he will imagine 
Peter, with the noon Paul, and with the evening 
Simon. In other words, he will imagine the existence 
of Paul and of Simon in relation to future time. If, 
on the contrary, he sees Simon in the evening, he will 
refer Paul and Peter to past time, imagining them, that 
is, simultaneously with past time. This he will do the 



Prop. 45] the mind. 119 

more uniformly, the oftener he has seen them in this 
order. But if he ever happens to see, on some other 
evening, James instead of Simon, he will on the fol- 
lowing morning imagine with the evening now Simon 
and now James, and not both together. For, by 
hypothesis, he has seen only the one or the other, not 
both together, simultaneously with the evening. His 
imagination will therefore waver, and with future 
evening time he will imagine now this one and now 
that. In other words, he will regard neither as cer- 
tainly, but each as contingently, future. And there 
will be this same wavering of the imagination, if we 
imagine things that we conceive in the same way with 
relation to time past or present. Hence we will con- 
ceive as contingent things related as well to present 
time as to time past or future. 

Corollary 2. — It is of the nature of reason to per- 
ceive things under a certain form of eternity. 

Proof. — It is of the nature of reason to regard 
things as necessary, and not as contingent {by the pre- 
ceding propositioii). Moreover, it perceives this neces- 
sity of things truly (41), that is (I, axiom 6), as it is in 
itself. But (I, 16) this necessity of things is the very 
necessity of the eternal nature of God. Therefore it 
is of the nature of reason to regard things under this 
form of eternity. Add to this that the foundations of 
reason are the notions (38) which represent the prop- 
erties common to all things, but do not represent (37) 
the essence of any particular thing ; and which, there- 
fore, must be conceived without any relation to time, 
under a certain form of eternity. 86 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 45. Every idea of a body, or of an indiiddiial 
thing actually existing, 7iecessarily involves the eternal 
and infinite essence of God, 



I20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

Proof. — The idea of an individual thing, actually 
existing, necessarily involves both the essence and the 
existence of that thing (8, cor)^. But individual 
things (I, 15) cannot be conceived without God ; and 
since (6) they have for their cause God, in so far as 
he is considered under the attribute of which they are 
modes, the ideas of them (I, axiom 4) must neces- 
sarily involve the conception of their attribute, that 
is (I, def. 6), must involve the eternal and infinite 
essence of God. Q. E. D, 

Scholium. — By existence I do not here mean dura- 
tion, that is, existence in so far as it is abstractly con- 
ceived, and, as it were, a certain kind of quantity ; 
I am speaking of existence in its very nature, which is 
attributed to individual things, because an infinity of 
things follow in infinite ways from the eternal neces- 
sity of God's nature (I, 16) ; I am speaking, I say, of 
the very existence of individual things, in so far as 
they are in God. For, although each individual thing 
is determined by some other to a particular mode of 
existence, the force by which each persists in existing 
follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of 
God. On this point see I, 24, cor.87 

Prop. 46. The knowledge of the eternal and infinite 
essence of God, which is involved in every idea, is ade- 
quate and perfect. 

Proof. — The proof of the preceding proposition is 
general, and, whether a thing be regarded as part or 
as whole, the idea of it, whether it be the idea of a 
part or of a whole, involves {by the preceding proposi- 
tion) the eternal and infinite essence of God. There- 
fore, that which gives a knowledge of the eternal 
and infinite essence of God is common to all 
things, and is equally in the part and in the whole. 



Prop. 47] THE MIND. 121 

Hence (38) this knowledge must be adequate. 88 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 47 , The human mind has an adequate knowl- 
edge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. 

Proof. — The human mind has ideas (22) through 
which (23) it perceives, as actually existing, itself, its 
body (19), and (16, cor. i, atid 17) external bodies. 
Therefore (45 and 46) it has an adequate knowledge 
of the eternal and infinite essence of God. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — From this we see that God's infinite 
essence and his eternity are known to all. Moreover, 
since all things are in God and are conceived through 
God, it follows that we can deduce from this knowl- 
edge many truths that we may adequately know ; and 
thus develop that third kind of knowledge of which 
I have spoken in 40, schol. 2, and of the excellence 
and utility of which I shall have occasion to speak in 
Part V. That men have not as clear a knowledge of 
God as of common notions arises from the fact that 
they cannot imagine God as they do bodies, and that 
they have connected the word God with images of the 
things that they are accustomed to see — a thing men 
can scarce avoid doing, as they are continually affected 
by external bodies. Many errors, indeed, consist in 
just this, that we apply the wrong names to things. 
For when one says that the lines which are drawn 
from the center of a circle to its circumference are 
unequal, one plainly means by a circle something else 
— for the time being, at least — than do mathemati- 
cians. Thus, when men make mistakes in reckoning, 
they have one set of figures in mind and another on 
the paper. Hence, if you consider their thought, they 
do not make mistakes ; yet they seem to do so, because 
we think they have in mind the same figures as are on 



122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

the paper. If this were not so, we would not believe 
they made any mistake ; just as I did not believe one 
mistaken, whom I heard lately proclaiming that his 
hall had flown into a neighbor's hen. His thought 
appeared to me sufficiently evident. Many contro- 
versies arise from the fact that men do not rightly 
express their meaning, or that they misconstrue the 
meaning of someone else. For in truth, while they 
flatly contradict each other, they are either thinking the 
same thing, or thinking of different things, so that the 
errors and absurdities they suppose in another have 
no existence. 

Prop. 48. There is in the mind no absolute or free 
7i'illj but the mind is determined to this or that volition 
by a cause, which has itself been deterinined by another 
cause, this again by another, and so to infinity. 

Proof. — The mind is a definite and determinate 
mode of thinking (11), therefore (I, 17, cor. 2) it 
cannot be a free cause of its own actions, that is, it 
cannot have an absolute power to will or not to will. 
It must be determined to this or that volition (I, 28) by 
a cause, which has itself been determined by another 
cause, this again by another, etc. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — In the same way it is proved that there 
is in the mind no absolute power of knowing, desiring, 
loving, etc. Whence it follows, these and similar 
faculties are either absolutely fictitious, or only meta- 
physical entities — universals — that we are accustomed 
to form from individuals. Thus, understanding and 
will are related to this or that idea and to this or that 
volition, as lapidity is related to this or that stone, or 
man to Peter or Paul. Why men think themselves 
free I have explained in the Appendix to Part I. Be- 
fore I go further, it should be noted that I mean by 



Prop. 49] THE mind. 123 

will, not desire, but the faculty of afifirming and deny- 
ing ; I mean, I say, the faculty by which the mind 
afifirms or denies what is true or false, and not the 
desire through which the mind seeks or avoids things. 
But having proved these faculties to be universal 
notions, which are not distinguished from the individ- 
uals of which we form them, it remains to inquire 
whether the volitions themselves are anything but just 
the ideas of things. It remains, I say, to inquire 
whether there is in the mind any other affirmation or 
negation than that involved in an idea, in that it is an 
idea. On this point see the following proposition, 
and, to avoid confounding ideas with pictures, see, also, 
def. 3 of this Part. For by ideas I do not mean such 
images as are formed at the back of the eye, or, if 
you please, in the middle of the brain, but the concep- 
tions of thought. 

Prop. 49. There is in the mind no volition, that is, 
no affirmation or negation, except that involved in an 
idea in that it is an idea. 

Proof. — There is in the mind {by the preceding prop- 
osition) no absolute power to will or not to will, but 
only particular volitions, namely, this or that affirma- 
tion, and this or that negation. Let us conceive, 
therefore, some particular volition — for instance, the 
mode of thinking by which the mind affirms the 
three angles of a triangle to be equal to two right 
angles. This affirmation involves the conception or 
idea of a triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived 
without the idea of a triangle ; for it is the same 
thing whether I say, A must involve the conception 
B, or A cannot be conceived without B. In the 
second place, this affirmation {axiom 3), without the 
idea of a triangle, cannot be. Therefore this afifirraa- 



124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

tion cannot^ without the idea of a triangle, either be 
or be conceived. Moreover, this idea of a triangle 
must involve this same affirmation of the equality of 
its three angles to two right angles. Therefore, con- 
versely, this idea of a triangle can neither be nor be 
conceived without this affirmation. Hence {def. 2) 
this affirmation belongs to the essence of the idea of a 
triangle, and is nothing but that idea. What I have 
said of this volition is (since I took it at random) to 
be said also of every volition, namely, that it is 
nothing else than an idea.89 Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Will and understanding are one and the 
same thing. 

Proof. — Will and understanding are nothing but 
particular volitions and ideas (48 and schol). But 
a particular volition and a particular idea are {by the 
preceding propositio)i) one and the same thing. There- 
fore will and understanding are one and the same 
thing. Q. E. D. 

Scholiuni. — In the foregoing I have set aside the 
cause commonly assigned to error. I have shown 
above, moreover, that falsity consists merely in the 
privation involved in mutilated and confused ideas. 
Hence a false idea, in so far as it is false, does not 
involve certainty. When we say, therefore, that a man 
acquiesces in what is false, and has no doubt of it, we 
do not say that he is certain, but only that he does 
not doubt, or that he acquiesces in what is false, 
because no causes are present to make his imagination 
waver. On this point see 44, schol. Consequently? 
no matter how tenaciously we suppose a man to cling 
to what is false, we never speak of him as being cer- 
tain. By certainty we mean something positive (43 
and schol.) not merely the privation of doubt. By 



Prop. 49] THE MIND. ,^ I25 

the privation of certainty, on the other hand, we mean 
falsity. But for the fuller explication of the preceding 
proposition it remains : first, to give warning of cer- 
tain dangers ; second, to ansvver the objections that 
can be made to this my doctrine ; and, third, I have 
thought it worth while to indicate certain useful results 
of this doctrine, that I may remove every scruple. I 
say certain of them ; for the most important ones will 
be better understood from what I shall say in Part V. 
I begin then with the first point, and I warn my 
readers to distinguish carefully between an idea — 
that is, a conception of the mind — and the images of 
things we imagine. It is necessary, in the second 
place, to distinguish between ideas and the words by 
which we indicate things. For these three, images, 
words, and ideas, are by many either wholly con- 
founded, not distinguished with sufift^nt precision, 
or not distinguished with sufficient care. Hence they 
are wholly ignorant of this doctrine of the will, a doc- 
trine the acceptance of which is truly necessary, as 
well for speculation as for the wise ordering of life. 
Of course, those who think that ideas consist in 
images formed in us on meeting bodies persuade them- 
selves that the ideas of things of which we can form 
no resembling image are not ideas, but mere figments, 
which we frame by an exercise of free will. They 
look upon ideas, then, as passive pictures upon a 
panel; and, possessed by this prejudice, they do not 
see that an idea, in that it is an idea, involves affirma- 
tion or negation. Again, those who confound the 
words with the idea, or even with the affirmation 
involved in the idea, think that they can will some- 
thing contrary to what they perceive, when they affirm 
or deny in words only something contrary to what 



126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

they perceive. He, however, vi^ill be able easily to 
shake off these prejudices, who fixes attention upon 
the nature of thought, in which the conception of 
extension is not involved in the least ; and who, there- 
fore, clearly understands that an idea (since it is a 
mode of thinking) consists neither in the image of a 
thing, nor in words. For the essence of words and 
of images is composed of bodily motions solely, and 
these do not involve at all the conception of thought. 
These few words of admonition will suffice, so I 
pass to the aforesaid objections. The Jirsf of them is 
— and they think this undisputed — that the will extends 
farther than the understanding, and therefore is dif- 
ferent from it. And the reason why they think the 
will extends farther than the understanding is, that 
they say they have found by experience that they do 
not need a greater power of assenting — affirming — or 
denying, in order to assent to an infinity of other 
things, which we do not perceive, than we now have ; 
but that they do need a greater power of understand- 
ing. The will is therefore distinguished from the 
understanding in that the latter is made finite, and the 
former infinite. Second, the objection can be raised 
that experience seems to teach nothing more clearly 
than that we can suspend judgment and not assent 
to what we perceive. This is also confirmed by the 
fact that no one is said to be deceived in so far as he 
perceives something, but only in so far as he assents 
or dissents. For example, he who imagines a winged 
horse does not, on that account, admit that there is 
a winged horse ; that is, he does not, on that account, 
make a mistake, unless he at the same time admit there 
is a winged horse. Experience, therefore, seems to 
teach nothing more clearly than this, that the will, or 



Prop. 49] THE MIND. 127 

the power of giving assent, is free, and different from 
the power of understanding. Third, the objection 
can be made that one affirmation does not seem to 
contain more reality than another ; that is, we do not 
seem to need a greater power for affirming to be true 
what is true, than for affirming to be true something 
that is false ; but we do perceive that one idea has more 
reality or perfection than another, for some ideas are 
as much more perfect than others as are their objects 
more excellent than the objects of those others. 
This, too, seems to establish a difference between will 
and understanding. Fourth, the objection can be 
made : If a man does not act from free will, what will 
happen if he be in equilibrium, like Buridan's ass ? 
will he die of hunger and thirst ? If I admit this, 
I would seem to be thinking of an ass or the statue 
of a man, and not of a man. If, on the other hand, 
I deny it, I make him self-determining, and, conse- 
quently, possessed of the power of going and doing 
whatever he wants. Perhaps other objections than 
these can be made, but as I am not obliged to crowd 
in everything anyone can dream of, I shall set myself 
to answer these objections only, and that as briefly as 
I can. 

In answer to the first, I say that I admit the will 
extends farther than the understanding, if by the 
understanding be meant clear and distinct ideas only ; 
but I deny that the will extends farther than the per- 
ceptions, that is, the faculty of conceiving. Nor, 
indeed, do I see why the faculty of willing should be 
said to be infinite rather than the faculty of perceiving. 
Just as by the faculty of willing we can affirm an 
infinity of things (one after another, however, for we 
cannot afiirm an infinity of things simultaneously), so. 



128 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

by the faculty of perceiving, we can perceive by sense 
or become aware of an infinity of bodies (of course, 
one after another). If it be said, there are an infinity 
of things that we cannot perceive, I retort, we cannot 
attain to these same things by any thought, nor, conse- 
quently, by any power of willing. It is objected, if 
God chose to make us perceive these things also, he 
would indeed have to give us a greater power of per- 
ceiving, but not a greater power of willing, than he 
has given us. This is the same as saying that if God 
should choose to make us comprehend an infinity of 
other beings, it would, indeed, be necessary for him to 
give us a greater understanding than he has given us, 
but not a more general idea of being with which to 
embrace this infinity of beings. For we have shown 
the will to be a universal, that is, an idea by which we 
explain all particular volitions, or, rather, what is com- 
mon to them all. When, tlierefore, persons believe 
that this idea common to all volitions — this universal 
idea — is a faculty, no wonder they say this faculty 
extends infinitely beyond the limits of the understand- 
ing. A universal is predicated equally of one, of sev- 
eral, or of an infinity of individuals. 

The second objection I answer by denying that we 
have a free power of suspending judgment. When 
we say that one is suspending judgment, we say only 
that he sees he does not adequately perceive a thing. 
Hence suspending judgment is really perception and 
not free will. To understand this clearly, let us con- 
ceive a boy imagining a horse, and not perceiving any- 
thing else. Since this image involves the existence of 
the horse (17, ^^r.), and the boy does not perceive 
anything that denies the existence of the horse, he 
will necessarily regard the horse as present, nor will 



Prop. 49] THE MIND. 129 

ne be able to doubt its existence, although he is not 
certain of it. This we daily experience in dreams, 
but I do not believe there is anyone who thinks that 
he, while he is dreaming, has a free power of suspend- 
ing judgment on the things he is dreaming, and of 
bringing it about that he should not dream he sees 
the things he is dreaming he sees. Nevertheless, it 
happens that even in dreams we suspend judgment, 
as when we dream that we are dreaming. Further- 
more, I admit that no one makes a mistake in so far 
as he perceives ; that is, I admit that the imaginations 
of the mind, in themselves considered, involve no 
error (17, sc/iol.) ; but I deny that a man, in so far as 
he perceives, makes no affirmation. What is it to 
perceive a winged horse, if not to affirm that a horse 
has wings ? For if the mind perceived nothing but 
the winged horse, it would regard it as present ; and 
it would have no cause to doubt of its existence, nor 
any power of dissenting, unless the image of the 
winged horse were connected with an idea that denied 
the existence of said horse, or unless it perceived its 
idea of a winged horse to be inadequate, in which case 
it would either necessarily deny the existence of said 
horse or necessarily doubt it. 

With this I think I have answered the third objec- 
tion also ; namely, in showing that will is a universal, 
predicated of all ideas, and that it signifies only what 
is common to all ideas, that is, an affirmation. Of 
this, consequently, the adequate essence, in so far as 
it is thus abstractly conceived, must be in every idea, 
and for this reason must be the same in all. But this 
is not true of it in so far as it is considered as con- 
stituting the essence of an idea, for in so far particular 
affirmations differ from each other as much as do ideas 



130 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

themselves. For example, the affirmation involved in 
the idea of a circle differs as much from that involved 
in the idea of a triangle as the idea of a circle does 
from the idea of a triangle. Again, I deny absolutely 
that we need an equal power of thinking to affirm 
that to be true which is true, and to affirm that to be 
true which is false. These two affirmations, from the 
point of view of the mind, are related to each other as 
being to not-being, for there is in ideas nothing posi- 
tive that constitutes the essence of falsity (35 and 
schol., and 47, sc/iol.). One must note, therefore, 
especially, how easily we make mistakes when we 
confound universals with particulars, and entities of 
the reason and abstractions with real things. 

Finally, as concerns ih.e fourth objection, I say that 
I quite admit that a man in such a state of equilib- 
rium (one, namely, who perceives nothing but hunger 
and thirst, and such food and drink placed at equal 
distances from him) will perish of hunger and thirst. 
If I be asked, is not such a man to be regarded as 
rather an ass than a man ? I say, I do not know ; just 
as I do not know how one should regard a man that 
hangs himself, or how one should regard children, 
fools, those of unsound mind, etc. 

It remains to indicate how much the knowledge of 
this doctrine contributes to the service of life, and 
this we shall easily comprehend from the following : 
First, it is of value in that it teaches us that we act 
solely according to God's decree, and are partici- 
pants in the divine nature ; and this the more, the 
more perfect the actions we perform, and the better 
and better we comprehend God. Hence this doctrine 
not only sets the soul completely at rest, but also 
teaches us in what our highest felicity or blessedness 



Prop. 49] the mind. 131 

consists, to wit, only in the knowledge of God, which 
leads us to do only those things that love and piety 
recommend. Thus we see clearly how far from a true 
estimate of virtue are those who expect God to honor 
them with the highest rewards for their virtue and 
good actions, as though for the extremest slavery — as 
if virtue and the service of God were not felicity 
itself and the completest freedom. Second, it is of 
value in that it teaches us how to behave with regard to 
those things which depend upon fortune, and which 
are not within our power, that is, with regard to those 
things that do not follow from our nature. It teaches 
us, namely, to look forward to and to endure either 
aspect of fortune with equanimity, just because all 
things follow from the eternal decree of God, by the 
same necessity with which it follows from the essence 
of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two 
right angles. Third, this doctrine is of service to 
social life, in that it teaches to hate no one, to despise, 
to ridicule, to be angry at no one, to envy no one. It 
is of service, further, in that it teaches each one to be 
content with what he has, and to aid his neighbor, not 
from womanish pity, partiality, or superstition, but 
solely under the guidance of reason, according to the 
demands of the time and the case. This I shall show 
in Part III. Fourth, this doctrine is of no little 
advantage to the state, in that it shows how citi- 
zens ought to be governed and led ; namely, not so 
as to act like slaves, but so as to do freely what is 
best. 

With this I have fulfilled the task I set myself in 
this scholium, and here I bring to a close this my 
second Part. In it I think I have explained the 
nature of the human mind and its properties sufifi- 



132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

ciently at length, and, so far as the difficulty of the 
subject admits of it, with clearness. And I have set 
forth truths from which can be inferred, as will in 
part appear from what follows, much that is very 
excellent and exceedingly useful, and that it is neces- 
sary to know. 90 



PART III. 

OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE 
EMOTIONS. 

Most of those who have written on the emotions 
and on human conduct seem to be treating not of 
natural things that obey the general laws of nature, 
but of things that lie outside of nature. Indeed, they 
appear to conceive of man in nature as a realm within 
a realm. For they regard man as rather disturbing 
than following the order of nature, as having absolute 
power over his actions, and as being determined solely 
by himself. Furthermore, human infirmity and in- 
constancy they attribute, not to the general power of 
nature, but to I know not what defect in human 
nature, which, accordingly, they bewail, deride, despise, 
or, more commonly, denounce ; and he who has 
learned to carp the most eloquently or the most in- 
geniously at the infirmity of the human mind is re- 
garded as a prophet. There have not been lacking, it 
is true, distinguished men (to whose labor and in- 
dustry I confess I owe much), who have written many 
excellent things concerning the right conduct of life, 
and have given to mortals counsels full of wisdom ; 
but yet no one, so far as I know, has determined the 
nature and strength of the emotions, and what the 
mind can do toward keeping them within bounds. I 
know, indeed, that the illustrious Descartes, although 
he believed the mind to have absolute power over its 



134 'i'HE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [I'ART III 

actions, yet endeavored to explain human emotions by 
their first* causes, and to show how the mind can gain 
absolute control over the emotions ; but in my opinion 
he shows nothing but the acuteness of his own great 
mind, as I shall prove in the proper place, for I wish 
to return to those who would rather denounce or 
deride human emotions and actions than comprehend 
them. To these it will no doubt seem strange that I 
undertake to treat of human defects and follies by the 
geometrical method, and wish to prove by rigid reason- 
ing what they proclaim to be inconsistent with reason, 
unmeaning, absurd, and dreadful. But my reason is 
this : nothing happens in nature that can be attributed 
to a defect in it ; for nature is always the same, and 
its virtue or power of acting is everywhere one and the 
same ; that is, the laws and rules of nature, according 
to which all things come to pass and undergo their 
changes of form, are everywhere and always the same ; 
consequently there should be also one and the same 
method of comprehending the nature of things of 
whatever kind, namely, through the general laws and 
rules of nature. Therefore the emotions of hate, 
anger, envy, etc., considered in themselves, follow 
from the same necessity and power of nature as do all 
other particular things ; and hence own to definite 
causes, through which they are comprehended, and 
have definite properties as worthy of our knowledge as 
the properties of any other thing in the mere contem- 
plation of which we take delight. I shall treat, there- 

* Descartes distinguished between the proximate cause of the pas- 
sions — the movement of the pineal gland by the animal spirits — 
and their first causes, by which he meant the objects which act 
upon the senses and thus give rise to passions C^Les Passions de 
I'Ame.," Art. 51}. 



Preface] ' the emotions. 135 

fore, of the nature and force of the emotions, and of 
the power which the mind has over them, by the same 
method as, in what precedes, I have treated of God 
and of the mind ; and I shall consider human actions 
and appetites just as though I were dealing with lines, 
surfaces, or solids. 

Definitions S)'^ 

1. I call a cdi\\?,& adecjuaie, when through it its effect 
can be clearly and distinctly perceived. On the other 
hand, I call inadequate or partial, one whose effect 
cannot be comprehended through it alone. 

2. When there takes place anything in us or outside 
of us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is {by 
the preceding definition), when there follows from our 
nature anything in us or outside of us which can 
be clearly and distinctly comprehended through our 
nature alone, I say that we are active. But when, on 
the other hand, there takes place anything in us, or 
when anything follows from our nature, of which we are 
only the partial cause, I say that we 2^x0. passive. 

3. By emotion I mean modifications of the body, by 
which the body's power of acting is increased or 
diminished, assisted or restrained, and also the ideas 
of these modifications. 

//", therefore, we can be the adequate cause of any one 
of these modifications, by emotion I mean an action j 
otherwise I mean a passion. 

Postulates. 

I. The human body can be affected in many ways 
by which its power of acting is increased or dimin- 
ished, and in still other ways which render its power 
of acting neither greater nor less. 



136 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

This postulate or axiom rests upon postulate i and 
lemmas 5 and 7, q. v. after II, 13. 

2. The human body can undergo many changes, 
and nevertheless retain the impressions or traces of 
objects {II, postulate 5), and, consequently, the same 
images of things. For the definition of these, see II, 
17, schol. 

Prop. i. Our mind is in some respects active and in 
some respects passive : in so far as it has adequate ideas 
it is necessarily active, and in so far as it has inadequate 
ideas, it is necessarily passive. 

Proof. — Some of the ideas in every human mind 
are adequate, while others are fragmentary and con- 
fused (II, 40, schol.). Now the ideas that are ade- 
quate in any mind are adequate in God in so far as 
he constitutes the essence of that mind (II, 11, cor.); 
and those that are inadequate in a mind are adequate 
in God {by the same corollary), not in so far as he con- 
tains within himself merely the essence of that mind, 
but in so far as he at the same time contains within 
himself the minds of other things. Again, granted 
any idea, some effect must necessarily follow (I, 36), 
and of this effect God is the adequate cause {def. i), 
not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is 
considered as affected by the aforesaid idea (II, 9). 
But of an effect, of which God is the cause in so far 
as he is affected by an idea which is adequate in 
a given mind, that mind is the adequate cause (II, 
IT, cor.). Hence our mind {def. 2), in so far as it has 
adequate ideas, is necessarily active. This was the 
first point. In the second place, a man's mind is not 
the adequate, but a partial, cause of anything that 
necessarily follows from an idea that is adequate in 
God, not in so far as he contains merely the mind of 



Prop. 2] THE EMOTIONS. 137 

that man, but in so far as he contains together with it 
also the minds of other things (II, ii, cor.). Hence 
{def. 2), in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas, it 
is necessarily passive. This was the second point. 
Therefore our mind, etc. 92 Q. E. D. 

Co7'ollary. — Hence it follows that, the more inade- 
quate ideas the mind has, the greater the number of 
passions to which it is subject ; and, on the other 
hand, the greater the number of its adequate ideas, 
the greater the number of its activities. 

Prop. 2. T]ie body cannot determine the mind to think, 
nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or 
any other state, if there be any other. 

Proof. — Every mode of thinking has God for its 
cause in so far as he is a thinking thing, and not in so 
far as he is expressed by some other attribute (II, 6). 
Hence whatever determines the mind to think is a 
mode of thought and not a mode of extension ; that 
is (II, def. i) it is not a body. This was the first 
point. In the second place, the motion or rest of one 
body must be due to another body, which in turn was 
determined to motion or rest by another, and abso- 
lutely everything that takes place in a body must 
have had its source in God in so far as he is con- 
sidered as affected by some mode of extension, and 
not by some mode of thought (II, 6) ; in other words, 
it cannot have its source in the mind, which (II, 11) 
is a mode of thought. This was the second point. 
Therefore, the body cannet determine the mind to 
think, etc. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This may be more clearly comprehended 
from what I have said in II, 7, schol., to wit, that the 
mind and the body are one and the same thing, con- 
ceived now under the attribute of thought, now under 



'138 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

that of extension. Whence it happens that the order 
or concatenation of things is the same, whether we 
conceive nature under this attribute or that ; and 
that, consequently, the order of the things done and 
suffered by our body is by nature the same as the 
order of the actions and passions of the mind. This 
is also evident from the proof I have given of prop. 12, 
Part II. 

These arguments leave no room for doubt, but 
nevertheless I scarcely think I can induce men to 
weigh them with an unprejudiced mind, unless I sup- 
port the doctrine by an appeal to experience, so 
firmly are men persuaded that the body is set in 
motion and is brought to rest solely at the mind's 
good pleasure, and performs a multitude of actions 
which depend only on the mind's choice and ability 
to think. For as yet no one has determined of what 
the body is capable ; in other words, experience has 
as yet taught no one what the body can do according 
to the laws of nature, considered merely as corporeal 
nature, and what it cannot do unless it be determined 
by the mind. For no one has as yet a sufficiently 
accurate knowledge of the structure of the body to be 
able to explain all its functions ; to say nothing of 
the fact that we observe in brutes many actions that 
far surpass human sagacity, and that somnambulists 
do a great many things while asleep that they would 
not dare to do when awake ; which sufficiently proves 
that the body, in accordance with the laws of its own 
nature solely, can do much that its mind wonders at. 

Again, no one knows how or by what means the 
mind moves the body, nor how many degrees of 
motion it can impart to the body, and how swiftly it 
can move it. Hence it follows that when men say 



Prop. 2] THE EMOTIONS. 139 

that this or that action of the body has its source in 
the mind, which controls the body, they do not know 
what they are saying, and merely confess in high- 
sounding words that they are ignorant of the true 
cause of that action and do not wonder at it. 

They will object that, whether they do or do not 
know by what means the mind moves the body, yet 
they know by experience that if the human mind were 
not capable of thinking, the body would be motionless. 
Furthermore, that they know by experience that it is 
within the power of the mind alone to speak or to 
remain silent, and to do many other things which, 
consequently, they believe to depend upon the mind's 
decree. 

But, as regards the first point, I ask those who urge 
this objection whether experience does not also show 
that if the body remains motionless, the mind is inca- 
pable of thinking? For when the body comes to, rest 
in sleep, the mind slumbers with it, and has not the 
power of thinking it has when awake. Again, I think 
everyone knows by experience that the mind is not 
always equally capable of thinking about the same 
object ; but, according as the body is the better adapted 
to having the image of this or that object excited in 
it, the mind is the more capable of contemplating this 
or that object. It will be objected that one cannot, 
from the laws of nature, when nature is regarded 
merely as corporeal, deduce the causes of buildings, 
paintings, and things of this sort, which are due solely 
to human skill, nor could the human body, unless it 
were determined and guided by the mind, build a 
temple. But I have already shown that those who 
reason thus do not know what the body can do, or 
what can be deduced from a mere contemplation of 



140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

its nature, and that they do know by experience that a 
great many things take place merely according to the 
laws of nature, that they never would have believed 
could take place except under the direction of the 
mind. Such are the acts performed by somnambulists 
during sleep — acts which they themselves wonder at 
when awake. I would, moreover, call attention to 
the structure of the human body, which vastly sur- 
passes in ingenuity anything constructed by human 
skill, to say nothing of the truth, proved above, that 
an infinity of things must follow from nature con- 
sidered under any attribute whatever. 

And as regards the second point, surely the condi- 
tion of human affairs would be much more satisfactory 
if it were as much within man's power to be silent as 
to speak. But experience gives sufficient and more 
than sufficient proof of the fact that there is nothing 
less under a man's control than his tongue, nor is there 
anything of which a man is less capable than of restrain- 
ing his impulses. This is the reason most persons 
believe that we are free only in doing those things to 
which we are impelled by slight desires, for the im- 
pulse to do such things can be easily checked by the 
memory of some other thing of which we often think ; 
but that we are by no means free in doing those things 
to which we are impelled by strong emotion, which 
cannot be checked by the memory of some other 
thing. But, had they not had experience of the 
fact that we do many things which we afterward 
regret, and that we often, when we are harassed by 
conflicting emotions, see the better and follow the 
worse, nothing would prevent them from believing 
that we are always free in our actions. Thus the 
infant believes it desires milk of its own free will ; the 



Prop. 2] THE EMOTIONS. I4I 

angry child that it is free in seeking revenge, and the 
timid that it is free in taking to flight. Again, a 
drunken man believes that he says of his own free will 
things he afterward, when sober, wishes he had left 
unsaid ; so also an insane man, a garrulous woman, a 
child, and very many others of the sort, believe they 
speak of their own free will, while, nevertheless, they 
are unable to control their impulse to talk. Thus 
experience itself shows, no less clearly than reason, 
that men think themselves free only because they are 
conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes 
which determine them. It shows, moreover, that the 
mind's decisions are nothing but its impulses which 
vary with the varying condition of the body. For 
everyone regulates his actions as his emotions dictate ; 
and those who are harassed by conflicting emotions 
do not know what they want ; while those who are 
not controlled by any emotion are driven hither and 
thither by the slightest motive. All this certainly 
shows clearly that the mind's decision, as well as its 
impulse and the determining of the body, all are by 
nature simultaneous, or rather all are one and the 
same thing, which, when it is considered under and 
expressed by the attribute of thought, we call a 
decision, and when it is considered under the attri- 
bute of extension, and deduced from the laws of 
motion and rest, we call a determining. This will be 
still clearer from what I shall say later. But the 
point I would have you especially note here is that we 
cannot do anything by a decision of the mind unless 
we remember it. We cannot, for example, speak a 
word unless we remember that word. Moreover, it is 
not within the free power of the mind to remember a 
thing or to forget it. Hence it is believed that this 



142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

alone is within the power of the mind : we can by the 
mere decision of the mind hold our peace concerning 
a thing we remember, or speak of it. But when we 
dream that we are speaking, we think we are speaking 
because our mind has freely decided to speak, and yet 
we are not speaking, or if we are speaking, it is due to 
a spontaneous motion of the body. Again, we dream 
that we are concealing things from men, and that by 
the same decision of the mind as that by which, when 
we are awake, we choose to hold our peace concerning 
the things we know. Finally we dream that, by the 
decision of our mind, we are doing things we do not 
dare to do when awake. 

In view of all this I should very much like to know 
whether there are in the mind two sorts of decisions, 
the one imaginary and the other free ? If such an 
absurdity is out of the question one must necessarily 
admit that this decision of the mind, which is thought 
to be free, is not distinguishable from imagination or 
memory, and is nothing but the affirmation necessa- 
rily involved in an idea, in that it is an idea (II, 49). 
Hence these decisions of the mind arise in the mind 
by the same necessity as the ideas of things actually 
existing. Those, therefore, who think that they 
speak, or hold their peace, or do anything whatever, 
by the free decision of the mind, are dreaming with 
open eyes. 93 

Prop. 3. The acts of the viind spring solely from 
adequate ideas; its passions depend wholly upon those 
that are inadequate. 

Proof. — The first thing that constitutes the essence 
of the mind is nothing but the idea of the actually 
existent body (II, ir and 13), and this idea (11, 15) is 
composed of many others, some of which (II, 38, 



Prop. 5] THE EMOTIONS. 143 

co7\) are adequate, and some inadequate (II, 29, cor). 
Hence everything tliat follows from the nature of the 
mind, and of which the mind is the proximate cause, 
through which it must be comprehended, must neces- 
sarily follow from an idea either adequate or inade- 
quate. But in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas 
it is necessarily passive (i). Therefore the acts of 
the mind follow solely from adequate ideas, and the 
mind is passive only in that it has inadequate ideas. 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Thus we see that passions cannot be 
attributed to the mind except in so far as it contains 
something that involves negation ; that is, except in 
so far as it is considered as a part of nature, which 
cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived by itself, 
and independently of other parts. By similar reason- 
ing I might show that passions are to be attributed to 
all individual things in the same way as to the mind, 
and that they cannot be perceived in any other way, 
but it is my purpose to treat only of the human 
mind. 94 

Prop. 4. NotJiing can be destroyed save by an 
external cause. 

Proof. — This proposition is self-evident, for the 
definition of a thing affirms the essence of that thing, 
but does not deny it ; in other words, it posits the 
essence of the thing, but does not remove it. As 
long, therefore, as we give our attention merely to the 
thing itself, and not to external causes, we shall be 
able to find in it nothing that can destroy it. 95 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 5. TJiings have contrary natures, that is, they 
cannot exist in the same object, in. so far as the one can 
destroy the other. 



144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part IH 

Proof. — If they could mutually agree, or could 
exist together in the same object, there could be in 
the said object something that could destroy it, which 
{by the preceding proposition) is absurd. Therefore, 
etc. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 6. Each thing, in so far as in it lies, strives 
to persevere in its being. 

Proof. — Particular things are modes, by which God's 
attributes are expressed in a definite and determinate 
manner (I, 25, cor?)\ that is (I, 34), things which 
express in a definite and determinate way God's 
power — that by which he is and acts. A thing, 
furthermore, has not in itself anything by which it 
can be destroyed, or which can annul its existence (4); 
on the contrary it is {by the preceding proposition) op- 
posed to everything that can annul its existence. 
Therefore, in so far as it can, and in so far as in it 
lies, it strives to persevere in its being.96 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 7. The endeavor ivith which each thing strives 
to persevere in its being is nothing bid the actual essence of 
the thing itself. 

Proof. — Granted the essence of anything, certain 
things necessarily follow (I, 36), nor are things able to 
do anything but what necessarily follows from their 
nature as determined (I, 29). Hence the power or 
endeavor of each thing, that by which the thing either 
alone or with others does or strives to do something, in 
other words (6) the power or endeavor by which it 
strives to persevere in its being, is nothing but the 
actual essence of the thing itself.97 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 8. The endeavor with which each thing strives 
to persevere in its being does not involve any finite time, but 
indefinite time. 

Proof. — If it involved a limited time that deter- 



Prop. 9] THE EMOTIONS. I45 

mined the duration of the thing, then from the very 
power by which the thing exists it would follow that 
the thing, after that limited time, could not exist, but 
would have to be destroyed. But this (4) is absurd. 
Hence the endeavor by which a thing exists does not 
involve any definite time ; but on the contrary, since 
(4) if no external cause destroy it the thing will al- 
ways continue to exist through the same power through 
which it now exists, this endeavor involves indefinite 
time. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 9. The mind, both in so far as it has clear and 
distinct ideas, and in so far as it has confused ideas, 
strives to persevere indefinitely in its being, and is con- 
scious of this its endeavor. 

Proof. — The essence of the mind is composed of 
adequate and inadequate ideas (3), and hence (7) both 
in so far as it has the former and in so far as it 
has the latter it strives to persist in its being, and 
that (8) indefinitely. But since the mind (II, 23) is 
necessarily conscious of itself through the ideas of the 
modifications of the body, it is (7) conscious of its 
endeavor. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This endeavor, when it is referred to 
the mind alone, is called will, but when it is re- 
ferred to the mind and the body both, it is called 
impulse. It is, therefore, nothing but the very 
essence of man, from whose nature necessarily fol- 
low those actions that subserve his preservation. 
Hence man is conditioned to the performance of 
these actions. Again, there is no difference between 
impulse and desire, except that we usually speak of 
men as having desires when they are conscious of 
their impulses, and consequently desire may be de- 
fined as impulse accompanied by a consciousness of the 



146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

same. Thus it is evident from all these considerations 
that we do not endeavor after, choose, strive for, or 
desire anything because we judge it to be good ; but, 
on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because 
we endeavor after, choose, strive for, or desire it. 

Prop. 10. There cannot be in our mind an idea wJiich 
excludes the existence of our body, but such an idea is 
contrary to it. 

Proof. — Anything that can destroy our body cannot 
exist in it (5), and hence the idea of that thing cannot 
be in God in so far as he has an idea of our body 
(II, 9, cor.); in other words (II, 11 and 13) the idea 
of that thing cannot be in our mind ; but, on the con- 
trary, since (II, 11 atid 13), the first thing that consti- 
tutes the essence of the mind is the idea of a body 
actually existing, it is the first and the chief endeavor 
of our mind (7) to affirm the existence of our body. 
Therefore an idea that denies the existence of our 
body is contrary to our mind, etc. 98 Q. E. D. 

Prop. ii. Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or 
restrains, our body's power of acting, the idea of that 
thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, our 
mind' s power of thinking. 

Proof. — This proposition is evident from II, 7, or 
from II, 14. 

Scholium. — Thus we see that the mind can undergo 
great changes, passing now to a greater now to a lesser 
degree of perfection, and these passions explain to us 
the emotions of pleasure and pain. '^■^ pleasure, there- 
fore, I shall mean in what follows a passion in which the 
mind passes to a greater degree of perfection. 'Qy pain I 
shall mean a passion in which it passes to a lesser degree 
of perfection. Again, I call the emotion of pleasure, as 
referred to both mind and body, titillation or liveliness j 



Prop, ii] the emotions. 147 

paiti so considered I call suffering or melancholy. But 
it should be noted that titillation and suffering are 
predicated of a man when one part of him is more 
affected than the rest ; and liveliness and melancholy 
when all parts are affected alike. What desire is I 
have explained in the scholium to prop. 9 of this Part. 
I recognize no primary emotion save these three, 
and shall show in what follows that the other emo- 
tions spring from these three. But before going 
further permit me here to give a fuller explanation of 
prop. 10, that it may be clearly understood how an 
idea may be contrary to an idea. 

In the scholium to prop. 17 of Part II, I have shown 
that the idea which constitutes the essence of the 
mind involves the existence of the body as long as 
the body itself exists. In the second place, from what 
I have proved in the corollary to prop. 8 of Part 
II, and in its scholium, it follows that the present 
existence of our mind depends solely upon this, to 
wit, that the mind involves the actual existence of the 
body. Finally, I have shown (II, 17, and 18 with its 
schol.) that the power of the mind, by which it imag- 
ines and remembers things, also depends upon this, 
namely, that it involves the actual existence of the 
body. Hence it follows that the present existence of 
the mind and its power of imagining are done away 
with, just as soon as the mind ceases to affirm the 
present existence of the body. But the cause of the 
mind's ceasing to affirm this existence of the body 
cannot be the mind itself (4), nor can it be the body's 
ceasing to exist. For (II, 6) the cause of the mind's 
affirming the existence of the body is not the body's 
having begun to exist ; and, therefore, by the same 
reasoning, it does not cease to affirm the existence 



148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

of the body because the body ceases to exist ; but 
(II, 17) that it does this is due to another idea which 
excludes the present existence of our body, and, con- 
sequently, of our mind, and which is, therefore, 
contrary to the idea that constitutes the essence of our 
mind.99 



Definitions of the Emotions. T-f^o 

1. Desire is the very essence of man, in so far as this 
is conceived as determined to some action by any one 
of his modifications. 

2. Pleasure is the transition of a man from a less to a 
greater perfection. 

3. Pain is the transition of a man from a. greater to 
a less perfection. 

4. Wonder is the conception of a thing, in which 
the mind remains fixed, because this particular con- 
ception has no connection with its other conceptions. 

5. Contempt is the conception of a thing which im- 
presses the mind so little that the mind is moved by 
the presence of the thing rather to the conceiving of 
what is not in the thing, than of what is in it. 

6. Love is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause. 

7. Hate is pain, accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause. 

8. Inclination is pleasure, accompanied by the idea 
of something which is per accidens^ the cause of the 
pleasure. 

9. Aversion is pain, accompanied by the idea of 
something which '\% per accidens the cause of the pain. 

*/. e., the thing in question happens under given ciixumstances 
to be the cause of the pleasure. 



Defs.] the emotions. 149 

10. Devotion is love toward one whom we admire. 

11. Dei'ision is pleasure, which has its source in the 
fact that we conceive something we despise to be in 
the thing we hate. 

12. Hope is inconstant pleasure arising from the 
idea of something future or past, of the event of which 
we have some doubt. 

13. Fear is inconstant pain arising from the idea of 
something future or past, of the event of which we 
have some doubt. 

14. Confidence is pleasure arising from the idea of a 
thing future or past, regarding which cause for doubt 
has been removed. 

15. Despair is pain arising from the idea of a thing 
future or past, regarding which cause for doubt has 
been removed. 

16. Joy is pleasure, accompanied by the idea of 
something past that has turned out contrary to ex- 
pectation. 

17. Disappointment is pain, accompanied by the idea 
of a thing past which has turned out contrary to 
expectation.* 

18. Commiseration is pain, accompanied by the idea 
of misfortune which has happened to another, whom 
we conceive to be like ourselves. 

19. Approbation is love toward one who has bene- 
fited another. 

20. Indignation is hate toward one who has harmed 
another. 

21. Over-estimation is thinking too highly of one, by 
reason of our love for him. 

* I take Mr. Pollock's rendering of the words conscientice 
morstts. 



150 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Parj- HI 

2 2. Under-estiination is thinking too little of one 
because we hate him. 

23. Envy is hate, in so far as it leads a man to be 
pained by another's good fortune, and to take pleas- 
ure in another's misfortune. 

24. Sympathy is love, in so far as it leads a man to 
take pleasure in another's good fortune, and to be 
pained by another's misfortune. 

25. Self-satisfaction is pleasure arising from a man's 
contemplation of himself and his power of acting. 

26. Humility is pain arising from a man's contem- 
plation of his own impotence or feebleness. 

27. Repentance is pain, accompanied by the idea of 
some deed that we think we have done by the free 
decree of our mind. 

28. Pride'\% thinking too highly "if one's self, by rea 
son of self-love. 

29. Self-abasement is thinking too little of one's self 
because of pain. 

30. Glorying is pleasure, accompanied by the idea 
of some one of our actions which we conceive others 
as praising. 

31. Shame is pain, accompanied by the idea of 
some one of our actions which we conceive others 
as blaming. 

32. Longing is desire or appetite for the possession 
of something, fostered by the memory of the thing, 
and at the same time restrained by the memories of 
other things which exclude the existence of the thing 
longed for. 

T^T^. Emulation is the desire for something, produced 
in us by the fact that we conceive others to have the 
same desire. 

34. Thankfulness or Gratitude is the desire, or zeal 



Defs.] the emotions. 151 

of love, with which we endeavor to benefit him who, 
from a like emotion of love, has conferred a benefit 
upon us. 

35. Benevolence is the desire of benefiting him 
whom we pity. 

36. Anger is the desire with which we are incited, 
from hate, to injure him whom we hate. 

37. Revenge is the desire with which, from a recipro- 
cal hate, we are incited to harm him who, from a like 
emotion, has done us an injury. 

38. Cruelty or Barbarity is the desire with which 
anyone is inclined to harm him whom we love or 
whom we pity. 

39. Timidity is the desire to escape a greater evil, 
which we fear, by means of a less. 

40. Boldness is the desire with which one is incited 
to some undertaking which involves peril that his 
equals fear to undergo. 

41. Cowardice is attributed to him whose desire is 
restrained by fear of a peril that his equals dare to 
meet. 

42. Consternation is attributed to him whose desire 
to escape evil is restrained by astonishment at the evil 
he fears. 

43. Cou7'tesy or Modesty is the desire of doing what 
pleases men, and of avoiding what displeases them. 

44. Ambition is the immoderate desire of fame. 

45. Luxury is the immoderate desire or love of 
feasting. 

46. Drunkenness is the immoderate desire and love 
of drinking. 

47. Avarice is the immoderate desire and love of 
riches. 

48. Lust is the desire and love of sexual intercourse. 



152 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

General Definition of the Emotions, 

An emotion, which is called a passion {pathemd) of 
the soul, is a confused idea, through which the mind 
affirms the energy of existence possessed by its body, 
or any part of it, to be greater or less than it was 
before ; and through the presence of which the mind 
itself is determined to this thought rather than to 
that. 



PART IV. 

OF HUMAN BONDAGE, OR OF THE STRENGTH 
OF THE EMOTIONS. 

PREFACE, 

Man's inability to moderate and restrain the emo- 
tions I call Bondage ; for a man who is subject to the 
emotions is' not his own master, but is ruled by fortune, 
and is so in her power that he is often forced, although 
he sees what is better for him, to follow that which is 
worse. The cause of this, and, furthermore, what is 
good or evil in the emotions, I propose to show in 
this Part. But before I begin I wish to say a few 
words, by way of preface, concerning perfection and 
imperfection, and concerning good and evil. 

One who has undertaken to make something and 
has brought it to completion will call the thing per- 
fect ; and not he alone, but everyone who rightly 
knows, or thinks he knows, the purpose of the author 
of this work and its object. For example, if one sees 
some work (which I suppose to be not yet completed), 
and knows that it is the object of the author of this 
work to build a house, he will call the house imper- 
fect, and, on the other hand, he will call it perfect, as 
soon as he sees the work carried through to the con- 
clusion which its author determined to give it. But if 
one sees some work, the like of which he never saw, 
and does not know the purpose of the maker, he 
surely cannot know whether that work be perfect or 

»53 



154 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART IV 

imperfect. This appears to have been the first mean- 
ing of these words.* But after men began to form 
general ideas, and to devise patterns of houses, build- 
ings, towers, etc., and to prefer some patterns of 
things to others, it came to pass that everyone called 
that perfect which he saw to be in harmony with the 
general idea he had formed of a thing of that kind ; 
and, on the other hand, called imperfect what he saw 
not to be in harmony with the pattern he had con- 
ceived, although it had been completed quite accord- 
ing to the intention of the maker. This appears to be 
the reason why even the things of nature, which have 
not been made by human hands, are commonly called 
perfect or imperfect. For men are wont to form 
general ideas of natural things as well as of artificial, 
and these they hold as patterns of things, as it were, 
and believe that nature (which they regard as doing 
nothing without some purpose) looks upon them, and 
sets them before itself as patterns. When, therefore, 
they see something take place in nature which is not 
in harmony with the pattern they had conceived of 
a thing of that kind, they think that nature itself has 
failed or has blundered, and has left that thing imper- 
fect. We see, then, that men have accustomed them- 
selves to call the things of nature perfect or imperfect 
rather from prejudice than from a true knowledge of 
them. I have shown in the Appendix to Part I. that 
nature does not act with any purpose in view ; for 
that eternal and infinite Being that we call God or 
Nature acts by the same necessity by which he exists. 
I have shown (I, i6) that he acts from the same neces- 

* The force of this is lost in translating. Perfectuni is the 
participle of perjicere, which means (i) to accomplish ; (2) to 
bring to completion, and thus to make perfect, — Tr, 



Preface] HUMAN BONDAGE. 155 

sity of nature as that from which he exists. The 
reason, therefore, or cause, why God or Nature acts, 
and why he exists, is one and the same. As, there- 
fore, there is no final cause of his existing, there is also 
no final cause of his acting ; but, as of his existing, so 
also of his acting, there is no efficient cause, and no end. 
Moreover, what is called the final cause is nothing but 
human impulse itself, in so far as it is considered as 
the efficient or determining cause of something. For 
example, when we say that the living in it was the 
final cause of this or that house, we mean only that 
a man, because he formed a conception of the 
pleasures of domestic life, had an impulse to build 
a house. Hence, the living in it, in so far as it is con- 
sidered as final cause, is nothing but this particular 
impulse, which, in truth, is the efficient cause ; and it 
is regarded as the first, because men are commonly 
ignorant of the causes of their impulses. For they 
are, as I have already often said, conscious, indeed, of 
their actions and impulses, but ignorant of the causes 
through which they are determined to any particular 
impulse. As for the common opinion that nature 
sometimes fails or blunders, and produces imperfect 
things, I class this with the fictions of which I have 
treated in the Appendix to Part I. Perfection and 
imperfection, therefore, are really mere modes of think- 
ing; that is, notions, which we are accustomed to frame 
because we compare with one another individuals of 
the same species or genus. For this reason I have 
said above (II, def. 6) that by reality and perfection 
I mean the same thing. For we are accustomed to 
refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, 
which we call the highest genus ; that is, to the notion 
of being, which pertains to all without exception of 



156 THE PHILOSOPHY OP SPINOZA. [Part IV 

the individual things in nature. In so far, therefore, 
as we refer the individual things in nature to this 
genus, and compare them with one another, and ascer- 
tain that some have more being or reality than others, 
in so far do we say that some are more perfect than 
others ; and in so far as we attribute to them anything 
that involves negation, as limit, end, impotence, etc., 
in so far do we call them imperfect, because they do 
not impress our minds as much as those we call per- 
fect, and not because they lack something that belongs 
to them, or because nature has blundered. For 
nothing belongs to the nature of anything, except 
what follows from the necessity of the nature of the 
efficient cause ; and whatever follows from the neces- 
sity of the nature of the efficient cause necessarily 
comes to pass. 

As for good and evil, these terms indicate no posi- 
tive element in things, considered, that is to say, in 
themselves. They are only modes of thinking, or 
notions, which we form because we compare things 
with one another. For one and the same thing can 
be at the same time good, bad, and indifferent. For 
example, music is good for the melancholy man, and 
bad for him who mourns ; while for the deaf man it 
is neither good nor bad. But, although this is so, we 
should, nevertheless, retain these terms. For since 
we desire to form an idea of man — a pattern, as it 
were, of human nature, upon which we may gaze — it 
will be of service to us to retain these terms in the 
sense in which I have spoken. Therefore, I shall 
hereafter mean by " good " what we certainly know to 
be a means by the aid of which we may come to 
resemble more and more the pattern of human nature 
that we have set before us. By " evil," on the other 



Preface] human BONDAGE. 157 

hand, I shall mean what we certainly know hinders 
us from reflecting that pattern. Furthermore, I shall 
say that men are more perfect or less perfect, in 
proportion as they resemble more or less closely this 
pattern. For it should specially be noted that when 1 
speak of a man as passing from a less to a greater 
perfection, and conversely, I do not mean that he is 
changed from one essence or form to another (a horse, 
for example, is as much destroyed by being changed 
into a man, as by being changed into an insect) ; but 
I mean that we conceive his power of acting, in so far 
as we comprehend this through his own nature, to 
be increased or diminished. Finally, by perfection, 
taken generally, I shall mean reality, as I have said ; 
that is, the essence of anything, in so far as it exists 
and operates in a definite manner, without regard to 
its duration. For no particular thing can be said to 
be more perfect from the fact that it has continued 
longer in existence. Indeed, the duration of things 
cannot be determined from their essence, seeing that 
the essence of things involves no definite and deter- 
minate time of existence. But each thing, whether it 
be more perfect or less, will always be able to con- 
tinue to exist with the same force with which it 
begins to exist ; so that all things are, in this respect, 
equal. loi 

Definitions. 

1. By good I mean what we certainly know to be 
useful to us. 

2. By evil I mean what we certainly know hinders 
us from obtaining possession of some good. 

(Concerning these, see the preceding preface, near 
the end.) 

3. Individual things I call contingent, in so far as, so 



158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part IV 

long as we pay attention merely to their essence, we 
discover nothing that necessarily affirms their exist- 
ence or that necessarily excludes it. 

4. These individual things I call possible, in so far 
as, while we pay attention to the causes by which they 
must be produced, we do not know whether these 
causes are determined to their production. 

(In I, T^T^^ schol. T, I made no distinction between 
possible and contingent, because there was no need 
there to distinguish them so carefully.) 

5. By contrary emotions I shall mean in what follows 
those that draw man in different directions, even 
though they belong to the same genus, as luxury and 
avarice, which are species of love. These are con- 
trary, not in their nature \>\x\. per accidens.^ 

6. What I mean by emotion toivard a tiling future, 
present, or past, I have explained in III, 18, schols. i 
and 2, q. v. \ 

(But one must here note that, as in the case of 
space, so also in the case of time, we cannot distinctly 
conceive distance save up to a certain definite limit. 
That is, just as we are accustomed to conceive as 
equally distant from us, and, hence, as though they 
were in the same plane, all those objects which are 
more than two hundred feet away from us, or the dis- 
tance of which from the place in which we are is 
greater than that we distinctly conceive ; so also we 

* See note to definitions of the emotions, 8. 

fin schol. I, a thing past or future is defined as one by which 
" we have been or shall be affected." Tlie image of such a tiling 
is said to affect the body as if the tiling itself were present ; though 
the emotions arising from such images are declared to be inconstant 
so long as one is not certain of the issue of the thing. In schol. 2 
are given definitions of Hope, Fear, Confidence, Despair, Joy, and 
Disappointment. See definitions of the emotions, 12 to 17. — Tr. 



App. I] HUMAN BONDAGE. 159 

conceive as equally far from the present all objects 
whose time of existing is distant from the present by a 
greater interval than that we are accustomed distinctly 
to conceive, and we refer them, as it were, to the same 
moment of time.) 

7. By the end, for the sake of which we do anything, 
I mean the impulse. 

8. By virtue and power I mean the same thing ; 
that is (III, 7), virtue, in so far as it relates to man, 
is the very essence or nature of man, in so far as he 
has the power of effecting certain things that can be 
comprehended solely through the laws of his own 
nature. 102 

Axiom. 

There is in nature no individual thing which is not 
exceeded in power and strength by some other thing. 
Than each thing there is always another thing more 
powerful, by which it can be destroyed. 



APPENDIX. 103 

What I have said in this part concerning the right 
method of living has not been so arranged that it can 
be seen at a glance, but I have proved what I have 
advanced piecemeal, as I was best able to deduce 
one thing from another. Accordingly, I will here 
gather up my remarks and reduce them to the form of 
a summary. 

I. 

All our strivings, or desires, follow in such a way 
from the necessity of our nature that they can be 
comprehended either through it alone, as through 
their proximate cause, or through our being a part of 



l6o THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part IV 

nature, which cannot be adequately conceived by 
itself without other individuals. 

IL 

The desires, which follow from our nature in such 
a way that they can be comprehended through it alone, 
are such as are referred to the mind, in so far as it is 
conceived as consisting of adequate ideas. The other 
desires, however, are not referred to the mind, except 
in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and their 
strength and growth must be defined, not as human 
power, but as that of the things which are outside of 
us. Hence, the former are properly called actions, 
the latter passions ; for the former always indicate 
our power ; the latter, on the contrary, our impotence 
and fragmentary knowledge. 

III. 

Our actions, that is, those desires which are defined 
as due to man's power, or to reason, are always good, 
but the others may be good or bad. 

IV. 

Hence it is of the utmost service in life to perfect 
the understanding or reason, as far as we can ; and in 
this one thing consists man's highest felicity or blessed- 
ness. Indeed, blessedness is nothing but that very 
satisfaction of the soul which arises from an intuitive 
knowledge of God. But to perfect the understanding 
is only to comprehend God, his attributes, and the 
actions that follow from the necessity of his nature. 
Wherefore the ultimate aim of the man who is con- 
trolled by reason, that is, the highest desire, with which 
he strives to restrain all the others, is that which impels 



App. VIII] HUMAN BONDAGE. l6l 

him to conceive adequately himself and everything 
that can fall within the scope of his understanding. 

V. 
There is, therefore, no rational life without intelli- 
gence ; and things are good only in so far as they help 
man to enjoy the life of the mind, which is defined as 
intelligence. On the other hand, those things that 
hinder man from being able to perfect his reason and 
enjoy a rational life, these alone do we call bad. 

VI. 

But since all those things of which man is the effi- 
cient cause are necessarily good, no evil can happen 
to man except from external causes ; that is to say, no 
evil can happen to him except in so far as he is a part 
of the whole of nature, whose laws human nature is 
compelled to obey, and to which it is forced to adjust 
itself in almost an infinity of ways. 

VII. 

It is impossible for man not to be a part of nature, 
and not to follow its general order ; but if he be 
placed among such individual things as harmonize 
with the nature of man itself, that will, in itself, aid 
and increase man's power of acting. If, on the con- 
trary, he be placed among such as do not harmonize 
with his nature, he will scarcely be able, without 
greatly changing, to adjust himself to them. 

VIII. 

Everything in nature that we judge to be evil — in 
other words, to hinder us from being able to exist and 
enjoy a rational life — we may remove from us in the 
way that appears safest ; everything, on the other 



l62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part IV 

hand, that we judge to be good — in other words, 
serviceable for the preservation of our being and the 
enjoyment of a rational life — we may turn to our 
profit, and use as we please ; and by the highest law 
of nature each one may do that, without restriction, 
which he thinks contributes to his profit. 

IX. 

Nothing can be more in harmony with the nature 
of anything than the other individuals of the same 
species. Hence (VII) there is nothing of more serv- 
ice to man for the preservation of his being and the 
enjoyment of a rational life than the man who is con- 
trolled by reason. Again, since among individual 
things we know nothing more excellent than the man 
who is controlled by reason, in nothing can one better 
show how much skill and ability he possesses than in 
so educating men that at last they live strictly under 
the dominion of reason. 

X. 

In so far as men are influenced by envy or by any 
emotion of hate toward one another, in so far are they 
mutually opposed ; and, hence, they are the more to 
be feared, as they have more power than the other 
individual things in nature. 

XI. 

Souls, however, are not conquered by force of 
arms, but by love and magnanimity, 

XII. 

It is of the utmost service to men'' to enter into 
social intercourse, and to bind themselves with those 



App. XIV] HUMAN BONDAGE. 163 

bonds that are best fitted to make them all a unit, 
and to do just those things that serve to strengthen 
friendship. 

XIII. 

But for this skill and vigilance are required. Men 
differ (for they are rare who live according to the 
dictates of reason), and yet most men are envious, and 
inclined rather to revenge than to pity. It needs, 
therefore, special strength of mind for one to follow 
one's own bent and restrain one's self from copying 
their emotions. But those, on the other hand, who 
know how to carp at men, and rather to upbraid 
them with vices than to teach them virtues — not to 
strengthen men's minds, but to crush them — these are 
a burden to themselves and everyone else. Where- 
fore, many, through an excessive impatience of mind 
and a false zeal of religion, have preferred living 
among brutes to living among men ; as boys or 
youths who cannot bear with equanimity the chiding 
of their parents fly to military service, and prefer the 
hardships of war and the authority of a despotic 
power to domestic pleasures and paternal admonitions, 
and suffer any burden to be laid upon them in order 
to be revenged on their parents. 

XIV. 

Therefore, although men regulate nearly everything 
according to their lusts, nevertheless there results 
from their common fellowship much more good than 
harm. Hence it is better to bear their injustices with 
equanimity, and to do zealously what serves to estab- 
lish harmony and friendship. 



164 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART IV 

XV. 

The things that engender harmony are those that 
are referred to justice, equity, and honor. For men 
bear with reluctance not only what is unjust and 
unfair, but also what is considered disgraceful ; that 
is, one's despising the accepted morals of a state. 
But for winning love those things are especially neces- 
sary that regard religion and piety. On these points 
see : IV, 37, schols. i and 2, 46, schol., and 73, schol.* 

XVI. 

Harmony is commonly the result of fear, but it is 
then not to be depended upon. Add to this, that fear 
springs from weakness of the soul, and does not, there- 
fore, belong to the use of reason ; nor does pity, 
although it seems to present the appearance of piety. 

XVII. 

Men are also won by liberality, especially those who 
have not the means of purchasing the necessaries of 
life. But to give aid to everyone who has need far 
surpasses the power and the profit of a private man. 
The wealth of a private man is far from able to meet 
such demands. Moreover the ability of a single man 
is too limited to permit him to join all men to himself 

* In which it is argued that the man of mere impulse tries to 
force men to live in the way which happens to please him, and 
becomes hateful to them ; while he who strives to lead men by 
reason always acts courteously, kindly, and consistently. Reli- 
gion is defined as those acts of which we are the cause, in so far 
as we have a knowledge of God ; piety, as a life according to 
reason ; honor, as the desire of a man, living according to 
reason, to associate others with him in friendship. The mutual 
helpfulness of good men is dwelt upon. — Tr, 



Apf. XX] HUMAN BONDAGE. 165 

in friendship ; hence the care of the poor is incumbent 
upon society as a whole, and concerns only the com- 
mon good. 

XVIII. 

In receiving favors and returning thanks, our duty 
is quite different, concerning which see IV, 70, schol., 
and 71, schol.* 

XIX. 

The love of a harlot — that is, lust of generation, 
which springs from beauty, and in general all love 
that owns to any other cause than freedom of the 
soul — easily passes over into hate ; unless, which is 
worse, it be a species of madness, and then it promotes 
discord rather than concord. See III, 31, cor.f 

XX. 

As regards marriage, it is certain that this is in 
harmony with reason, if the desire for sexual inter- 
course be not engendered by beauty alone, but also by 
the desire of begetting children and educating them 
wisely ; and if, further, the love of both — that is, of 
the man and of the woman — has for its cause not 
mere beauty, but chiefly freedom of soul. 

* Wherein it is stated that one should, as far as possible, avoid 
receiving favors, yet should in this exercise caution and avoid giving 
offense ; that one should repay in kind favors received : that 
ingratitude is base, as indicating that a man is affected by hatred, 
anger, pride, avarice, etc. — Tr. 

f . . . everyone strives, as far as he can, to have everyone love 
what he loves and hate vs'hat he hates : as the poet says : 
Speremtcs pariter, parifer meiuamus amantes ; 
Ferretis est, si quis, quod sinit alter ^ amat. 
(Ovid, Amoves^ II, xix. 4, 5. — Tr.) 



l66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART IV 

XXI. 

Furthermore, flattery engenders harmony, but 
through the disgraceful crhne of slavishness or per- 
fidy ; indeed, none are more taken with flattery than 
the proud, who wish to be first and are not. 

XXII. 

Self-abasement has a false appearance of piety and 
religion. And although self-abasement is the opposite 
of pride, nevertheless he who abases himself is nearest 
to the proud. See IV, 57, schol.* 

XXIII. 
Shame contributes to harmony only in those things 
that cannot be concealed. Further, since shame itself 
is a species of pain, it has no relation to the use of 

reason. 

XXIV. 

The other emotions of pain that have men for their 
object are directly opposed to justice, equity, honor, 
piety, and religion ; and although indignation seems 
to resemble equity, yet men live lawlessly where any- 
one may pass judgment upon another's deeds and 
vindicate his own right or that of another. 

XXV. 
Modesty, that is, the desire of pleasing men, that is 
determined by reason, is (as I have said in IV, 37, 
scJiol. I t) referred to piety. But if it springs from 

* In which it is argued that his pain comes from the comparison 
of his own weakness with the power of others, and thus the dis- 
covery of faults in others will give him pleasure, as raising him in 
the scale. Pride is defined as pleasure arising from a sense of 
superiority over others. — Tr. 

f See note to XV.— Tr, 



App. XXVII] HUMAN BONDAGE. 167 

emotion, it is ambition, that is, a desire by which men, 
under the false appearance of piety, commonly excite 
discords and seditions. For he who desires to aid 
others by counsel or deed, that all together may enjoy 
the highest good, will first of all endeavor to win their 
love for himself ; he will not strive to lead them to 
admire him, that a doctrine may bear his name, and 
he will try not to give them any ground whatever for 
envy. Farther, in conversation he will avoid referring 
to men's faults, and will take care to speak only spar- 
ingly of human infirmity, but more at length of human 
virtue or power and how it can be perfected ; that 
thus men may strive to live, as far as they can, accord- 
ing to the dictates of reason, not from fear or aversion, 
but influenced merely by the emotion of pleasure. 

XXVI. 

Except men, we know no individual thing in nature, 
in the mind of which we can take delight, and which 
we can join with us in friendship or any kind of com- 
panionship. Hence a regard for our interest does 
not require us to preserve anything that exists in 
nature except men, but teaches us, according to its 
various uses, to preserve it, to destroy it, or to adapt 
it to our use in any way whatever. 

XXVII. 

The advantage we derive from things external to us 
is, besides the experience and knowledge we gain by 
observing them and by changing them from one form 
to another, chiefly the preservation of the body ; and 
in this respect those things are especially useful that 
can so sustain and nourish the body that all its parts 
can rightly perform their functions. For the more 



l68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part IV 

capable the body is of being affected in many ways, 
and of affecting external bodies in many ways, the 
more capable the mind is of thinking (IV, 38 and 39).* 
But very few things in nature appear to be of this 
kind ; wherefore, to nourish the body properly, it is 
necessary to use many aliments of different sorts. 
The human body, indeed, is composed of very many 
parts of different natures, which need constant and 
varied nutriment, that the whole body may be equally 
capable of all those actions that may follow from its 
nature, and, hence, that the mind also may be equally 
capable of framing many conceptions. 

XXVIII. 

But the strength of each man would scarcely suffice 
to procure this, did not men mutually aid each other. 
Now money has furnished us a representative for 
everything, whence it has happened that its image is 
wont to greatly occupy the mind of the masses ; for 
they can scarcely imagine any kind of pleasure unac- 
companied by the idea of money as its cause. 

XXIX. 

But this is a vice only in those who seek money, 
not from need, nor on account of their necessities, but 
because they have learned the arts of gain, with which 
they carry themselves ostentatiously. For the rest, 
they nourish their body from force of habit, but spar- 
ingly, believing that they lose as much of their sub- 
stance as they spend on the preservation of their 
body. But those who know the true value of money, 
and regulate the measure of their wealth solely 
according to their need, live content with little. 

*See II, 14. 



App. XXXI] • HUMAN BONDAGE. 169 

XXX. 

Since, therefore, those things are good that help the 
parts of the body to perform their functions, and 
pleasure consists in this, that the power of man, in so 
far as he is composed of mind and body, is aided and 
increased — all those things that give pleasure are 
good. Nevertheless, since, on the other hand, things 
do not act with the purpose of giving us pleasure, and 
their power of acting is not adjusted to suit our 
advantage, and since, finally, pleasure is very often 
referred chiefly to one part of the body, emotions of 
pleasure (unless one exercise reason and vigilance), and 
hence also the desires engendered by them, are often 
excessive. Besides, an emotion leads us to put that 
first which is agreeable at the present time, nor are we 
able to regard what is future with an equal emotion 
of the soul. (IV, 44, schol., and 60, schol!^^ 

XXXI. 

Superstition, however, appears to maintain that to 
be good which gives pain, and, on the other hand, that 
bad which gives pleasure. But, as I have already 
said (IV, 45, scJiol.\^, no one but the envious takes 
pleasure in my infirmity and misfortune. For the 
greater the pleasure with which we are affected, the 

* The former argues that emotions referred to one part of the 
body are excessive, in that they so hold the mind to the thought 
of one object that it is unable to pass to others. Excessive 
absorption in a single object is madness. 

The latter refers back to IV, 9, which reads : " An emotion, 
the cause of which we conceive to be with us at the present time, 
is stronger than if we did not conceive the cause to be with us." 
This is proved from II, 17. — Tr. 

\ Simply says at greater length what is said above. — Tn, 



l70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

greater the perfection to which we pass, and con- 
sequently the greater our participation in the divine 
nature ; and a pleasure which is regulated by a true 
regard for our advantage can never be evil. But he 
who is ruled by fear, and does good to avoid evil, is 
not ruled by reason. 

XXXII. 

But human power is very limited, and is infinitely 
exceeded by the power of external causes ; hence we 
have not absolute power to turn to our advantage the 
things that are external to us. Nevertheless, we will 
bear with equanimity those things that happen to us 
contrary to what a regard for our profit demands, if 
we are conscious tliat we have done our duty, and that 
the power we have could not have reached so far as to 
enable us to avoid them ; and that we are a part of 
the whole of nature, whose order we follow. If we 
clearly and distinctly comprehend this, that part of us 
which is defined as intelligence — that is, the best part 
of us — will be entirely satisfied with this, and will strive 
to persevere in this satisfaction. For in so far as we 
have understanding, we can desire only what is neces- 
sary, and we can have perfect satisfaction only in the 
truth ; in so far, therefore, as we rightly comprehend 
this, in so far does the endeavor of the better part of 
us harmonize with the order of nature as a whole. 



PART V. 

OF THE POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR 
OF HUMAN FREEDOM. 

PREFACE. 

I PASS now to another Part of the " Ethics," and this 
is concerned with the method or way that leads to 
Freedom. I shall here, accordingly, treat of the 
power of reason, and shall show, first, what influence 
reason itself can have upon the emotions, and, second, 
what the freedom or blessedness of the mind is. From 
this we shall see how much more power the wise man 
has than the ignorant. The further inquiries, however, 
how and in what way the understanding should be 
brought to perfection, and in what manner the body 
should be cared for, that it may be able properly to 
perform its functions — these do not belong here. The 
latter concerns medicine, the former logic. Here, 
therefore, I shall, as I have said, treat only of the 
power of the mind or of reason, and I shall show first 
of all, how great and of what sort is the control it has 
over the emotions in compelling or restraining them. 
That we have not absolute control over them I have 
just demonstrated. Yet the Stoics thought them 
absolutely dependent on our will, and that we can 
control them absolutely. Nevertheless, they were 
compelled by the protest of experience, and not in- 
deed by their own principles, to admit that it requires 
no little practice and exertion to control and to restrain 



172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

them. This someone has attempted to show by the 
illustration of the two dogs (if I remember rightly), 
the one a house-dog, and the other a hunting-dog. 
For it has been possible, by training, to accustom the 
house-dog to hunt ; the hunting-dog, on the contrary, 
to give over chasing hares. To this opinion Descartes 
was strongly inclined. For he maintained that the 
soul or mind is united chiefly with a certain part 
of the brain called the pineal gland, by means of 
which the mind perceives all the motions that are ex- 
cited in the body and external bodies, and which 
the mind can move in diverse ways by merely willing 
to do so. He held that this little gland is so sus- 
pended in the middle of the brain that it can be 
moved by the least motion of the animal spirits. He 
held, furthermore, that this gland may be suspended 
in the middle of the brain in as many different ways 
as there are different ways in which the animal spirits 
impinge upon it ; and that, further, there may be as 
many different traces imprinted upon it as there are 
different external objects that propel the animal 
spirits toward it. Whence it happens that if, after- 
ward, by the volition of the soul moving it in various 
ways, the gland be suspended in this or that way in 
which it was once before suspended by the spirits 
driven in this or that way, the said gland will propel 
and determine the said animal spirits in the same way 
as they were before driven by a similar suspension of 
the little gland. He held, moreover, that each volition 
of the mind is united by nature to a certain definite 
motion of the gland. For example, if one will to look 
upon a distant object, this volition causes a dilatation 
of the pupil ; but if one think only of dilating the pupil, 
it is of no use to have the will to do this, for nature 



Preface] HUMAN FREEDOM. 173 

has not joined with the will to dilate or contract the 
pupil, that motion of the gland that serves to impel the 
spirits toward the optic nerve in the proper way for 
dilating or contracting the pupil, but has joined this 
only with the will to look upon distant or near objects. 
Finally he held that, although each motion of this 
little gland seems to have been joined by nature with 
a single one of our thoughts from the beginning of 
our life, yet these motions can be joined with other 
thoughts as a result of habit. This he tried to prove 
in Art. 50, Part I, of the " Passions of the Soul." 
From these considerations he infers there is no soul so 
feeble that it cannot, when well directed, acquire an 
absolute power over its passions. These are, as he has 
defined ihtvci, perceptions, or sensati</!is, or agitatio7is of 
the soul, referred to it especially, and produced, kept up, 
and intensified by some motion of the spirits {see Art. 27, 
Part I, of the ^^ Passions of the Soul"). But seeing 
that we are able to join with any volition any motion 
of the gland, and consequently of the spirits, and that 
the determination of the will is wholly in our own power, 
^t follows that, if we determine our volition by definite 
and steadfast decisions, according to which we wish to 
direct the actions of our life, and join to these deci- 
sions the motions of the passions we wish to have, we 
shall acquire an absolute control over our passions. 
This (so far as I can gather it from his words) is the 
doctrine of that illustrious man — a doctrine I should 
scarce have believed put forward by such a man had 
it been less acute. Indeed, I cannot sufficiently 
wonder that a philosopher, who had firmly deter- 
mined to infer nothing except from self-evident prin- 
ciples, and to afifirm nothing but what he clearly 
and distinctly perceived, and who so often blamed 



174 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

the scholastics for wishing to explain obscure things 
by occult qualities, should assume a hypothesis more 
occult than any occult quality. What, I ask, does he 
mean by the union of mind and body ? What clear 
and distinct conception has he, I say, of thought most 
closely united to a certain small portion of extension 
{quantiias) ? Would that he had explained this union 
by its proximate cause. But he had conceived the 
mind as to such a degree distinct from the body that 
he was unable to assign any particular cause either of 
this union or of the mind itself, but was compelled to 
fall back upon the cause of the universe as a whole, 
that is, upon God. Again, I should vastly like to 
know how many degrees of motion the mind can 
communicate to that little pineal gland, and with what 
degree of force it can hold it suspended. For I do 
not know whether this gland is driven about by the 
mind more slowly or more swiftly than by the animal 
spirits, nor whether the motions belonging to the pas- 
sions, which we have firmly joined to steadfast deci- 
sions, may not be detached from them in turn by 
corporeal causes. In this case it would follow that, 
although the mind has formed a firm purpose of 
going to meet dangers, and has joined to this decision 
the motions appropriate to courage, nevertheless, at 
sight of the danger the gland may be so suspended 
that the mind can think of nothing but flight. Surely, 
since there is no comparing volition and motion, there 
is also no comparing the power or force of the mind 
and of the body. Consequently the force of the latter 
cannot possibly be determined by that of the former. 
Add to these considerations that this gland is not 
found to be so situated in the middle of the brain 
that it can be driven about so easily and in so many 



Prop, i] ■ HUMAN FREEDOM. 1 75 

ways, and further, that some of the nerves do not ex- 
tend as far as the cavities of the brain. Finally, I 
omit all that this writer asserts concerning the will and 
its freedom, as I have given sufficient and more than 
sufficient proof that it is false. Since, therefore, the 
power of the mind is, as I have shown above, limited 
solely to understanding, we shall determine, solely 
from the mind's knowledge, the remedies for the 
emotions — remedies of which I think all men have 
experience, but which they do not carefully observe, 
nor distinctly see — and from this same knowledge we 
shall deduce all that concerns the mind's blessedness. 

Axio7ns. 

1. If two contrary actions are excited in the same 
subject, either both of them or one of them must 
necessarily undergo change until they cease to be 
contrary. 

2. The power of an effect is defined by the power 
of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or 
defined by the essence of its cause. 

(This axiom is evident from III, 7.) 

Prop. i. J'ust as the thoughts, and the ideas of things, 
are arranged and connected in the mind, so, precisely, are 
the modifications of the body, or the images of things, 
arranged and connected in the body. 

Proof. — The order and connection of ideas is the 
same (II, 7) as the order and connection of things, 
and conversely, the order and connection of things is 
the same (II, 6, cor., and 7) as the order and connection 
of ideas. Therefore, just as the order and connec- 
tion of ideas in the mind follow the order and con- 
catenation of the modifications of the body (II, 18), 
so, conversely (Til, 2), the order and connection of 



176 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

the modifications of the body follow the order and 
concatenation in the mind of thoughts and the ideas 
of things. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 2. If we separate an agitation of the mind, that 
is, an emotion, from the thought of its external cause, atid 
Join it to other thoughts, both the love or hate toward the 
external cause, and the agitations of the soul that arise 
from these emotions, tvill be destroyed. 

Proof. — That which constitutes the essence of love 
or hate is pleasure or pain, accompanied by the idea 
of an external cause {defs. of the emotions, 6 andi). 
Therefore, when this last is taken away, the essence of 
love or hate is taken away, and, consequently, these 
emotions, and those that spring from them, are 
destroyed. 104 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 3. An emotion that is a passion ceases to be a 
passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. 

Proof. — An emotion that is a passion is a confused 
idea {general def. of the emotions^. If, therefore, we 
form a clear and distinct idea of this emotion, this 
idea will be only logically distinct from the emotion 
itself, in so far as it is referred to the mind alone 
(II, 21, and schol?). Hence (III, 3) the emotion will 
cease to be a passion. Q. E. D. 

Corollmy. — An emotion is, therefore, the more in 
our power, and the mind is the less passive with respect 
to it, the better it is known to us.ioS 

Prop. 4. There is no modification of the body of 
which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception. 

Proof. — That which is common to all things can 
only be conceived adequately (II, 38). Therefore 
(II, 12, and 13, schol.,leni. 2), there is no modification 
of the body of which we cannot form a clear and 
distinct conception. Q. E. D. 



Prop. 4J HUMAN FREEDOM. 1 77 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that there is no emo- 
tion of which we cannot form a clear and distinct 
conception. For the emotion is the idea of the modi- 
fication of the body {general def. of the emotions), 
which, consequently {by the preceding proposition), 
must involve a clear and distinct conception. 

Scholium. — Since there is nothing from which some 
effect does not follow (I, 36), and since we compre- 
hend clearly and distinctly everything that follows 
from an idea that is in us adequate (II, 40), it follows 
that everyone has the power of knowing himself and 
his emotions clearly and distinctly, if not wholly, at 
least in part ; and, consequently, has the power of 
making himself less subject to these emotions. This, 
then, should be the chief object of our efforts, to 
know each emotion, so far as is possible, clearly and 
distinctly ; so that the mind may thus be determined 
by the emotion to the thought of that which it clearly 
and distinctly perceives, and in which it wholly acqui- 
esces, and to the end that the emotion itself may be 
separated from the thought of its external cause and 
joined to true thoughts. From this it will result, not 
only that love, hate, etc., will be destroyed (2), but 
also that the appetites or desires which are wont to 
spring from such emotions cannot be excessive (IV, 
61).* For it is especially to be noted that it is one and 
the same appetite on account of which a man is said to 
be now active and now passive. For example, we have 
shown that human nature is so constituted that each 
one desires to have the rest live according to his way 

*The desire that springs from reason cannot be excessive. 
(Proved from defs. of the emotions, i, and III, 3. As this desire 
is the very essence of man, and as this essence cannot exceed 
itself, the desire cannot be excessive. — Tr.) 



lyS THE PHILOSOPHY OP SPINOZA. [PART V 

of thinking (III, 31, schoL)^ ; this appetite is in the 
man who is not led by reason, a passion, which is 
called ambition, and does not greatly differ from 
pride ; in the man, on the other hand, who lives in 
obedience to the precept of reason, it is an activity or 
a virtue, which is called piety (IV, 37, scJiol. i, and the 
second proof of the satne proposition). \ Thus all the 
appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they 
spring from inadequate ideas, and are reckoned as 
virtues when they are excited by or spring from 
adequate ideas. For all the desires by which we are 
determined to any action can arise as well from 
adequate ideas as from inadequate (IV, 59) J Than 
this remedy for the emotions (to return to the point 
from which I started), consisting as it does in the true 
knowledge of them, none more excellent, that is 
within our power, can be devised ; seeing that the 
mind has no other power than that of thinking and 

* In which the desire to have our own likings and aversions 
approved is called ambition, and reference made to III, 29, schol., 
where ambition is defined as an endeavor to do things or leave 
them undone solely with a view to pleasing men, especially the 
vulgar. — Tr. 

f See IV, App. XV, note. In this second proof it is argued 
that the good a man desires and loves he will love the more, the 
more he sees others love it. Hence he will endeavor to bring 
them to love it as he does. See the 5th note to prop. 20. — Tr. 

\ To all the actions to which we are determined by an emotion 
which is a passion, we may, without this, be determined by 
reason. [To act rationally is to do those things that follow solely 
from the necessity of our nature (III, def. 2, and III, 3). But 
whatever is bad diminishes our power of action (IV, preface, at 
end). Hence a passion, which is a confused idea (general def. of 
the emotions), and in so far inferior to reason, cannot deter- 
mine us to any action to which we may not be determined by 
.reason. — Tr.] 



Prop. 6] • human freedom. 179 

forming adequate ideas, as I have (III, 3) already 
shown. 106 

Prop. 5. The emotion with which we regard a thing 
that we conceive simply, and not as necessary or possible 
or contingent, is, other things being equal, the greatest 
of all. 

Proof. — The emotion with which we regard a thing 
that we conceive to be free is greater than that with 
which we regard what we conceive to be necessary 
(III, 49),* and consequently still greater than that 
with which we regard what we conceive of as possible 
or contingent (IV, ir).t But to say that we conceive 
a thing as free, can only mean that we conceive it 
simply because we are ignorant of the causes that 
have determined it to act {by what I have shotun in II, 
35, schol.). Therefore the emotion with which we 
regard a thing that we conceive simply is, other things 
being equal, greater than that with which we regard a 
thing that we conceive as necessary, as possible, or as 
contingent. Consequently it is the greatest. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 6. /// so far as the mind comprehends all things 
as necessary, in so far has it a greater power over the 
emotions, and is less subject to them. 

Proof. — The mind comprehends that all things are 
necessary (I, 29), and that they are determined to 

* The author argues that, if we conceive a thing as free, we 
conceive it through itself, without anything else. If, then, we 
conceive it as causing pleasure or pain, our love or hate toward it 
will be extreme, for we will regard it as the sole cause of the pleas- 
ure or pain. — Tr, 

f An emotion toward a thing which we conceive as necessary 
is, other things being equal, more intense than an emotion toward 
a thing that is possible or contingent, that is, not necessary. (For 
in so far as we conceive it necessary, we conceive it as existent. — 
Tr.) 



I So THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

exist and to operate by an infinite nexus of causes (I, 
28). Hence {by the preceding propositioii) it in so far 
brings it about that it is less subject to the emotions 
which arise from them, and (III, 48)* regards with less 
emotion the things themselves. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — The more this knowledge that things are 
necessary is brought to bear upon individual things, 
which we imagine more distinctly and vividly, the 
greater is the power of the mind over the emotions. 
To this fact experience itself bears witness. We see 
sorrow at the loss of some good thing mitigated, as 
soon as the man who has lost it perceives that he 
could not have preserved it in any possible way. Thus 
we see, also, that no one pities an infant because it 
cannot speak, walk, or reason, and because, in a word, 
it lives so many years, as it were, without the conscious- 
ness of self. But if most persons were born as adults, 
and only one here and there as an infant, then every- 
one would pity infants, for then we should regard 
infancy itself, not as a natural and necessary thing, 
but as a defect or fault of nature. I might note many 
other instances of the same kind. 107- 

Prop. 7. Emotions which arise out of or are produced 
hy reason are, if lue take time into account, more potver- 
ful than those that are referred to particular things 
7vhich we conceive as absent. 

Proof. — We do not regard a thing as absent on 
account of the emotion with which we conceive it, 
but on account of the fact that the body is affected by 

* Love or hate, for examplS, toward Peter, is destroyed, if the 
pain involved in the latter, or the pleasure involved in the former 
be connected with the idea of another cause ; and it is diminished 
in so far as we conceive Peter not to have been the sole cause. 
(See dels, of the emotions, 6 and 7. — Tr.) 



PftOP. 8] HUMAN FREEDOM. l8l 

another emotion that excludes the existence of the 
thing (II, 17). Hence it is not in the nature of an 
emotion that is referred to a thing we conceive as 
absent, to dominate the other activities and the 
power of a man {on which point see IV, 6),* but, on 
the contrary, it is in harmony with its nature, that it 
can be to some degree brought into subjection by 
those emotions that exclude the existence of its 
external cause (IV, 9).f But an emotion that springs 
from reason is necessarily referred to the common 
properties of things [see the definition of reason, II, 
40, schol. 2), and these we always conceive as present 
(for there can be nothing to exclude their present 
existence), and always represent to ourselves in the 
same way (II, 38). Therefore such an emotion always 
remains the same ; and, consequently {axiom i), the 
emotions that are contrary to it, and that are not sup- 
ported by their external causes, must accommodate 
themselves to it more and more, until they are no 
longer contrary. In so far the emotion that springs 
from reason is the more powerful. 108 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 8. The greater the number of concurrent causes 
by which an emotion is aroused, the greater the emotion. 

Proof. — A large number of causes acting simultane- 
ously have more effect than if there were fewer 
(III, 7). Therefore (IV, 5) J the greater the number 

* The force of any passion or emotion can overcome the remain- 
ing activities or power of a man, so that the emotion persistently 
cleaves to the man. (See note to prop. 8, and IV, axiom. — Tr.) 

f See IV, App. XXX, note.— Tr. 

X The force and growth of any passion, and its persevering in 
existence, are not defined by the power with which we endeavor 
to persevere in existence, but by the power of an external cause as 
compared with ours. (See III, defs, i and 2, and II, 16. — Tr.) 



l82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

of simultaneous causes by which an emotion is 
aroused, the stronger is the emotion. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This proposition is evident also from 
axiom 2 of this Part. 

Prop. 9. An emotion referred to many different caitses, 
which the mind conceives simultaneously zvith the emotion 
is less harmful than another emotion equally great 
referred to a single cause or to fewer causes : moreover, 
we are less dominated by it, and regard ivith less emotion 
any one cause. 

Proof. — An emotion is evil or harmful only in so far 
as it makes the mind less capable of thinking (IV, 26 
and 2"]).^ Hence an emotion which leads the mind 
to conceive many objects simultaneously is less harm- 
ful than another emotion equally great, that so holds 
the mind to the contemplation of a single object or of 
a few objects that it cannot think of others. This was 
the first point. In the second place, since the essence 
of the mind — that is (III, 7), its power — consists in 
thought alone (II, 11), the mind is less dominated by 
an emotion that leads it to contemplate many things 
simultaneously than by an emotion equally great that 
holds it absorbed in the contemplation of but one 
object or of a smaller number of objects. This was 
the second point. In the last place, this emotion 
(III, 48), f inasmuch as it is referred to many external 
causes, is less with respect to each one of them. 
Q. E. D. 

*A11 that we endeavor to do in obedience to reason is to com- 
prehend ; nor does the mind, in so far as it exercises reason, judge 
anything to be of advantage to it, except what assists its compre- 
hension. 

We certainly know nothing to be good or evil except what truly 
assists our comprehension or may hinder us from comprehending. 

f See 6, note. — Tr. 



Prop, io] human freedom. 183 

Prop. 10. As lo)ig as we are not harassed by emotions 
that are contrary to onr nature, we have the pozver of 
arranging and connecting the modifications of the body 
according to the intellectual order. 

Proof. — Emotions that are contrary to our nature 
— that is (IV, 30),* that are evil — are only evil in so 
far as they interfere with the mind's compreliension 
(IV, 27). f So long, therefore, as we are not harassed 
by emotions that are contrary to our nature, the 
power of the mind, by which it strives to compre- 
hend things (IV, 26), f is not hampered, and hence it 
has the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and 
of deducing some from others (II, 40, schol. 2, and z^*], 
schoiy, consequently (r), so long have we the power 
of arranging and concatenating the modifications 
of the body according to the intellectual order.109 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Through this power of rightly arranging 
and concatenating the modifications of the body, we 
can keep ourselves from being easily affected by evil 
emotions. For (7) it requires a greater force to con- 
trol emotions arranged and concatenated according 
to the intellectual order than to control indefinite 
and vague emotions. The best thing, therefore, that 
we can do, as long as we have not a perfect knowl- 
edge of our emotions, is to frame a right method of 
living, or definite rules of life, to commit them to 
memory, and to continually apply them to the indi- 
vidual cases often met with in life, so that our imagi- 
nation may be deeply affected by them, and we may 

* A thing cannot be bad through that which it has in common 
with our nature ; but in so far as it is bad for us, it is contrary to 
our nature. (See IV, preface ad Jin., and Note 103. — Tr.) - 

\ See g, note. — Tr, 



184 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

always have them at hand. For example, I have 
placed it among the rules of life (IV, 46, and schol.)^ 
that hate must be conquered by love or magnanimity, 
and not repaid by a return of hate. But that we may 
have this precept of reason always at hand, where it 
will be of use, we should think upon and often medi- 
tate the injustices men commonly practice, and to 
what extent and in what way they may best be averted 
by magnanimity. Thus shall we join the image of 
the injustice to the thought of this principle, and 
(II, 18) we shall always have it at hand when we are 
treated with injustice. But if we also have at hand 
the consideration of what is truly useful to us, and of 
the good that results from mutual friendliness and 
common fellowship, being mindful, moreover, of the 
fact that the highest satisfaction of the soul springs 
from the right method of living (IV, 52),f and that 
men, like other things, act from natural necessity ; 
then an injustice — that is to say, the hate that is wont 
to spring from it — will occupy a very small part of the 
imagination, and will easily be overcome. Or if the 
anger that is wont to spring from the greatest injus- 
tices be not so easily overcome, still it will be over- 
come, though not without agitation of the soul, in 
a much shorter time than if we had not thus reflected 
upon these things beforehand. This is evident from 
props. 6, 7, and 8 of this Part. In the same way one 

* He who lives under the control of reason endeavors, as far as 
he can, to repay the hate, anger, contempt, etc., of others with 
love or magnanimity. See III, definitions of the emotions, 6. 
The schol. argues that he who avenges wrongs with hate is 
miserable. See III, definitions of the emotions, 7 and 36. — Tr. 

f Self-satisfaction may arise from reason, and only that which 
arises from reason is the highest possible. (See III, defs, of the 
emotions, 25, and III, 3. — Tr.) 



Prop, io] human freedom. 185 

must think concerning the courage that lays fear 
aside ; to wit, one must enumerate and often imagine 
the common perils of life, and reflect how by presence 
of mind and fortitude they can best be avoided or 
overcome. But it should be noted that, in arranging 
our thoughts and images, we should always pay atten- 
tion (IV, 6;^, cor., and III, 59)* to what is good in 
each thing, so that we may always be determined in 
our action by the emotion of pleasure. If, for ex- 
ample, one sees that he is too eager in the pursuit of 
fame, let him think of its proper value, to what end it 
should be sought, and by what means it can be attained; 
but let him not think of its misuse, of its emptiness, of 
the fickleness of men, or of other things of the sort, 
of which no one thinks except through morbidness. 
For with such reflections do the most ambitious give 
themselves the most distress, when they despair of 
attaining the honor that they strive for ; and, while 
they are vomiting forth their wrath, they wish to 
appear wise. Therefore it is certain that they are the 
most desirous of fame who complain the loudest of its 
misuse and of the emptiness of the world. Nor is this 
peculiar to the ambitious, but it is common to all who 
suffer from adverse fortune and are weak in char- 
acter. The covetous poor man keeps talking of the 
misuse of money and the vices of the rich, whereby 
he only succeeds in afflicting himself, and in showing 
others that he is discontented not only with his own 
poverty but also with the riches of others. So, also, 
those who have been badly received by their mistress 
think of nothing save the inconstancy and deceitful 
character of women, and the rest of their much- 
harped-upon faults, all of which they immediately 
* See III, defs. of the emotions, 2 and 3. — Tr. 



1 86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

commit to oblivion as soon as they are again received 
by their mistress. Hence the man who is zealous to 
moderate his emotions and appetites, from the mere 
love of freedom, will strive, as far as possible, to gain 
a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to 
fill his soul with the joy that springs from a true 
knowledge of them ; but by no means to reflect upon 
men's vices, to disparage men, and to rejoice in a 
false show of freedom. He who will diligently ob- 
serve these precepts (for they are not difficult), and 
will practice them — he, verily, will be able in a short 
time to regulate his actions for the most part accord- 
ing to the dictates of reason, no 

Prop. ii. The greater the number of things to 
which an image is referred, the more frequent is it, or 
the oftener does it recur, and the more does it occupy the 
mind. 

Proof. — The greater the number of things to which 
an image or emotion is referred, the greater is the 
number of causes by which it can be aroused and 
maintained, and all of these {by hypothesis^ the mind 
considers simultaneously through the said emotion. 
Therefore is the emotion the more frequent, or the 
more often recurrent, and (8) it occupies the mind 
more. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 12. The images of things are more easily joined 
to those images that are referred to the things we clearly 
and distinctly comprehend than to others. 

Proof. — The things we clearly and distinctly com- 
prehend are either the common properties of things or 
what is inferred from these {see the definition of reason, 
n, 40, schol. 2), and consequently their images are {by 
the preceding proposition) the more frequently aroused 
in us, Therefore it is easier for us to consider other 



Prop. 16] HUMAN FREEDOM. 187 

things simultaneously with these than with other 
images, and, hence (II, 18), it is easier to join their 
images with these than with others. m Q. E. D. 

Prop. 13. The greater the number of other images to 
which an image is joined, the oftener does it recur. 

Proof. — The greater the number of other things to 
which an image is joined, the greater is the num- 
ber of causes (II, 18) by which it can be aroused. 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 14. The mind can bring it to pass that all the 
modifications of the body, or the images of things, are 
referred to the idea of God. 

Proof. — There is no modification of the body of 
which the mind cannot form a clear and distinct 
conception (4). Hence the mind can bring it to 
pass (1, 15) that all are referred to the idea of God. "2 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 15. He who clearly and distinctly comprehends 
himself and his emotions, loves God, and this the more, 
the better he comprehends himself and his emotions. 

Proof. — He who clearly and distinctly compre- 
hends himself and his emotions has pleasure (III, 
53),* and this is accompanied by the idea of God {by 
the preceding proposition). Therefore {defs. of the 
etjiotions, 6) he loves God, and {by the same reasoning) 
this the more, the better he comprehends himself and 
his emotions. 113 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 16. This love toward God must occupy tJie 
mind in the highest degree. 

Proof. — This love is joined to all the modifications 

* When the mind contemplates itself and its power of acting it 
has pleasvire ; and this the more, the more distinctly it conceives 
itself and its power of acting. (See III, defs. of the emotions, 
2.— Tr.) 



l88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [ParT V 

of the body (14) and is fostered by them all (15) , 
hence (11) it must occupy the mind in the highest 
degree. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 17. God is ■unthont passions, and is not affected 
with any enwtio7i of pleasure or pain. 

Proof. — All ideas, in so far as they are referred to 
God, are true (II, 32), that is (II, def. 4), they are 
adequate. Therefore {general defs. of the emotions) 
God is without passions. In the second place, God 
cannot pass to a greater or a less degree of perfection 
(I, 20, cor. 2). Therefore {^defs. of the eniotioiis, 2 and 
3) he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or 
pain. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Properly speaking, God does not love 
or hate anyone. For God is not {by the preceding 
proposition^ affected with any emotion of pleasure or 
pain. Consequently {defs. of the emotions, 6 and 7) 
he does not love or hate anyone. 114 

Prop. 18. No one can hate God. 

Proof. — The idea of God that is in us is adequate 
and perfect (II, 46 and 47). Therefore, in so far as 
we contemplate God we are active (III, 3) ; and 
hence (III, 59) * there can be no pain accompanied 
by the idea of God, that is {defs. of the emotions, 7), 
no one can hate God. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Love toward God cannot turn to hate. 

Scholium. — The objection may be made that, in the 
very act of comprehending God as the cause of all 
things, we regard him as the cause of pain. To this 
I answer that, in so far as we comprehend the causes 
of pain, in so far (3) it ceases to be a passion ; that is 
(III, 59), t in so far it ceases to be pain. Therefore, 

* See III, defs. of the emotions, 2 and 3. — Tr. 
f See III, I, and 11, schol. — Tr. 



Prop. 20] human freedom. 189 

in so far as we comprehend God as the cause of pain, 
we feel pleasure. "5 

Prop. 19. He who loves God cannot endeavor to have 
God love him in rettirn. 

Proof. — If a man did this, he would (17, cor^ 
wish God whom he loves were not God ; and hence 
(III, 19)* he would wish to have pain, which (III, 28)f 
is absurd. Therefore, he who loves God, etc. "6 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 20. This love toward God cajinot be stained 
either with the emotion of envy' or that of jealousy., but it 
is the more intensified the greater the number of men we 
conceive bound to God by this same bond of love. 

Proof. — This love toward God is the highest good 
that we can strive for according to the dictate of reason 
(IV, 28), J and it is common to all men (IV, 36), § and 
we desire all to rejoice in it (IV, 37). I Therefore 
{defs. of the emotions., 23) it cannot be stained with the 
emotion of envy, nor (18, and the def. of jealousy, 

* He who conceives what he loves to be destroyed will feel 
pain ; but if he conceives it to be preserved, he will feel pleasure. 
(See defs. of the emotions, 6. — Tr.) 

f Whatever we conceive as giving pleasure, we strive to bring 
about ; but what we conceive as opposed to this, or as conducive 
to pain, we strive to remove or destroy. 

\ The highest good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and 
the highest virtue of the mind is to know God. (Spinoza refers to 

I, def. 6, and I, 15, to prove that the mind can conceive nothing 
higher than God, and infers that the mind's highest good is knowl- 
edge of God. As it is the mind's nature to know, it furthers its 
being in knowing, i. e., it does what is useful to it. See IV, 
pref., ad fin. ^ and defs. i and 8. — Tr.) 

§ The highest good of those who follow virtue is common to all, 
and all may enjoy it equally. (See the note just preceding, and 

II, 47, schol.—Tv..) 
II See 103.— Tr. 



IQO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

q. V. Ill, 35, schol.)^ with tlie emotion of jealousy ; but 
on the contrary (III, 3i)t it must be the more intensi- 
fied, the greater the number of men we conceive to 
enjoy it. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — We can show in the same way that there 
is no emotion directly opposed to this love capable of 
destroying it. Hence we may conclude that this love 
toward God is the most unchangeable of all the 
emotions, and cannot, in so far as it is referred to the 
body, be destroyed except with the body itself. What 
its nature is, in so far as it is referred to the mind 
alone, we shall see hereafter. 

In what precedes I have included all the remedies 
against the emotions, that is, all that the mind, con- 
sidered in itself alone, can do to overcome the emo- 
tions. From this it appears that the power of the 
mind over the emotions consists: First, in the knowl- 
edge of the emotions itself (4, schol.). Second, in the 
separation of the emotion from the thought of its ex- 
ternal cause, which we conceive confusedly (2 and 4, 
schol.). Third, in the superiority, in the point of view 
of time, possessed by the emotions that are referred 
to the things we comprehend over those referred to 

* Jealousy is defined as "an agitation of the soul arising from 
combined love and hate, accompanied by the idea of someone else 
who is envied." — Tr. 

\ If we conceive anyone to love, desire, or hate anything that 
we ourselves love, desire, or hate, we shall love, etc., the thing 
more deeply. If, however, we conceive him as having in aversion 
what we love, or the converse of this, we shall suffer agitation of 
mind. (Proved by a reference to III, 27, where it is argued that, 
if we think of anyone like ourselves as having an emotion, this 
thought will be accompanied by a modification of the body similar 
to that which is present when we have the same emotion. See II, 
17, cor. and schol. — Tr.) 



Prop. 20] human FREEDOM. 191 

the things we conceive confusedly or fragmentarily 
(7). Fourth, in the multitude of causes by which the 
modifications that are referred to the common proper- 
ties of things or to God are fostered (9 and 11). 
Fifth, and last, in the order in which the mind can 
arrange and link together its emotions (10, schol., and 
12, 13, and 14). 

But in order to understand more clearly this power 
of the mind over the emotions, one should specially 
note that we call the emotions great when we compare 
the emotion of one man with the emotion of another, 
and see that the one is harassed more than the other 
by the same emotion ; or when we compare with each 
other the emotions of one and the same man, and find 
that he is more affected or moved by one emotion than 
by another. For (IV, 5)* the force of any emotion is 
measured by the power of its external cause as com- 
pared with our power. But the power of the mind is 
measured by knowledge alone, and its weakness or 
passion merely by the privation of knowledge ; that 
is, it is measured by that on account of which ideas 
are called inadequate. From this it follows that that 
mind is the most passive of which inadequate ideas 
constitute the greatest part, so that it is distinguished 
rather by what it endures than by what it does ; and, 
on the other hand, that is the most active of which 
adequate ideas constitute the greatest part, so that, 
although it contains as many inadequate ideas as the 
former, it is distinguished rather by those ideas that 
are attributed to human virtue than by those that in- 
dicate human infirmity. Again, one should note that 
griefs and misfortunes have their chief source in an 
excessive love of that which is subject to many varia- 
* See prop. 8, note. — Tr. 



192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

tions, and of which we can never have control. No 
one is solicitous or anxious about anything unless he 
love it ; nor do injustices, suspicions, enmities, etc., 
arise, except from the love of things of which no one 
can really have control. Thus we easily conceive what 
power clear and distinct knowledge, and especially 
that third kind of knowledge (II, 47, schoL), the foun- 
dation of which is the knowledge of God and nothing 
else, has over the emotions ; if it does not, in so far as 
they are passions, absolutely remove them (3, a7id 4, 
sc/wL), at all events it brings it about that they con- 
stitute the least part of the mind (14). Furthermore, 
it begets love toward that which is immutable and 
eternal (15), and which we really have within our 
power (II, 45); a love which, consequently, is not 
stained with any of the defects inherent in common 
love, but can always become greater and greater (15), 
and take possession of the greatest part of the mind 
(16), and affect it everywhere. 

This completes all I have to say as regards this 
present life. The truth of what I said at the begin- 
ning of this scholium, to wit, that I had briefly set 
forth in it all the remedies for the emotions, anyone 
can easily see who will give attention to what I have 
said in this scholium, and also to the definitions of the 
mind and its emotions, and finally, to props, i and 3 of 
Part III. Therefore it is now time to pass to the 
things that pertain to the duration of the mind without 
relation to the body. "7 

Prop. 21. The mind cannot imagine anything, 
or remember things past, unless while the body 
endures. 

Proof. — The mind does not express the actual ex- 
istence of its body, nor conceive the modifications of 



Prop. 23] human freedom. 193 

the body as actual, except while the body endures 
(II, 8, cor.) ; hence (II, 26) it does not conceive any 
body as actually existing, except while its body en- 
dures. Therefore, it cannot imagine anything {see the 
def. of Imagination in II, 17, schol), or remember 
things past, except while the body endures {see the def. 
of Memory in II, 18, .rr/;^/.)ii8 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 22. Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an 
idea which expresses the essence of this or that human 
body under the form of eternity. 

Proof. — God is not only the cause of the existence 
of this or that human body, but also of its essence (I, 
25) ; which must, therefore, necessarily be conceived 
through the essence of God and nothing else (I, axi- 
om 4), and that by certain eternal necessity (I, 16). 
This conception must necessarily be in God (II, 3).ii9- 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 23. The hnman mind cannot be absolutely 
destroyed with the body, but soniethiug of it remains, 
which is eternal. 

Proof. — There is necessarily in God a conception or 
idea, which expresses the essence of the human body 
{by the preceding proposition), and which, consequently, 
is necessarily something that belongs to the essence 
of the human mind (II, 13). But we do not ascribe 
to the mind any duration that can be defined in terms 
of time, except in so far as it expresses the actual ex- 
istence of the body, which is explained by duration 
and can be defined in terms of time ; that is (II, 8, 
cor.), we do not ascribe to it duration, except while 
the body endures. But since there is, nevertheless, 
something that is conceived by a certain eternal ne- 
cessity through the essence of God and nothing else 
{by the preceding propositio/i), this something that 



194 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPIN02A. [Part V 

belongs to the essence of the mind is necessarily 
eternal. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — This idea that expresses the essence of 
the body under the form of eternity, is, as I have said, 
a definite mode of thinking, which belongs to the es- 
sence of the mind, and which is necessarily eternal. 
Yet we cannot be made to remember having existed 
before the body, since there can be no traces of it in 
the body, and since eternity cannot be defined in 
terms of time, and cannot have any relation to time. 
Nevertheless we feel and know that we are eternal. 
The mind perceives those things that it conceives by 
an act of the understanding no less than those that it 
has in the memory. The eyes of the mind, with which 
it sees and observes things, are themselves proofs. 
Hence, although we do not remember having existed 
before the body, yet we feel that our mind, in so far 
as it involves the essence of the body under the form 
of eternity, is eternal, and that this its existence cannot 
be defined in terms of time or described as duration. 
Our mind, consequently, can be said to endure, and 
its existence can be measured by a definite time, only 
in so far as it involves the actual existence of the 
body ; and only in so far has it the power of meas- 
uring in time the existence of things, and of conceiv- 
ing them as having duration. 120 

Prop. 24. The better we comprehend particular 
things, the better do we comprehend God. 

Proof. — This is evident from the corollary to propo- 
sition 25, Part 1. 121 

Prop. 25. It is the highest endeavor of the viind and 
its highest virtue to knotv things by the third kind of 
knowledge. 

Proof. — The third kind of knowledge proceeds 



Prop. 27] human freedom. 195 

from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to 
an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (see 
its def., II, 40, schol.) ; and the better we comprehend 
things in this way, the better {by the preceding proposi- 
tion) do we comprehend God. Hence (IV, 28)* it is 
the highest virtue of the mind, that is (IV, def. 8), the 
power or nature of the mind, or (III, 7) its highest 
endeavor, to know things by the third kind of knowl- 
edge. 122 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 26. The more capable the mind is of knotving 
things by the third kind of knoitdedge, the more it desires 
to know things by tJiis kind of Jinowledge. 

Proof. — This is evident. In so far as we conceive 
the mind to be capable of knowing things by this 
kind of knowledge, we conceive it as determined to a 
knowledge of things by this kind of knowledge ; and, 
consequently {defs. of the emotions, i), the more 
capable the mind is of this, the more it desires it. 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 27. From this third kind of knoivl- 
edge springs the highest possible satisfaction of the 
mind. 

Proof. — It is the highest virtue of the mind to know 
God (IV, 28), f that is, to know things by the third 
kind of knowledge (25) ; and this virtue is the 
greater, the better the mind knows things by this 
kind of knowledge (24). Therefore he who knows 
things by this kind of knowledge passes to the 
highest degree of human perfection, and consequently 
{defs. of the emotions, 2), is affected with the highest 
pleasure, and that (II, 43) with the accompanying 
idea of himself and of his virtue. Hence {defs. of 

* See prop. 20, note. — Tr. 
•j- See prop. 20, note, — Tr, 



196 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

the emotions, 25) from this kind of knowledge springs 
the highest possible satisfaction. Q. E. D. 

Prop. 28, The endeavor, or desire, to know things by 
the third kind of hiotvledge cannot spring from the 
first, but from the second kind of kiwivledge. 

Proof. — This proposition is self-evident. For what- 
ever we clearly and distinctly comprehend, we com- 
prehend either through itself, or through that which 
is conceived through itself. That is, ideas that are 
clear and distinct in us — in other words, which are 
referred to the third kind of knowledge (II, 40, schol. 
2) — cannot follow from fragmentary and confused 
ideas, which {by the same schol.) are referred to 
the first kind of knowledge, but from adequate 
ideas, that is {by the same schol?), from the second and 
third kinds of knowledge. Hence {defs. of the emo- 
tions, I ) the desire to know things by the third kind 
of knowledge cannot spring from the first, but from 
the second kind. 123 Q. E. D. 

Prop. 29. Whatever the mind comprehends under the 
form of eternity, it does not comprehend through conceiv- 
ing the present actual existence of the body, but through 
conceiving the essence of the body under the form of 
eternity. 

Proof. — In so far as the mind conceives the present 
existence of its body, it conceives duration, which can 
be measured by time, and in so far only has it tlie 
power of conceiving things with relation to time (21, 
and II, 26). But eternity cannot be expressed by 
duration (I, def. 8, and its explanation). Hence the 
mind in so far has not the power of perceiving things 
under the form of eternity. But since it is of the 
nature of reason to conceive things under the form of 
eternity (II, 44, cor. 2), and it also belongs to the 



Prop. 31] human freedom. 197 

nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the 
body under the form of eternity (23), and besides 
these tvvo nothing else belongs to the essence of the 
mind (II, 13) ; it follows that this power of conceiv- 
ing things under the form of eternity does not belong 
to the mind, except in so far as it conceives the es- 
sence of the body under the form of eternity. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — We conceive things as actual in two 
ways : either in that we conceive them as existing 
with relation to a definite time and place, or in that 
we conceive them as contained in God, and as follow- 
ing from the necessity of the divine nature. Those 
things, however, that we conceive as true or real in 
this second way, we conceive under the form of 
eternity, and the ideas of them involve the eternal 
and infinite essence of God, as I have shown in II, 45. 
See also the scholium to this proposition. 124 

Prop. 30. Oiu- mind, in so far as it knows itself and^ 
the body under the form of eternity, necessarily has a 
knowledge of God, and knotvs that it is in God and is 
conceived through God. 

Proof. — Eternity is the very essence of God, in so 
far as this involves necessary existence (I, def. 8). 
Hence, to conceive things under the form of eternity 
is to conceive things in so far as they are conceived 
as real beings through the essence of God, that is, in 
so far as they involve existence through the essence 
of God. Therefore, our mind, in so far as it con- 
ceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, 
necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows, etc. 125 
Q. E. D. 

Prop. 31. The third kind of knowledge depends on the 
mind, as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is 
eterjial. 



198 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

Proof. — The mind conceives nothing under the 
form of eternity except in so far as it conceives the 
essence of its own body under the form of eternity 
(29), that is (21 and 23), except in so far as it is 
eternal. Therefore {^by the preceding proposition), in 
so far as it is eternal, it has a knowledge of God, 
which knowledge is necessarily adequate (II, 46). 
Hence the mind, in so far as it is eternal, is capable 
of knowing all those things that can follow when this 
knowledge of God is granted (II, 40) ; that is, it is 
capable of knowing things by the third kind of 
knowledge {see the def. of this, II, 40, schol. 2), of 
which, consequently, the mind (III, def. i), in so far 
as it is eternal, is the adequate or formal cause. 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Therefore, the more of this kind of 
knowledge anyone possesses, the clearer is his con- 
sciousness of himself and of God ; that is, the more 
perfect and blessed is he, as will appear still more 
clearly from what follows. But here it should be 
noted that, although we are now certain that the mind 
is eternal, in so far as it conceives things under the 
form of eternity, nevertheless, in order that the things 
I wish to prove may be the more easily explained and 
the better understood, we will consider it, as we have 
done hitherto, as though it were just beginning to be, 
and were just beginning to know things under the 
form of eternity. This we may do without any 
danger of error, provided we are careful to draw no 
conclusions except from premises that are clearly 
evident. 126 

Prop. 32. Whatever we knotv by the third kind of 
knowledge, we take pleasure in and that with the accom- 
panying idea of God as cause. 



Prop. 34] human freedom. 199 

Pj'oof. — From this kind of knowledge springs the 
highest possible satisfaction of the mind, that is {defs. 
of the einoiio7is, 25), the highest possible pleasure, and 
that with the accompanying idea of the mind itself 
(27), and, consequently (30), also with the accompany- 
ing idea of God as cause. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — From the third kind of knowledge 
necessarily springs the intellectual love of God. For 
from this kind of knowledge springs {by the preceding 
proposition) pleasure, accompanied by the idea of 
God as cause, that is {defs. of the emotions, 6), a love 
of God, not in so far as we imagine him as present 
(29), but in so far as we comprehend God to be 
eternal. It is this that I call the intellectual love of 
God. 127 

Prop. 33. The intellectual love of God, which springs 
from the third kind of knoivledge, is eternal. 

Proof. — The third kind of knowledge (31, and I, 
axiom 3) is eternal ; therefore {by the same axiom), the 
love that springs from it is also necessarily eternal. 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Although this love toward God has not 
had a beginning {by the preceding propositioii), never- 
theless it has all the perfections of love, just as if it 
had had a beginning, as we have chosen to assume in 
the corollary to the preceding proposition. Nor is 
there here any difference, except that the mind has 
eternally had these same perfections that we have just 
conceived of as added to it, and that with the accom- 
panying idea of God as eternal cause. But if pleas- 
ure consists in the transition to a greater perfection, 
blessedness must surely consist in this, that the mind 
is endowed with perfection itself. 128 

Prop. 34. The mind is not subject to those emotions^ 



200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

which are classed as passions, except tvhile the body 
endures. 

Proof. — A mental image {imagination is an idea 
through which the mind contemplates something as 
present {see the def. of it, II, 17, schol.), but which 
indicates rather the present constitution of the human 
body than the nature of the external thing (II, 16, 
cor. 2). An emotion is therefore {by the general def . 
of the emotions) a mental image, in so far as it indi- 
cates the present constitution of the body ; and, con- 
sequently (21), the mind is not subject to those emo- 
tions which are classed as passions except while the 
body endures. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that no love except the 
intellectual love is eternal. 

Scholium. — If we turn our attention to the commonly 
received opinion, we shall see that men are indeed 
conscious of the eternity of their mind, but con- 
found it with duration, and ascribe it to the imagi- 
nation or memory, which they think remains after 
death. 129 

Prop. 35. God loves himself with an infinite intellec- 
tual love. 

Proof. — God is absolutely infinite (I, def. 6), in 
other words (II, def. 6), God's nature rejoices in infinite 
perfection, and that (II, 3) with the accompanying idea 
of himself, that is (I, 11, and def. i), tlie idea of its 
cause. It is this that in the corollary to prop. 32 of 
this Part I have called the intellectual love. 

Prop. 36. The intellectual love of the mind toward 
God is the very love of God with 7ahich God loves him- 
self, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he 
can be expressed by the essence of the human mind, con- 
sidered under the form of eternity. That is, the Intel- 



Prop. 36] human freedom. 201 

lectual love of the mind toivard God is a part of the 
infinite love ivith luhich God loves himself. 

Proof. — This love of the mind must be classed 
among the acts of the mind (32, cor., and III, 3). It 
is, therefore, an act in which the mind contemplates 
itself, with the accompanying idea of God as cause 
(32, and cor.), that is (I, 25, cor., and II, 11, cor.), an 
act, in which God, in so far as he can be expressed by 
the human mind, contemplates himself, with the ac- 
companying idea of himself. Therefore {l>y the pre- 
ceding proposition) this love of the mind is a part of 
the infinite love with which God loves himself. Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that God, in so far as 
he loves himself, loves men, and consequently that 
the love of God toward men and the intellectual love 
of the mind toward God are one and the same. 

Scholium. — From this we clearly comprehend in 
what our salvation, or blessedness, or freedom con- 
sists ; to wit, in an unchangeable and eternal love 
toward God, that is, in the love of God toward men. 
This love or blessedness is in the sacred Scriptures 
called glory, and not without justice. For whether 
this love be referred to God, or to the mind, it may 
justly be called a satisfaction of the mind, which, in 
truth, is not distinguishable from glory (defs. of the 
emotions, 25 and 30). In so far as it is referred to 
God, it is (35) pleasure^ — let me still use this word — 
with the accompanying idea of himself ; and it is the 
same thing in so far as it is referred to the mind (27). 
Again, from the fact that the essence of our mind 
consists in knowledge alone, of which the source and 
foundation is God (I, 15, and II, 47, schol.), it be- 
comes clear to us how and in what way our mind 
follows, as regards its essence and existence, from the 



202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

divine nature, and continually depends on God. I 
have thought it worth while to note this here, that 
I might show by this illustration of how much worth 
is that knowledge of individual things, that I have 
called intuitive or of the third kind (II, 40, scJiol. 2), 
and how preferable to general knowledge, which, 
I have said, is of the second kind. For although, in 
Part I, I showed by a general argument that all 
things (including, consequently, the human mind) 
depend upon God as regards their essence and exist- 
ence ; nevertheless that demonstration, while it is 
legitimate and placed beyond risk of doubt, yet does 
not so impress our mind as when the same conclusion 
is drawn from the very essence of some individual 
thing which we say depends upon God. 130 

Prop. 37. There is nothijig in nature that is opposed 
to this intellectual love, that is, that can destroy it. 

Proof. — This intellectual love necessarily follows 
from the nature of the mind, in so far as this is con- 
sidered as an eternal truth through the nature of 
God (33 ajid 29). If, then, there were anything that 
were opposed to this love, it would be opposed to the 
truth : and, consequently^ that which could destroy 
this love would bring it to pass that what is true 
would be false ; which {as is self-evident) is absurd. 
Therefore, there is nothing in nature, etc. 131 Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — The axiom of Part IV. has to do with 
individual things, in so far as they are considered with 
relation to a definite time and place. No one, I think, 
doubts this. 

Prop. 38. The greater the number of things the mind 
kjiows by tJie second and third kinds of knowledge^ the 
less is it subject to hurtful emotions, and the less does it 
fear death. , 



Prop. 39J human freedom. 203 

Proof. — The essence of the mind consists in 
knowledge (IT, 11); hence, the greater the number 
of things the mind knows by the second and third 
kinds of knowledge, the greater the part of it which 
abides (29 and 23), and, consequently {l>y the preceding 
proposition^., the greater the part of it which is not 
affected by the emotions that are contrary to our 
nature, that is (IV, 30),* that are hurtful. Therefore, 
the greater the number of things the mind knows by 
the second and third kinds of knowledge, the greater 
the part of it that remains unharmed, and conse- 
quently, the less is it subject to hurtful emotions, etc. 
Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — From this we comprehend what I have 
touched upon in the scholium to IV, 39, and have 
promised to explain in this Part ; namely, that death 
is the less hurtful^ the greater the clear and distinct 
knowledge of the mind, and consequently the more 
the mind loves God. Furthermore, since (27) from 
the third kind of knowledge springs the highest 
possible satisfaction, it follows that the human mind 
can be of such a nature that the part of it which I 
have shown to perish with the body (21) is of no 
importance in comparison with the part of it which 
remains. But more of this presently. 132 

Prop. 39. He whose body is capable of the greatest 
number of activities has a mind, the greatest part of 
tvhich is eternal. 

Proof. — He whose body is capable of the greatest 
number of activities is the least harassed by hurtful 
emotions (IV, 38), f that is (IV, 30),! by emotions 

* See note to prop. 10. — Tr. 

f See IV, App. XXVII, and note.— Tr. 

X See note to prop. 10. — Tr. 



204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PaRT V 

which are contrary to our nature. Therefore (lo) he 
has the power of arranging and concatenating the 
modifications of the body according to the intellectual 
order, and consequently of bringing it about (14) that 
all the modifications of the body are referred to the 
idea of God. Whence it happens (15) that he is 
affected with love toward God, which (16) must 
occupy or constitute the greatest part of the mind ; 
and hence (33) he has a mind, the greatest part of 
which is eternal. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — Since human bodies are capable of very 
many activities, there is no doubt but that they can 
be of such a nature as to be related to minds that 
have a great knowledge of themselves and of God, 
and of which the greatest or the chief part is eternal — 
of such a nature, consequently, as scarcely to fear 
death. That this may be the more clearly compre- 
hended, one should here consider that we live in con- 
tinual change, and according as we change for the 
better or for the worse, we are said to be fortunate or 
unfortunate. He who, from being an infant or a 
child, becomes a corpse, is said to be unfortunate, 
and, on the other hand, it is regarded as good fortune 
to have been able to pass the whole span of life Avith 
a healthy mind in a healthy body. And in truth, he 
who, like an infant or a child, has a body capable of 
very few activities, and very dependent on external 
causes, has a mind that, in itself considered, is 
scarcely conscious of itself, of God, or of things ; on 
the other hand, he who has a body capable of very 
many activities has a mind that, in itself considered, 
has a vivid consciousness of itself, of God, and of 
things. In this life, therefore, it is our chief endeavor 
to change the body of the infant, as far as its nature 



Prop. 40] HUMAN FREEDOM. 205 

permits, and as far as is profitable for it, into another 
body capable of very many activities, and related to a 
mind conscious of itself, of God, and of very many 
things ; so that all that is referred to its memory or 
imagination will be, in comparison with the under- 
standing, of scarcely any importance, as I have just 
said in the scholium to the preceding proposition. i33 

Prop. 40. The more perfection each thing has, the 
more active is it, and the less passive j a7id, conversely, 
the more active it is, the more perfect is it. 

Proof. — The more perfect each thing is, the more 
reality has it (II, def. 6), and consequently (III, 3, and 
schol.), the more active is it and the less passive. 
This demonstration proceeds in the same way in in- 
verse order ; whence it follows that, conversely, a 
thing is the more perfect, the more active it is. 
Q. E. D. 

Corollary. — Hence it follows that the part of the 
mind which abides, whatever its amount, is more per- 
fect than the rest. For the eternal part of the mind 
(23 and 29) is the understanding, and it is on account 
of this alone that we are said to be active (III, 3) ; 
but the part that we have shown perishes is just the 
imagination (21), and it is on account of this alone 
that we are said to be passive (III, 3, and general def . 
of the emotions). Therefore {by the preceding proposi- 
tion), the former, whatever its amount, is more perfect 
than the latter. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — These are the things I set out to prove 
with regard to the mind, in so far as it is considered 
without relation to the existence of the body. From 
these, and at the same time from I, 21, and other prop- 
ositions, it appears that our mind, in so far as it 
knows, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is de- 



2o6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

termined by another eternal mode of thinking, this 
again by another, and so to infinity ; so that they 
all together constitute the eternal and infinite intel- 
lect of God. 134 

Prop. 41. Even if we did not know otir jjiind to be 
eternal, we should nevertheless regard as of the highest 
importance piety and religion, and all withoict restriction 
of those things that, as I have shown in Part IV, are 
referred to courage and niagnani?nity. 

Proof. — The first and only foundation of virtue or 
of aright method of living (IV, 22, cor., andlY, 24)* 
is to seek one's own advantage. But in the determina- 
tion of what reason pronounces to be of advantage, 
we have taken no account of the eternity of the mind, 
which we have come to a knowledge of only in this 
Fifth Part. Hence, although at that time we were 
ignorant that the mind is eternal, we regarded as of 
the highest importance those things that, as I have 
shown, are referred to courage and magnanimity. 
Therefore, were we even now ignorant of that fact, 
we should nevertheless regard as of the highest impor- 
tance these precepts of reason. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — The belief of the multitude appears to 
be otherwise. Most men seem to think that they are 
free just in so far as they are permitted to gratify 
desire, and that they give up their independence just 
in so far as they are obliged to live according to the 
precept of the divine lav/. Piety, then, and religion, 
and all things, without restriction, that are referred to 
greatness of soul, they regard as burdens ; and they 
hope after death to lay these down and to receive the 
reward of their bondage, that is, of piety and religion. 
And not by this hope alone, but also and chiefly by 
* See IV, def. 8 ; IV, App. IV, and Note 103.— Tr. 



Prop. 42] human freedom. 207 

fear — the fear of being punished after death with dire 
torments — are they induced to live according to the 
precept of the divine law so far as their poverty and 
feebleness of soul permit. If men had not this hope 
and fear, but if, on the contrary, they thought that minds 
perished with the body, and that for the wretched, 
worn out with the burden of piety, there was no con- 
tinuation of existence, they would return to their incli- 
nation, and decide to regulate everything according to 
their lusts, and to be governed by chance rather than 
by themselves. This seems to me no less absurd than 
it would seem if someone, because he does not believe 
he can nourish his body with good food to eternity, 
should choose to stuff himself with what is poisonous 
and deadly ; or, because he sees that his mind is not 
eternal or immortal, should choose on that account to 
be mad, and to live without reason. These things are 
so absurd as scarcely to be worth mentioning.iSS 

Prop. 42. Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but 
virtue itself ; nor do tve rejoice in it because we restrain 
the desires, but on the contrary, becau.se we rejoice in it 
we are able to restrain the desires. 

Proof. — Blessedness consists in love toward God 
(36, and schol.), which love- springs from the third kind 
of knowledge (32, cor.). Therefore this love (III, 59,* 
a7id III, 3) must be referred to the mind in so far as 
it is active, and hence (IV, def. 8) it is virtue itself. 
This was the first point. In the second place, the 
more the mind rejoices in this divine love or blessed- 
ness, the more it knows (32); that is (3, cor.), the 
greater the power it has over the emotions, and (38) 
the less it is subject to emotions that are hurtful. 
Therefore, from the fact that the mind rejoices in this 

*See III, I.— Tr. 



2o8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

divine love or blessedness, it has the power of restrain- 
ing the desires. And since the power of man to re- 
strain the emotions consists in understanding alone, 
no one rejoices in blessedness because he has re- 
strained the emotions, but, on the contrary, the power 
of restraining the desires springs from blessedness 
itself. Q. E. D. 

Scholium. — With this I have completed all that I 
intended to show regarding the power of the mind 
over the emotions, and the freedom of the mind. 
From what I have said it is evident how much stronger 
and better the wise man is than the ignorant man, who 
is led by mere desire. For the ignorant man, besides 
being agitated in many ways by external causes, and 
never attaining true satisfaction of soul, lives as it 
were without consciousness of himself, of God, and of 
things, and just as soon as he ceases to be acted upon, 
ceases to be. While, on the contrary, the wise man, in 
so far as he is considered as such, is little disturbed 
in mind, but, conscious by a certain eternal necessity 
of himself, of God, and of things, he never ceases to 
be, but is always possessed of true satisfaction of soul. 
If, indeed, the path that I have shown to lead to this 
appears very difficult, still it may be found. And 
surely it must be difficult, since it is so rarely found. 
For if salvation were easily attained, and could be 
found without great labor, how could it be neglected 
by nearly everyone ? But all excellent things are as 
difficult as they are rare. 136 



CRITICAL AND EXPLANATORY NOTES. 

INTRODUCTORY NOTE. 

Since the limits of this volume do not permit of 
my printing extended extracts from certain of 
Spinoza's writings which cast a light upon his theory 
of knowledge, and are of no small assistance in ex- 
plaining the reasoning contained in the " Ethics," and 
since those reasonings are, both on account of their 
unfortunate mathematical dress and on account of 
the peculiar character of the writer's thought, difficult 
of comprehension even to students who have had 
a good training in the interpretation of philosophical 
systems, I have thought it desirable in this edition to 
give rather copious notes, and to preface them with 
a brief exposition of our author's theory of knowledge 
and an examination of the general structure of his 
thought. In this preface I do not examine in detail 
all of Spinoza's conceptions, but refer the student for 
such an examination to the notes that follow. Here 
I am concerned only with certain things which the 
reader may well bear in mind from the outset, and 
which will make intelligible to him some of the intri- 
cacies and obscurities of Spinoza's reasoning. One 
cannot do justice to an author's thought until one 
sees how, under the circumstances, the writer might 
naturally have written as he did. It is my desire to 
put the student, as fer as possible, in such a position 
with regard to Spinoza. 



2IO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

I. Spinoza's Epistemology. 
I. Ideas and Things. — Spinoza draws a sharp dis- 
tinction between ideas and the objects which they 
represent. An idea is one thing and its object 
another, and the two are not even alike. The idea of 
a circle, for example, is not the circle, and does not 
resemble the circle, for it has no center and no cir- 
cumference as a circle has.* Yet in some sense it 
truly represents the circle, or, in the language of that 
day, the same thing that exists " formally " or " actu- 
ally," /. e., as a real, external thing, out there beyond 
the mind, also exists " objectively " or by way of 
representative image in the mind.f This way of 
speaking, which makes the one thing or " essence " or 
" nature " exist in two ways, the one " formal " or 
real, the other " objective " or representative, seems 
to bridge the gulf between the idea and its object, 
even when they are clearly seen to be two distinct 
things, as, for example, by Descartes,^; and gives rise 
to confusion. It makes it easy for one whose theory 
of knowledge has wholly cut off the world of mind 
from a supposed real world beyond it, to recover that 
real world surreptitiously, and without a clear con- 
sciousness of his inconsistency. § If I say that it is an 
eternal world that exists " objectively " in my thought, 
then in my thought I appear to myself to be grasping, 
not merely ideas, but an external world. One cannot, 
of course, obtain real knowledge by thus juggling with 
words, and for the moment regarding as one two 
things defined to be distinctly two. When the matter 

* De Intellectus Emendatioiie," p. ii, ed. Van Vloten and 
Land. 

f Ibid. X " Meditations," III. 

§ " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. ii, ct seq. 



I, 2] CRITICAL NOTES. 211 

is narrowly examined it is easy to see that a pure 
assumption has been made, and the fact partly hidden 
under a phrase. If the idea is one thing, and its 
object, as we express it, a something beyond it and 
distinct from it, and if, further, the mind is shut up to 
its ideas, how can I know that my idea is represent- 
ative of something beyond itself ? How can I know 
that it is in any sense a copy ? Evidently I am simply 
assuming without proof of any sort the '' formal " 
existence of the object and then concealing from 
myself the fact that I have made such an assumption 
by declaring that this external thing exists " objec- 
tively " in my thought. It is easy to forget one's own 
hypothesis — the doctrine that the mind is shut up to 
the circle of its own ideas — and to fall back into the 
notion that we have direct experience of things, and 
can correct our ideas of things by an immediate refer- 
ence to the things themselves. One finds this incon- 
sistency everywhere in the history of philosophy,* and 
one does not have to look far for instances of it in 
contemporary writings. Such an inconsistency ap- 
pears a little less glaring when cloaked by the scholas- 
tic phrase I have been discussing. 

2. Parallelism of Ideas a7id Things. — Now Spinoza 
distinguishes, as I have said, between the idea and the 
object. He declares them to be wholly unlike each 
other.f Indeed, he pushes so far the Cartesian antith- 
esis between matter and mind as to deny all inter- 
action between ideas and things. J Nevertheless he 
assumes, as above stated, that the idea truly represents 

^' E. g., See Descartes, "Meditations," III or Locke's 
"Essay," bk. iv. eh. xi. 

I " De Intellectus Emendatione," loc. ci(. 
\ " Ethics," II, 6, 



212 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

its object, and that the world of thought as a whole 
mirrors with exactitude the world of things. The 
two worlds of thought and extension he makes com- 
pletely independent, but absolutely parallel to each 
other, the one containing " objectively " what exists 
" formally " in the other. In short, he regards them 
as one thing viewed under two aspects.* How two 
things so different as are, in his conception, thought 
and extension, can be parallel and stand in the rela- 
tion of original and representative — how an idea, 
which is denied a center and circumference, can 
represent a circle, of which these constitute the very 
essence — Spinoza never attempts to make clear. He 
leaves the problem where it is left by modern writers 
who hold to a doctrine of representative perception, 
declare ideas to be distinct from things and wholly 
without extension, and yet regard them as in some 
occult sense truly representative of extended things. 
It is easy to see how Spinoza, given the doctrine of 
the " objective " existence of real things, which he 
inherited from the past, and given also the Cartesian 
antithesis between mind and matter as wholly different 
in nature, might naturally hit upon the idea of an 
absolute independence and yet a complete parallelism 
between the two worlds. It will save the student 
some trouble if he will bear in mind that Spinoza 
never ofTers proof of such a parallelism, but simply 
assumes it ; that in some passages he presents doc- 
trines inconsistent with it ; and that, as a matter of 
fact, he rests upon an appeal to experience in justifi- 
cation of his position. f Such an appeal to experience 

* " Ethics," II, 7. 

f " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 8 ; "Ethics," II, axioms 
4 and 5. 



I, 3] CRITICAL NOTES. 213 

is, of course, an abandonment of the position assumed 
at the outset. 

3. The Test of Truth. — Having thus separated 
thought from things and denied all interaction between 
them, Spinoza naturally raises the question : What is 
the test of truth ? how can a true idea be distinguished 
from a false ? Since he has cut off ideas from 
things, he cannot consistently make the test to lie 
in an observed correspondence of the idea with its 
object. Ideas are independent of their objects and 
not to be accounted for by a reference to the objects. 
He is, hence, quite consistent in seeking for the test 
of truth in the idea itself.* He falls back upon his 
notion of " formal essences " and their corresponding 
"objective essences" or mental representatives, and 
makes certitude to consist in the possession of the 
" objective essence " of a thing, or a true idea.f In 
other words, in having a true idea we possess the truth 
and may know we possess the truth, for truth shines 
by its own light, and we need not go beyond the idea 
to know that it is true. Error arises merely from con- 
fusion, from our affirming of the "objective essences " 
of things what does not properly belong to them. J 
We may, therefore, guard against error by avoiding 
confusion, by attaining clear ideas ; and, as very sim- 
ple ideas cannot be confused, error witli regard to 
them is impossible.! Spinoza's endeavor in all this is 
sufficiently reasonable. He is trying to find a criterion 
of truth which will not compel him to pass beyond 
the circle of ideas to a something wholly outside of 

* " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 23, and " Ethics," II, 43, 
schol. 

f " De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 12, 23. 
\Ibid.^T^. 24. %Ibid., pp. 21, 22, 



214 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD, 

them and, by hypothesis, wholly cut off from the mind. 
The problem is a living one, and very irrational solu- 
tions of it are offered still. If we have only copies of 
things, representations, and never the things them- 
selves, it may well " gravel a philosopher," as Bishop 
Berkeley hath it, to discover any means of proving 
that they are mere representations or copies, or to pick 
out those that are true copies from those that are not. 
In declaring that the idea is an "objective essence " 
Spinoza makes precisely the assumption made by the 
adherents of the doctrine of representative perception 
now, and he cuts the knot in precisely the same way. 
Of course, the assumption that all clear ideas are true, 
in so far as this means that they correspond to real 
things or " formal essences," is a mere assumption, and 
adopted without proof. Here again we have a mode 
of procedure closely analogous to what we meet every 
day. Indeed, it is most interesting to the student of 
the history of philosophy to see how ancient and how 
modern is this bit of loose reasoning. It turns up 
everywhere. Had Spinoza cut loose from the hypo- 
thetical " external " thing altogether, and become an 
idealist, and had he, instead of seeking the criterion 
of truth in the idea itself, sought it rather in the rela- 
tions of the idea in question with other ideas ; in short, 
had he sought some such criterion of truth as charac- 
terizes Berkeley's " ideas of sense,"* he would have 
had a much more hopeful outlook, and could have 
avoided the inconsistencies and assumptions which 
burden his argument. 

4. The Concatenation of Ideas. — Since the world of 
thought mirrors with exactitude the external, real 
world, the relations between ideas, according to 
* " Principles," §§ 29-33. 



I, 5] CRITICAL NOTES. 215 

Spinoza, correspond exactly to the relations between 
things. In other words, the logical deduction of ideas 
from each other corresponds to the physical relation 
of effect and cause. If a real thing in nature is caused 
by another thing and could not have existed without 
it, then its idea "involves" the idea of that other 
thing and cannot be conceived without it.* Hence in 
order to reproduce faithfully in our thought all nature, 
it is only necessary to begin with the idea which 
represents the origin and source of nature and to com- 
pletely develop it, deducing all our ideas from it. 
Could we do this satisfactorily we would possess all 
truth. The being from the idea of which all truth 
may thus be evolved is Spinoza's God, or Substance. 
It is needless to say that Spinoza did not succeed in 
thus evolving all ideas from the idea of God, and the 
student will look in vain for such a deduction. I 
mention this in passing, as I reserve the subject for 
fuller discussion a little later. I wish simply to remark 
here that the student will find this parallel between 
logical deduction and physical causation one of the 
most puzzling things in the " Ethics." It cannot be 
carried out consistently, and it introduces much 
obscurity into Spinoza's reasoning. The origin of the 
idea is sufficiently clear. It is a corollary to the gen- 
eral parallelism between ideas and things, which I 
have discussed above. 

5. Mind and Body. — As every object has its corre- 
sponding idea, one may say that all things are ani- 
mated, and as the difference between two ideas corre- 
sponds to the difference between their objects, some 
ideas are more complex than and superior to others. f 

* " De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 13, 14. 
f " Ethics," II, 13, schol. 



2l6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

The human body is highly complex ; the idea corre- 
sponding to it is the human mind ; and, since thought 
and extension are wholly independent of each other, 
the mind cannot act upon the body nor the body 
upon the mind.* This would seem to teach that the 
human mind can know only the human body, its 
object, but this is not Spinoza's teaching. He uses 
the word idea in two distinct senses, in one of which 
it signifies that in the world of thought, which corre- 
sponds to some given object in the world of reality, 
is, so to speak, its soul, and in the other a representa- 
tive image, which need not be the idea of the object 
known in the former of the two senses. Spinoza him- 
self distinguishes! between the two senses of the 
word, but he does not make the distinction clear, nor 
does he keep the two meanings separate. A part of 
his reasoning is based on a confusion of the two. 
This treatment of ideas the student will find one of 
the troublesome parts of the " Ethics." I shall dis- 
cuss it more fully in a note later. It is evident from 
certain passages that Spinoza fell back upon experi- 
ence for his evidence that the mind is connected with 
the body, and forgot that he had wholly cut them off 
from each other.J 

6. Summary. — To summarize briefly : one should 
bear in mind that Spinoza distinguishes between ideas 
and their objects, and makes them numerically distinct; 
that he makes them wholly different in nature, and 
denies all interaction between them ; that he, never- 
theless, makes them absolutely parallel, and regards 
ideas as representative of things ; that, as a conse- 

* " Ethics," III, 2 and schol. f "Ethics,"' II, 17, schol. 

:j: " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 8; "Ethics," axioms 4 
and 5. 



II, 7] CRITICAL NOTES. 21 7 

quence, he believes he can reproduce all nature by 
logical deduction from the idea of the Being which is 
the source of nature ; and that he regards the relation 
of mind and body as a special instance of the general 
parallelism between thought and things, calling the 
mind the "idea" of the body. These doctrines 
underlie the reasonings in the " Ethics." They Avill 
furnish an explanation of much that seems very arbi- 
trary. One may complain, much that is arbitrary, 
since the doctrines themselves rest upon unproved 
assumptions, and do not shine by their own light. 
To this I answer, it is easy to see how Spinoza might 
have been led to make such assumptions, which, more- 
over, are not widely different from those made by 
philosophers of our day. One may admire the bold- 
ness and ingenuity of his thought, while recognizing 
that its foundations are themselves without founda- 
tion. And it ill behooves philosophers of the nine- 
teenth century, whose books bristle with "intuitions " 
and " necessary truths," to criticise severely a philoso- 
pher of the seventeenth for a few natural assumptions 
of a similar nature. It is a great saving of labor to 
assume things as self-evident. 

II. Spinoza's Realism the Key to the Reasonings 

Contained in the " Ethics." 

7. The System of Ideas. — Spinoza insists that the 
idea from which all other ideas are to be deduced 
must not be an abstraction, but the idea of " a partic- 
ular affirmative essence," of a real Being. This Being 
is God or substance. From this idea must stream 
forth all our other ideas, as from God stream forth all 
things.* Had he rigorously and consistently carried 
*" De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 32, 33. 



2l8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

out this thought he would have had to deduce from 
substance the attributes thought and extension, which 
"the intellect perceives as constituting its essence"; 
from them, in turn, the two eternal modes, motion and 
"absolutely infinite intellect "; and from these one or 
more other eternal modes : after that, " essences " of 
various orders ; and, finally, finite particular modes, 
or the individual things in nature, which close the 
series. These last, however, on account of their 
number and their complicated relations to each other, 
as well as on account of the fact that their existence 
has no connection with their "essence," he declares it 
beyond the power of the human intellect to obtain 
by deduction.* He therefore distinguishes between 
their " essence " or nature and their existence, and 
allows us the power of deducing the former only 
from the series of "fixed and eternal things. "f For 
information regarding the existence of individual things 
we must look elsewhere. We must turn to experience 
and the order of causes. J 

The student will seek in vain in the " Ethics " for 
the deductions here indicated. The attributes are not 
deduced from the idea of substance at all ; the infinite 
modes are not deduced from the attributes ; nor are 
the essences of finite modes deduced from the infinite 
modes. As to particular finite modes or individual 
things, with their "accidents " as well as their essences, 
there is not even an indication of the way in which 
these are to be traced back to the idea of God or sub- 
stance. The '^ existence " of finite things, which is 

* Ibid. 

\ I. e, , the essences of various orders which constitute the steps 
in this deduction, beginning with God or substance, 
\ " Ethics," I, 7, schol. 2., and 11, proof 2, 



II, 8] CRITICAL NOTES. 219 

distinct from their essence and to be accounted for 
separately, is left unaccounted for, in fact, being 
merely referred in a general way to God, the source of 
all.* It is true that Spinoza seems to indicate in the 
passage referred to above, that our inability to deduce 
individual things from the idea of God is due rather 
to the weakness of our understanding than to the 
nature of the problem itself, but, as I shall point out 
later, he treats finite existences as different in their 
nature from essences, and not susceptible of the same 
kind of an explanation. 

8. Spinoza s Realism. — It was natural that Spinoza 
should pass lightly over these deductions, for in the 
nature of the case they cannot be made. The exist- 
ence of these different orders of being has to be 
assumed — taken up as furnished by experience — and 
then the things, in accordance with a general principle, 
are referred to God as source and cause. Our author, ' 
though he warns us against abstractions, is really 
dealing with abstractions, universals, not concrete 
things, and one cannot deduce a world of concrete 
realities from an abstraction, even if that abstraction 
be, after the fashion of the realists, inconsistently 
treated as a real thing. The question of the nature 
of the "fixed and eternal things," beginning with God 
or substance, is a very important one to the student of 
Spinoza ; and without solving it he cannot find the 
key to the peculiar reasonings contained in the 
" Ethics." When he has solved it he can readily see 
why Spinoza undertook this deduction and why he 
was doomed to failure. He must realize that " fixed 
and eternal things" are treated as both abstract and 
concrete, as universals and real entities. As universals 
*" Ethics," I, 25, schol. 



220 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [InTROD. 

they form a chain, are related to each other as lower 
and higher, and seem to make possible a passage from 
one to the other ; as real entities they appear to jus- 
tify the derivation of a concrete from that which is 
really less concrete. Nowhere in the "Ethics" must 
one lose sight of the fact that they are endowed with 
this double nature. Spinoza's reasonings are the 
reasonings of a realist, and he falls into their tradi- 
tional error. This I shall try to show in what follows. 
We hear a good deal of Spinoza's nominalism, and 
we have seen that he insists upon an avoidance of 
abstractions, upon a deduction of all our ideas from 
an idea in the strictest sense concrete, that of a " par- 
ticular affirmative essence." His nominalism was, how- 
ever, only skin-deep, and he was at heart as thorough 
a realist as any philosopher of the Middle Ages. No 
one, it is true, has more clearly indicated the way in 
which we arrive at certain general notions or uni- 
versals. Note the following: ""Nevertheless, that I 
may omit nothing that it is necessary to know, I will 
briefly mention the causes in which the terms known 
as transcendental have had their origin, as, for example, 
Being, Thing, Something. These terms arise from 
the fact that the human body, since it is limited, is 
only capable of forming in itself distinctly a certain num- 
ber of images at the one time. If this number be ex- 
ceeded, the images begin to run together ; and if the 
number of images that the body is able to form in itself 
distinctly at one time be greatly exceeded, they are all 
entirely confused with each other. Since this is so, it 
is evident from the corollary to prop. 17, and from 
prop. 18, that the human mind can imagine distinctly 
at one time as many bodies as there are images that 
can be formed at one time in the body corresponding 



II, 8] CRITICAL NOTES. 221 

to it. But when the images in the body are wholly 
confused with each other, the mind, too, will imagine 
all the bodies confusedly and without distinguishing 
them at all. It will grasp them under one attribute, 
as it were, namely, under the attribute of Being, of 
Thing, etc. This can also be deduced from the fact 
that images are not always equally lively ; and from 
other causes analogous to these, which it is not neces- 
sary to unfold here, for it is sufficient to the object I 
have in view to consider a single one. They all 
amount to this, that these terms stand for ideas in the 
highest degree confused. Again, from like causes 
have sprung the notions called universals, as Man, 
Horse, Dog, etc. There are formed in the human 
body at the one time so many images — for instance of 
man — that they overcome the faculty of imagination ; 
not, indeed, wholly, but to such a degree that the 
mind is unable to imagine the little differences in the 
individuals (as the color, the size, etc., of each) and 
their exact number. It distinctly imagines only that 
in which all, in so far as they affect the body, agree. 
By this element, especially, the body was affected in 
the case of each individual ; it is this that the mind 
expresses by the word man j and this that it predicates 
of an infinity of individuals. As I have said, it cannot 
imagine the exact number of individuals. But bear in 
mind that these notions are not formed by everyone 
in the same way, but differently by each according to 
tiie nature of the object by which the body has been 
the more often affected, and which the mind most 
easily imagines or remembers. For example, those 
who have more often regarded with admiration the 
stature of men will understand by the word 7?ian an 
animal erect in stature. Those, on the other hand, who 



222 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

have been accustomed to notice something else, will 
form another common image, as that man is a laughing 
animal, a featherless biped, a rational animal, and so 
on. Each one will form universal images of things 
according to the character of his body." * 

Leaving out the " images " formed in the body, we 
have here something quite modern, and Spinoza applies 
his doctrine more boldly than many of the moderns. 
To quote from the " Ethics " a little further on : " In 
the same way it is proved that there is in the mind 
no absolute power of knowing, desiring, loving, etc. 
Whence it follows, these and similar faculties are 
either absolutely fictitious, or only metaphysical en- 
tities — universals — that we are accustomed to form 
from individuals. Thus, understanding and will aye 
related to this or that idea and to this or that volition, 
as lapidity is related to this or that stone, or man to 
Peter or Paul."f 

This appears to be a nominalism, or at least con- 
ceptualism, sufficiently thorough-going, but it is, as 
I have said, merely on the surface. Spinoza is at 
heart a realist, and his reasonings can only be ex- 
plained after admitting the fact. Had he consistently 
carried out the thought of the citation just given, he 
would have recognized that in the several stages of 
this deduction of things from the idea of God or sub- 
stance he was handling mere abstractions and not 
things at all. He would have seen that the attribute 
thought cannot be regarded as a real thing distinct 
from the sum total of ideas or modes in which the 
attribute is expressed ; and that his substance, so far 
from being a " particular affirmative essence," is 

* " Ethics," II, 40, schol. i. f II, 48, schol. 



II, 8] CRITICAL NOTES. 223 

either that ultimate abstraction " being," or simply 
a name for the sum total of particular concrete beings. 
As a matter of fact, Spinoza vibrates between these two "^ 
conceptions. Usually he makes the higher orders of 
being, from which concrete things are to be deduced, 
abstractions, or, perhaps I should say, treats them as 
somewhat inconsistent abstractions, while calling 
them something else. 'But sometimes he clearly 
comes back to the other conception and makes the 
lower orders of being parts of the higher. For exam- 
ple, in his treatise " On the Improvement of the 
Understanding," after stating that the first principle 
of nature cannot be conceived as a universal — as an 
abstraction — he says that what we are in search of is 
"a. being single and infinite, in other words, the sum 
total of being, beyond which there is no being." * 
Again, in speaking of the relation of the finite mind 
to God, he expresses the same thought. Our ideas 
are inadequate when we know only in part, and inade- 
quate ideas arise in us only because we are parts of 
a thinking being, whose thoughts, some in their 
entirety and some as fragments, constitute our mind.f 
The " Etliics " is, if possible, more explicit : " These 
are the things I set out to prove with regard to the 
mind, in so far as it is considered without relation to 
the existence of the body. From these, and at the 
same time from I, 21, and other propositions, it ap- 
pears that our mind, in so far as it knows, is an eternal 
mode of thinking, which is determined by another 
eternal mode of thinking, this again by another, and 
so to infinity ; so that they all together constitute the 
eternal and infinite intellect of God."| Here a por- 

*P. 26. f P. 25. 

X V, 40, schol. ; cf. Letter 32, ed. Van Vloten and Land. 



224 'fHE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntROD. 

tion of the human mind is made part of an infinite 
mode, and not subsumed under it as an individual 
under its universal or class notion. 

On the other hand these higher orders of being are 
not usually treated as wholes having the lower as 
their parts, but rather as universals. The fact that 
they are universals is not, it is true, very clearly 
brought out, for the reasoning is vitiated by that 
unfortunate parallel between physical causation and 
logical deduction. But it seems to me sufficiently 
clear that Spinoza treated them rather as universals 
than as aggregates. That he did not think of them 
simply as aggregates is plain from a multitude of pas- 
'sages. The idea of God is called the cause of all our 
ideas as God is the cause of all things.* All our ideas 
are to be deduced from this one, not found in it as the 
part in the whole. Substance (or God) is by nature 
prior to its modifications ; f is active while all its modi- 
fications are passive; J and is indivisible, while modes, 
as modes, can be divided. § In short, on the supposi- 
tion that Spinoza uses the word substance merely as 
another name for the universe regarded as an aggre- 
gate, much of his reasoning is wholly inexplicable. 

That these "fixed and eternal things" from which 
the essences of concrete individuals are to be deduced 
are really treated by Spinoza as universals, should be 
clear, I think, to every careful reader of his works. 
In one passage in his treatise " On the Improvement 
of the Understanding " he explicitly admits that they 
resemble universals, and attributes to them a propert}'' 
which must be denied to every single individual thing 

* " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 32. 

f " Ethics," I, I. 

X " Ethics," I, 16, 17. § "Ethics," I, 15, schol. 



II, g] CRITICAL NOTES. 225 

of whatever kind. He writes : " Hence these fixed 
and eternal things, although they are individuals, must, 
on account of their presence and power everywhere, 
be to us as universals, that is, as genera of definitions 
of individual mutable things, and the proximate causes 
of all things." * It is only a universal that can, in 
any strict sense of the word, be " present " f every- 
where. An individual can be present in different 
places at the one time only as an aggregate of parts. 
In many other passages one may see that Spinoza 
thought of these "eternal things " as universals, and 
that this thought has given birth to much of his rea- 
soning. 

9. The Concept. — The great importance of this 
question to the Spinozistic philosophy will justify me 
in indulging in what some may regard as a digression 
on the subject of the concept or general notion, the 
much-mooted universal. For a fuller discussion of 
some aspects of this subject I must refer the reader 
to a monograph I printed a few years since, entitled 
" On Sameness and Identity," | and having for object 
tlie making clear the different senses in which we may, 
in accordance with common usage, call a thing or 
things the same. It deals at some length with the 
question of universals. I shall return later to the 
"eternal things " of Spinoza. 

When two or more things resemble each other in 
any way, or, as we say, have anything in common, 
we may make a distinction between the quality or 
qualities they have in common and those in which 

*P. 33. 

f I explain later in what sense a universal may be said to be 
" present " anywhere. 

X University of Pennsylvania Press, 1890. 



226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

they differ from each other, and we may regard the 
objects as forming a class, giving them a class name. 
This class name indicates just what they have in com- 
mon, and abstracts from the other qualities possessed 
by the objects. When, for example, I compare sev- 
eral men, I may recognize that they are all alike in 
certain respects, and may, for convenience, regard 
them as a class, giving them the general name " man." 
This general name " man " stands, or should stand, only 
for those qualities possessed by every member of the 
class. In the same way I may form other class notions 
of higher and higher degrees of generality, after the 
fashion of the handbooks on logic, and may obtain a 
series of general terms related to each other as lower 
and higher in the same series, such as man, animal, 
living being, body, being. Whether the concept be of 
a low or of a high degree of generality, the procedure is 
just the same. That which a number of individuals 
have in common is distinguished from that in which 
they differ, and is, for the time being, made the object 
of special attention. 

It was but natural that, at an early period of the 
history of thought, reflection should occupy itself with 
this general notion, marked by the class name, and 
strive to fathom its significance. We apply the name 
" man " to a great many different individuals, and 
recognize that, in so far as each is a man, they are in 
some sense the same. When a man dies and dis- 
appears " man " does not disappear, for here is " man " 
in another individual. What more natural than to 
assume that " man " (the universal) must have a 
reality independent of all individual men, eternal, im- 
mutable and apart, unaffected by all the changes in 
individual things ? What more natural than to as- 



II, g] . CRITICAL NOTES. 227 

sume that the " man " in each individual man must be 
strictly identical with that in each other, and that, 
although present in all, it must be in some sense an 
individual real thing ? This is just what Plato does. 
Distinguishing between the universal and the indi- 
vidual, between " man " and men, he thought it nec- 
essary, according to Aristotle, who does not, I think, 
do him injustice, to assume an object for the universal 
outside of and apart from all the individuals forming 
a class. This, the object of the general term, is the 
Platonic Idea. It is a real thing, the real thing, in 
which the individuals participate, or of which they are 
copies ; but it is not itself to be found in any or all of 
them except, so to speak, in a figurative or metaphor- 
ical way. Aristotle, seeing no reason to assume a new 
individual, for so he regarded the Platonic Idea, placed 
the universal in the objects composing the class. Cer- 
tain of the schoolmen, emphasizing the difference 
between real things and mental representations, main- 
tained that only individuals have real existence, and 
asserted either that universals exist merely as peculiar 
combinations of mental elements which serve to think 
the objects forming a class, or that the only thing 
that can properly be called universal is the word, which 
may be applied indifferently to many individuals of 
the one kind. In these views we have the universalia 
ante rem, the universalia in re, and the universalia post 
rem ; or Extreme Realism, Moderate Realism,* and 
Nominalism in its two forms. 

Now the great snare and stumbling-block of all those 
who busy themselves with universals is the tendency 
to make abstractions concrete things — to add what 

* When in this volume I use the word " realism" without qual- 
ification, I do not mean to include this doctrine. 



228 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD, 

the very nature of the case demands should be absent. 
When we give a name to a class of objects as a class, 
or, rather, when we give a name to what a number 
of objects have in common, we should remember that 
we are abstracting from everything in which the objects 
differ. We are trying to indicate that each possesses 
certain elements which, taken by themselves, render 
impossible any distinction between different objects. 
We distinguish two objects as two through some 
difference, even if it be only local or temporal. Red- 
ness conbined with a and redness combined with b 
are recognized as two occurrences of redness, but this 
only account of a and b. Redness perceived to-day 
and redness perceived yesterday are two occurrences 
of redness, marked as such by the " to-day " and the 
" yesterday." Redness considered simply contains 
nothing which will allow of such distinctions. This 
does not imply at all that redness considered simply is 
an occurrence of redness — that since we have not two 
or more occurrences of the quality we have a single 
occurrence of it, an individual. We have not, if we 
have really abstracted from all save the redness, any 
" occurrence " or " occurrences " at all, for these 
imply just the elements of difference which we are 
endeavoring to eliminate. An "occurrence" of red- 
ness means redness with a difference which will mark 
it out from other redness, from another " occurrence." 
When, therefore, one gives to twenty individuals a 
common name to indicate that they resemble each 
other, he should keep clearly in mind just what this 
means. It means that along with various differing 
elements each contains the element x. And when he 
proposes to separate the x from the other elements, and 
consider it separately, he should be most careful to see 



II, g] CRITICAL NOTES. 229 

that he is really taking it separately, and not allowing 
shreds of foreign matter to hang to it and give rise 
to inconsistencies and perplexities. He should make 
sure that he is keeping his abstraction abstract, and 
not turning it into a concrete thing in any sense what- 
ever. For instance, he should not overlook the fact 
that there is a fallacy in the very question, Whether 
the X in any one individual is strictly identical with the 
X in any other ? If these two x's are distinguishable 
as in two individuals, one is not considering x merely, 
but X with other elements. The separation of the x 
element from the other elements in the objects is here 
not complete, or one would be considering not " an x " 
or '^x's " but X. The abstract x cannot, strictly speak- 
ing, be in any of the individuals while remaining an 
abstraction. When it is in an individual it is " an x " 
— or X with a difference. So when Spinoza makes 
his " fixed and eternal things " individuals, and yet 
declares them to be present everywhere, he is in the 
same sentence making them abstract and concrete. 
A universal may be present in many places only in the 
sense that the x — common, as we say, to a number of 
individuals — is found now combined with these ele- 
ments and now with those. As combined with them it 
becomes this x or that, and is no longer universal. 
Every individual x, as an individual, is, of course, a 
different thing from every other, and is not strictly 
identical with it. 

Now when Plato looked for the object of the gen- 
eral name, what did he do ? He created a new object 
distinct from and apart from all the others. He is 
very vague in his statements, and he was probably quite 
as vague in his thought ; but I cannot see how any- 
one familiar with the " Phaedrus," the " Republic," the 



230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

" Timseus," the " Symposium," and the " Parmenides," 
and familiar with Plato's concrete way of thinking in 
images, can avoid coming to the conclusion that the 
idea was to him predominantly an object, an individ- 
ual — a vague and inconsistent object, if you please, 
but still an object. But an x is in no sense a univer- 
sal. It is the same with other x's only in being like 
them. The x that they have in common must be x 
considered simply, not x considered as here or there, 
in this place or that. All such differences must be 
completely eliminated if one is to get not an individual, 
but a universal. If the idea may be considered as 
apart from objects, it is an object in so far not essen- 
tially differing from the others, and it matters little 
whether it be put in heaven or on the earth or in the 
waters that are under the earth. Wherever and what- 
ever it may be, it is an individual and must act like an 
individual, that is, it can only be in the one place at the 
one time. Plato did not recognize this fact. Although 
he makes his idea an object, he does not put it on the 
same plane with other objects. They suffer change, 
while it is immutable ; they are perceivable by the 
senses, and it is not ; they are fettered by space and 
time conditions, while it is in some sense present in 
many individuals and is in its nature eternal. The 
trouble has arisen out of his difificulty in keeping an 
abstraction abstract ; he has turned it into a concrete, 
and, finding in the world of sense no place for 
this concrete, this new individual, he has given it 
a world of its own, where it lives an amphibious 
life peculiar to itself, and becomes a perennial source 
of difficulties to succeeding generations of philos- 
ophers. 

Aristotle, seeing very clearly some of the objections 



II, g] CRITICAL NOTES. 23I 

to this mode of procedure, placed the idea in the 
objects forming the class. It may be objected that 
putting X in a place individualizes it as much as 
putting it out of a place. This is quite true if the 
" in " be taken locally — taken as it is when we speak 
of a man as being in one room rather than in another. 
The X in one object is not identically the x in another 
object. We do not get the universal, x in the 
abstract, until we lose the distinctions " in the one 
object " and " in the other object." If, however, by 
the statement that the universal is in the objects, one 
mean merely that the universal is that element x, 
which, combined with certain elements, forms a total 
which is known as this object, and combined with 
certain others forms a total which is known as that, 
but taken by itself contains no distinction of this and 
that ; if this be all that is meant by the " in," there is 
no objection to the use of the statement, and it is 
strictly true. The x element is a part of each of the 
objects, but, until some addition is made to it, it is 
not " the X in this object " or " the x in that object "; 
it is what they have in common. The " in common " 
means just this. 

The nominalistic doctrine has, as has been said, two 
forms. The extreme nominalistic position, that the 
only true universal is the name, is highly unreason- 
able. If the objects to be classed really have some- 
thing in common, then that which they have in com- 
mon is a universal element. If, on the other hand, 
they have nothing in common, why put them in one 
class and give them a common name ? As for the 
more moderate nominalism, or the doctrine of the 
conceptualists — that appears to do justice to ideas, 
but hardly to things. In so far as it holds that the 



232 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

mind can form a concept, which shall consist of the 
element or elements several objects have in common, 
we have no quarrel with it. Here we find a true 
universal, obtained by discarding differences which 
distinguish objects from one another. We obtain by 
this that mental core common to several similar 
mental objects, in other words, to several ideas. 
If, however, we distinguish between mental objects 
and " real " things corresponding to them, we have 
evidently two distinct fields to consider. Do our 
ideas truly correspond to external objects ? Then, if 
the ideas have something in common, are enough 
alike to furnish a concept, must not their correspond- 
ing objects also be alike ? must they not, too, have 
something in common ? a universal element ? It does 
not in the least explain the universal element in 
" real " things to point out that in the mind there 
exists a concept or general notion. The concept can 
be no true representative of what is outside unless it 
truly correspond to a universal element outside. This 
sounds a little like extreme realism, but it differs from 
it as widely as the poles. It is only necessary to bear 
in mind that, just as the concept, to remain a uni- 
versal, must be kept abstract, so this hypothetical 
external universal must be kept abstract, and not 
turned into a thing. 

On the whole, the most reasonable doctrine is the 
Aristotelian, the moderate realism. It is necessary, 
however, to understand it carefully, and to avoid all 
tendency to individualize abstractions. That this is 
by no means easy to do, the history of philosophy 
clearly shows ; and it shows, too, into what serious 
perplexities one falls when one neglects to observe 
this precaution. The Anselmic view of genera and 



II, lo] CRITICAL NOTES. 233 

species as universal substances * is an instance of this 
error. The doctrine attributed to William of Cham- 
peaux by Abelard, that universals are essentially and 
wholly present in each of their individuals, in which 
latter there is no diversity of essence, but only variety 
through accidents,! is tenable or not, according to the 
sense in which the words are taken. The word 
"wholly " is an awkward one, and would seem to indi- 
cate that William regarded the universal as a thing, a 
concrete, which may be in this place or that. What- 
ever he may have intended to say, there can be no 
mistake as to the meaning of the following sentence 
from Robert Pulleyn : " The species is the whole 
substance of individuals, and the whole species is the 
same in each individual : therefore the species is one 
substance, but its individuals many persons, and these 
many persons are that one substance.''^ The man 
who could pen such a sentence must have seen his 
universals through the thickest of fogs, and must have 
been capable of all sorts of logical enormities. We 
find nearly everywhere in the Middle Ages this tend- 
ency to turn abstractions into things, and we see the 
same tendency later. The procedure has a peculiar 
charm for the mystic, and one which he finds it hard 
to resist. It would not be difficult to cite con- 
temporary instances of the blunder. § 

10. Concepts Made Causes. — When one has turned 
universals — abstractions — into things, it is easy to 
ascribe to them causal functions which can only be 

* Haureau, " Philosophic Scholastique, "Paris, 1872, I, p. 281. 
\ " Historia Calamitatura," quoted by Haureau, I, p. 324. 
:|: Quoted by Haureau, I, p. 328. 

§ In the foregoing pages I have made use of my above men- 
tioned treatise. 



234 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

exercised by individual real things, having existence 
as well as " essence." As has been pointed out, con- 
cepts may be more or less general, and may stand in a 
relation of lower and higher. Plato, who had turned 
the Socratic concept into the concrete Idea, conceives 
of the Ideas as real things arranged in such a series, 
and makes the highest member of the series the Idea 
of the Good. He regards the Ideas as causes of 
things,* and the highest of them as the ultimate 
cause of all reality and all knowledge.! John Scotus 
Erigena well illustrates this same way of thinking. He 
taught that God is the supreme unity, and that, by a 
process of evolution from the general to the partic- 
ular, individual things are produced by him. First 
come forth the highest genera, then the lower, and 
finally individuals. He conceived universals as real 
things, which, by a process of unfolding, give birth to 
that which represents a lesser degree of generality. J 
As we have seen, the philosophers who have thus 
made their universals concrete have not made them 
completely and consistently concrete. They have 
given them an existence apart from the individuals 
subsumed under them, but not an existence wholly 
separate. To have done this would have been to en- 
tirely abandon the problem of the universal. Plato, 
for instance, describes the relation of individuals to 
their ideas as a " participation " in, an "imitation " of, 
the idea. The idea is the "pattern" and individual 
objects "images." The idea has a "community" 
with objects, it is in some sense "present" in them. 
And John Scotus declares that God alone truly is ; 

* " Phsedo," 96 et seq. f " Republic," VI, 508. 

:|: Ueberweg's "Hist, of Philos.," Vol. I, § 90. See also 
Haureau, I, p. 150 ^/ seq. 



II, lo] CRITICAL NOTES. 235 

that he is the essence of all things ; that they do not 
exist outside of him, but he is their very substance. 
This of course is not in harmony with the notion of a 
causal relation, for in any intelligible sense of the 
word cause, a cause must be something distinct from 
its effect and cannot be contained in it. 'I'he words 
" immanent cause," when they are so used as to con- 
vey any distinct meaning at all, signify something so 
different from the causal relation as commonly under- 
stood that it would be much better to use some other 
term to express the idea. Cause and effect are two 
distinct things, and must remain two distinct things to 
remain cause and effect. I shall speak of this again 
when I discuss in the notes Spinoza's doj^trine of the 
causa siii. The attempt to make universals causes, and 
yet keep them universals, has been the source of much 
vague and loose reasoning. It is simply the attempt 
to make them concrete and abstract at the same time. 
II. Concepts, though Causes, yet Universals. — Much of 
the reasoning of the " Ethics " will become sufficiently 
intelligible to one who will bear in mind that Spinoza's 
"fixed and eternal things" are universals — abstrac- 
tions — but universals treated as though they were in 
some sense concrete things, real causes. He falls into 
the snare always set for the realist, or, perhaps I should 
say, into the snare into which one must have fallen to 
be a realist at all, as Plato and John Scotus are realists. 
As evidence that his " eternal things" are really uni- 
versals I shall refer to a few passages in the " Ethics." 
The proof that there cannot be in the universe two or 
more substances of the same nature, or with the same 
attribute, reads as follows : "Were there several dis- 
tinct substances, they would have to be distinguished 
from one another either by a difference in attributes 



236 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

or by a difference in modifications. If merely by a 
difference in attributes, it will be admitted there can- 
not be more than one with the same attribute. If, on 
the other hand, one is to be distinguished from another 
by a difference in modifications, then, since a sub- 
stance is by nature prior to its modifications, when we 
lay aside its modifications and consider it in itself, 
that is, consider it as it is, we cannot conceive it as 
distinguished from another substance. In other words, 
there cannot be several substances, but only one."* 
Here the substance is evidently what remains after 
stripping off differences, just as the genus is what 
remains when we overlook the differences which dis- 
tinguish the species. If we leave out of view the 
different classes of men, the " modifications " of 
"man," and consider "man" simply, of course we 
cannot get more than one "man" — for that matter we 
cannot get one " man," for what we really get is not 
an individual but an abstraction. Spinoza, however, 
reasons as though the substance reached by this process 
were an individual, though elsewhere he indicates that 
it cannot be properly called one.\ In his argument 
to prove that substance absolutely infinite is indivisible 
he reasons as follows: "Were it divisible, the parts 
into which it would be divided will either retain the 
nature of absolutely infinite substance, or will not. 
If the former, there will be several substances of the 
same nature, which is absurd. If the latter, then it 
will be possible for absolutely infinite substance to 
cease to be, which is also absurd." | Here substance 
is evidently treated as that which several things have 
in common, and upon this depends the absurdity of 
the first alternative. If substance is an abstraction, a 
* " Ethics," I, 5. f Letter 50. % " Ethics," I, 13. 



II, lo] CRITICAL NOTES. 237 

universal, it is of course absurd to speak of several 
substances. We cannot keep things separate from 
each other when we have left them nothing but their 
common core. 

In speaking of extension, or, as he calls it, quantity, 
Spinoza says : " If, nevertheless, one here asks why we 
are so prone by nature to divide quantity, I answer, it 
is because we conceive quantity in two ways ; to wit, 
abstractly, that is, superficially, as when we imagine it, 
and, second, as substance, in which case we conceive 
it by means of the understanding alone. If, therefore, 
we consider quantity as it is in the imagination, a thing 
we do often and quite easily, we shall find it finite, 
divisible, and composed of parts. If, on the other 
hand, we consider it as it is in the understanding, and 
conceive it as substance — a very difficult task — then, 
as I have already sufficiently proved, we shall find it 
infinite, single, and indivisible. This will be plain 
enough to everyone who knows how to distinguish 
between the imagination and the understanding, 
especially if he will also consider that matter is every- 
where the same, and that there is in it no distinction 
of parts except as we conceive it affected in divers 
ways, whence its parts are distinguished only modally, 
not really. For example, we conceive water, in so far 
as it is water, to be divided and its parts to be sep- 
arated from one another ; but not in so far as it is 
corporeal substance, for, in so far as it is that, it is 
neither separated nor divided. Again, water, in so 
far as it is water, is generated and destroyed ; but 
in so far as it is substance, it is neither generated nor 
destroyed."* 

It is, of course, true that if we turn our attention 

*" Ethics, I, 15, schol. 



238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

from matter in so far as it is "affected in divers 
ways," and fix it simply on matter as matter, /. e., on 
matter in the abstract, we cannot divide matter. All 
physical division implies that we distinguish between 
the parts of the thing divided as this part and that, 
here and there, and in so doing we add the differences 
that Spinoza calls modifications. His " quantity " 
conceived as substance is simply the extension in the 
abstract which is found in all extended things. 

The same thought is expressed in the language he 
uses in dealing with modes elsewhere : " Modes are 
only modifications of the attributes of God ; " * " It 
cannot have followed from God or from one of his 
attributes, in so far as this is modified by a modifica- 
tion which is infinite or eternal ; " f the " essence of 
man consists of certain modifications of God's attri- 
butes ; " X " a modification or mode which expresses 
God's nature in a definite and determinate manner." § 
Mode is defined as " the modifications of substance, 
in other words, that which is in, and is conceived by 
means of, something else ; " || body is *' a mode which 
expresses in a definite and determinate manner the 
essence of God, in so far as he is considered as an 
extended thing." *1[ This mode or modification is the 
concrete corresponding to a universal, and the " defi- 
nite and determinate manner " in which extension is 
expressed is an individualization through accidents. 
Note again : " Such modes of thinking as love, desire, 
or whatever else comes under the head of emotion, do 
not arise unless there be present in the same indi- 
vidual the idea of the thing loved, desired, etc." * * 

* " Ethics," I, 28. I Ibid. % " Ethics," II, 10, cor. 
§ Ibid. II " Ethics," I, def. 5. T[ " Ethics," II, def. i. 

* * " Ethics," II, axiom 3. 



II, 12] CRITICAL NOTES. 239 

The " thinking " is here the class notion. Still clearer 
is the following proof that thought is an attribute of 
God, that is, that God is a thinking thing : " Indi- 
vidual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes 
which express in a definite and determinate manner 
God's nature. God, therefore, possesses the attribute, 
the conception of which is involved in all individual 
thoughts, and through which they are conceived. 
Hence thought is one of the infinite attributes of God, 
and it expresses God's eternal and infinite essence ; 
that is, God is a thinking thing."* Evidently the 
attribute, the conception of which is involved in all 
individual thoughts, is simply the universal, the 
abstraction which remains after abstracting from 
differences. And the infinite attributes of God are 
the ultimate abstractions at which one arrives by 
a process of extracting the core common to many 
individuals. 

12. The Word ''''Involved.''' — The somewhat vague 
phrase, "involved in all individual thoughts," de- 
serves some attention. In the passage quoted 
" involved in " is equivalent to *' contained in," as 
the universal is contained in (I must warn the reader 
to bear in mind what I have said on the subject of 
this " in ") the individuals subsumed under it. The 
word involved {involvere) is constantly used by 
Spinoza, and he has explained with some clearness 
what he means by it. He writes : " Let us conceive, 
therefore, some particular volition — for instance, the 
mode of thinking by which the mind affirms the three 
angles of a triangle to be equal to two right angles. 
This affirmation involves the conception or idea of a 

*" Ethics," II, I ; cf. the " Short Treatise on God, Man and 
His Blessedness," Part I, ch. 7. 



240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

triangle, that is, it cannot be conceived without the 
idea of a triangle ; for it is the same thing, whether I 
say A must involve the conception B, or A cannot be 
conceived without B. In the second place, this 
affirmation, without the idea of a triangle, cannot be^ 
Therefore this affirmation cannot, without the idea of 
a triangle, either be or be conceived. Moreover, this 
idea of a triangle must involve this same affirmation 
of the equality of its three angles to two right 
angles. Therefore, conversely, this idea of a triangle 
can neither be nor be conceived without this affirma- 
tion. Hence this affirmation belongs to the essence 
of the idea of a triangle, and is nothing but that 
idea." * Manifestly, in this illustration, to "involve", 
means to contain something, or to be identical with 
something, according as we take more or less liter- 
ally the last clause. f Again : "Things which have 
nothing in common cannot be comprehended by 
means of each other ; that is, the conception of the 
one does not involve the conception of the other." J 
Here the one involves the other in virtue of the fact 
that they have something in common, and it is plain 
from what Spinoza says a little later § that he was 
thinking of the two things in question as higher class 
and lower, or as universal and individual. That the 
idea of any mode, in which the human body is 
affected by external bodies, must involve both the 
nature of the human body and the nature of the 
external body, Spinoza proves as follows : " All the 
modes, in which any body is affected, are a conse- 
quence both of the nature of the body affected and 
the nature of the body affecting it. Hence their idea 

* " Ethics," II, 49. f " Ethics," Cf. I, def. i, and I, 20. 

\ " Ethics," I, axiom 5. § " Etliics," I, 3. 



II, 12] CRITICAL NOTES. 24I 

necessarily involves the nature of both bodies. Con- 
sequently, the idea of any mode, in which the human 
body is affected by an external body, involves the na- 
ture of the human body and of the external body."* 
From this he infers, in the first place, that the human 
mind perceives the nature of very many bodies along 
with the nature of its own body ; and, in the second 
|)lace, that the ideas which we have of external bodies 
indicate rather the constitution of our own body than 
the nature of external bodies, f The phrase "involves 
the nature of both bodies," as here used, means that 
these essences are (at least in part) " objectively " 
present in the idea. In other words, it includes 
them. That this is what is meant is evident from 
Spinoza's use of this proposition later : " Let A be 
something, which is common to and a property of 
the human body and certain external bodies, which is 
equally in the human body and in these external 
bodies, and which, finally, is equally in the part and 
in the whole of each external body. Of this A there 
will be in God an adequate idea, both in so far as he 
has an idea of the human body, and in so far as he 
has ideas of the said external bodieso Now, let the 
human body be affected by an external body, through 
that which they have in common, that is, through A. 
The idea of this modification will involve the prop- 
erty A ; and, hence, the idea of this modification, in 
so far as it involves the property A, will be adequate 
in God, in so far as he is affected by the idea of the 
human body ; that is, in so far as he constitutes the 
nature of the human mind. Therefore this idea is 
adequate in the human mind also." J When an idea 

*" Ethics," II, 16. \ Ibid, cors. i and 2. 

X " Ethics," II, 39. 



242 THE PHILOSOPHY OP SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

is, not partially, but wholly in the human mind, it 
is, according to Spinoza, adequate in the human 
mind, or adequately known by the human mind. 
Since the idea of the modification in question " in- 
volves " the property A, and since said idea is in the 
human mind, the idea of A, which it contains within 
it, is in the human mind too. Many more instances 
of this use of the word "involve" might be given, 
but these will suffice. In general, one thing involves 
another when it contains it, and, in particular, the 
word is employed to indicate the relation of the indi- 
vidual to its universal, or of the species to its genus. 
Spinoza does not, however, use the word consist- 
ently in this sense. Indeed, he could not do so, since 
he does not keep his universals abstract, but turns them 
into concrete things, causes. The word "involve" 
suffers a corresponding change in signification, and is 
sometimes used to indicate a relation between effect 
and cause. For example, we find it accepted as an 
axiom that " knowledge of an effect depends upon and 
involves knowledge of its cause." * We find the same 
idea very definitely expressed in one of the arguments 
offered in support of the thesis: " The formal being 
of ideas admits of God as its cause only in so far as 
he is regarded as a thinking thing, and not in so far as 
he is manifested in some other attribute. That is, the 
ideas both of the attributes of God and of individual 
things do not admit of their objects — perceived things 
— as their efficient cause, but God himself, in so far as 
he is a thinking thing." The argument is : " The 
formal being of ideas is a mode of thinking, that is a 
mode which expresses in a definite manner the nature 
of God in so far as he is a thinking thing, and thus 

*" Ethics," I, axiom 4. 



II, 12] CRITICAL NOTES. 243 

involves the concept of no other attribute of God, and 
consequently is the effect of no other attribute than 
thought. Therefore the formal being of ideas admits 
of God as its cause only in so far as he is regarded as 
a thinking thing."* Again: "The modes of any 
attribute have God as their cause only in so far as he 
is considered under the attribute of which they are 
modes, not in so far as he is considered under any 
other attribute." This is proved in the same way : 
" Each attribute is conceived through itself independ- 
ently of anything else. The modes, then, of each 
attribute involve the concept of their own attribute, 
but of no other ; therefore they have as their cause 
God, only in so far as he is considered under the attri- 
bute of which they are modes, and not in so far as 
he is considered under any other attribute," f That 
Spinoza uses the word cause in a sense approaching 
its usual acceptation seems to me sufficiently evident 
from the tenor of the passages cited. He denies that 
external things cause our ideas, but says they are 
caused by God " in so far as he is regarded as a think- 
ing thing," or, in other words, in so far as he is ex- 
pressed in the attribute thought. Moreover he calls 
this cause the efficient cause, as if to make his mean- 
ing unmistakable. Just afterward he uses the axiom 
above mentioned to prove that the order and connec- 
tion of ideas is the same as the order and connection 
of things, arguing that since the idea of an effect de- 
pends upon a knowledge of its cause, the order of ideas 
must correspond exactly to the nexus of causes and 
effects in the physical world. J. By this order of causes 
and effects he did not merely mean the order of 
"fixed and eternal things" which might be claimed to 

=5= "Ethics," II, 5. f "Ethics," II, 6. :}: " Ethics," II, 7. 



2.J4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

be " immanent " causes. He includes all separate, 
individual, existing things, the causes and effects 
recognized by science.* Such causes and effects are 
external to and distinct from each other. When, 
therefore, Spinoza makes his universals causes, he in so 
far takes them out of the individuals in which they are 
found (remember this " in ") and makes them con- 
crete things outside of their effects. In the passages 
given above the word " involve " marks such a relation 
to an illicitly obtained concrete. As, however, Spi- 
noza's " fixed and eternal things " are, like Plato's Ideas, 
really universals, though treated as in some sense con- 
crete, one finds sometimes in the same passage a 
double sense in the word " involve." 

13. Essence. — So much for the " fixed and eternal 
things," as universals. Of these same things as con- 
cretes, as causes, I have already spoken briefly in the 
paragraph just preceding. As, however, this aspect 
of them comes out very clearly in Spinoza's doctrine 
of " essence," and as that doctrine plays an important 
part in his philosophy, I shall discuss it rather fully 
here. Just where Spinoza got this doctrine, or rather 
where he drew the original inspiration which led him 
to formulate it as he did, I do not pretend to say. 
He has left us but scanty information regarding the 
sources of his philosophy. His fundamental ideas are, 
however, not new, but had become common property 
in the Middle Ages. They appear in various forms 
in the writings of the Jewish philosophers with which 
he was familiar, and they may be traced back ulti- 
mately to the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies. 

When one has arranged a number of things in 

*" Ethics," II, 9, and cor.; cf. I, 8, schol. 2, and II, 10, cor. 
schol. ; also III, i. 



II, 13] CRITICAL NOTES. 245 

a class, and, abstracting from the differences of 
individuals, has marked by a class name that which 
they have in common, it is, as I have shown at length 
above, easy to forget just what one has gotten by the 
process, and how one has gotten it. It is easy to give 
the result a significance which does not properly 
belong to it, and to regard it as something higher in 
nature than the individuals in which it is found — 
something fixed and unchangeable. Of course, things 
may be classed by means of any one of their proper- 
ties, and the process is in all cases identical; but 
some classifications are more important than others, 
and it is natural to consider apart the class names 
which mark these, as expressing the true " nature " or 
" essence " of things. Aristotle, for example, does 
not, with Plato, separate his universals from indi- 
viduals, but he appears to lose sight of the origin of 
all universals in distinguishing, as he does, between 
those which express the essential attributes of their 
objects and those which do not, and treating the 
former as of higher rank. There is, it is true, no 
objection to making such a distinction, provided one 
bear in mind that the difference is one of utility only 
and that such universals do not differ in their nature 
from any others. It is, however, difficult to bear this 
always in mind, and to the words " nature " and 
'" essence " are to be attributed a multitude of phil- 
osophical errors. 

Now, Spinoza distinguishes between the essence of 
things and their existence, and not making this simply 
a difference between the universal and the particular, 
he treats the essence as different from the other prop- 
erties of a class of objects ; as independent of the 
individual and not derived from it in the manner 



246 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

indicated. He writes : " Hence we are able to prove 
in another way that there cannot be more than one 
substance with a given nature, and I have thought it 
worth while to set forth the proof here. But to do 
this in a methodical way I must note : First, that the 
true definition of a thing neither involves nor ex- 
presses anything except the nature of the thing 
defined. Whence it follows, in the second place, that 
no definition either involves or expresses a certain 
definite number of individuals, seeing that it expresses 
nothing but the nature of the thing defined. For 
example, the definition of the triangle expresses 
nothing but just the nature of the triangle, and not 
a certain definite number of triangles. I must note, in 
the third place, that every existing thing necessarily 
has some definite cause, by reason of which it exists. 
And finally, in the fourth place, that this cause, by 
reason of which anything exists, must either be con- 
tained in the very nature and definition of the existing 
thing (for the reason, of course, that it belongs to the 
nature of such a thing to exist), or it must be outside 
of it. Granted these points, it follows that if there 
exist in the world some definite number of individ- 
uals, there must necessarily be a cause why those 
individuals, and neither more nor less, exist. If, for 
example, there exist in the universe twenty men (I 
will suppose, to make the matter clearer, that they 
exist at the same time, and that no others have ever 
existed before), it will not be a sufficient explanation 
of the existence of the twenty men to show the cause 
of human nature in the abstract; but it will be further 
necessary to show the cause why twenty exist, and 
not more nor less ; for (by point third) there must 
necessarily be a cause for the existence of each one. 



II, 13] CRITICAL NOTES. 247 

But this cause (by points second and third) cannot 
be contained in human nature itself, since the true 
definition of man does not involve the number twenty. 
Hence (by point fourth), the cause why these twenty 
men exist, and, consequently, why each one exists, 
must necessarily be outside of each one. Therefore 
the conclusion is unavoidable, that everything of such 
a nature that several individuals with that nature can 
exist, must necessarily have an external cause to bring 
about their existence. Now, since it belongs to the 
nature of a substance to exist, its definition must 
involve necessary existence, and hence its existence 
may be inferred from its mere definition. But from 
its definition (as has just been proved from points 
second and third) the existence of several substances 
cannot be inferred. From it, therefore, it follows 
necessarily, that but one of a given nature exists, as 
was maintained." * 

The only part of this extract which concerns us here 
is the distinction between essence and existence, uni- 
versal and individual, Spinoza separates them from 
each other very sharply, but so far from looking to 
individuals for the essence, the only question he raises 
is whether the individual can be deduced from the 
essence. The essence he puts among the " fixed and 
eternal things " to be deduced from the idea of God 
or substance, in the manner already described. f Not 
everything common to several individuals may be re- 
garded as an essence. He distinguishes between the 
properties constituting the essence and other prop- 
erties, as follows : " To be called perfect, a definition 
must set forth the inmost essence of a thing, and we 

* " Ethics," I, 8, schol. 2 ; cf. I, 11, proof 2. 
f " De Intellectus Emendatione," pp. 32-33. 



248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

must be careful not to substitute for this some of its 
properties. To make this clear I shall give an illus- 
tration, and passing over other examples, for fear I 
may appear to be desirous of exposing other people's 
errors, I shall only take the case of an abstract thing, 
the exact definition of which is unimportant; I shall 
take, namely, a circle. If this be defined as a figure 
of such a sort that all lines drawn from its center to 
its circumference are equal, it is plain to everyone that 
such a definition does not in the least set forth the 
essence of the circle, but only one of its properties. 
And although, as I have said, this is of little moment 
in the case of figures and other abstractions, yet it is 
of great importance when one has to do with physical 
and real entities ; for the properties of things are not 
understood, as long as one is ignorant of their essence. 
If we overlook these essences, we necessarily subvert 
the natural order of ideas, which should reflect the 
order of nature, and we wholly miss our aim."* 

From the above as well as from many other pas- 
sages, it is clear that Spinoza did not regard his 
" essences " as mere universals, but rather as real 
things independent of individuals, while retaining 
certain characteristics of universality. They are 
" fixed and eternal things," in no sense arbitrary cre- 
ations, but existing somewhat after the fashion of 
Plato's Ideas. Spinoza does not, however, always use 
the words " nature " and "essence " in this sense. He 
defines desire as " the very essence of man, in so far 
as this is conceived as determined to some action 
by any one of his modifications," f and he proves the 
thesis "any emotion of one individual differs from the 

*" De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 31. 
■(■" Ethics," III, defs. of the emotions, i. 



II, 14] CRITICAL NOTES. 249 

emotion of another, only in so far as the essence of 
the one differs from the essence of the other," by the 
argument that emotion varies as does desire, and that 
a difference in desires means a difference in nature or 
essence.* This would make the essence different in 
each individual man. Again, he writes : " Since the 
essence of the mind consists in its affirming the actual 
existence of its body, and since by perfection I mean 
the very essence of a thing ; it follows that the mind 
passes to a greater or less perfection, when it happens 
to affirm of its body, or of any part of it, something 
involving more or less reality than before." f Here 
the essence of the mind is made a variable quantity. 
Very striking is the preface to Part IV. of the "Ethics," 
where the meaning of the word " perfection " is dis- 
cussed. Spinoza argues that we form general ideas of 
classes of things by comparing individuals with each 
other, and thus obtain patterns or ideals by which we 
afterward judge individuals. He continues: "Per- 
fection and imperfection, therefore, are really mere 
modes of thinking ; that is, notions, which we are 
accustomed to frame because we compare with one 
■another individuals of the same species or genus. For 
this reason I have said above that by reality and per- 
fection I mean the same thing. For we are accustomed 
to refer all the individual things in nature to one genus, 
which we call the highest genus ; that is, to the notion 
of being, which pertains to all, without exception, of 
the individual things in nature. In so far, therefore, 
as we refer the individual things in nature to this 
genus, and compare them with one another, and as- 
certain that some have more being or reality than 

*" Ethics," III, 57 ; cf. IV, 33. 

f Gen. def. of the emotions, Explanation. 



250 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntROD. 

others, in so far do we say that some are more per- 
fect than others ; and in so far as we attribute to 
them anything that involves negation, as limit, end, 
impotence, etc., in so far do we call them imperfect, 
because they do not impress our mind as much as 
those we call perfect, and not because they lack some- 
thing that belongs to them, or because nature has 
blundered. For nothing belongs to the nature of 
anything, except what follows from the necessity of 
the nature of the efficient cause ; and whatever fol- 
lows from the necessity of the nature of the efficient 
cause necessarily comes to pass." The terms good 
and evil likewise are mere notions, formed by com- 
paring things with one another, but such terms should 
be retained as a matter of convenience : " For since 
we desire to form an idea of man, a pattern, as it 
were, of human nature, upon which we may gaze, it 
will be of service to us to retain these terms in the 
sense of which I have spoken. Therefore, I shall 
hereafter mean by ' good,' what we certainly know 
to be a means by the aid of which we may come to 
resemble more and more the pattern of human nature 
that we have set before us. By ' evil,' on the other 
hand, I shall mean what we certainly know hinders 
us from reflecting that pattern. Furthermore, I shall 
say that men are more perfect or less perfect in pro- 
portion as they resemble more or less closely this pat- 
tern. For it should specially be noted that when I 
speak of a man as passing from a less to a greater 
perfection, and conversely, I do not mean that he is 
changed from one essence or form to another (a 
horse, for example, is as much destroyed by being 
changed into a man, as by being changed into an insect) ; 
but I mean that we conceive his power of acting, in 



II, 13] CRITICAL NOTES. 251 

SO far as we comprehend this through his own nature, 
to be increased or diminished. Finally, by ' perfec- 
tion,' taken generally, I shall mean reality, as I have 
said ; that is, the essence of anything, in so far as it 
exists and operates in a definite manner, without 
regard to its duration." 

In the above Spinoza contrasts what really belongs 
to the nature of a thing — and this means everything 
that belongs to the thing — with what we regard as 
belonging to its nature when we have formed an ideal 
of that kind of a thing and refer to this ideal as a 
pattern. The " essence " of man, as he uses the word 
in the passages quoted further back, evidently is such 
a pattern. It is formed by comparing individuals, 
and is fixed and changeless only in the sense that the 
individuals really contain the elements thus taken, and 
that we form our pattern by choosing these individuals 
rather than others. In this argument Spinoza ex- 
presses forcibly the truth that the essences of things 
are not independent of individuals, but are abstrac- 
tions, and formed through comparison.* Oddly 
enough he comes back at the close to the other notion 
and limits the reality of each thing by its essence, as 
though this essence were something really existent in 
nature, and not a product owing its existence as an 
abstraction to its convenience, and found, in so far as 
it may be said to really exist at all, only in the indi- 
viduals which have it as their common core. It is 
strange that he should not have seen that the essence 
of man is only a pattern formed by comparing differ- 
ent men, and the essence of horse one formed by 
comparing different horses ; that they are entia rationis 

* Compare the striking passage in his letter to Blyenbergh, 
Letter 21. 



252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD. 

as much as " white man " or " black horse." This, 
however, he did not see. Although, as we have seen, 
he uses the words essence and nature inconsistently, 
his fundamental thought, and one essential to his phil- 
osophical system, is that essences are not the result of 
an abstraction from the differences of individuals, but 
entities of a different class, eternal, unchangeable, 
independent of individuals ; not mere abstractions, 
but real causes ; in other words, they are Platonized 
abstractions.* 

14. Deduction of Ideas from the Idea of God. — We 
are now in a position to see why Spinoza passes lightly 
over the deduction of all our ideas from the idea of 
God or substance. Such a deduction of the concrete 
from the abstract is an impossibility, and Spinoza's 
" fixed and eternal things " really are at bottom abstrac- 
tions. From the concrete one may get the abstract by 
fixing attention upon certain elements and disregard- 
ing others, but from a single abstraction one can never 
get a concrete, for elements have to be added which 
are not contained in the former. For example, from 
" white man " I can get " man," but from man alone 
I cannot possibly get " white man." This difficulty 
Spinoza met face to face in one of the extracts I have 
given above. He could not help seeing that he could 
not get twenty concrete individual men out of " man " 
in the abstract, for " the definition of man does not 
involve the number twenty." He was therefore forced 
to conclude that the essence — man in the abstract — 
could not be the cause of the existence of twenty 
individuals. The deduction of all our ideas from the 
idea of the origin and source of nature, must then, 

* The definition of essence in Part II. of the " Ethics " (def. 2) 
is criticised later. See Note 48. 



II, 14] CRITICAL NOTES. 253 

perforce, stop at essences, and is not prevented from 
going on to individuals merely by the complexity of 
the problem and the limitations imposed by human 
weakness, as seems indicated elsewhere.* And, al- 
though Spinoza has not recognized the fact, the dififi- 
culty does not end here. It logically repeats itself at 
each stage of the deduction. If I cannot get twenty 
men from man, how can I get man and other essences 
from something higher which will stand to them in a 
similar relation ? And how deduce from the attri- 
butes, at the outset, the infinite modes immediately 
caused by God ? f The intellect " perceives certain 
things, or forms certain ideas, absolutely; some ideas 
it forms from others. The idea of extension it forms 
absolutely, and without considering other thoughts. 
The idea of motion, however, it cannot form without 
reference to the idea of extension." J That is, exten- 
sion can be conceived without thinking of motion, but 
motion cannot be conceived without thinking of 
extension. Just so, man can be conceived without 
thinking of twenty men, but twenty men cannot be 
conceived without thinking the group of qualities rep- 
resented by the word man. Whether one be concerned 
with the relation of individuals to their essence, or of 
essences to something more abstract, one meets the 
same difficulty. It is, consequently, not surprising that 
we do not find in the " Ethics " attributes deduced 
from substance, infinite modes from attributes, essences 
of a lower order from infinite modes, or individuals 
from their essences. Things are not obtained by 

* " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 33. But even here 
Spinoza denies any connection between existence and essence, 
f " Etliics," I, 28, schol. ; and Letters 64 and 83. 
:(: " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 35. 



254 I'HE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntrOD, 

deduction, but taken up as given in experience, and 
then referred in a general way to God as their cause.* 

15. The Dual Causality of the "Ethics." — This 
explains, too, the puzzling dual causality one finds 
everywhere in Spinoza's writings. As we have just 
seen, he recognized the impossibility of extracting 
individuals from essences, and denied that the essence 
could be the cause of the existence of the individuals. 
This forced him to look elsewhere for the cause, and 
he accounted for the existence of individuals — finite 
particular modes — by a reference to other individuals, 
the unconditional antecedents recognized as causes in 
the sciences. This chain of finite causes he conceived 
of as stretching back to infinity. It is true that God 
is declared to be the sole cause of things, of their 
existence as well as of their essence ; f but this chain 
of finite causes nowhere shows any tendency to 
approach substance. In declaring that essences can- 
not cause the existence of individuals, Spinoza has 
wholly cut them off from each other. We are left 
with the hierarchy of " fixed and eternal things " on 
the one side, and concrete individuals on the other ; 
between them is a great gulf fixed, and the reader 
will do well to simply accept this state of affairs as he 
finds it, and save himself the trouble of looking for 
a bridge where none is forthcoming. J 

There are thus two distinct aspects to the philoso- 

* As the reader must see, Spinoza's difficulties arise out of a 
misconception of the true significance and use of universals in 
deductive reasoning. 

f " Ethics," I, 25. 

\\vi an early work ("Short Treatise on God, Man and His 
Blessedness," Part I, ch. 2, Second Dialogue) Spinoza attempts 
to bridge the gulf by an illustration. He does not succeed. 



II, i6] CRITICAL NOTES. 255 

phy of Spinoza, the one having to do with the chain 
of finite existences or real things, and the other with 
the fixed and eternal things, the abstractions which he 
hypostasizes and regards as causes. The former we 
may call its scientific aspect, and the latter its meta- 
physico-theological. Each is sufficiently uncompro- 
mising, and, in forming an estimate of Spinozism, 
neither should be overlooked or explained away. 
That the theological form given to his reasoning is 
not merely a dress borrowed by Spinoza for the pur- 
pose of making his scientific notions more welcome to 
his contemporaries should, I think, be clear to any 
unprejudiced reader of his works. The religious 
instinct was evidently the fundamental one in his 
character and furnished the impulse to his philoso- 
phy.* Moreover, the whole structure of the " Ethics " 
demands that we yield recognition to this medieval 
realistic side of his thinking. With that abstracted 
his reasonings become incomprehensible. It is this 
religious instinct, too, that forced him into inconsist- 
encies. To feed it satisfactorily through universals 
it is' absolutely necessary to make them something 
more, to make them concretes. God or substance 
should logically be to Spinoza simply the highest 
abstraction, the element contained in every idea of 
whatever sort.f If, however, these words were clearly 
recognized as meaning nothing more, the religious 
element would evaporate out of the Spinozistic phi- 
losophy and leave it sufficiently flat. 

16. The Eternity of Essences. — In closing this intro- 
ductory note, which I have already made much longer 
than I intended, I shall treat very briefly one more 

* " De Intellectus Emendatione," opening sentences. 
I " Ethics," II, 45-47. 



256 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

topic, that of the " eternity " of essences of whatever 
sort. This plays a role of no small importance in 
Part V. of the "Ethics." 

I have said, in discussing the formation of the con- 
cept, that, to have a true universal, it is necessary to 
keep the element or elements it represents really 
abstract, that is, wholly separate from others. This x 
and that x, for example, are distinguished as two by 
the " this " and the " that," by qualities or marks of 
some sort, even if they be only spatial or temporal 
differences. That which they have in common — x in 
the abstract — must, to remain abstract, be stripped of 
all such individualizing elements. Hence, x in the 
abstract is conceived apart from all time-relations. It 
cannot change, of course, for change implies two con- 
ditions or states related in time. It cannot cease to 
be, for if these words mean anything they imply exist- 
ence in time and a negation of existence in time. One 
cannot abstract from the notion of time, and then 
use such expressions- On the other hand, x in the 
abstract cannot remain unchanged, for it takes time 
to remain unchanged as well as to change ; and it 
cannot continue to exist, for continuance out of time 
is an absurdity. It will not do to deny certain time- 
relations of universals, and then use words which 
imply certain others. The essence "man," for ex- 
ample, cannot cease to exist, but it is equally true that 
it cannot go on existing, does not exist now, and 
never has existed. To remain a genuine essence, a 
universal, it must not touch the stream of time at any 
point. It must be kept wholly abstract. 

Now Spinoza follows an ancient custom in applying 
to essences the word eternal to indicate that they are 
independent of time-relations. I cannot but regard 



II l6] CRITICAL NOTES. 257 

this use of the word as unfortunate, for when we use 
the word eternal we commonly mean to indicate an 
existence through endless time. This, of course, it 
cannot mean when applied to universals, to essences 
of any sort ; yet it is very evident that those who em- 
ploy the word draw from this source the consolation 
they find in thinking of essences as eternal. Spinoza 
expressly denies that the word as he uses it has any 
reference to continuance in time,* but it is clear to a 
careful reader that he did not really abstract from the 
idea of time at all. This I shall point out in the notes 
to follow. We cannot limit one's right to use words 
as one chooses, and everyone is free to employ the 
word eternal after his own fashion, but in the interests 
of clear thinking I may be excused for protesting that 
it is of great importance to bear clearly in mind the 
true connotation of the word and to keep to the one 
connotation throughout. One should remember that, 
as applied to universals, the word should mean simply 
that one has abstracted from all time-relations. Uni- 
versals of all sorts are, therefore, equally eternal. 
" Redness " is as eternal as " man," and " sourness " as 
eternal as " substance." f If one chooses, then, to 
prove man's immortality by pointing to the fact that 
"man" in the abstract is eternal, he should remember 
that this is a cheap immortality shared by " man " 
with the object of every class name, and that it does 
not imply that "man" exists now or ever will exist. 
Such an immortality should surely never be confounded 
with immortality as commonly understood. It is par- 
ticularly important to think of this when reading 
Part V, of the " Ethics." 

That essences of all sorts are eternal and in what 
* " Ethics," I, clef. 8. f Compare Plato, " Parmen.," 130. 



258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [IntroD. 

sense they are eternal, should also be borne well in 
mind when one reads the earlier parts of the " Ethics." 
In following Spinoza's account of the procession from 
God or substance to nature as a diversified aggregate 
of parts — the creation of things, as he calls it* — we 
seem to have before us a historical progress marked 
by a fixed order in time. The impression one thus 
gains is, liowever, delusive, and is due to the fact that 
Spinoza employs words indicating time-relations when, 
by hypothesis, all time-relations must be abstracted 
from. The fixed and eternal things "are all by nature 
simultaneous "f — which unfortunate phrase must, for 
the sake of consistency, be understood as simply deny- 
ing temporal succession, and not as affirming co-exist- 
ence in time. Thus natiira naturans, or God con- 
sidered as a free cause, does not precede in time 
iiatura naturataX created things, but is merely to be 
regarded as a logical priiis. The things immediately 
created by God do not precede in time those created 
through the instrumentality of these former things. 
We have in the whole series not a description of what 
takes place or has taken place, but simply a logical 
arrangement of abstract conceptions as higher and 
lower. The only historical process is to be found in 
the series of particular finite modes, or real things ; 
and, as has been pointed out, there is no indication of 
any manner in which these may be referred to God or 
inferred from God. 

17. Summary. — In what precedes I have occupied 
myself almost exclusively with the theologico-meta- 
physical aspect of the Spinozistic philosophy, for this is 

* " Ethics," I, 33, scliol. 2. 

\ " De Intellectus Emendatione," p. 34. 

\ " Ethics," I, 29, schol. 



II, 17] CRITICAL NOTES. 259 

the aspect that the modern reader finds unintelligible. 
When Spinoza writes as a medieval realist he employs 
conceptions which seem to most persons in our day 
strange and unfamiliar. When, however, he touches 
the conceptions of modern science he is easily under- 
stood, and references in the notes will suffice to bring 
out this side of his doctrine. Such references I shall 
give from time to time. 

Again to summarize briefly : Spinoza sets out to 
deduce from the idea of God, or substance, all our 
other ideas, and believes it possible to thus produce 
a priori the order of the whole of nature. He con- 
ceives of the gap between substance and the individual 
finite things found in nature as filled by a chain or 
series of entities, a hierarchy of essences, or fixed and 
eternal things, which stand to each other in the rela- 
tion of cause and effect, and which must furnish the 
steps in the above-mentioned deduction. These 
essences are really abstractions, universals of a greater 
or less degree of generality, but they are hypostatized 
by Spinoza, who was a realist, and treated by him as 
things, yet as things possessed of properties which 
belong only to universals. Sometimes, though not 
usually, they are spoken of as aggregates or wholes, 
of which finite individual things are parts. 

The series of essences here indicated is nowhere 
given, nor is the deduction carried out in any of its 
parts. Such a deduction of the concrete from the 
abstract is an impossibility, and rests upon a miscon- 
ception of the significance of universals and their 
employment in deductive reasoning. This difficulty 
forced itself upon Spinoza's attention at one point, 
and compelled him to regard the chain which should 
connect substance with finite individual things as 



26o THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Introd. 

broken at its last link — he declares it impossible to 
deduce real existing things from their essences. He 
is consequently compelled to accord to essences alone 
a place in his proposed deduction, and to account for 
real existing things by a reference to other things of 
the same kind, the causes recognized in the sciences. 
Both the existence and the essence of individual 
things are, it is true, referred to God as sole cause, 
but no indication is given of any vi^ay of connecting 
existences with God. They are w^holly unprovided 
for in Spinoza's general scheme. 

Essences are declared to be eternal, and by eternity 
Spinoza is careful to explain that he does not mean 
existence through endless time. He means that 
essences are to be regarded as wholly apart from time- 
relations of any sort. It is true that the universal, in 
so far as it is really kept universal, must be kept clear 
from all such individualizing elements. If this be all 
that is meant by the word eternal, then, of course, 
universals are eternal — not merely the universals 
which Spinoza calls essences, but universals of all 
sorts. " Man," for example, is not more eternal than 
"hat," or " substance "' than "accident." Such eter- 
nity does not imply that the universal in question 
really exists, ever has existed, or ever will exist, for 
such language introduces the time-relations supposed 
absent. This should be remembered in reading 
Part V. of the "Ethics." 

Since, finally, essences are thus eternal, the series 
of fixed and eternal things must not be conceived as 
coming into existence successively ; its parts do not 
mark a historical progress. We are not to regard 
God as prior in time to the things he has created, nor 
the things immediately created by him as prior in 



II, ly] CRITICAL NOTES. 261 

time to those created through their instrumentality. 
The story of the Creation as given by Spinoza is not 
a description of what has taken place. Its chapters 
are not successive. The scries of fixed and eternal 
things is simply a logical arrangement of abstract con- 
ceptions as lower and higher. This should be kept 
carefully in mind throughout, for the language of the 
" Ethics " is misleading. 



NOTES TO PART I. 

!• (def. i) The notion of a causa sui is not original 
with Spinoza, but dates from a much earlier time {see 
Martineaus note, "^ Study of Spinoza,'' Part II, ch. i, 
§ 2). Spinoza sometimes appears to recognize that 
the phrase cannot be taken literally, but rather as 
indicating that the being in question has no cause 
{De Int. Emendat., pp. 23, 30, 32), 

This, however, is not in harmony with his language 
in other places, where the idea of causality is unmis- 
takably present {see I, 8, schol. 2 ; 11, proof 2, proof 
3, and schol.; 16 and cors.j 18 ; 25, schol. j etc.) ; and 
a very positive significance was given to the phrase by 
his master Descartes. The latter maintains {^'^ Answers 
to the First Objections to the Meditations ") that when we 
call God the cause of himself we may, indeed, use the 
words negatively, as indicating that he has no cause ; 
but when we ask why he is or continues to exist, and 
consider the incomprehensible power contained in the 
idea of him, we recognize that this is the true and 
only cause of his existence. To escape verbal dis- 
putes, says Descartes, we may avoid the term efficient 
cause ; but we are justified in believing that his rela- 
tion to himself is analagous to that of the efficient 
cause to its effect, and, consequently, that he is the 
cause of himself in a positive sense. 

Spinoza cannot use the phrase in a merely negative 
sense, for his philosophy demands an a priori proof 
of the existence of God. He denies that essences 

262 



Def. i] critical notes. 263 

can be obtained from individual things given in expe- 
rience. They must be deduced from the series of fixed 
and eternal things i^De Int. Etnendat., p. 2>Z \ Letter 
10. See my Introductory Note^ II, 13). Since the 
idea of God cannot be taken from experience, and 
since all others are to be deduced from it, some way 
must be discovered of getting it at the outset. This 
way is found in declaring God's existence to be 
included in his essence, and then inferring it from 
his essence. This is not a passing thought with 
Spinoza ; he evidently regarded it as of the utmost 
importance, and he returns to it constantly in his 
different works. 

A little later {prop. 11) I shall have occasion to 
discuss the arguments for the existence of God or 
substance. Here I wish only to consider what is im- 
plied in including existence in an essence. To one 
who has read carefully the second part of my Intro- 
ductory Note the reasoning will be sufficiently clear. 

Essences are not individual things, but universals, 
such as " man." A universal is such only in virtue of 
the fact that it represents what several individual 
things have in common, and does not contain any of 
the elements which mark them as individuals. It 
does not exist in this time or that, or in this space or 
that. It does not, indeed, exist at all, as a real thing; 
for it exists only in the individuals subsumed under it 
(remember what is signified by this use of the word 
in), and the " man " in any particular individual man 
is not "man "in the abstract, but an occurrence of 
the qualities connoted by the word man, at a particu- 
lar time and place. 

Now, if I take up existence among the other quali- 
ties composing an essence, then, no matter what I 



264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

may mean by the word existence, I must universalize 
it, I must understand it as existence in general, the 
mere idea of existence, that which all existing things 
have in common. I cannot possibly regard it as any 
particular existence, and insist that, because existence 
in the abstract has been added to other abstract quali- 
ties, I have now no abstraction, but a concrete existing 
thing. If I have such a concrete individual, it is not 
an essence, for an essence is not individual, but uni- 
versal. If I have an essence, then, whether existence 
be one of the qualities attributed to it or not, I have 
not an existing thing. Unless one wholly change the 
meaning of the word essence, one cannot escape from 
self-contradiction in speaking of the real existence of 
an essence. As we have seen, Spinoza turned his 
essences into concrete things, and thus found it easy 
to ascribe to them real existence. 

The use of the phrase causa sid in a positive sense 
it seems hardly necessary to criticise. The word 
cause implies a relation between two things. A thing 
cannot be said to be related to itself. It can no more 
be its own cause than it can be its own neighbor. 

2. (def. 3) This definition becomes sufficiently in- 
telligible when one remembers (i) the parallelism of 
thought and things held by Spinoza {Introductory Note, 
I, 2), and (2) his notion of the existence of a series of 
eternal entities corresponding to the logical arrange- 
ment of concepts as lower and higher {^Introductory 
Note., II, 7). He regards each lower essence (species) 
as in the one above it (genus), and the highest of all 
as in none. This he expresses by saying that it is in 
itself. Since the mental order reflects the external, 
each lower concept is conceived by means of the one 
above it, and the highest, of course, cannot be con- 



Def. 4] CRITICAL NOTES. 265 

ceived through any other. Hence it is conceived 
through itself. 

The highest abstraction would not logically be the 
notion of substance, and Spinoza has simply substituted 
for it this latter, which seems to give us a concrete 
thing and not an abstraction. He was by no means the 
first to do this, the Realists before him having regarded 
universals as substances {see the sentence quoted from 
Robert Pulley n, Introductory Note, H, 9; or the doctrine 
of John Scotus, Ueberwegs '^Hist. of Philos.^ vol. I, 

§ 9°)- 

3. (def. 4) Since the attributes constitute the es- 
sence of substance, one would naturally infer that 
Spinoza regarded substance as simply a name for the 
sum of the attributes. The reader of the ''Ethics" 
will see that there is much to be said in support of 
this view. Substance is said to consist of attributes 
{def. 6, a7id props. 11 and 12) ; they are declared iden- 
tical in such a phrase as the following : "God is eter- 
nal ; that is, all God's attributes are eternal " {prop. 19; 
see also 2g, schol.)\ attribute is, like substance, defined 
as that which must be conceived through itself {prop. 
10 and Letter 2); it is stated that nothing exists save 
substance and its modes {prop. 4; 6, cor.-, 15; 28); and 
the things immediately created by God are made modes, 
not attributes, though one of Spinoza's correspondents, 
in discussing this point, suggests that by these things 
the author must mean attributes {prop. 28, schol., and 
Letter 64). 

On the other hand such an interpretation is not in 
harmony with the general structure of Spinoza's 
thought. The attributes of substance are infinite in 
number, and should find their unity in some universal 
which stands above them, if the hierarchy of essences 



266 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

is to be complete and end in an ultimate unity. Such 
a unity Spinoza gives them in substance, and much of 
his language becomes unintelligible if one assume 
that he was clearly conscious that by substance he 
meant only the sum of the attributes {see prop. lo, schol.j 
props. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 ; II, 7, sc/ioL, etc.). 

Spinoza never distinguishes clearly between attri- 
butes and substance, and never deduces the former 
from the latter. In tracing individual things, finite 
modes, to God, he only goes back to the attribute 
under which they are to be subsumed, and appears to 
regard his task as finished. This favors the first view 
of the meaning of the word substance. And yet Spi- 
noza regarded the universe as a unit; he was in search 
of a Being, single and infinite, and a multitude of dis- 
tinct attributes would not satisfy him so long as he 
recognized them as distinct and independent. The 
word substance, I think, besides its other suggestions, 
represented to him the universe as a cosmos, a con- 
nected whole ; it binds together (very vaguely, it is 
true) the otherwise independent attributes. Indefinite 
as is this Spinozistic substance, it is not more indefinite 
than the notion of substance or substratum still gener- 
ally accepted. 

The expression, " which the understanding perceives 
as constituting," appears to distinguish between things 
as they are and things as they appear to us, and seems 
to play into the hands of the idealist. As, however, 
Spinoza postulated an exact parallelism of thought 
and things, the idealist can only take the words as an 
involuntary betrayal of the untenability of his position. 

4- (def. 5) For an explanation of this language 
see Note 2. Modes are the more concrete things sub- 
sumed under a universal. 



Axioms] critical notes. 267 

5- (def. 6) In the opening propositions in the 
"Ethics," where Spinoza is developing the general 
idea of substance, he does not call substance God. 
After proving that there is but one substance, he uses 
the terms as interchangeable {p7-op, 11), In the ex- 
planation appended to the definition, the words 
" everything that expresses essence," etc., mean 
everything real and unlimited. 

6. (def. 7) See Note i. 

7. (def. 8) See my Introductory Note, II, 16, and 
Note I. In defining eternity as existence itself, Spinoza 
evidently does not stand by the eternity of essences 
as I have explained it. The word should only mean 
that the essence in question is a true universal and 
freed from all individualizing elements. Consequently, 
as a universal, it does not really exist. Its only real 
existence is in its individuals (please remember this 
ill), and regarded as in an individual it is individual- 
ized and no longer universal. It is "an occurrence " 
of certain qualities, not the qualities in the abstract. 

8. (axioms) In explanation of these axioms, see my 
Introductory Note, I. The language of axioms i and 
2 is explained in Note 2. Axiom 5 depends on the same 
thought. Things which have nothing in common 
cannot be conceived by means of each other because 
they cannot be related as genus and species are 
related. For axiom 7, see Note t- Anything can be 
conceived as non-existent, unless we start with the hy- 
pothesis that it exists and that the thought of its 
existence must not be divorced from it, in which case, 
of course, we contradict ourselves in denying its 
existence. I can conceive any house as non-existent. 
I cannot conceive an existing house as non-existent, 
without ceasing to think of it as an existing house. 



268 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

If I insist that it shall remain an existing house, it is 
futile to attempt to conceive of it as non-existent. 
This is really what Spinoza does in including existence 
in essence, and then assuming the inconceivability of 
the non-existence of this essence. 

9- (prop, i) This does not mean prior in time, but 
logically prior (see Introductoij Note, II, i6). 

10. (prop. 2) See Note 8, where axiom 5 is referred 
to. 

11. (prop. 3) See Introductory Note, I, 4. The 
order of causes is assumed to correspond exactly to 
the order of conceptions. 

12. (prop. 4) The puzzling words "outside of the 
understanding " seem to be inserted without good 
reason, as Spinoza makes the understanding a modi- 
fication of substance. Note that substance in this 
proof appears to be made identical with its attributes. 

13- (prop. 5) Naturally, if we mean by substance 
the ultimate abstraction obtained by laying aside all 
the differences of things, there cannot be more than 
one substance. So much for the latter part of the 
argument. As to distinguishing substances by their 
attributes, if by attribute we mean all that we can con- 
ceive as constituting the substance, then to speak of 
two substances with but the one attribute is, of course, 
absurd. We have in mind one attribute and that is 
all, and from that we can get no duality of any sort. 
We must add something to pure " x " to get " this x" 
and " that x." But if each of two substances has 
a group of attributes, then (even if substance be but 
a name for the attributes). they may be distinguished 
as two in spite of a common attribute, for they may 
also possess attributes that differ. Spinoza's argument 
is good only for substances with but one attribute. 



Prop. 8] CRITICAL NOTES. 269 

14- (prop. 6) Such expressions as " produced by " 
are misleading, and the reader must be on his guard 
against tliem all through the " Ethics." The causal- 
ity with which Spinoza is here concerned is the time- 
less causality of fixed and eternal things, corresponding 
to the logical order of conceptions {^Introdtictoiy Note, 
II, 15). In the corollary it is assumed as self-evident 
that a substance cannot be produced by modifications. 

^5- (prop. 7) See Note i. The argument is not 
above reproach as a bit of logic. If everything that 
exists must have a cause, if substance exists, and if sub- 
stance cannot have anything else as its cause, then we 
must infer that it is its own cause. Of these three 
" ifs " Spinoza furnishes only the third. 

16. (prop. 8) In assuming that every finite substance 
must be limited by another of the same nature, 
Spinoza has of course assumed that something is in- 
finite. This infinite something is not, however, the sub- 
stance with which the argument sets out. If we con- 
ceive of a finite substance extending to a certain point 
and then being continued by another of the same kind, 
we are not merely considering an attribute, but also 
bringing in a mode. The thing that stops here and 
the thing that begins there are clearly recognizable as 
two things. The thing that is infinite is, consequently, 
not the substance with which we started, and which 
ends at a given point. If it be said, we may overlook 
the mode and consider only the attribute ; I answer, 
then we should not start with the mode, the supposi- 
tion of a given finite substance. The argument con- 
sists in making a distinction and then overlooking it. 

17' (prop. 8, schol. i) It will be remembered that 
prop. 7 was not proved. Note also that finitude is not 
necessarily a negation. I may think of the thing 



270 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part I 

disqussed in the last note positively as being just what 
it is ; I may also think of it as not going on, but stop- 
ping here. So I may think of the infinite as going 
on ; or I may think of it as not stopping. 

18. (prop. 8, schol. 2) The argument is as follows : 
All clear ideas are true {Introductory Note, I, 3). Some 
true ideas may represent things not actually existent. 
Their truth consists in the fact that they are true de- 
ductions from something else that is true — their essence 
is included in it. Since substance cannot be thus 
carried back to something else, the only truth it can 
have must consist in actual existence. We have a 
clear, or true, idea of substance, and thus should never 
doubt its existence. Nor can substance ever have been 
non-existent, for then the idea of it would have been a 
false idea (as having no reality corresponding to it), 
and after the creation of the substance it would be a 
true idea, and thus a false idea would become true, 
which is absurd. 

19- (prop. 8, schol. 2) I have discussed this question 
of the essence and the individuals to be subsumed under 
it in the Introductory Note (II, 13). We have here a 
striking illustration of the dual causality assumed by 
Spinoza. Mark that this process of separating the 
essence from individuals, and considering the former 
alone, does not justify us in inferring the existence of 
one substance any more than of several substances. 
We do not get a single individual thing, but a mere 
abstraction {Introductory Note, II, 11). 

20. (prop. 9) As we commonly use the word reality, 
a small thing has as much reality as a great one, pro- 
vided both exist. In other words, both are equally 
real. In this proposition, as is evident, amount of 
reality means simply amount of being. If by attribute 



Prop, ii] critical notes. 271 

be meant that which constitutes the being of substance, 
the reference to def. 4 is to the point, 

21. (prop. 10) See Note 3- 

22. (prop. 11) See Note i- 

23- (prop. II. proof 2) This proof may be con- 
demned merely on the ground that it rests on the 
general statement that a thing must exist if there be no 
cause which prevents its existence. Even if we admit 
the positive statement that everything that exists must 
have some cause, we are not bound to admit the 
negative statement that there must be a cause for the 
non-existence of whatever does not exist. Strictly 
speaking, one cannot say that there must be a cause for 
the non-existence of things, for this has no real being, 
and cannot be an effect, /. e., cannot stand in a certain 
relation to another thing. When we say, as we some- 
times do, that a thing does not exist because the system 
of things is what it is, we only mean that there does 
not exist a suitable cause for the production of the 
thing in question. We cannot mean to causally relate 
the non-existence of the thing to a part or the whole 
of the system of things. The doctrine that there must 
be a cause for the non-existence of everything that 
does not exist would have strange consequences. Let 
us suppose nothing at all to exist (a conception pos- 
sible enough): would it then follow that there must 
exist causes of all this non-existence of things ? 

Spinoza's reasoning in this proof contains other 
errors, which I shall not discuss in detail, as they will 
be recognized as such by the student who has read the 
notes preceding. I shall merely point out, as touch- 
ing the notion of the causa sui, the fallacy which lurks 
in the words " the reason for the non-existence of a 
square circle is given in its very nature." As the 



272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

words " square circle " are said to involve a contradic- 
tion, they must be, as thus taken together, wholly 
meaningless. There is, therefore, no " nature " to 
appeal to — one cannot conceive it as either existent 
or non-existent, for one cannot conceive it at all. If 
we choose to say the nature of a square circle pre- 
cludes its existence, we can only mean that, since we 
cannot frame any idea at all corresponding to the 
words, we cannot conceive of a thing, corresponding 
to the idea, as existing. 

24. (prop. II, proof 3) The premises upon which 
this proof rests should not have been assumed as self- 
evident. The statement that to be able not to exist 
is lack of power, is, interpreted in the sense made 
necessary by the argument built upon it, evidently 
false. If a thing does not exist, one cannot say that it 
has the power not to exist, or has anything else. The 
proof compares the power of an existing finite being 
with that of a non-existent infinite being, and declares 
that, in so far as the infinite being is non-existent, it is 
less powerful. Now it is possible to compare the prop- 
erties of an existent thing with those of a non-existent 
if we abstract from the existence and non-existence. 
In such a comparison we say, in effect, that, did both 
of the things exist, one would stand in such and such 
relations to the other. But if the existence and non- 
existence enter into the comparison and cannot be 
abstracted from, the matter is very different. A thing 
cannot be less powerful than another in that it is 
non-existent, for in that it is non-existent it cannot 
enter into any comparison at all. A non-existent 
thing cannot be infinite, or strong, or weak, or any- 
thing else, for it is nothing. The argument, there- 
fore, falls. 



Prop. 14] CRITICAL NOTES. 273 

25- (prop. II, schol.) See the preceding note. Even 
if ability to exist may properly be called a power, it can 
certainly not be possessed or exercised by something 
that does not exist, and the whole question is whether 
the being to which we are attributing a given nature does 
exist or not, and hence whether it can have any power 
whatever. If the being does not exist, none of the 
attributes we allot to it can exist, nor can the number 
of these non-existent attributes be any indication of a 
real power to exist on the part of the being in question. 

The error which underlies and gives support to all 
these arguments for the existence of God or substance 
is the separation of existence and essence, and the 
attribution to essences of a sort of real being inde- 
pendent of existence. See the discussion of essences 
in the second part of my Introductory Note. 

26. (prop. 12) See the notes to the propositions 
referred to in support of this argument. 

27. (prop. 13) See the notes to the propositions 
referred to in the text. All this becomes clear when 
one bears in mind that substance is treated as an 
abstraction obtained by eliminating differences, a 
universal {see props. 5 and 8. See also prop. 15, fol- 
lowing). 

28. (prop. 14) In this proposition God or substance 
appears to be simply a name for the sum total of pos- 
sible attributes {see JVoteZ)- If the one substance be 
a something constituted by all possible attributes, and 
if there cannot be two attributes of the same kind 
(/. e., if in comparing attributes we must overlook all 
modal distinctions, see Note 13), then, of course, there 
must be but the one substance. Having included in 
God all that is, it is a simple matter to prove there is 
nothing else in existence. 



274 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part I 

29. (prop. 15) Here Spinoza comes back to the 
notion of substance as simmiiim genus {see Notes 2 
a?id 3). 

30- (prop. 15, schol.) In this scholium we meet with 
those perennial bugbears, the mathematical antinomies. 
I cannot here discuss them at length, but must refer 
the reader for a fuller discussion of the whole subject 
to my little volume, " The Conception of the Infinite " 
(J. B. Lippincott Co., Phila., 1887). Spinoza really 
touches the true solution of these puzzles in his 
remark that they arise from " the supposition that 
infinite quantity is measurable." He does not, how- 
ever, apply correctly this principle, and hence does 
not solve the problems. 

The conception of the infinite is not quantitative. 
We cannot say that one infinite is greater or less than, 
or equal to, another, for these words imply measure- 
ment, and measurement of a thing means marking the 
distance between the limits of the thing. That which 
has no limits cannot be measured, nor can its extent 
as a whole be compared with the extent of something 
else. It is not a whole, for, when we use this word, 
we mean to include all that lies within the limits of 
an object. It is not a quantity or amount. 

When we cut an infinite line, we may, if we choose, 
call the two lines resulting from this section infi- 
nite. By infinite we here mean limited at but one 
point, and one point is not enough to determine the 
extent of a line. The resulting lines cannot be 
declared equal to each other, or less or greater than 
each other. They cannot be compared in extent 
with the original line. 

The argument that an infinite line divided into feet 
will be twelve times as long as one divided into inches. 



Prop. 15] critical notes. 275 

since each contains an infinite number of divisions, 
evidently assumes that the number of divisions is in 
each case the same, /. e., that it is a finite number, and 
may be compared with other numbers. 

Again, in considering the two lines drawn from the 
point A, we may criticise the statement that " the 
distance between B and C will continually increase, 
and at length from a determinate distance will become 
indeterminable." This " at length " supposes the end 
reached, when, by hypothesis, there is no end. 

As to a line's being composed of points, etc., I must 
refer the reader to the little volume mentioned above, 
or to my monograph, " On Sameness and Identity," 
§ 36. It would take too much space to discuss the 
matter here, and it does not greatly concern us. 
Spinoza's way out of the difficulty is the assumption 
that a line does not really consist of parts at all. He 
regarded space or extension as a real thing, which, 
diversely modified, constitutes the world of extended 
objects. Hence he could not admit of the possibility 
of a vacuum. When he denies that one part of cor- 
poreal substance could be annihilated, he says, in effect, 
that it is impossible to conceive of one part of space 
as annihilated. From this he infers that the parts are 
not really distinct. If this be true, we may infer that 
all corporeal substance (or space) is one and the 
same. 

But, whether Spinoza is right in assuming that we 
cannot think of any part of space as annihilated or 
not, and no matter how we regard space, this argu- 
ment does not prove that space is not really composed 
of parts. The parts of a thing may be conceived as 
indestructible, but that does not prevent their being 
true parts, and, as such, distinct from one another. 



276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

The notion of space simply disappears if we abstract 
all idea of part out of part. Lines are no longer 
lines, surfaces are no longer surfaces, nor are solids 
solids. 

In denying that the parts of corporeal substance 
are distinct from each other, in conceiving it " as it is 
in the understanding," Spinoza simply abstracts from 
the differences which distinguish this part as here and 
that part as there. He overlooks the modes and falls 
back on the attribute, and his attribute is not some- 
thing concrete, composed of concrete parts, but an 
abstraction. He is considering extension in the 
abstract, which, of course, implies some notion of 
part out of part, but leaves out of view the marks of 
any concrete individual parts. The difference be- 
tween extension as it is in the imagination and exten- 
sion as it is in the understanding, is the difference 
between concrete and general knowledge, between the 
individual and the universal. This escape to the con- 
cept in no way solves the problems forced on us by 
the conception of the infinite. We cannot lay the 
ghosts of those infinite lines by denying that they are 
really infinite lines, and composed of parts. As well 
deny that a yard is composed of feet, or a foot of 
inches, or refuse to believe that anything is really 
extended, and may contain a smaller thing or be con- 
tained in a greater. 

31- (prop. J 6) See the Introductory Note I, 4, and 
II, 10. In corollary i God is called the efficient 
cause. It should be remembered that the word cause 
has a double sense in the "Ethics." The "fixed and 
eternal things " are " immanent " causes. Finite indi- 
viduals are transient causes of other individuals. The 
word elificient cause should only apply to causes in 



Prop. 17] critical notes. 277 

the latter sense. The causality attributed to essences 
and to individual things is discussed in the Introduc- 
tory Note, II, 15. 

Corollaries 2 and 3 are, of course, inferred from 
the fact that nothing can be attributed to any cause 
outside of the divine nature. 

32. (prop. 17) Spinoza conceives all ideas as follow- 
ing by logical deduction from the idea of God, and, 
by a parallel process, all things following from God. 
This leaves no room for arbitrary choice, the physical 
necessity keeping step with the logical. Remember 
that neither this logical deduction of ideas, nor 
the corresponding physical progression, describes a 
historical process, for the " fixed and eternal things " 
are " all by nature simultaneous " {see Ititrodiictory 
Note, II, 16). The deductions from the nature of 
the triangle should not have been made parallel with 
the relation of cause and effect, where, when the 
words are properly used, the effect is not in the cause 
and simply brought out of it by analysis. 

The difficulty about God's creating all he knows 
and being unable to create any more is easily over- 
come. It arises from the fact that one employs the 
words "all he knows" to signify a definite amount, a 
finite quantity. If " all he knows " be infinite, one 
cannot use the word greater in speaking of it, for no 
comparison is possible {see Note 30). 

The words " God's omnipotence has from eternity 
been actual, and to eternity will abide in this actuality," 
mean simply that the whole system of " fixed and 
eternal things" — the hierarchy of abstractions dis- 
cussed in Introductory Note, II — really exists, has 
always existed, and will always exist. Of course Spi- 
noza introduces here, as in many other places, the 



278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

notion of time, and inconsistently makes eternity to 
consist in endless time. 

In the argument to prove God's intellect and will 
different from ours there are several difficulties. 
Making God's intellect the cause of things contradicts 
II, 6, cor. The statement that our intellect and will 
agree only in name with God's intellect and will appears 
to contradict what is explicitly stated elsewhere, e. g., 
V, 40, schol. (on this point see Note 59). The doctrine 
of causality here taught contradicts I, 3, which latter is 
more in harmony with Spinoza's general doctrine of 
the causality of essences. 

33- (prop. 18) See the Introductory Note (II, 10) 
and Notes i, 2^ and 3. A universal may in some sense 
be said to be immanent in the individuals subsumed 
under it, and Spinoza here returns to the notion of 
God as the ultimate universal. I have criticised in the 
Introductory Note his ascribing causality to these 
abstractions. The words " immanent cause " are unfor- 
tunate. If the cause cannot be regarded as a dis- 
tinct thing from the effect, we simply come back 
to the notion of a causa sui, which I criticised in 
Note I. 

34- (prop. 19) This proposition appears to make 
substance only a name for the sum of the attributes 
{see JVoteZ). As to God's eternal existence, see Notes 
I and 15. There is evidently a leap in the argument. 
Existence is included among a number of other attri- 
butes as belonging to an essence. It is thus treated as 
distinct from each. Then it is concluded that each 
attribute is eternal — that is, that the existence included 
among the other attributes as one of a number is not 
a distinct property, but is fused with each other attri- 
bute as they are not fused with each other. It if 



Prop. 24] CRITICAL NOTES. 279 

spread over all the rest. It is thus not treated as an 
element included with others in an essence. 

The argument in the " Principles " to which Spinoza 
refers is as follows : If we do not attribute to God 
an unlimited existence, we must admit that he, an om- 
niscient and a most perfect being, would know the 
limits set to his existence. He would thus know that 
he, a most perfect being, does not exist beyond those 
limits, which is absurd. Hence God has not a limited 
but an infinite existence, and this we call eternity. 

35- (prop. 20) See the criticism of the treatment of 
existence in the preceding note. Prop. 20 completes 
the confusion by declaring existence absolutely iden- 
tical with all the other elements in the essence. 

36. (prop. 21) This reasoning becomes plain if we 
bear in mind that here the attribute thought is not 
treated as a mere universal, an abstraction, but as a 
thing, infinite in extent and made up of finite thoughts 
[see the Introductory Note, II, 8). The idea of God is 
conceived of as one of these finite thoughts, limited by 
thought beyond itself. It is inferred that, as there 
may be thought beyond the limits of the idea of God, 
the idea of God does not follow from the very nature 
of thought. If it did, we could not have thought with- 
out it. The second argument is like the first, except 
that duration is substituted for extent. 

37- (prop. 24) See prop. 8, schol. 2, and Note 19. As 
I have shown at length in the Introductory Note, 
Spinoza gives no hint of the way in which individual 
things, existences, are to be derived from God. The 
preceding propositions have been concerned to prove 
that all that follows from his absolute nature must be 
eternal and infinite. How his nature comes to be so 
conditioned that finite things of any sort may follow 



28o THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART I 

from it is left wholly unexplained. The propositions 
which follow rest upon the assertion — introduced, as 
it were, by violence — that God is cause of existences 
as well as of essences. 

38. (prop. 25) See the preceding note. The state- 
ment in the scholium that God is cause of all things in 
just the sense in which he is said to be cause of him- 
self {see Note i), will not square with one of the kinds 
of causality accepted by Spinoza, that set forth in 
prop. 28. Each finite thing must have a finite cause 
external to itself, and unless we simply obliterate the 
distinctions between things and call them really one 
and the same (as Sphwza does in the scJiolium to prop. 
15, see Note 3° near the end), we cannot fall back on 
the causa sui idea. 

39- (prop. 28) See Notes 37 and 38. 

40. (prop. 28, schol.) Spinoza gives in one of his let- 
ters {Letter 6 \, ed. Van Vlotenand Land), as instances 
of the things immediately produced by God, in the 
attribute thought, "absolutely infinite understanding "; 
and in the attribute extension, '' motion and rest." As 
a representative of the second class, he instances 
" the face of the universe as a whole, which, though 
it varies in infinite ways, remains always the same." 

41- (prop. 29) As all ideas are supposed to flow by 
strict logical necessity from the idea of God, and all 
things, by a parallel process, from God, the natural 
result is a universal determinism. The libertarian 
reader may console himself with the thought that this 
deduction of ideas and things has not been made 
{Introductory Note, II, 14). 

42. (prop. 29, schol.) Again, the causa sui notion. 
The attributes as unmodified constitute God as cause ; 
as niodified, they are God as effect. It should be kept 



Prop. 33] CRITICAL notes. 281 

in mind that natura naturans does not precede in time 
natura naturata. We have not here a history of crea- 
tion, but a portrayal of the logical structure of things. 
Spinoza appears to forget this from time to time, and 
uses language which is misleading {read, for example, 
2,Z, schol. 2). In making God as cause in any way 
distinguishable from God as effect, Spinoza strains 
somewhat the causa sui idea. He, however, regards 
the two as identical, as constituting, not two things, 
but one (25, cor.^. 

43- (prop. 30) See the Introductory Note, I, 2. 

44- (prop. 32) Read 28, which is referred to in the 
proof of this proposition, and see Notes 37 and 38, 
Will is regarded as determined because it is a mode, 
and all modes are determined, and follow necessarily 
from the nature of God. 

45- (prop. 2,Z'> schol. 2) Notice the time-relations in- 
troduced everywhere in this second scholium. Spi- 
noza has evidently found it impossible to get on 
without the "when, before, and after" excluded by 
the idea of '' eternity " {see Note 42). 

As to the perfection in which God has brought-^ 
things into being : Spinoza uses the word perfection 
in a sense quite different from that in which it is used 
by those whom he criticises. He brings out clearly 
the difference in the Preface to Part IV. See, also, 
his definition of perfection in Part II {def. 6). When, 
however, he speaks of things as having been " brought 
into being by God in the highest perfection," and 
labors to prove it, he is evidently taking advantage of 
the associations which cluster around the word as 
ordinarily used. In the same way he makes use of 
the associations which cluster around the word God, 
though his doctrine changes the meaning of the word 



282 • THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

to something the ordinary man never thinks of. He 
writes, for example {^Letter 21) : " Meanwhile I know 
(and this knowledge gives me the highest satisfaction 
and tranquillity of mind) that everything comes to 
pass by the power and immutable decree of a 
supremely perfect Being." 

46. (appendix) See the preceding note. Spinoza's 
naturalism is here sufficiently uncompromising. It 
is well to remember, however, that he did not wholly 
divorce from the word God the associations which 
ordinarily accompany it. Had he done so, his 
philosophy would not have influenced religious 
minds as it has done since his day. 

The force and clearness of this scholium make one 
regret that Spinoza did not write his whole treatise 
in the same style. The difficulties met with in the 
" Ethics " are partly due to its unfortunate mathemat- 
ical dress. 



NOTES TO PART II. 

47- (preface) The reader will remember that, in Part 
I, no indication was given of the way in which modes 
could be deduced from the essence of God. Part II 
begins with such notions as body, idea, individual 
things, man, love, desire, etc. These are not deduced 
from the idea of God, but simply taken up as given 
in experience, and then referred to God. 

48- (defs.) As regards def. 2, see what I have 
said concerning Spinoza's doctrine of essences in the 
Introductory Note (II, 13). This definition demands 
too much, and would make the essence of a thing 
strictly identical with the thing itself. Spinoza does 
not generally use the word essence in this sense. In 
explanation of def. 4, see Introductory Note, I, 3. 
Def. 5 takes up duration, or existence in time, which 
Spinoza contrasts elsewhere with eternity {see Intro- 
ductory Note, II, 16). We may take exception to the 
explanation appended to it, it being by no means clear 
that the existence of a thing may not thus be limited. 
Of course, no finite thing is wholly independent, and 
what happens to it is in part due to the influence of 
external things. As to def. 6, see the second para- 
graph of Note 45' 

49. (axioms) As regards axiom i, see I, 8, schol. 2, 
and Introductory Note, II, 13. The four axioms fol- 
lowing are simply accepted as facts of experience. 
It is interesting to note that in axiom 4 he avoids 
idealism (inconsistently, it is true, see Introductory 

283 



284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part I 

Note I, 3) by appealing to the fact that we perceive our 
body. He forgets that what we perceive is our per- 
ceived body, a complex in consciousness, and that it 
still remains to prove that there is a something else 
external to this perception, and corresponding thereto. 
Such a proof he nowhere attempts. He did well not 
to attempt it, for it is nothing more nor less than the 
attempt to obtain a conclusion without premises, to 
gain from experience what experience does not con- 
tain and cannot furnish. 

Axiom 5 is very interesting. Spinoza has defined 
God or substance as a being consisting of an infinity 
of attributes (I, 11). In Part H he teaches that each 
of these attributes is wholly independent of every 
other. The modes of each attribute are caused by 
their attribute alone, and can in no way act upon or 
be acted upon by the modes in an-y other attribute. 
They are, so to speak, in different worlds. This would 
seem to destroy the unity of substance absolutely, and 
make it only a name for an infinity of wholly different 
and independent things, existing without any bond of 
union whatever. Yet, as we have seen {see Note 3), 
Spinoza regards substance as giving a unity to the attri- 
butes. It is one, while they are many. Extended sub- 
stance and thinking substance are one and the same 
substance, apprehended now under this, now under that 
attribute (7, schoL). And since the modes of each 
attribute correspond exactly to those of each other 
attribute (7, cor., and sc hoi.), a mode of extension and 
the idea of that mode are the same thing, but expressed 
in two ways. Hence every individual thing is ex- 
pressed in an infinity of ways, for it appears as a 
mode in each attribute. 

Now, Spinoza accepts it as an axiom that we per- 



Axioms] critical notes. 285 

ceive by sense the modifications of our body ; /. (?., the 
mind perceives a mode in another attribute, that of 
extension. He also accepts it as self-evident that we 
do not perceive any individual modes except bodies 
and modes of thinking. But if our mind, a mode of 
thought, is identical with our body, a mode of exten- 
sion, it is no less identical with an infinity of other 
modes. And if it bear the same relation to them that 
it does to the body, why is its knowledge limited to 
bodies and modes of thinking ? 

This difficulty was pointed out by one of Spinoza's 
contemporaries, and Spinoza attempts to meet it, but 
without much success {see Letters 63 to 66). He 
appears to teach that, as the human body has its cor- 
responding idea, the human mind {see prop. 13 and 
schol.), so the particular mode in each of the other 
attributes, which corresponds to the human body, has 
its idea too, and this is in every case related to it as 
the mind is to the body. All these ideas are distinct 
from each other and infinite in number. They con- 
stitute an infinity of minds. Thus each individual 
thing is represented once in every attribute except that 
of thought, and in that one is represented an infinite 
number of times — or perhaps (though Spinoza could' 
not admit more than one attribute of the same kind) 
one should say, is represented once in each of an 
infinite number of thought-attributes, for these ideas 
seem to belong to different worlds. 

It will be noticed that thought is here put on a very 
different footing from the other attributes. It is, so 
to speak, spread over all the rest, as existence is spread 
over all the rest of the elements in the essence in 
which it is included in I, 19. Of course, this multi- 
plying the number of times each thing is represented 



286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

in the attribute thought does not explain why we 
know only two aspects of each thing. The idealistic 
reader will take a certain satisfaction in noting that 
this difficulty really has its root in that first extension 
of the attribute thought which makes it go beyond 
itself and seize upon extended things. If it can do 
this once, why not again ? 

The doctrine of the infinity of attributes plays no 
important part in the philosophy of Spinoza : he 
occupies himself only with thought and extension. 

50. (prop, i) The proof of this proposition brings 
out well the fact that Spinoza's attributes are uni- 
versals, abstractions obtained by obliterating differ- 
ences {see Introductory Note, II, 11). The statement 
in the scholium, that, since we conceive an infinite 
being by fixing attention upon thought alone, we must 
regard thought as one of the infinite attributes of God, 
needs a little attention. Strictly speaking, by fixing 
attention upon thought alone, we get nothing but 
thought, just as by fixing attention upon extension 
alone we get nothing but extension. Had Spinoza 
gotten his substance by a further abstraction from the 
differences between different attributes, then fixing 
attention upon thought alone would not result in con- 
ceiving an infinite being — the infinite being, God, or 
substance. He only carries his abstraction, however, 
back to the attributes, and then speaks as if he had 
reached God or substance. Thinking an attribute is, 
thus, conceiving an infinite being, for the attributes 
express the nature of this being. As I have said, 
Spinoza never clearly distinguishes between the being 
and its attributes {see Note 3). 

Note that in the proof it is not stated that the 
infinity of the attribute thought depends upon the 



Prop, 5] CRITICAL NOTES. 287 

fact that the number of modes that express it is 
infinite, while the schoHum makes a thinking being 
infinite because it can think an infinite number of 
thoughts. The proof gives us thought as a universal, 
the element contained in every thought : the scholium 
gives us infinite thought as an individual made up of 
parts. The infinity of the former (if we may call it 
infinity at all) is a very different thing from that of 
the latter. 

5i« (prop. 3) It is not proved in prop, i that God 
can think an infinity of things in an infinity of ways. 
As has been stated just above, the proof of that 
proposition gives us thought as a universal, a mere 
abstraction, and overlooks all modal distinctions. 
These are retained in the scholium. Since they are 
so retained, it is not true that "we conceive an infinite 
being by fixing attention upon thought alone." The 
infinity of the being depends upon our retaining the 
idea of a multitude of individual thoughts, finite 
modes, and Spinoza comes back to the idea of God as 
an aggregate, composed of parts. He is not con- 
sidering an attribute alone, but an attribute as modi- 
fied, and his references (I, defs. 4 and 6) are not 
pertinent. Hence the proof of prop. 3 really rests 
upon a play upon the words " an infinite thinking 
being." The conception contained in the scholium of 
the preceding proposition is substituted for that con- 
tained in the proof. This one starts with modes, and 
does not deduce them from the attribute. 

52. (prop. 4) See Introductory Note, I, 2, on the 
parallelism of ideas and things, 

S3- (prop. 5) Prop. 3, to which reference is made in 
the first part of this proof, has been criticised in 
Note 51. The second part falls back on the notion of 



288 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PaRT II 

the genus as cause o.f the species. Ideas are modes 
of thought, /. e., thought bears to them the relation of 
universal to particular, hence it is their cause. Exten- 
sion is not so contained in ideas, hence it cannot be 
their cause. This doctrine of universals as causes I 
have discussed at length in the second part of the 
Introductory Note (lo). 

54- (prop. 6) See the preceding note. Compare the 
statements of the corollary with what is said in the 
scholium to I, 17, near the end {see Note 32). 

55- (prop. 7) For the proof and corollary read the 
Introductory Note, I, i, which discusses the parallel- 
ism of the chain of ideas with that of real- causes and 
effects. As regards the scholium, see Note 3 and the 
part of Note 49 which is concerned with axiom 5. 

As we have seen, Spinoza regards every finite mode 
as conditioned by an endless series of finite causes (I, 
28). He denies that the modes of one attribute can 
condition those of another (II, 6). Each attribute 
is, therefore, modified by an infinity of finite modes 
causally connected with each other, but having no 
causal connection with the modes of any other attri- 
bute. Nevertheless, the modes in each attribute 
absolutely correspond to the modes in every other. 
Each mode in one attribute must, therefore, have 
a corresponding mode in every other attribute, which 
mode is simply a different way of expressing the same 
thing. Thus we have in the attribute of extension an 
infinite series of material things connected with each 
other in a necessary and fixed order ; and in the 
attribute of thought an infinite series of ideas also 
connected with each other in fixed order. For every 
material thing there is a corresponding mode in the 
attribute of thought, and this is the idea of the thing. 



Prop. 7] CRITICAL NOTES. 289 

They are also the same with each corresponding mode 
in the other attributes of substance. 

This illustration of the correspondence of modes 
becomes clearer when we remember that Spinoza 
regarded all nature as animated {see 13, sc/ioL). In 
other words, he believed that each material thing has 
an actually existing counterpart in the attribute 
thought, which counterpart may properly be called its 
idea. In this sense of the word the human mind is 
the idea of the human body {prop. 13). The doctrine 
of the infinite number of the attributes of substance 
is, as has been remarked {Note 49), of little significance 
in Spinoza's philosophy. What is important is his 
attempt to bridge the gulf between thought and 
extension. He regarded this identity of the modes 
in the one substance as furnishing the bridge sought 
for {see 13, schol^. 

Spinoza's formal proof that there is no causal con- 
nection between the modes of one attribute and those 
of another will, as we have seen, not bear critical 
examination {see props. 5 and 6 and the notes which 
relate to them). It was, however, very natural that he 
should take such a position. Descartes had so sepa- 
rated thought and extension in his philosophy as to 
make almost inevitable the doctrine of Occasional 
Causes, which arose among his immediate followers. 
This doctrine held that God is the immediate cause 
of mental changes which appear to result from mate- 
rial causes, and of material changes which appear to 
result from mental causes. What appears to us the 
cause is only the occasion for God's action. This 
constant interference on the part of an external cause 
Spinoza could not admit, as it is wholly opposed to 
his notion of the divine immanence in things. It 



29.0 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

was, therefore, necessary for him to deny that thought 
can act upon extension or extension upon thought. 
It remained for him to find some explanation of the 
fact (which it never seems to have occurred to him to 
question) that thought and things are so related as to 
make a knowledge of things possible. 

The thesis of prop. 7 is not proved by Spinoza, 
but simply assumed with the doubtful axiom (I, 
axiom 4) that, knowledge of an effect depends on 
knowledge of its cause and involves it. The expres- 
sions " knowledge of an effect " and " knowledge of 
its cause " assume at once the correspondence of the 
"knowledge " and the "effect" in the one case, and 
of the " knowledge " and the " cause " in the other. 
As the words " cause " and " effect " assume the mate- 
rial things in question to be in a certain definite rela- 
tion, it only remains for the axiom to declare the same 
relation to hold good between the intellectual factors. 

The correspondence of modes is thus simply as- 
sumed in proof of our proposition. In the scholium 
an explanation of the fact is offered. A thing and its 
idea are declared to be the same thing viewed under 
different aspects. They are one, because substance is 
one, and they are modes of substance. This needs 
some examination. As I have said {NoteZ), Spinoza's 
statements regarding substance are very vague, but 
whether we regard it as a name for the sum of the 
attributes, as the stniimum genus, or as a something 
underlying modes and different from them {substra- 
fum), we cannot accept the scholium as really explain- 
ing anything. If by substance we mean merely the 
sum of the attributes, we have plainly no explanation 
at all. Our calling two distinct things the same thing 
will not make them correspond, nor can it furnish any 



Prop. 7] CRITICAL NOTES. 291 

evidence that they do correspond. If substance be 
the siimmum genus, the ultimate abstraction, it can 
serve our turn no better. It will not explain the 
parallelism of two lines of fence to say they are both 
" fence." As to the third sense of the word : if the 
one substance which Spinoza regards as revealed in 
both the thing and the idea of the thing be something 
different from both and underlying them (the sub- 
stratum with which the students of the history of 
philosophy are familiar), then proof should be offered 
(i) that substance of this kind exists ; (2) that the 
substance underlying the tvvo modes in question is 
really identical, and (3) that a single substance under- 
lying two modes would cause such a parallelism of 
modes as the one in question. The proofs of the 
existence of substance have already been discussed 
{see I, II, and the notes ivhich criticise it). The second 
point Spinoza does not prove in any sense which 
could serve the desired end. He has argued that 
substance is indivisible (I, 12, 13). The substance 
underlying one mode is, therefore, identical with the 
substance underlying any other mode. If, then, we 
argue that a thing is one and the same with the idea 
of that thing, on the ground that they are only differ- 
ent expressions of the same substance, we may also 
argue that a thing is one and the same with the idea 
of any other thing. Any attempt to prove the corre- 
spondence of modes from identity of underlying sub- 
stance must assume that the substance underlying 
each material thing is distinct from that underlying 
every other material thing, and is identical with that 
underlying one particular idea. Such a partition of 
substance Spinoza could not admit. As regards the 
third point, if it be not incompatible with the unity of 



292 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

the one substance that it should have two such differ- 
ent manifestations as thought and extension, what 
reason is there to think it incompatible with its 
unity that the order and arrangement of parts in its 
two manifestations should be different? 

The reader will remark a close analogy between 
Spinoza's doctrine of the independence and parallel- 
ism of modes in the attributes thought and extension 
and the modern psychological doctrine of cerebral 
"automatism." The scholium to prop. 2, Part III, for 
example, reads like a chapter from a contemporary 
work on psychology. The failure of Spinoza's argu- 
ments to prove that mind and body cannot act on one 
another does not, of course, dispose of this doctrine. 

56. (prop. 8) This corollary and scholium rest on 
the parallelism of thought and things set forth in 
the last proposition. Spinoza maintains that an 
idea cannot have actual existence unless its object 
has it. The only thing puzzling here is the sort 
of existence attributed to those things that "do not 
exist except in so far as the infinite idea of God 
exists." It is the sort of existence attributed to es- 
sences, which (to take the mental series) may be de- 
duced from the idea of God, and in so far may be said 
to exist when once the idea of God is given. The 
whole series of "fixed and eternal things" are sup- 
posed to be "simultaneous," and given in the highest 
member of the series from which they may be deduced. 
Though Spinoza distinguishes between essence and 
existence, and denies to these things the latter, yet he 
grants them a shadowy kind of "essential" existence. 
An actually existing rectangle has, consequently, a 
dual existence. On this subject of essences, see the 
Introductory Note, II, 13. 



Prop, io] CRITICAL NOTES. 293 

57- (prop. 9) The statement in the proof that God 
is cause of the idea of an individual thing actually ex- 
isting only " in so far as he is considered as affected 
by some other mode of thinking " simply says in other 
words that each idea is caused by some other idea 
{see I, 28). All things are said to be in God, and, 
hence, whatever is caused by anything is caused by 
God *' in so far," etc. As I have said, Spinoza nowhere 
indicates how the chain of finite existences may be 
connected with God {see Notes 37 and Z^). 

As to the corollary : God as a thinking thing means 
God revealed in the attribute thought {prop. i). Now 
the only representative of any individual thing in the 
attribute thought is the idea of the thing. Hence 
God's knowledge of the thing must be shut up to this. 

58. (prop. 10) The reader will find a detailed criti- 
cism of these arguments by turning to Spinoza's refer- 
ences and looking up the notes indicated. 

The definition of essence made use of in the proof 
and the scholium to the corollary demands too much 
of an essence {see Note 48), and would make the 
essence of a thing identical with the thing itself. 
When the word is used in its proper sense, it does 
not follow that, given the essence, the thing is given. 

We have seen that, had Spinoza been logical in 
following up his series of " fixed and eternal things," 
God would have been to him simply the ultimate 
universal, the highest abstraction {see Notes 2 and Z). 
He would thus be included in the essence of each 
individual thing, for he would be reached by abstract- 
ing from all differences of individuals and retaining 
w^hat they have in common. Given the individual, 
then, God would be given ; but given God, the indi- 
vidual would not be given at all. Yet Spinoza's 



294 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

" proper order of philosophizing" begins with the ab- 
stract and endeavors to develop a concrete. 

59' (prop, ii) The only criticism I need make on 
the proof of this proposition is that props. 21 and 22 of 
Part I do not, even supposing the reasoning there to 
be valid, prove that an infinite thing must always 
necessarily exist. 

As to the corollary : the infinite intellect of God, 
which, as we have seen {Note 4°), is an infinite and 
eternal mode in the attribute thought, is conceived as 
made up of ideas, and the human mind is regarded as 
one of its parts, not as subsumed under it as the par- 
ticular is subsumed under the universal {see V, 40, 
schoL). This appears to contradict I, 17, sc/ioL, which 
maintains that God's intellect and man's intellect have 
nothing in common but the name. Possibly this dif- 
ficulty may be overcome by supposing that in the 
scholium just mentioned Spinoza is considering God 
merely as natura iiaturans, as consisting merely of 
unmodified attributes. Had he, however, had this 
thought, he could very easily have said that intellect 
is a modification of the attribute thought, that no 
modifications of any sort belong to God regarded as 
the first cause, and that, consequently, intellect cannot 
be said to belong to the divine nature in any sense. 
His language does not entirely fit this interpretation. 

In this corollary we again meet the " in so far," etc. 
{see Note si). It will recur constantly. It does noth- 
ing but remind us that all things are in God. When 
Spinoza says that God, in so far as he constitutes the 
essence of the human mind, has this or that idea, he 
means merely that the idea in question is the essence 
of the human mind, and that this is a part of God's 
intellect. When he says "God has this or that idea, 



Prop. 13] CRITICAL NOTES. 295 

not merely in so far," etc., he means that the human 
mind constitutes only a part of the whole idea of the 
thing in question, and that this whole is part of God's 
intellect. 

Thus it will be seen that Spinoza makes the human 
mind to consist in ideas. He comes very near to a 
simple and scientific psychology quite up to the require- 
ments of modern thought. His unfortunate realism, 
his failure to grasp the true difference between imag- 
ination and thought, etc., conspired, as the reader will 
see, to becloud his horizon. 

60. (prop. 12) The thing puzzling about this proof is 
the fact that it is presented as a proof with the " in so 
far," etc., as premises {see Notes 57 and 59). The 
argument really should be that, since the human mind, 
which is the idea of a given object, exactly represents 
that object, whatever takes place in the object must be 
represented in the human mind. Spinoza assumes 
here, and in the corollary to prop. 9, that this is equiv- 
alent to saying the mind knows what takes place in 
the object. 

61. (prop. 13) The proof of this proposition rests 
upon axioms 4 and 5, which appeal to experience {see 
Note 49). It would perhaps be better to say there is no 
proof at all, as everything is given in the axioms, and 
the detour about ideas being " in God, in so far," etc., 
adds nothing to the thought {see Notes 57 and 59), ex- 
cept to keep one in mind of the fact that the mind is to 
be regarded always as a part of God. It has nothing 
whatever to do with the proof of the thesis. 

The language of the corollary seems to imply that 
the existence of the body has been proved. It has, 
however, been assumed with axiom 4. For the 
scholium, see Note 55. 



296 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA, [PART II 

What follows, as far as the next proposition. I shall 
not criticise in detail, for it is at least sufficiently in- 
telligible. I shall merely take up two points. The 
a priori proof {iemina 3, cor.) that a body in motion 
cannot, unassisted, come to rest, nor a body at rest set 
itself in motion, rests upon the thought that the idea 
of the effect must be actually contained in that of the 
cause. Out of the mere thought of motion we cannot 
get rest, or vice versa. It is, however, only experience, 
or a deduction from premises furnished by experience, 
that can tell us what causes and effects go together. 
Again, the statement {lemma 7, sc/iol.) that the parts 
of nature may vary in infinite ways without any change 
of the " whole individual " {see Note 40), will be ac- 
cepted as true or not according to one's definition of 
what constitutes change in an individual. The doc- 
trine of the conservation of energy appears to furnish 
what Spinoza was feeling for here. 

62. (prop. 15) The reference to God in this proof 
has nothing to do with the argument {see Note 60)^ 
which rests solely upon the doctrine that an idea 
exactly represents its object. 

63- (prop. 16) In this proposition with its corolla- 
ries we meet with a serious difficulty. In harmony 
with the doctrine of the parallelism of thought and 
things, the object of the idea constituting the human 
mind has been declared to be the body and noth- 
ing else {prop. 13), and it has been maintained 
that everything that takes place in the body, and 
every part of the body, are represented in the mind 
{props. 12 and 15). There ought, therefore, to be in 
the mind "objectively" just what is in the body 
" formally " and no more. But the external causes of 
the modifications of the body, the things which act 



Prop. i6] CRITICAL NOTES. 297 

upon it, are not in the body at all. They ought not, 
then, to be represented in the mind, but in other ideas 
or minds which are external to the mind. In making 
the mind perceive anything beyond the body the paral- 
lelism of mind and body is violated. 

Of course, Spinoza's argument bases itself, in a 
way, on the doctrine of parallelism. As effect is related 
to cause, so is the idea of the effect to that of the 
cause. The former "involves " the latter. But that 
does not imply that both ideas make part of one mind 
— the human mind, which is limited to the representa- 
tion of what takes place in the body, and ought not 
to include the representation of anything else. I have 
discussed at length in the Introductory Note (II, 12) 
the meaning of the word involve. Usually it denotes 
the relation of particular and universal. I have also 
shown that Spinoza uses the word cause in two quite 
distinct senses, the one to indicate the relation of uni- 
versal and particular, the other to indicate the relation 
of finite causes and effects as recognized by science. 
In the latter case the cause is outside of its effect, 
and is a distinct thing from it. Now, anything that 
could be regarded as a cause of the modifications of 
the body in the first sense of the word cause might 
be said to be in the body, and its idea might be said to 
be in the mind. But causes of the second kind can- 
not be in the body, nor can their ideas (if we are to 
hold to a parallelism) be in the mind. It is true that 
Spinoza uses the word idea in two senses (I shall dis- 
cuss this a little later), but everything that has pre- 
ceded has led up only to ideas of the one kind, 
/. e., the representatives in the attribute thought of 
modes in the attribute extension. To put one of these 
representatives in another — to put the idea of some- 



298 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

thing else than the body in the mind — is not per- 
missible. 

The concession of cor. 2 reminds one of the old 
"relativity" arguments of Hamilton and others. 
Spinoza does not attempt to distinguish in detail 
between what really belongs to external objects and 
what does not. 

64. (prop. 17) For a criticism of the proof of this 
proposition see the preceding note. In the corollary 
we find the generally accepted psychological doctrine 
that, given the same cerebral condition, we will have 
the same mental activity. With the psychological 
doctrine we can have no quarrel, as it is a legitimate 
inference from certain facts given in experience. 
When, however, we come to examine it in its relation 
to Spinoza's theory of knowledge, we find, as has been 
indicated in the preceding note, serious difficulties. 

The two senses in which Spinoza uses the word idea 
come out clearly in the scholium. The idea of Peter 
which constitutes the essence of Peter's mind directly 
expresses the essence of Peter's body. It is the mode 
in the attribute thought, which corresponds to the 
physical Peter, a mode in the attribute extension. 
The doctrine of parallelism demands that this corre- 
spondence be complete and absolute. There must be 
nothing in Peter's body that is not in this idea, and 
nothing in this idea that is not in his body. But the 
idea of Peter that is in Paul's mind is a very different 
thing. It is not in Peter's mind at all, but forms, for 
the time being, a part of Paul's mind — the idea of 
Paul, in the sense of the word given above. And 
there may be in Paul's mind a vast number of ideas of 
things other than Paul's body. As a good Spinozist 
Paul's endeavor must be to arrive at the idea of the 



Prop. 17] critical notes. 299 

" origin and source of nature " and deduce from it a 
host of ideas which are not ideas of his body. 

Now, the doctrine of parallelism, as Spinoza has 
developed it in what precedes {pi-ops. 7, 8, 9, 11, 13) 
presents us with an infinite series of bodies to which 
correspond, point for point, an infinite series of ideas. 
Each idea answers to one body, and each body to that 
particular idea. This correspondence is explained by 
the assumption that a body and its idea are really 
identical with each other. Thus if two bodies are dis- 
tinct from and outside of each other, their ideas are 
distinct from and outside of each other. By no pos- 
sibility can the idea of one body be in the idea of 
another. 

This doctrine in no way demands a correspondence 
between Paul's idea of Peter and Peter as he is. It 
does demand a correspondence between Paul's idea of 
Peter and some modification of Paul's body. Paul's 
mind is only a part of the infinite intellect of God 
{prop. Ti, co)'?^, and the idea of Peter (Peter's mind) 
is another part. Hence that Peter should be in any 
way represented in Paul's mind, or that Paul should 
be able to represent in his mind the whole of nature 
or any large part of nature seems to contradict the 
doctrine of parallelism of modes, or, at least, to com- 
plicate it by the addition of a quite new doctrine. 
We have here a second parallelism of ideas and things, 
which must be carefully distinguished from the first. 
It is this second parallelism, which suddenly appears 
with the double meaning of the word "idea," that 
ought to be the important one to Spinoza. His con- 
cern is with the reality of knowledge, and it is with 
knowledge that this is concerned. That he confused 
the '.wo senses of the word idea seems plain, if only 



300 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

from the fact that he leap«, without warning the reader, 
from the one parallelism to the other. 

It would hardly be just to close this criticism with- 
out adding the statement that Spinoza finds himself 
in good company when he falls into perplexing diffi- 
culties over the problem of the possibility and reality 
of knowledge. The doctrine of the duality of ideas 
and things, convenient and unobjectionable in psy- 
chology, will not pass in epistemology. This is not 
the place to discuss the subject at length, and I must 
refer the reader to my monograph "On Sameness and 
Identity," § 35.* 

65- (prop. 19) The references to God add nothing to 
the argument {see Notes 57 and 59). Spinoza's reason- 
ing is, in substance, as follows : The human mind is the 
idea or knowledge of the human body. The human 
body is not independent, but a part of a system of 
finite modes and related to other bodies. The mind 
is similarly related to other ideas. To express this 
thought in other words, we may say God has the idea 
of the human body, /. e., knows the human body, and 
so far as he is affected by the ideas of many individual 
things. Hence God has an idea of the human body, 
/. e.^ knows the human body, in so far as he is affected 
by many other ideas, /. <?., consists of other ideas in 
addition, and not in so far as he constitutes the nature 
of the human mind, or, in other words, is the human 
mind. Thus the human mind (the knowledge of the 
human body) does not know the human body. But 
the ideas of the modifications of the body are in the 
mind, and whatever is in the mind the mind perceives. 
These modifications involve the existence of the body, 
and hence through them the mind perceives the body. 

* See also my article in The Psychological Review^ vol. i, No. 2. 



Prop. 20] CRITICAL NOTES. 301 

It seems scarcely necessary to criticise such a bit of 
reasoning, but I may simply point out : (i) That even 
if the human mind be regarded as related to other 
ideas, the knowledge of the human body is not to be 
found in any part of this system of ideas outside of 
the human mind, for the latter, and that alone, is the 
knowledge of the human body. Hence the knowl- 
edge of the human body must be in God, noi in so far 
as he has other ideas, but in so far as he constitutes 
the nature of the human mind. (2) That the reason- 
ing of the first part of the proof may be applied as 
well to " ideas of the modifications of the body," as 
to "the idea of the body," for these modifications are 
part of a system of things, too. 

It seems odd that Spinoza should have defined the 
mind as " the knowledge of the human body," and 
yet have denied to it a knowledge of the human body. 
He appears to have been trying to adjust to his doc- 
trine the experienced fact that when the body is 
affected in certain ways consciousness results, and 
when the body is not so affected there is no conscious- 
ness. As his doctrine of parallelism demanded a 
duplication of things in the attribute thought, he had 
to regard the " idea of the body " as existing even 
when consciousness seemed absent. We have here 
the double sense of the word "idea" discussed in the 
preceding note. The mind itself is the idea of the 
body in the one sense of the word, and its knowledge 
is (or includes) the idea in the other sense. It is well 
to bear this in mind in reading what follows. 

66. (prop. 20) This proposition really gives us the 
thought series of things in infinite repetition. We 
have not merely the parallelism of things and their 
ideas, but of these ideas with their ideas, etc., etc. 



302 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

The existence of these series is not arrived at by 
deduction from the attribute thought, but is accepted 
to explain the experienced fact that we can have an 
idea of an idea as we have an idea of an object. Just 
as Spinoza's epistemology holds to a duality of objects 
and their ideas, so his psychology gives us a similar 
duality of ideas and ideas of these ideas. The one 
position is perhaps as reasonable as the other. 

67. (prop. 2r) The relation of an idea and its idea 
cannot be the same as that of an idea and its mate- 
rial object, for, as Spinoza points out in the scho- 
lium, the latter are in two different attributes, and the 
former in one and the same attribute. When the 
Spinozist encounters the " same " thing in different 
attributes he has some way of marking a duality and 
distinguishing " phases " of the thing. But the 
" same " thing in the same attribute appears to 
yield an identity so complete as to make impossible 
any distinction of phases or capacities. Thus the 
infinite number of series of modes in the attribute 
thought melt into each other in fact, and do not 
remain separate. 

68. (prop. 22) Spinoza has put the ideas of the 
modifications of the body in the human mind. He 
falls back upon the doctrine of parallelism to prove that 
these ideas of ideas are referred to God in the same 
way as the ideas themselves {see prop. 20). This 
means simply that they are really parallel to the ideas 
or exactly correspond to them. He then argues that, 
since the ideas of the modifications are referred to 
God " in so far as he constitutes the essence of the 
human mind," the ideas of them, which are referred 
to him in the same way, must be referred to him too 
" in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human 



Prop. 22] critical notes. 303 

mind " — in other words, must be in the human mind. 
But the doctrine of parallelism demands that the 
words " in the same way " must mean " in a similar 
way," or we have no parallelism, but a complete iden- 
tity. Spinoza really makes the ideas of ideas melt 
into the ideas themselves when he thus puts them in 
the mind {see the preceding note). 

Spinoza makes the mind to consist of ideas. It is 
"the idea of the body," and made up of many differ- 
ent ideas. He nowhere treats it as a substratum or 
" unit-being " which has ideas. When, therefore, he 
speaks of the mind as knowing this or that, a literal 
interpretation of his language would lead us to con- 
clude that the idea of the body, which is unconscious 
of the body and of itself, is conscious of the modifi- 
cations of the body, of the ideas of them, and of the 
ideas of these ideas, etc., etc. In other words, it is 
conscious of certain things in itself, and reaches 
across to its parallels and knows certain things in 
them. From these things it infers itself {prop. 23), the 
body {prop. 19), and other bodies {prop. 16). 

The general difficulty of conceiving the mind as 
reaching across to something beyond itself and know- 
ing it is met with in every epistemology which tries 
to hold to a world beyond consciousness. It is not 
peculiar to Spinoza. It makes the act of knowing 
unintelligible, and simply takes refuge in words to 
which no clear thought corresponds. 

On the other hand, Spinoza's doctrine offers diffi- 
culties peculiar to itself. The mind is the idea or 
knowledge of the human body. This knowledge is in 
God, and it is in God " as modified." God " as modi- 
fied " is only another name for the whole system of 
finite things. When we say God knows the human 



304 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

body we simply mean that he has an idea of it (^proof 
of prop. 19), and this is equivalent to saying that the 
idea is in him " as modified," i. e., it is a part of the 
system of things, or, limiting ourselves to the attribute 
thought, a part of the system of finite ideas. God 
then only knows the human body in so far as he con- 
stitutes or is the human mind {see Note 65). Surely, 
then, the human mind ought to know the human body. 
The human mind is God " in so far as" he knows the 
human body. Yet Spinoza denies that the human 
mind knows the human body. 

Again, it seems strange that the human mind should 
know certain things in itself, and yet not know itself. 
It is not a "substratum," a something " behind " the 
things it knows, but consists of ideas. If it knows 
some of the ideas in itself, why does it not know the 
rest? why, in other words, does it not know all of 
itself ? 

In props. 20-23 Spinoza advances the doctrine that 
to know an idea we must have an idea of that idea — 
a duplicate, as it were. What is here the knower ? 
Is it this duplicate ? As we have just seen, he tries 
to solve the problem of reflective knowledge, the 
" know that I know," by a multiplication of parallel 
ideas and a melting of them into one again [see Notes 66 
aiidd']^. Perhaps we may say that he made conscious- 
ness to consist in such a multiplication, and mere 
knowledge of the sort represented by " the idea of 
the body " in a single layer of ideas. 

In all this discussion of the mind and its knowledge 
we can see that Spinoza is trying to adjust to his 
philosophy certain things gathered from experience, 
and of which it is sufficiently difficult to give a consis- 
tent analytic account. Using language in its ordinary 



Prop. 27] CRITICAL NOTES. 305 

sense, it is quite true tliat we do not know all about 
the body or all about the mind. Psychologists gener- 
ally are ready to admit that our knowledge of both 
is based upon conscious experiences which are a result 
(or concomitant) of certain modifications of the body. 
We all speak of having an idea of an object when our 
attention is directed to the object, and having an idea 
of an idea, when we are engaged in a somewhat dif- 
ferent mental operation. What is really implied in 
such statements ? Spinoza has offered his own ex- 
planations, which are not free from difficulties, as we 
have seen. One good thing he has done : he has 
dropped the mind as a metaphysical entity behind 
ideas, and made it a group of ideas. So far, he has 
rendered us service. 

69. (prop. 23) See the notes to Spinoza's references. 

70- (prop. 24) The only point I need criticise here is 
this : Even supposing the human body to be com- 
posed of parts which maybe replaced by other bodies, 
and which only belong to it while they are in it and 
function in a certain way, that does not imply that 
"the idea of the body " does not include the ideas of 
these parts as they are at the time they compose the 
body. What they are at other times and in other 
circumstances may not concern it. For a criticism of 
the word " involve," see Note 63. The word " ade- 
quate " should mark only this distinction between a' 
complete knowledge of the bodies which compose the 
human body, and a knowledge of them in their 
relations to it. 

71. (prop. 25) As regards the part of the argument 
in which Spinoza refers to prop. 9, see Note 65. 

72. (prop. 27) See Note 70, on the use of the word 
" adequate." The reasoning here is analogous. 



3o6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

73. (prop. 28) The reasoning is sufficiently clear. 
We do not know all about a part of a system, unless 
we know the whole system. In this proposition and 
scholium the idea of the body (the mind) and the 
ideas of the modifications of the body are treated as 
fragmentary and incomplete on the same ground. 
Compare with this argument that of prop. 19. There 
this very same bit of reasoning is employed in making 
a distinction between the two, and denying to the 
mind any knowledge of the body (see Note 65). It 
will be noticed that Spinoza uses " clear and distinct" 
as synonymous with "adequate." Note also that 
Spinoza has argued (25 and 27) that the ideas of the 
modifications of the body do not " involve " an ade- 
quate knowledge of the body or of external bodies. 
How, then, can the fact that we do not have an ade- 
quate knowledge of the human body or of external 
bodies make these ideas like conclusions without 
premises ? As Spinoza is using the word " involve," 
it means " implied in, as the cause is implied in its 
effect." If we know the body and external bodies in 
so far as they are causally related to these ideas of 
the modifications of the body, we have an adequate 
(/. t'., complete) knowledge of the modifications of the 
body. No premise is lacking. 

74. (prop. 29) Just as the body, the idea of the body 
(the mind), and the idea of the idea of the body 
(consciousness of the mind) are parallel, so are the 
modifications of the body, the ideas of such modifica- 
tions, and the ideas of these ideas. If, then, the idea 
of a modification of the body does not involve an 
adequate knowledge of the body, the idea of that 
idea cannot involve an adequate knowledge of the 
mind. 



Prop. 35] critical notes. 307 

The knowledge of things which the mind acquires 
according to "the ordinary course of nature" does 
not seem incompatible with some sort of a parallelism 
between mind and body. But the determination of 
the mind from within, of which the scholium makes 
mention, introduces us to a subject treated of at 
length in Part V, and which the student will find it 
hard to adjust to the Spinozistic doctrine. Compare 
with this scholium prop. 28 of Part I. 

75. (pi'op. 30) See my discussion of the dual causal- 
ity found in the " Ethics " {Introductory Note, II, 15). 

76. (prop. 32) The reference to God has nothing to 
do with the argument. The doctrine of parallelism 
assumes for every idea a corresponding object, and 
the axiom referred to is interpreted as meaning that 
every idea with a corresponding object is true. It 
would naturally follow that every idea must be true. 

77. (prop. 33) Here again the reference to God is 
useless. It has just been assumed that every idea is 
true. It follows that no idea can be false, in any 
positive sense of the word, i. e., in any sense which 
would deny the assumption just made. 

78. (prop. 35) Spinoza could not make falsity to 
consist in the non-correspondence of any idea with its 
object {see the two notes preceding). He, hence, makes 
it to consist in the possession of a fragmentary or 
incomplete idea. But the doctrine of parallelism 
requires that each fragment of an idea have its frag- 
ment of an object corresponding to it. It must then 
be true {see Note 76), and falsity is in no sense opposed 
to truth. The fact is that Spinoza really includes more 
in his idea of falsity than he says he does. This is 
shown in his two illustrations in the scholium. For 
example, if his doctrine regarding the will be true, 



3o8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

the man who thinks himself free has an idea which 
does not correspond to the facts as they are. He 
thinks, as Spinoza admits, that his actions are not 
determined, when they are determined. This is not 
the same thing as simply being ignorant of the fact 
that they are determined. Spinoza distinguishes 
between ignorance and error, but his definition of 
error rubs out the distinction. 

On this whole subject of the truth or falsity of 
ideas, Spinoza's doctrine of parallelism has very im- 
portant bearing, as the reader has seen. As I have 
pointed out, Spinoza really has two doctrines of par- 
allelism, and he passes from the one to the other, 
apparently ignorant that he has made a leap. The 
student would do well to bear in mind what has been 
said in Note 64. 

79- (pi'op. 37) See Note 48, on the definition of 
essence. 

80. (prop. 38) There is a weak point in the proof of 
this proposition. The nature of the human body and 
that of external bodies are only involved " to some 
degree " in the ideas of the modifications of the 
human body. It is conceivable that something com- 
mon to every part of all these bodies may not be so 
involved. It is hardly necessary to keep repeating 
that the references to God do not really touch the 
argument at all. They are merely tautological, and 
could perfectly well be dispensed with. The proofs 
of the next two propositions contain the same 
tautology. 

81. (prop. 39) This proposition and corollary are 
puzzling. As I shall try to show later, Spinoza must 
mean by that which is common to all things (38) one 
of God's attributes. If this is what he does mean, 



Prop. 40] critical notes. 309 

it is easy to see why he regarded it as adequately 
known — it cannot be carried back to anything else as 
an effect of that something else. But here he inti- 
mates that the human body and other bodies may have 
several things in common, and that the number is 
variable. I do not think this can be adjusted to the 
rest of his doctrine {see Note 82). 

82. (prop. 40, schol. 2) In this scholium Spinoza has 
admirably described the process of forming the con- 
cept, the universal. Leaving out of view the refer- 
ence to the *' images "formed in the body, his account 
of the origin of the " transcendental " and " uni- 
versal " notions is clear and sensible, and quite in har- 
mony with modern doctrine. It is strange that he 
should contrast with these notions those that he calls 
" common." The only difference that there can be is 
a difference in degree of generality. All concepts are 
formed in the same way, and they do not differ in 
kind but in degree. 

I have discussed at some length in the Introductory 
Note (II, 13) Spinoza's doctrine regarding essences. 
Essences are in reality nothing but class notions, 
universals, formed as Spinoza has said universals are 
formed. He, however, overlooks this fact and treats 
them as something quite different. 

83. (prop. 40, schol. i) The student will find the 
kinds of knowledge discussed also in the " Short 
Treatise on God, Man, and His Blessedness," Part 
II, chaps. I and 2, and in the treatise " On the 
Improvement of the Understanding." The three 
expositions are substantially in harmony, and the illus- 
tration of the three numbers appears in all. 

I think it will throw some light on this scholium if 
v/e bear in mind in reading it the dual causality found 



3IO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

in the " Ethics," and discussed at length in the Intro- 
ductory Note (II, 15). It will be remembered that 
Spinoza has placed, each finite particular thing in an 
infinite series of finite causes and effects, and has 
asserted that it must be determined by some other 
finite thing (see I, 28). We have here the series of 
real causes and effects of the kind recognized in the 
sciences. On the other hand, he has brought forward 
still another series of causes and effects, that of " fixed 
and eternal things," which correspond to the hierarchy 
of conceptions, and are subsumed under each other 
as lower and higher. In this case, what he regards as 
the cause is not a cause at all, but a more abstract 
conception, which embraces the lower if we are con- 
sidering its " extension," as the logicians say, but is 
contained in it, if we are considering its " intension." 

Now he has stated that when the mind imagines, 
it knows things inadequately, for its knowledge is 
caused by something external to it. It has, conse- 
quently, "conclusions without premises' [prop, 28). 
Here he is considering the series of finite real things 
in which cause and effect are external to each other. 

On the other hand, he has stated that in certain 
cases the mind is determined from within [prop. 29, 
sc/wl.), and in that case its knowledge is complete and 
adequate. Here it has in itself both cause and effect, 
premises and conclusion. 

It is evident that in thus distinguishing between 
imagination and knowledge in which the mind is 
active, Spinoza passes from the one causal series to 
the other. Since every idea must be a modification of 
an attribute of God, it "involves," /. e., carries within 
itself, its own ultimate cause, the attribute. When an 
idea is referred to the attribute, that is when we are 



Prop. 40] ' critical notes. 311 

considering its relation to the series of "fixed and 
eternal tilings," we do not go beyond the mind itself 
for a cause, and we may call our knowledge adequate. 
Of course there is a difficulty in adjusting to each 
other the two kinds of causality, but I need not dwell 
upon that here, as I have already discussed it. 

Knowledge of the first kind is imagination. It is 
inadequate. In knowledge of the second and third 
kinds we know adequately, for we start with what is 
adequately known. To be adequately known an idea 
must be completely in the mind. Spinoza has just 
maintained that the ideas completely in the mind are 
the ideas of what is common to all things. But the 
only things really common to all things are God's attri- 
butes—the attribute extension, for example, being 
that which is common to all extended things, and 
which, diversely " modified," constitutes their being. 
In knowing an attribute we know adequately, for we 
have reached the end of our series. Thus knowledge 
of the second and third kinds would consist in a de- 
duction along the series of " fixed and eternal things," 
from an attribute of God. 

To this interpretation of Spinoza, which is in har- 
mony with the general teachings of the " Ethics," it 
may be objected in the first place that it rubs out the 
distinction drawn between the knowledge of the 
second and third kinds ; and, in the second place, 
that it does not fit prop. 39, with its corollary, the 
illustrations given in the " De Intellectus Eraenda- 
tione," nor the illustration of the three numbers. The 
force of these objections must be admitted. It 
should, however, be remembered that in the proposi- 
tions to follow Spinoza does really make the " common 
notions" identical with a knowledge of the eternal 



312 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

and infinite essence of God [see props. 44 to 47). In 
Other words a common notion means simply knowl- 
edge of one of God's attributes. It should also be 
borne in mind that this scholium, although in sub- 
stantial harmony with the other two presentations of 
the same subject, is better adjusted to the general 
doctrine of the " Ethics." It looks as if Spinoza had 
used the material at hand in his earlier work " On 
God, Man," etc., without wholly recasting it, or 
wholly adjusting it to his philosophy in its final form. 

As to the intuitive character of the third kind of 
knowledge. As may be seen, Spinoza did not make 
it really intuitive, but describes it as a process of 
inference. It proceeds from this to that {see Note 130 
for a further discussion of the kinds of kno7vledge). 

84. (prop. 43) The argument of the proof is as fol- 
lows : Given an adequate idea in the human mind 
(that is, an idea which is true, and really has an 
object corresponding to it), there must be in the same 
mind an idea of this idea, /. e., the mind must be con- 
scious of its knowledge, and adequately conscious. 
This means that the man is certain of the thing 
known. 

It will be noticed that the truth of the idea, the fact 
that it has a corresponding reality, is presupposed, 
and then it is assumed that the mind is conscious, not 
merely that it has an idea, but that it has a true idea, 
/. e., that the idea corresponds to its object. I have 
criticised Spinoza's criterion of truth in the Introduc- 
tory Note (I, 3). The references to God have nothing 
to do with the argument. 

Spinoza's statement that an idea is not " something 
passive like a picture on a panel " is quite contrary to 
the teachings of his earlier philosophy {see the treatise 



Prop. 44] CRITICAL NOTES. 313 

" On God, Man and His , Blessedness,'' Part II, 
chap. 15). I think his abandonment of his former 
position introduces confusion into his thinking. If 
one assume that the external object causes the idea, 
one may regard the presence of the idea as a 
guarantee of the presence of the object. If the idea 
be independent, the assumption that it is related to 
an object seems gratuitous. However, one may argue 
on the other side, that as long as one regards an idea 
of whatever sort as analogous to a complete or incom- 
plete picture on a panel, one cannot see how in hav- 
ing an idea one can have anything beyond the idea 
itself ; in other words, how, in having an idea, one 
can reach beyond the idea to a thing. Hence it is the 
notion that ideas are not like pictures, but something 
wholly different, that has led Spinoza to treat them as 
he does. The position is, I think, well taken. It is 
this notion that has led Spinoza to reason as he has, 
and even in his earlier work, where he explicitly main- 
tains the opposite doctrine, he is evidently influenced 
by it. It has made of ideas for him, as for many 
writers later, a something incomprehensible. It has 
been a source of endless confusion in psychology and 
epistemology. 

85. (prop. 44) If the interpretation of Spinoza's 
words regarding reason, which 1 have given in Note 83, 
be correct, reason can only descend from an attribute 
of God to a thing along the series of " fixed and eternal 
things." It must make a logical deduction of the 
thing. It cannot concern itself with the real finite 
causes which lie outside of the thing and condition as 
described in I, 28. Hence it must regard everything 
as necessary, for everything it knows it knows as 
a logical consequence from an attribute of God. 



314 'i"HE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA, [Part II 

I'his deduction from God's attributes has been suffi- 
ciently criticised in tlie Introductory Note. 

86. (prop. 44, cor. 2) The phrase " under a certain 
form of eternity " {^sub quadam (Bternitatis specie) means 
" as in a certain sense eternal." In the same way 
Spinoza speaks of accepting something " under the 
form of the good," or rejecting it " under the form of 
the evil," /. <?., accepting it or rejecting it as good or 
evil (" Short Treatise on God, Man and His Blessed- 
ness^' Fart II, chap. 17). 

The idea contained in this proof is that what is 
known as logically implied in the nature of God does 
not belong more to this time than to that. We may 
regard simply the relation of the thing to God, and 
realize that the question of time does not enter into 
the problem. Of course when we call this " eternal " 
we are really bringing in the notion of time, if we use 
the word in its common acceptation. The reader will 
notice that Spinoza constantly does introduce the idea 
of time when he is discussing eternity. [See the dis- 
cussion of eternity in the Introductory Note, II, t6.) 

87. (prop. 45) The attribute is here treated as the 
ultimate abstraction reached by overlooking differ- 
ences. It is " involved " in every idea, /. e., contained 
in it as the abstract is in the concrete. It is a cause, 
the ultimate cause, in Ihe series of " fixed and eternal 
things." All these points have been discussed in the 
Introductory Note, II. For the relation of attribute 
and substance, see Note 3- 

In the scholium we meet again the two kinds of 
causality recognized in the " Ethics." It will be re- 
membered that in Part I {see 8, schol. 2, latter part) 
Spinoza distinguished between existence and essence, 
putting the latter in the series of "fixed and eternal " 



Prop. 49] CRITICAL NOTES. 315 

causes, and accounting for the former by a reference 
to the order of nature. Here he tries to regard exist- 
ence as in some sense referable to the same source as 
essence, the series of " fixed and eternal things." 
This is not in harmony with his earlier statements, and 
his reference to I, 24, cor., does not help him at all. 

88. (prop. 46) As the attribute expresses God's 
essence, and as the attribute is the abstract element 
contained in every idea, the whole attribute (the 
abstraction) is in every idea, and the idea " adequately 
involves " God's essence. 

89. (prop, 49) By will Spinoza here understands, 
not what commonly goes by the name of volition, but 
the intellectual process of assent. Volition proper he 
appears to include under "the desire through which 
the mind seeks or avoids things" (48, schoL). On this 
question of the relation of will and understanding see 
the scholium following, with its note. 

90. (prop. 49, schol.) There are several points in 
this scholium which need a little criticism. 

As to the certainty enjoyed by the man who has a 
true idea, and the undoubting acquiescence of the 
rnan who has a false one. Spinoza has defined cer- 
tainty as "the mode in which we perceive the real 
essence of a thing " {^^De Int. Emendat.,'' ed. Van Vloten 
and Land, p. 12). To him, therefore, the man who 
possesses a true idea alone is certain. But as a matter 
of fact, from the standpoint of each of the men, 
the certainty resolves itself into a confidence in 
the truth of the idea possessed. Both are confident 
(/. ^., subjectively certain) though we may happen to 
know that one has misplaced his confidence. The 
man who is wrong may feel quite as sure he is right as 
the man who really is right. And it is not by con- 



3l6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

sidering an idea itself that we can prove the truth 
(objective validity) of the idea [see Introductory Note, 

1,3). 

Spinoza's doctrine regarding understanding and will 
is in some respects pretty closely in harmony with that 
of a number of modern psychologists. He discards 
"faculties" as a something distinct from the phenom- 
ena they have been employed to explain, and reduces 
understanding and will to a collection of individual 
ideas and volitions. He then identifies will with the 
activity inherent in ideas, and maintains that every 
idea involves an affirmation or negation. From this 
he argues that there are as many separate affirmations 
or negations as there are ideas, and no more, so 
that will cannot extend beyond understanding {cf. 
Descartes, whom he is refuting, " Meditation " 4); he 
argues, again, that since ideas are not free but deter- 
mined, so are volitions. 

The modern psychologist is also inclined to cast 
aside "faculties" and confine himself to a study of 
mental phenomena simply. He does not divide them 
into the fixed and separate classes once generally 
accepted, but distinguishes between their sensory and 
their motor aspects, recognizing that every idea has 
its motor aspect. He is inclined to regard a deliber- 
ate volition, a conscious determination marked by a 
sense of effort, as differing in degree and not in kind 
from what is present in all mental activity, but is often 
less marked. Like Spinoza, he is disposed to treat 
the sensory and the motor aspect of mental phe- 
nomena as alike determined. 

I do not think that this view of mental phenomena, 
the reduction of understanding and will to separate 
" ideas "" and " volitions," wholly disposes of the prob- 



Prop. 49] CRITICAL NOTES. 317 

lem of the freedom of the will. If we mean by free- 
dom undetermined action, we may assume that, at 
some point in our mental experience, the nexus is 
broken in such a way that what follows is not con- 
ditioned by what precedes, and cannot be wholly 
accounted for by a reference to it. If we embrace 
the doctrine of a parallelism of conscious states and 
cerebral changes, we must, of course, assume that, 
corresponding to the break in the mental series, there 
is a break in the physical series, too. The man who 
repudiates " faculties " may not be inclined to make 
such assumptions, but he is not forced to deny such 
possibilities. He may still be a libertarian, if he 
wishes to. 

As to Spinoza's reflections concerning the benefits 
to be derived from his doctrine. In reading the first 
it is well to bear in mind what Spinoza really means 
by God. The student who has read carefully the 
parts of the " Ethics " I have criticised so far, will not 
be much impressed by it. In reading the others, it is 
well to note that what our author says fits better a 
fatalistic than a deterministic doctrine. Discontent, 
anger, ridicule, may be regarded by the determinist as 
useful factors in determining actions, even though 
themselves determined. Whether they are to be 
indulged in or not is a question apart from that of 
the freedom of the will. 

NOTE ON THE MIND AND ITS KNOWLEDGE. 

As, in the notes which precede, the exposition and 
criticism of Spinoza's teachings regarding the nature 
of the mind and the nature and extent of its knowl- 
edge are necessarily somewhat disconnected, and as 
this part of the " Ethics" appears to present great dififi- 



3l8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART II 

culties to most readers, I ^ippend tliis note, in which I 
gather up in outline the positions talcen by our author 
and my own criticism of them. 

In the opening propositions of Part II, Spinoza 
develops his doctrine of the parallelism of modes in 
the two attributes thought and extension. He main- 
tains that " whether we conceive nature under the 
attribute of extension, or under that of thought, or 
under any other attribute whatever, we shall find there 
follows one and the same order, or one and the same 
concatenation of causes, that is, the same thing" 
(7, schol.). Corresponding to each thing there exists 
an idea, which is the idea of that thing, and perfectly 
reflects it. Ideas and things are to be referred to God 
in the same way, that is, ideas are related to the at- 
tribute thought exactly as things are related to the 
attribute extension. The place of an idea in its series 
corresponds to the place of its object, the thing, in 
its series ; and whatever takes place in the thing, every 
modification to which it may be subjected, has its rep- 
resentative in the corresponding idea. This corre- 
spondence of idea and object is explained by the 
statement that they are really but the one thing viewed 
in two ways. 

The mind is declared to be the idea of the body. 
It is that which corresponds, in the attribute thought, 
to that particular mode in the attribute extension. It 
exactly represents the body , is, like the bod}', highly 
complex ; and, in fact, is composed of the ideas of 
the parts of the body. Whatever takes place in the 
body (any modification of the body) must be per- 
ceived by the mind, for the idea of it is in the mind, 
which is, as has just been stated, the idea of the body. 

So far Spinoza's doctrine is sufficiently consistent 



The Mind] CRITICAL NOTES. 319 

with itself. What follows cannot be reconciled with 
it. The reasoning continues thus : 

The modifications of the body perceived by the 
mind are the joint effect of the nature of the body 
itself and of that of the external body acting upon 
it (16). Each modification "involves" the nature 
of these bodies, and accordingly its idea " involves " 
their ideas. Hence the human mind perceives exter- 
nal bodies and its own body (17, 19). It knows them, 
not directly, but only through their ideas being in- 
volved in the ideas of the modifications. In other 
words, it knows them by inference. 

Again : since an infinite thinking being must have 
an idea of whatever is in him (3), there must be in 
God an idea of the mind. As, furthermore, ideas are 
always parallel with their objects, this idea of the 
mind is in God in the same way as the idea of the 
body (20). In other words, it exactly corresponds in 
its series to the idea of the body in its series. 
To express the same thing in still other words, it 
is united to the mind as the mind is united to 
the body (21). Now, since the ideas of ideas are 
exactly parallel with the ideas themselves, we must 
reason about the idea of the mind as we reason about 
the mind. The mind does not directly know the body, 
but only the modifications of the body ; and, similarly, 
it perceives the ideas of the ideas of the modifications 
of the body, but it does not perceive directly itself 
(22 a;/^ 23). It knows itself only by inference from 
the ideas of the ideas of the modifications of the body 
(23). Its nature is " involved " in these ideas. 

This reasoning concerning the mind's knowledge 
of the body and of itself is evidently loose and arbi- 
trary. If the mind is the knowledge of the body, 



320 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

why does it not know the body ? Where is the knowl- 
edge of the body, if not in the mind ? Spinoza can 
offer no valid reason for making the mind know the 
modifications of the body and not the body itself. 
Again, what is meant by saying that the modifications 
of the body " involve " the body and external bodies? 
Manifestly only that these are joint causes of the 
modifications in question. But "involve" usually 
means, in the " Ethics," " contain," as the concrete 
contains the abstract, or the particular the universal 
{see Introditciory Note, II, 12). It cannot mean that 
here, for we are dealing, not with the series of " fixed 
and eternal things," but with individual real objects, 
which exist external to one another, and stand side by 
side in a series. How, then, can the knowledge of 
these things be gotten out of the knowledge of the 
modifications of the body ? Evidently Spinoza has 
passed to a new parallelism. He has made a jump. 
He has used the word idea in a double sense, and 
deceived himself. His doctrine of parallelism de- 
mands that the idea of the body (the mind) should 
perfectly represent the body. It does not demand 
that anything in the idea of the body should truly 
represent something external to the body, an external 
body ; nor does it demand that any part of the idea 
of the body, that is, the ideas of the modifications, 
should in any way contain that which represents 
something else than the modifications of the body, 
that is, the body itself. We do speak of having ideas 
of things external to the body, but this sense of the 
word idea is quite different from that in which we 
employ the word when we speak of the mind as " the 
idea of the body." Spinoza's parallelism covers only 
this last use of the word, and yet he assumes that 



The Mind] CRITICAL NOTES. . 321 

ideas in both senses of the word are truly representa- 
tive of things. 

He reasons about knowledge of mind just as he 
reasons about knowledge of body, but he has to con- 
tend with the added difficulty that he makes ideas of 
ideas distinct from and parallel with the ideas them- 
selves, and yet puts them in the same attribute. 
There seems, consequently, no reason for keeping 
them separate, and in fact he lets them melt into each 
other, after distinguishing them from each other, and 
he loses his parallelism. 

What is " the mind " as Spinoza uses the term ? 
A literal interpretation of his words would lead us to 
suppose that it is simply " the idea of the body," and 
that this " idea of the body " is in all cases the 
knower. Yet he puts the ideas of ideas in the 
mind too (22), and seems to cover by his use of 
the word both the idea of the body and the idea of 
the idea of the body, thus melting them into one. It 
is easy to see that he is influenced here by the notion 
(still held almost everywhere) that knower and thing 
known, idea and object, must in some sense be dis- 
tinct and different. The knowledge of the body (the 
idea of the body, the mind) must be a different thing 
from the body, and, in the same way, the idea of the 
mind must be a different thing from the mind. It 
must be, so to speak, a duplicate. But where can 
one put this idea of the mind ? Surely it must be 
in the mind, and nowhere else. Thus, I think, did 
Spinoza reason. Strict consistency would have com- 
pelled him to declare the idea of the mind the knower 
of the mind, if the mind is the knower (or the knowl- 
edge) of the body, but he did not choose to do this. 
Instead of confinino- the knowledge of the mind to 



322 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part II 

the idea of the mind, and denying it of the mind 
itself, he allows the two to melt into each other, and 
says the mind can, under such and such conditions, 
know itself. 

As to the extent of the mind's knowledge and the 
kinds of knowledge, Spinoza reasons thus : 

The human mind does not involve an adequate 
knowledge of the parts which compose the human 
body, for they belong to the essence of the human 
body only in so far as they function in a certain 
way (24). Nor can the mind adequately know either 
its own body or any external body, since both of 
them are involved in the modifications of the human 
body (which it does know) only in a certain capacity, 
/. (?., in so far as they are causes of these modifica- 
tions (25 and 27). Furthermore, the ideas of the 
modifications of the body themselves, as they exist in 
the human mind, resemble conclusions without prem- 
ises (28), that is, are not clear, but confused ; for 
they are effects, and their causes lie beyond the limits 
of the human mind. 

The same reasonings may b^ applied to the idea of 
the human mind, and to the ideas of the ideas of the 
modifications of the body (28, schol., and 29). 

Of the duration of our own body and of external 
bodies our knowledge must be very inadequate, for 
the duration of a body does not depend on its essence 
but upon the common order of nature. Now the 
order of nature as a whole is not contained " objec- 
tively " in the human mind, for that is only a part of 
the system of ideas, and it is the whole system as a 
whole that reflects nature. Hence we cannot have an 
adequate knowledge of the duration of our body or 
of that of other bodies (30, 31). 



The INIind] ' critical NOTES. 323 

But there are some things that we do adequately 
know. That which is common to all things, and 
exists equally in the part and in the whole, cannot be 
conceived except adequately (38). That which is 
thus contained in every part of each thing must be an 
attribute of God, and in knowing it we know the eter- 
nal and infinite essence of God (45, 46, and 47). 
Since all ideas in the mind which follow from ideas 
that are in the mind adequate, are also themselves 
adequate (40), we have here a fruitful source of ade- 
quate ideas. They may be obtained by deduction from 
the idea of one of God's attributes. 

To criticise briefly this reasoning : To the state- 
ment that the human mind does not involve an ade- 
quate knowledge of the parts which compose the 
human body, one may object that the mind (/. <?., that 
in the attribute thought which exactly corresponds to 
the body) ought, according to the doctrine of paral- 
lelism logically carried out, to involve a knowledge of 
every part of the body as long as it remains a part of 
the body. Is the mind not composed of the ideas of 
the parts of the body (15)? And if the mind cannot 
know adequately either its own body or any external 
body, that ought not to make the ideas of the modifi- 
cations of the body like conclusions without premises, 
for bodies are known so far as they are involved in 
these modifications, that is, so far as they may serve 
as premises. 

As to our knowledge of the duration of things. If, 
from the ideas of the modifications of the body, we 
can pass to a knowledge of the body and external 
bodies, if, that is, we can pass along the line of finite 
causes from one thing to things beyond it, why can 
we not infer the "order of nature," so far as it is 



324 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

"involved in" (or concerns) the human body or any 
other body of which we have knowledge ? Spinoza's 
argument concerning our knowledge of the duration 
of things, if valid, would deny that we can know the 
human body or external bodies at all. 

In the part of the argument just criticised Spinoza 
has used the word " involve " in the sense of " related 
to, as a cause is related to its effect.'" Now he uses 
It in the sense of "contained in, as the universal is 
contained in the singular, the abstract in the con- 
crete." The impossibility of a deduction of the con- 
crete from the abstract, of lower orders of being from 
an attribute, I have pointed out in the Introductory 
Note (II, 14). The second and third kinds of knowl- 
edge Spinoza makes to rest on such a deduction — a 
descent along the series of " fixed and eternal things," 
that Jacob's ladder of a mystic's dream. 



NOTES TO PART III. 

91. (defs.) As an effect is brought about by its 
cause, so the idea of the effect is conceived through 
that of its cause (see Introductory Note, I, 4). We are 
cause of an effect when it is due to our nature or 
essence alone (on essences and their causality see 
Introductory Note, II, especially §§ 10, 13, 14, 15). 
The reader will notice that the confusion of logical 
deduction with causation, plays an important role in 
the remaining parts of the " Ethics." 

92. (prop, i) As usual, the references to God add 
nothing to the argument. The student should remem- 
ber that Spinoza regards an idea as cause of another 
when he conceives of the latter as logically deduced 
from the former (see the preceding note). If, then, an 
idea is adequate in our mind, all that maybe deduced 
from it must be referred to our mind, and to our 
mind alone. Hence our mind is its sole cause, and is 
wholly active in bringing it forth. 

93- (prop. 2) The parallelism of ideas and things 
brought forward in this proposition has already been 
discussed at length, and I refer the reader to the 
references given in the text and the notes correspond- 
ing to them. In the scholium we have an excellent 
statement of the " automaton " theory of mind so 
much discussed at the present day. 

94. (prop. 3) The word " essence " is loosely used 
in this proposition and in those that follow. In so 
far as the word indicates a link in the chain of " fixed 



326 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

and eternal things," that to which it is appHed should 
contain no inadequate ideas, for all that is in it should 
be arrived at by a descent along that series from the 
idea of God. The mind "considered as a part of 
nature, which cannot be clearly and distinctly per- 
ceived by itself, and independently of other parts," 
cannot be an essence in the strict sense of the word 
[see Introductory Note, II, 13). 

95- (prop. 4) Of course, if we keep our attention 
merely upon the " nature " of a thing, we will think 
of nothing but the " nature " of that thing ; but that 
does not prove that the "nature " of the thing in any 
sense brings about the real existence of the thing or 
causes it to continue in existence. This " nature" is 
not a cause, and cannot either produce or destroy 
the thing. Spinoza, as we have seen {^Introductory 
Note, II, 10), made such abstractions causes, though 
he was also forced to admit causes of a different 
kind, real causes {Ibid, 15). 

96. (prop. 6) See the preceding note. Elsewhere 
(" Cog. Metaphy I, 6) Spinoza applies this reasoning 
to prove that a body once in motion must continue in 
motion unless brought to rest by an external cause. 
Inertia he makes a special case of the conatus, or 
will to persist, which is proper to every essence. 

97. (prop. 7) See Note 94, on the double use of the 
word essence. The word here is used to cover the 
whole being of the mind. 

98. (prop. 10) The reference to God does not affect 
the argument, for the statement that an idea is in God 
in so far as he has an idea of our body means simply 
that the said idea is in our mind. 

99. (prop. 11) There is a passage in Martineau 
("Study of Spinoza," II, ch. 3, § 3) on pleasure, pain, 



Defs.] critical notes. 327 

and desire, to which I refer the reader. Martineau 
regards pleasure and pain as passive indications in 
consciousness of changed conditions in the body. 
Desire he makes the reaction of the mind's essence, 
and, hence, an activity. It should be remembered, 
however, that Spinoza does not here use the word 
"essence" in its strict sense. He is not dealing with 
a universal, belonging to the series of " fixed and 
eternal things," but with an individual thing, which 
forms part of the real system of things or nature. It 
is important to note this, for, in using the word 
" essence " in this ambiguous way, Spinoza appears to 
fill up in a manner the gap between essences and real 
individual things — in other words, to bring together 
the two kinds of causes recognized in the " Ethics " 
and in some passages wholly cut off from each other 
{see Introductory Note, II, 15). If we are active and 
free {see Part V) in so far as our actions are deter- 
mined by our essence (in the strict sense), then, in 
acting freely, we bridge the gulf between the series of 
" fixed and eternal things " and the individual finite 
things which together make up the system of nature. 
As, however, that, on the mental side, which corre- 
sponds to the physical relation of cause and effect, is 
logical deduction, this means that we deduce individ- 
uals from universals. This is, as we have seen, not 
consistent with what Spinoza teaches elsewhere. 

100. (defs. of the emotions) The explanations 
appended to the definitions of the emotions I omit for 
lack of space. The dynamic of the emotions, as 
Spinoza has worked it out, is very ingenious. The 
interest attaching to this part of the " Ethics " is, 
however, rather psychological than philosophical, 
and I shall not linger over it. A brief exposition 



328 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part III 

of the general lines of our author's reasoning must 
suffice. 

The student should bear in mind what has been 
said about the dual causality recognized in the 
"Ethics" [Iiilroductoiy Note,\l, 15). On the one 
hand we have the series of " fixed and eternal things," 
the hierarchy of essences, which come by deduction 
from the idea of God ; on the other the nexus of real 
causes, the individual things found in nature, each of 
which, whether it be physical or mental, is conditioned 
by its antecedent in the same real series. Reason 
descends along the series of essences ; imagination 
has to do with the order of real causes, and knows 
things as forming part of the system of nature. As 
Spinoza would express it, it knows them confusedly. 
The passions are mental states thus confusedly known 
{see general def. of the enwtlons). We suffer from a 
passion in so far as something takes place in us that 
cannot be deduced from our essence (in the strict 
sense of the word), but is caused by the action of 
other real things upon us. 

Now, in Part III, Spinoza is dealing with the 
imagination, with real existences which have their 
place in nature. When, therefore, he uses the word 
essence in this Part, as he constantly does, he does 
not use it in the strict sense, but as standing for the 
whole being of the thing in question — for the thing 
as it actually exists. An essence as thus understood 
is individual, and not universal, and the essence of 
each man is distinct from, and may be different 
from, that of every other man. Such as it is, each 
essence or each thing strives to persevere in its being 
{props. 4-7). In prop. 12 Spinoza assumes without' 
proof — for it cannot be deduced from the propositions 



Defs.] critical notes. 329 

referred to [see Notes 95 and g^) — that it goes beyond 
this, and endeavors to enlarge or render more perfect 
its being. This endeavor or impulse is desire. 
Pleasure is the passage to a greater perfection : pain 
is the reverse. All other emotions arise from these. 
In its effort to enlarge its being the mind seeks 
pleasure, and in its effort to avoid a diminution of its 
being it avoids pain. Thus it strives to maintain 
pleasant images and to banish painful ones. To this 
we must refer such passions as love and hate, intem- 
perance, lust, etc. Some passions are to be explained 
through the laws of association — as, for example, 
avarice. The sympathetic emotions are accounted 
for by the fact that, when we think of a being that 
resembles us as feeling pain or pleasure, there is set 
up in our body a modification similar to that which 
is present when we feel pain or pleasure ourselves. 
Hence we really do feel pain or pleasure. 

Dr. Martineau's exposition of Spinoza's treatment 
of the emotions is clear and systematic, and to it I 
refer the reader who cares to go into the question. 
The criticism which will probably occur first to most 
students of Part III of the " Ethics " is that Spinoza 
treats man as an isolated and independent phe- 
nomenon, as a being without a history. The study of 
the emotions from a phyjogenetic standpoint belongs 
to a later time. 



NOTES TO PART IV. 

loi. (preface) Note Spinoza's treatment of essences 
in this Preface. He makes an essence a pattern or 
standard, a type-idea gained from an examination of 
individuals and used as a norm. Perfection, in one 
of the senses of the word, means harmony with this 
idea. Such a pattern is not a changeless, eternal, 
independent thing, but is our creature. This is the 
doctrine of the greater part of the preface. 

At the end Spinoza returns to the strict meaning of 
the word essence. Perfection means not merely har- 
mony with the type-idea, but also quantity of being. 
A thing becomes more perfect as its being is increased. 
This would seem to argue that a horse, for example, 
might become more perfect in ceasing to be a horse 
and in becoming a man. Spinoza avoids this con- 
clusion by holding that increase of being must take 
place within the limits set by the type-idea. He thus 
makes the type-idea or essence something fixed and 
unchangeable, an eternal thing not arbitrarily con- 
structed. Neither of the senses in which the word 
"essence" is used in this preface will fit the treat- 
ment of essences in Part HI. There the word is 
used to denote an individual real thing (^see the pre- 
ceding note). 

The use of the word *' perfection " to indicate 
amount of being or reality was in harmony with the 
thinking of Spinoza's day, but seems strange to us. 
Of course, this sense of the word should be sharply 

.33° 



CRITICAL NOTES. 33 I 

distinguished from the one which makes perfection to 
consist in harmony with an ideal or pattern. Com- 
pare with this preface the appendix to Part I. Note 
that when Spinoza calls God perfect {as in I, 33 schol.) 
he can only mean that there is no limit to his 
" reality." 

102. (def. 8) Remember what I have just said 
about the use of the word "essence" in Part III. In 
the reference here given (III, 7) the word is used to 
indicate the whole actual being of a thing. In this 
Part Spinoza uses the word in a different sense. The 
essence of the mind now means the part of it which 
consists of adequate ideas ; and, as we shall see later 
(Part V), this essence belongs to the series of "fixed 
and eternal things," and does not form "a part" of 
nature. In so far as this essence is active, man acts 
freely and virtuously. 

103. (appendix) In Part III, as I have said, Spinoza 
is wandering in the world of the imagination, the 
world of real existing things. The problem of the 
" Ethics " is to indicate the path by which one may 
escape from this " City of Destruction " to the 
" Celestial City " of real essences. Our author is on 
his way in Part IV, and when he reaches prop. 21 of 
Part V he may be said to have arrived. In Part III 
the essence of the mind means the whole mind re- 
garded as an existent thing, a link in the chain of 
natural things and subject to natural law. In Part IV 
the essence of the mind is a part of the mind, and this 
part has become emancipated from the bondage to 
natural law. It is, to be sure, still in the real world, 
but it is there as a missionary — in it, but not of it. 
In the last half of Part V this part of the mind has 
turned into a pure essence, in the strict sense of the 



332 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PaKT IV 

word, and has withdrawn from all communication 
with real existences. Spinoza has indicated no way 
in which existences may turn into essences, or essences 
be really present and active in the world of exist- 
ences. Such an intercommunication between the two 
worlds is inconsistent with his own doctrine {^Intro- 
ductory Note, II, 15). Nevertheless, this is the path 
he actually takes in the " Ethics," and it is the path 
which he indicates for all who seek salvation or 
blessedness (V, 42, sc/iol.). 

Part IV contains those portions of the "Ethics" 
which we would now regard as strictly ethical. It is 
occupied in setting forth " the right method of liv- 
ing," and treats man as a social being, having rights 
and duties. It is interesting to notice how Spinoza 
incorporates all this in his philosophy. He reasons 
as follows : 

The whole effort of man is to preserve his being, 
and the more capable he is of doing this, the more 
virtuous is he {props. 20, 22). But a man has virtue 
or power only in so far as he is determined to actions 
by his essence {dcf. 8), /. e., by the part of him which 
is composed of adequate ideas. Hence our sole aim 
must be to gain adequate ideas, and our blessedness 
must consist in their possession. So far we have 
a pure egoism : the highest law for each man is the 
law of self-preservation. The problem is to derive 
from this a social morality, and Spinoza goes about 
its solution thus : 

A thing wholly different from our nature cannot 
have any effect upon us whatever, for its conception 
cannot have anything in common with that of our 
nature, and, hence [see II, 6), it and our nature cannot 
be causally related. Whatever is to act upon us must 



Appendix] critical notes. 333 

then have something in common with our nature. 
But nothing can be bad for us through that which it 
has in common with our nature, for in that case it 
would be bad for itself. I'his is evident, for, when 
we say that a tiling has something in common with 
our nature, we mean that in it and in our nature there 
is an identical element, x. To say that the x in the 
thing hurts the x in us amounts — since x is x — to 
saying that x hurts itself, which is absurd, for it con- 
tradicts III, 4 [see IV, 30). Thus a thing cannot be 
bad for us, through that which it has in common with 
our nature. Again, in so far as a thing is in harmony 
with our nature (contains a common element) it must 
be good for us. This is evident, for x must strive to 
keep X in being (IV, 31). 

Now, in so far as men live in obedience to reason 
they are in harmony, for their actions are determined 
by the essence of man, and this is the same in every 
man (IV, 35). Hence man is useful to man, and the 
good that each man desires for himself he must desire 
for all other men too (IV, 37). Man must, therefore, 
care for his fellow man, for self-interest demands it. 

Thus does Spinoza pass from an uncompromising 
egoism to an altruistic utilitarianism. His reasoning, 
as one may easily see, is bad, and the error lies in 
assuming that the " essence" in each man is strictly 
identical with that in each other man, and cannot be 
helped or hurt without helping or hurting that other. 
The X in this man and the x in that are not strictly 
identical, they are only alike ; and it is conceivable 
that the one should destroy the other and itself re- 
main uninjured {see Introductory Note, II, 9). That 
Spinoza practically abandons the egoistic standpoint 
in his recognition of the validity of commonly ac- 



334 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. 

cepted moral maxims is evident from the way in which 
he meets such a concrete case as the following : May 
a man, in obedience to the law of self-preservation, 
break faith to escape death ? He answers, No ; for 
if reason persuaded one man to do so, it would be 
right for all men to do so. This would mean that 
reason would not persuade men to subject themselves 
to common laws, which is absurd. The argument 
palpably does not prove that it may not serve the 
interests of a particular man to break faith. He cer- 
tainly does not persevere in his being by dying. 



NOTES TO PART V. 

104. (prop. 2) As the reader may easily see, an 
emotion is, in the thesis of this proposition, distin- 
guished from the thought of its external cause, and 
treated as though it may remain an emotion when 
detached from the latter; in the proof the thought of 
the external cause is regarded as belonging to the 
essence of the emotion (the love or the hate). Of 
course, if the thought of the object loved belongs to 
the essence of love, then, in banishing this thought, 
we destroy the love. But we cannot, in that case, 
separate the love from the thought of its external 
cause, and join it to other thoughts. The reasoning 
is loose. 

105- (prop. 3) The reasoning here is not good. The 
passions have been defined as confused ideas. Of all 
our ideas we may have ideas, and the latter are paral- 
lel with the former as ideas are parallel with things 
(see II, 20,^.). But as the idea of an idea exists in 
the same attribute with said idea, the two are onl}^ 
logically, not really, distinct — they are, in fact, identi- 
cally the same thing [see Note 67). It should follow 
that we cannot form a clear and distinct idea of a con- 
fused idea or passion. This forming a clear idea of 
a passion must then amount to substituting for the 
passion a clear idea. What does this imply ? 

Bear in mind the dual causality of the "Ethics" 
{Introductory Note, II, 15) — the hierarchy of essences 
on the one hand, and the chain of real individual 

335 



^;i6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [ParT V 

existences, the order of nature, on the other. Every- 
thing in nature must have its cause in the real world 
of individual things (I, 28), as well as its cause in the 
world of essences (I, 25). As will be remembered, 
Spinoza has indicated no way of bringing together 
these two kinds of causes. 

Now, we are the adequate cause of an emotion, or, 
in other words, are active or free (see III, de/s. 1, 2, 
and 3, andY, Pre/.), in so far as the emotion is wholly 
due to our nature or essence. This means [see Intro- 
ductory Note, I, 4) that the emotion which is a link in 
the series of finite real existences, is logically deduced 
from our essence. Such a descent from the essence 
to the individual Spinoza has declared to be impossi- 
ble ^^Introductory Hote, II, 7). He attempts, as I have 
said before, to bridge the gulf which separates essence 
from existence by using the word essence in a double 
sense. 

Again, ideas which are adequate (clear and distinct) 
in us are those which are logically deduced from some 
attribute of God ; they come to us by filtering through 
the series of essences (see my note " On the Mind and 
its Knowledge"). When, therefore, we form a clear 
idea of a passion, we are really not forming an idea 
of a passion at all ; we are substituting for an idea 
which must be accounted for by a reference to the 
order of nature one which is derived from the world 
of essences. How such an idea can be brought into 
the system of real things and become a part of nature 
without breaking the nexus of natural causes Spinoza 
nowhere indicates. This is the old difficulty of the 
dual causality. 

106. (prop. 4) Seethe references in the text and my 
notes corresponding. 



Prop. 7] CRITICAL NOTES. 337 

That which is common to all things is the attribute 
of which they are modes. Of this attribute we have 
an adequate idea. But even if we admit this it does 
not follow that there is no modification of the body of 
which we cannot form a clear and distinct (an ade- 
quate) conception, as is inferred in the proof ; nor does 
it follow that there is no emotion of which we cannot 
form a clear and distinct conceotion, as is inferred in 
the corollary. I do not clearly conceive a chair in 
clearly conceiving extension, nor a given passion in 
clearly conceiving thought. To clearly conceive any 
mode, to have, that is, an adequate idea of it, I must 
deduce it from its attribute along the series of "fixed 
and eternal things." See the two notes immediately 
preceding. 

107. (prop. 6) One may accept as a psychological 
fact the influence upon the emotions of a recognition 
of things as necessary or as natural, and may even 
say that this gives the mind a greater power over the 
emotions, without at all accepting Spinoza's interpre- 
tation of this phrase. 

108. (prop. 7) Spinoza's reasoning is as follows: An 
emotion is stronger when we conceive of its cause as 
present. An emotion that springs from reason always 
has a present cause, for reason arrives at every mode 
by a deduction from an attribute of God, and this 
must be present in everything. Hence an emotion 
that springs from reason is always powerful and can 
overcome others. 

It is evident that the words " emotions which arise 
out of, or are produced by reason," must not be 
understood in their ordinary sense. They are used 
in a technical sense, so to speak, and have reference 
to the deduction of ideas from the idea of God, the 



338 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

descent along the series of essences {Introductory 
Note, II, 14 and 15). 

109. (prop. 10) Again the struggle between the two 
kinds of causes. When we are not harassed by emo- 
tions contrary to our nature, the essence of the mind 
is free to act and to deduce the modifications of the 
body from the attribute of extension, or, in other 
words, to arrange them " according to the intellectual 
order." This formation of clear and distinct ideas I 
have discussed in Note 105. 

no. (prop. 10, schol.) Spinoza's maxims are excel- 
lent, but the*reader should notice that all this has noth- 
ing to do with the arrangement and concatenation of 
the modifications of the body according to the intel- 
lectual order {see the preceding note). Spinoza had 
much the same notion of what is reasonable as any 
other sensible man. His ethical teachings are highly 
valuable, but they are loosely connected with his 
metaphysic. One might subscribe to the greater part 
of what he says on the conduct of life and the order- 
ing of the emotions in obedience to reason, and yet 
repudiate his world of essences altogether. I think 
he himself was misled by the double sense of the 
expression, " emotions which arise out of, or are pro- 
duced by reason " [see Note 108). His philosophy 
demands that the words be taken in one sense, and 
his ethical maxims take them in another. 

111. (prop. 12) See Notes 106 and 108. 

112. (prop. 14) See Note 106. Again the attempt 
to carry back existing things to the idea of God. As 
I have so often had occasion to say, Spinoza no- 
where attempts this deduction {see Introductory Note, 
II, 14 and 15). 

113. (prop. 15) The student must not forget that 



Prop. iS] CRITICAL NOTES. 339 

Spinoza does not use words in their ordinary senses. 
He sometimes slips into the ordinary sense, as we have 
seen in what precedes, but when he does so his rea- 
soning suffers. The word God, for example, should 
have, to the consistent Spinozist (if, indeed, there can 
be a consistent Spinozist) a very peculiar. connotation. 
God is the highest universal, that which is present in 
all \X\\\\^?> {^Introductory Note,W, 14); and love toward 
God is the pleasure which arises in the mental exer- 
cise of deducing the concrete (the individual thing) 
from the abstract (the attribute). This is, of course, 
something very different from what is commonly 
meant by love toward God. 

114. (prop. 17) As the reader will see on looking up 
Spinoza's references, II, 32, and II, def. 4, have little 
connection. The reasoning of this proposition is as 
follows : one is subject to a passion when he is acted 
upon from without, /. e., when what takes place in 
him cannot be deduced wholly from his essence or 
nature. In other words, he is passive in so far as he 
has inadequate ideas. God cannot have inadequate 
(fragmentary) ideas, for all that exists comes from him. 
Hence he is without passions. Again, God cannot 
be affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, for 
he belongs to the world of essences (I, 20), and these 
emotions imply change. See, below, the note to 18, 
schol. 

115. (prop. 18) Comprehending God as the cause of 
pain means deducing the pain, along the series of 
" fixed and eternal things," from the idea of God. I 
have discussed in Note 105 what it means to form a 
clear idea of (comprehend the causes of) a passion. 

If we make pain something positive, and place it as 
an element in the system of real things, there is no 



34° THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

escape from referring it to God as its cause, since 
everything must be referred to him. But Spinoza 
treats it somewhat as we might treat the notion " in 
part," in saying we know such and such a thing " in 
part," but God cannot know it in part, nor could we, 
if our knowledge were more perfect. 
ii6. (prop. 19) See Note 113. 

117. (prop. 20, schol.) In this scholium Spinoza 
makes a transition to the puzzling question of the 
mind's immortality. The reader will notice that the 
opening and closing sentences of the scholium do not 
admit of a ready adjustment to the doctrine of parallel- 
ism he has developed in Part II. It is here hinted, 
and later plainly taught, that the mind may continue 
to exist when the body is destroyed. See the follow- 
ing notes. 

118. (prop. 21) See the references in the text and 
my notes corresponding. Spinoza follows the Aristo- 
telian tradition in making memory and imagination 
dependent upon the existence of the body, and rea- 
son independent and imperishable. See Ueberweg's 
"■ History of Philosophy," vol. i, § 49. 

119. (prop. 22) Once more the dual causality [see 
Introductory Note, II, 15). The essence of the human 
body, like all other essences, belongs to the series of 
" fixed and eternal things," and its idea comes by 
logical deduction from the idea of God. One should 
note that Spinoza brings together, by the use of an 
insidious phrase, this essence and the individual 
existing thing, a body. He talks of the essence of this 
or that human body, just as he does of \S\q. existence 
of this or that human body. This makes of the es- 
sence, no longer a universal, but a component part of 
an individual ; it has become " an occurrence " of 



Prop. 23] critical notes. 341 

the essential qualities, not those qualities abstractly 
considered. It is, then, no longer a true essence, a 
something common to a class of things. In my Intro- 
ductory Note (II, 9) I have warned the reader of the 
danger of giving to universals a local habitation in an 
individual, of making them concrete. In so doing 
we bring our universal into the system of real exist- 
ences, but when there it is no longer a universal. The 
whole of an individual existent human body is indi- 
vidual and real — no part of it can be singled out 
from the rest and be dubbed its essence. It takes a 
class of things to have an essence, and when we con- 
sider but one single thing, the notion of essence dis- 
appears. One man cannot walk in single file. The 
reader will notice in what follows that Spinoza does 
make the essence a part of the individual mind, and 
grants to that part immortality while denying it to 
the rest. This conversion of the abstract into the 
concrete was forced upon him, for he had to make 
contact somewhere between the world of essences and 
the world of real things. 

120. (prop. 23) Spinoza's doctrine of immortality is 
perhaps the most disputed point in his system. Some 
have believed that he teaches a doctrine of personal 
immortality, as it is commonly understood ; others 
have supposed him to mean by immortality only a 
state of intellectual clarity, and in no sense a con- 
tinuance of mental life after the death of the body ; 
still others have supposed that he did not clearly 
understand his own meaning, and that his utterances 
are, in consequence, inconsistent with each other ; 
and some have gone so far as to accuse him of 
a deliberate intention to conceal his true thought. 
The charge of disingenuousness may be dismissed, 



342 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

for, though Spuioza often uses words in a sense widely 
different from that in which they are generally ac- 
cepted, he is sufficiently frank in the rest of his book, 
and does not hesitate to oppose commonly received 
opinions. 

The student who has followed thus far my criti- 
cisms of Spinoza's reasonings should be able to see, 
I think, where the difficulty lies. Bear in mind our 
author's division of things into the world of essences 
and the world of real existences {Introductory Note, 
II, 15). All essences are eternal. The human 
mind, which is composed of ideas, contains some 
adequate and some inadequate ideas. All its ade- 
quate ideas come to it along the chain of essences, 
and themselves belong to the world of essences, thus 
participating in the eternity of essences. The part of 
the human mind composed of adequate ideas is thus 
eternal, and cannot perish. It is obtained by logical 
deduction from the idea of God, and is, so to speak, 
eternally contained in that idea. 

So much for Spinoza's argument. It is clear that 
it is open to criticism. In the first place, adequate 
ideas are referred to the world of essences, and yet 
made a part of an actually existing individual thing, 
the human mind. I have criticised this in the pre^ 
ceding proposition. In the second place, the paral- 
lelism of mind and body is violated, for it is plainly 
indicated that the whole of the body may be 
destroyed, while a part of the mind continues to 
exist. The doctrine of parallelism would demand that 
a part of the body continue to exist, too — as much of 
it as can properly be called " essence." In the third 
place, the eternity attributed to the indestructible 
part of the mind cannot, it is claimed, be defined in 



Prop. 24] critical notes. 343 

terms of time, and cannot have any relation to time, 
and yet Spinoza spealcs of this something as remain- 
ing after the destruction of the body, and it is indi- 
cated that it existed before the body. All this means 
nothing at all, if we completely abstract from the 
notion of time. The reader will notice that, in the 
propositions to follow, Spinoza has a very hard time, 
indeed, with his timeless eternity. It absolutely 
refuses to stay timeless ; and we can scarcely con- 
demn it, for we may set down its efforts to gain time 
as the conatus or impulse to persevere in its thinkable 
being, a life-and-death struggle to mean something. 
As there still exist philosophers who believe that the 
words "timeless eternity " are not without significance 
to them, I shall point out in the following notes 
Spinoza's inconsistency, even at the risk of being 
a little tiresome. {On the eternity of essences, see In- 
troductory Note, II, 16.) 

There is one point in the scholium which may seem 
obscure, the mind's feeling of its own immortality. 
We may understand this in two ways : Spinoza may 
have meant that we are as conscious of the presence 
in our mind of adequate ideas (abstractions, concepts, 
essences) as of inadequate (sense-perceptions), and 
hence may know clearly that we are immortal ; or he 
may have appealed to the " feeling of immortality " 
as it exists in many persons, the instinctive belief in 
a future life. Perhaps his words may be interpreted 
in both ways. 

121. (prop. 24) I have shown in the Introductory 
Note (II, 8) that Spinoza sometimes makes God the 
universal obtained by abstracting from the differences 
of things, and sometimes makes him the sum total of 
things. If we nieari by the word God the sum total 



344 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

of things, then, of course, it follows that the better we 
comprehend particular things the better we compre- 
hend God ; if, on the other hand, we mean simply 
and strictly the highest universal, this does not follow. 
I have also shown, however, that Spinoza does not 
keep his universals strictly universal, but makes them 
in some sense concrete. He conceives of God as the 
source from which all things flow, from which they 
derive both their existence and their essence. Now, 
if it belongs to God's essence or nature to unfold into 
a system of things, and if our comprehension of things 
consists in seeing them flow from God (or as logically 
contained in God), we may say that in comprehending 
things we are comprehending God. This derivation 
of the ideas of things from the idea of God I have 
discussed at length in the Introductory Note. 

122. (prop. 25) I have discussed the kinds of knowl- 
edge in Note 83. The virtue of the mind Spinoza 
regards as identical with its power. As it is its nature 
to know, and as it cannot do anything else, its virtue 
is proportional to its knowledge. But the mind is 
active (/. e., really knows things completely) in so far 

* as it has adequate ideas (/. e., ideas which can be 
deduced along the series of essences from the idea of 
God). Hence its highest endeavor is to know things 
by the third kind of knowledge, that is, to know them 
by such a deduction from the idea of God. 

123. (prop. 28) I do not think that there is really 
any difference between the second and third kinds of 
knowledge {see Note 83). Spinoza's reasoning in this 
proposition may seem a little obscure, but it becomes 
clear when one remembers that he makes desire the 
very essence of a man, regarded as a cause, and that 
he has held that adequate ideas can only spring from 



Prop. 29] CRITICAL NOTES. 345 

adequate ideas. Hence the desire to know things by 
the third kind of knowledge {t. e., the cause of such 
a knowledge of things) must itself consist of adequate 
ideas, and must spring from adequate ideas. 

124. (prop. 29) The reasoning here is loose, and the 
student will find it difficult to obtain Spinoza's con- 
clusion from the references given in the text. I 
think the argument he means to present is about as 
follows : The mind is the idea of the body, and its 
knowledge of the body and of other real things is 
based upon the ideas it has of the modifications of 
the body. It can only have ideas of such modifica- 
tions, and, hence, can only know the body and other 
existing things, as long as the body exists. In other 
words, it can only know real existing things, things 
which " endure," as long as the body exists, and 
through its ideas of the modifications of the body. 
It can, thus, only have such knowledge as long as it 
conceives the present existence of its body. But 
there are some things that the mind knows under the 
form of eternity. It has, in other words, some ade- 
quate ideas, and the part of it composed of adequate 
ideas is eternal. But the part of the mind which is 
eternal is the essence of the mind, the part which cor- 
responds in the world of thought to the essence of 
the body in the world of extension. Hence the mind 
can only conceive things under the form of eternity 
in so far as it is itself eternal, or in so far as it repre- 
sents the eternal essence of the body. We may say, 
then, that it can only conceive things under the form 
of eternity in so far as it conceives the essence of the 
body under the form of eternity. 

See my note " On the Mind and its Knowledge," 
appended to the notes to Part II. It will be noticed 



346 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

that Spinoza's argument given above rests on the doc- 
trine of parallelism. We have on the one hand the 
correspondence between knowledge of individual real 
things, things that " endure," and real things, and on 
the other that between essence of mind (adequate 
ideas) and essence of body. It will be evident to a 
reader of the note referred to just above that Spinoza 
reasons loosely. 

125. (prop. 30) The mind, that is, knows itself as 
deduced along the series of essences from the idea of 
God. {See Note 121). 

126. (prop. 31) The argument here is that the mind 
in so far as it is eternal, or in so far as it belongs to 
the series of " fixed and eternal things," has a knowl- 
edge of God (for the idea of God is, as immanent 
cause, involved in every essence). Hence, having 
the idea of God, it may have an adequate knowledge 
of all that is involved in this idea — which ought to 
mean a knowledge of everything. But when Spinoza 
makes the mind the adequate cause of this knowledge 
he reasons badly, for the mind's essence is only one 
of many essences which have been obtained by deduc- 
tion from the idea of God, and the mind ought to be 
regarded as the formal cause (on making essences 
causes, see Introductory Note, II, 10) only of ideas 
which follow from it, and not of those which follow 
from other essences, in the line of descent toward 
individuals. If it be argued that the mind may know 
all things by such a deduction on the ground that it 
contains the idea of God, from which all are to be 
derived, one may answer that Spinoza has held that 
every idea, without exception, involves the idea of 
God (II, 46). Hence a mind consisting of any ideas 
whatever might be regarded as the adequate cause of 



Prop. 33] CRITICAL NOTES. 347 

all that can be deduced from the idea of God, and 
not merely a mind regarded as an essence, or as 
eternal. 

In the scholium it is maintained that the more ade- 
quate ideas the mind possesses the better its knowl- 
edge of itself and of God. What I have said just 
above shows that this is not reasonable. The pos- 
session of any idea ought to give one an adequate 
(perfect) knowledge of God, and, hence, of one's self 
and everything else. 

Note the temporal flavor given to eternity in the 
scholium. 

127. (prop. 32, cor.) Do not confound this intel- 
lectual love of God with love of God in the ordinary 
sense of the words. It is nothing more nor less than 
the pleasure arising from intellectual activity. He 
who deduces individual extended things from the 
attribute of extension, or individual ideas from the 
attribute thought, and feels pleasure therein, is en- 
gaged in loving God. The words are highly mis- 
leading, and must be taken in the strict technical sense 
given them by Spinoza. 

128. (prop. 33) Spinoza's two orders of being, exist- 
ences and essences, here entangle him in desperate 
difficulties. The third kind of knowledge is declared 
to be eternal. This means that it never began to be ; 
and it follows that the love which springs from it 
never began to be. But how then can the mind 
*' endeavor " to know things by this kind of knowl- 
edge [props. 25 and 28) ? Must it not, while endeavor- 
ing to gain such knowledge, be without it ? And may 
not the amount of such knowledge in any given mind 
progressively increase (38, and 7,9 and schol.) ? 

The difificulty lies in this : Spinoza has conceived 



348 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [PART V 

of the world of essences as eternally contained in God ; 
rhey do not flow from him by a historical process, but 
exist in him and are related to him as the conclusion 
in a syllogism is related to the premises. Now the 
mind, or the idea of the body, is an existent thing, 
and belongs to the world of existences. Things in 
this world are perishable, and not eternal. The prob- 
lem is to transfer a part of the mind, as it were, to 
this other world in which things are eternal ; to turn 
a greater or less portion of it into an essence. Spinoza 
does not succeed any better here than he does in his 
earlier attempts to make contact between the two 
worlds. 

Note, again, the temporal flavor of the eternity in 
the scholium : " The mind has eternally had these 
same perfections that we have just conceived of as 
added to it," etc. I may remark in passing that if 
the mind has always had these perfections, why has 
it endeavored to obtain them ; and why should it 
endeavor to obtain any more, for it must already have 
those it desires to obtain, if it ever can have them, 
since they are eternal and cannot begin to be. As 
the reader must see, in talking of a timeless eternity 
one is simply playing with words. " Has had " and 
*' will have " mean nothing if we abstract all idea of 
time. 

129. (prop. 34) Again the notion of time is intro- 
duced. It is implied that, although the imagination 
cannot remain after death, another part of the mind 
can {see prop. 23). 

130. (prop. 36) The thesis of this proposition re- 
minds one of the constant tautological references to 
God in Part II. God, *' in so far as he can be ex- 
pressed by the essence of the human mind," is nothing 



Prop. 36] ' CRITICAL NOTES. 349 

else than the essence of the human mind, /. e., its 
eternal part. Hence, of course, it is mere tautology 
to say that the mind's love toward God is God's love 
of himself. Compare with this the scholium to prop. 
40. On the nature of this love, see Note 127. 

The corollary appears to contradict what is said 
in the corollary to prop. 17. In the latter, how- 
ever, Spinoza is speaking of love as a passion, a love 
accompanied by pleasure. Here he is speaking of a 
love which is a pure activity, and " blessedness " has 
taken the place of the pleasure. 

The distinction made in the scholium between the 
second and third kinds of knowledge is not in har- 
mony with what I have said in Note 83 about the kinds 
of knowledge. I there said that there was really no 
difference between knowledge of the second and third 
kinds. It does not appear to me that it is consistent 
with Spinoza's doctrine to make such a distinction. 
Knowledge, is adequate when it can be wholly 
accounted for without going beyond the limits of the 
mind itself, that is, when it carries within itself its 
own explanation — can be deduced from the attribute 
which it "involves." But knowledge thus deduced 
from an attribute is of the third kind. Whether the 
deduction stops somewhere in the series of essences 
before it reaches concrete individuals does not affect 
the question (see the definition of knowledge of the 
third kind in II, 40, schol. 2). In this scholium 
Spinoza appears to mean, by knowledge of the second 
kind, knowledge which passes from the idea of God 
to some essence not at the bottom of the series, and 
by knowledge of the third kind, knowledge which 
goes all the way to the bottom. This would make 
the two kinds of knowledoe differ, not in their start- 



350 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

ing point (the idea of an attribute) but in the point 
where they end. The reader will notice that this 
does not adjust itself to the illustration of the three 
numbers (II, 40, schol. 2), for there the three kinds of 
knowledge are made to end with the same fact, the 
difference between them being that they start from 
different premises. That knowledge of the second 
kind should start from the idea of an attribute seems 
plain from II, 37, 38, 45, 46, and 47, That it should 
end where knowledge of the third kind ends may be 
inferred from the illustration of the three numbers. 
It cannot, then, be consistently distinguished from 
knowledge of the third kind. 

131. (prop. 37) Spinoza's reasoning here is as 
follows: the essence of the mind, regarded as an 
eternal truth, is deduced from the nature of God. 
That is, its relation to the nature of God is similar 
to that of the truth that the three angles of a triangle 
equal two right angles to the nature of the triangle. 
If, then, the essence of the mind were destroyed, an 
eternal truth would not be an eternal truth. As the 
intellectual love arises out of this relation of the mind's 
essence to God, it, too, must be eternal and indestruc- 
tible. Note the reference to time in this use of the 
word "destroy." The plain implication is that what 
cannot be destroyed will continue to exist. 

132. (prop. 38) The reader will notice, on looking 
up II, 1 1, that the essence of the mind, as there treated, 
is an actually existing thing, a something belonging 
to the world of real existences, not to the world of 
essences. In making a part of it continue to exist 
when the rest has been destroyed, Spinoza has trans- 
ferred it from the one world to the other (se^ Notes 119 
and 120). 



Prop. 40] critical notes. 351 

Note, again, the temporal flavor of Spinoza's eter- 
nity : a part of the mind will perish, but the eternal 
part will "remain." 

133- (prop. 39) In this proposition and scholium 
it comes out clearly that in passing from bondage to 
freedom, from the state of perishable beings to that of 
immortal and imperishable, we are converting ideas 
of memory or imagination into ideas of the reason. 
We are, in other words, transferring ideas from the 
world of real existences to that of essences {see the 
precedijig note'). I should like the reader, after finish- 
ing this Part of the " Ethics," to peruse once more the 
second part of my Introductory Note. It is really 
important to have clearly in mind what is meant by 
the world of essences, if one is to comprehend Spi- 
noza's difficulties with his two orders of being. He 
quite cuts them off from one another, and then allows 
the gulf between them to be filled up by essences that 
become individual things (or parts of individual things), 
and by individual things which become essences 
(modifications of the body which come to be referred 
to the idea of God). 

134. (prop. 40) The argument of the proof hinges, 
I think, on the statement in the scholium to III, 3, 
to the effect that passions or passive states cannot 
be attributed to the mind except in so far as it con- 
tains something that involves negation. Thus it 
seems to follow that the more perfect a thing is the 
less passive it is, for perfection is identical with reality, 
and reality is the opposite of negation. The corollary 
infers from this that the part of the mind which abides 
(the essence or reason) is more perfect than the part 
which perishes (the imagination). 

All this reasoning rests upon Spinoza's distinction 



352 THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA. [Part V 

between the world of existences and the world of 
essences. An existing thing is a part of nature and 
cannot be explained without a reference to other parts; 
in other words, does not carry its explanation (cause) 
within itself. It is then incomplete, it lacks being, or 
involves negation. Essences are complete in them- 
selves, and do not thus lack being. But it should be 
remarked that, as has been pointed out, Spinoza 
has already incorporated his essences in the system of 
nature. The part of the mind which abides is a part 
of the mind, that is, a part of a real existent thing, a 
part of nature, and hence should need explanation in 
just the same way as other real things in nature. It 
should then involve negation, or lack perfection, as 
much as the part of the mind which perishes. I may 
further mention that one may take exception to Spi- 
noza's statement that things regarded as a part of 
nature involve negation, and hence lack perfection. 

Note, again, the time-content given in the corollary 
to the idea of eternity. A part of the mind " per- 
ishes," and a part of it " abides." Note, also, that in 
the scholium Spinoza has come back from the idea of 
God as the highest universal, to the idea of him as 
a sum total made up of parts {see lutrodudoj'y Note, 
II, 8). The opening sentence of the scholium shows 
how Spinoza has forgotten the parallelism of mind 
and body. 

135- (prop. 41) See Notes 102 and 103. Piety and 
religion and the rest should be taken in the strict 
Spinozistic sense. We have seen what love of God 
means to the consistent Spinozist. [Note 113.) We 
have seen also that virtue means simply power, and 
that it is the sole duty of man to consult his own 
interests (IV, def. 8, and app. VIII). Now, as the 



Prop. 42] CRITICAL NOTES. 353 

mind is capable of no activity or perfection save 
knowledge, and as it passes to a greater perfection, 
and hence experiences pleasure, only in knowing, it 
must regard as of the highest importance increase of 
knowledge, and that whether this knowledge is to 
" abide " or not. In Part V of the " Ethics " we dis- 
cover that it is to abide. 

I do not, of course, mean to say that the words 
piety, religion, and virtue did not mean more to 
Spinoza than his philosophy would permit them to 
mean. They did mean more to him, I am sure ; but, 
in so far as they did mean more, he was not a good 
Spinozist. 

136. (prop. 42) The only point that can cause diffi- 
culty here is the somewhat inconsistent treatment of 
love toward God, or blessedness. This is said to 
spring from knowledge, and is thus treated as some- 
thing distinct from the knowledge. It is then identi- 
fied with virtue, or knowledge. 

Note, again, Spinoza's treatment of eternity in the 
scholium : the wise man " never ceases to be, but is 
always possessed of true satisfaction of soul." Sub- 
tract from this sentence all idea of time, and see what 
is left. 



INDEX. 



Active, wlien we may be said 
to be, 135 ; mind, in having 
adequate ideas is, 136. 

Ambition, 151. 

Anger, 151. 

Attribute, defined, 25. See 
Substance. 

Automatism, 137 ff. 

Avarice, 151. 

Aversion, 148. 

Beauty, relativity of, 70. 

Benevolence, 151. 

Blessedness, defined, 160 ; not 
the reward of virtue, but vir- 
tue itself, 207. 

Body, defined, 74 ; relation to 
mind, 87 ff. and 137 ff. ; com- 
position and identity of in- 
dividual bodies, 88 ff. 

Boldness, 151. 

Bondage, 153. 

Cause, of itself, defined, 25 ; 

when adequate, 135. 
Certainty, 124 ff. 
Commiseration, 149. 
Common Notions, their nature 

and origin, 112 ff. 
Confidence, 149. 
Consternation, 151. 
Contempt, 148. 
Contingent, why things are so 

called, 59; definition of , 157. 
Contrary Emotions, 158 
Cowardice, 151. 
Cruelty, 151. 

Death, not feared by a mind 
endowed with clear jvoowl- 

edge, 203. 



Derision, 149. 

Descartes, on the emotions, 133; 

on the seat of the soul, 172. 
Design. See Final Causes . 
Desire, 145, 148. 
Despair, 149. 
Devotion, 149. 
Disappointment, 149. 
Drunkenness, 151. 
Duration, 75. See Titne. 

Emotion, defined, 135 ; defini- 
tions of individual emotions, 
148-15 1 ; general definition 
of the emotions, 152 ; emo- 
tions produced by reason the 
most powerful, 180 ; how to 
control the emotions, 183 ff. 

Emulation, 150. 

End, of need, 68 ; of assimila- 
tion, 68 ; God does not act 
with a view to, 64 ff.; de- 
finition of, 159. 

Envy, 150. 

Error. See Falsity. 

Essence, definition of, 74 ; 
what is common to all things 
the essence of no individual 
thing, 109. 

Eternity, defined, 26 ; form of, 
119, 193 ff. ; of the mind, 
193 ff. 

Evil, relative, 156 ; definition 
of, 156. 

Falsity, nothing positive, 108 ; 
definition of, 108 ; does not 
involve certainty, 124. 

Fear, 149. 

Final Causes, origin of the be- 
lief in, 64 ff. 



m 



356 



INDEX. 



Form, of eternity, iig, 193 ff. 
Free, a thing free when, 26 ; 

why men think themselves 

free, 65. 

Glorying, 150. 

God, or substance, defined, 25; 
consists of infinite attributes, 
34 ; necessarily exists, 34 ff. ; 
the efficient cause of all 
things, 44 ; acts solely from 
the necessity of his nature, 
44 ; an immanent cause, 48 ; 
is eternal, 48 ; does not act 
from the freedom of his will, 
58 ; could not have produced 
things in any other way than 
they have been produced, 59 
ff. ; his perfection an argu- 
ment against the freedom of 
his will, 60 ; his power itself 
his essence, 63 ; is a thinking 
thing, 76 ; is an extended 
thing, 76 ; has necessarily an 
idea of his own essence, and 
of all those things which fol- 
low from it, 76 ; the idea of 
God, but one, 78 ; he is the 
cause of the modes in any 
attribute only in so far as he 
is considered under that at- 
tribute, 79 ; has a knowledge 
of the human mind, loo ; is 
without passions, 188 ; can- 
not be hated, 188 ; loves him- 
self with an infinite love, 200. 

Good, origin of the notion, 70, 
156 ; defined, 157 ; what 
things good, 162 ; super- 
stition regards pain as good, 
i6g. 

Gratitude, 150. 

Hate, 148. 
Hope, 149. 
Humility, 150. 

Idea, defined, 74 ; when ade- 
quate, 75 ; their order and 
connection the same' as the 



order and connection of 
things, 79 ; the idea of the 
mind united to the mind as 
the mind is united to the 
body, 100 ; all ideas true in 
so far as referred to God, 

107 ; they contain no posi- 
tive element of falsity, 108 ; 
ideas, when adequate, true, 

108 ; the idea of what is 
common to the human body 
and external bodies adequate, 
no; ideas that follow from 
adequate ideas themselves 
adequate, in. 

Imagination, 95 ff. 
Immortality, 193 ff. 
Impossible, a thing, when, 59. 
Inclination, 148. 
Indignation, 149. 
Individual things, defined, 75. 
Infinite, the, 39-43. 

Joy, 149. 

Knowledge, of the first, second, 
and third kinds, 114, 115 ; 
that of the first kind, the sole 
cause of falsity, 115 ; that of 
the second and third kinds 
true, 115 ; the only true end 
of man, 160 ; man's highest 
endeavor to know things by 
knowledge of the third kind, 
194; from this kind of knowl- 
edge springs the intellectual 
love of God, 199. See Mind. 

Longing, 150. 

I.ove, defined, 148 ; toward 

God, 187 ff. 
Lust, 151. 
Luxury, 151. 

Marriage, 165. 

Memory, 98. 

Mind, what constitutes the 
being of the, 85 ; perceives 
what takes place in the body 
corresponding to it, 86 | its 



INDEX. 



357 



union with the body, 87 ff. ; 
has more perceptions as the 
body is capable of more 
changes, 94 ; the idea which 
constitutes its essence not 
simple, 94 ; knows the body 
only through the ideas of the 
modifications of the body, 
99 ; only knows itself in so 
far as it perceives the ideas 
of the modifications of the 
body, loi ; does not have an 
adequate knowledge of the 
parts that compose the human 
iDody, 102 ; perceives ex- 
ternal bodies only through 
the ideas of the modifications 
of its own body, 103 ; has a 
very inadequate knowledge 
of the duration of the body, 

106 ; or of external things, 

107 ; has an adequate knowl- 
edge of the essence of God, 
121 ; cannot act upon the 
body, 137 ; strives to perse- 
vere in its being, 145. 

Mode, defined, 25 ; infinite 
modes, 53-55 ; all modes 
necessarily determined to ex- 
istence and action by God, 
53 ff.; parallelism of, in dif- 
ferent attributes, 78 ff., 137, 

175- 
Modesty, 151. 

Necessary, a thing necessary 
or coerced when, 26, 53; the 
will a necessary cause, 57. 

Natura Naturans, 56. 

Natura Naturata, 56. 

Order, relativity of the notion, 

Overestimation, 149. 

Pain, 148. 

Parallelism of modes. See 

Mode. 
Passion, ceases to be such when 

clearly conceived, 176. 



Passive, when we may be said 
to be, 135. 

Perfection, origin and signifi- 
cance of the term, 153 ff.; 
identical with reality, 75, 157. 

Pineal gland, as seat of the 
soul, 172-175. 

Pleasure, 148. 

Possible, individual things 
when, 158. 

Power, identical with virtue, 

159- 
Pride, 150. 

Reality, the same as perfection, 

75, 157. 

Reason, regards things not as 
contingent but as necessary, 
117 ; perceives things under 
the form of eternity, lig. 

Repentance, 150. 

Revenge, 151. 

Self-abasement, 150. 

Self-preservation, the highest 
law of nature, 161. 

Self-satisfaction, 150. 

Shame, 150. 

Social intercourse, its utility, 
162 ff. 

Substance, defined, 25 ; can- 
not be produced by anything 
else, 29 ; existence belongs 
to its nature, 29 ; necessarily 
infinite, 29 ; consists of in- 
finite attributes, 34 ; neces- 
sarily exists, 34 ff. ; is indi- 
visible, 37 ff. ; God the only 
substance, 38 ff. ; does not 
constitute the essence of 
man, S3. 

Sympathy, 150. 

Time, can be conceived by the 
mind only while the body 
endures, 192-194. 

Timidity, 151. 

Truth, its own norm, 115-117. 

Underestimation, 150. 



358 



Understanding, must compre- 
hend the attributes and 
modifications of God and 
nothing else, 56 ; must be 
referred to nahira naturata 
and not to natura natuj-ans, 
57 ; is nothing but particular 
ideas, 124. 

Universals, their origin, 112 ff. 

Virtue, the same as power, 159. 



Will, not a free but a necessary 
cause, 57 ; God does not act 
from the freedom of his, 
58 ; determined to each vo- 
lition, 122 ; volitions nothing 
but ideas, 123 ; the faculty 
of will nothing but partic- 
ular volitions, 124 ; will and 
understanding the same, 
124 ff. 

Wonder, 148. 



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